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ABSTRACT 
Heather Blakey 
A Sovereign People? Lessons from Participatory Budgeting Experiences in the 
UK 
A study of egalitarian and elitist democratic narratives animating the practice of 
citizenship, and their role in determining appropriate responses to the UK 
democratic deficit. 
Key words: Participatory budgeting; UK local governance; democratic deficit; 
sovereignty; participatory democracy; political participation. 
This study explores the UK ‘democratic deficit’ through the question of citizen 
democratic appetite, taking the varying degrees of citizen mobilisation in 
different contexts as a point of departure. The ongoing struggles between 
(broadly) elitist and egalitarian democratic narratives provide an analytical 
framework. These narratives’ underlying values and principles are illustrated 
through the US constitutional debates. Through this lens, the UK democratic 
deficit can be understood (at least partially), not as a failure of the system but as 
a measure of its success in containing citizen participation. The Porto Alegrean 
participatory budgeting experience provides a contrasting example of the 
egalitarian tradition which has inspired similar innovations around the world (in 
some cases, precisely in hopes of reinvigorating Western democracies). This 
study presents evidence from two such UK cases (gathered through participant 
observation and in-depth interviews). Newcastle’s U-Decide programme and 
Bradford’s ‘Decision Day’ both represent an encounter between the two 
narratives, and enable the values and assumptions held by citizens, elected 
representatives and state officials to be explored. In sum, they offer a 
compelling case that citizen engagement is stimulated by a more egalitarian 
democratic experience. However, such experiments are also shown to reflect 
deeply embedded ‘representative habits of mind’, which are revealed by a direct 
challenge to the democratic status quo. The study emphasises the value of a 
‘citizen-eye’ perspective which focuses on democratic experience over 
outcomes, and the need for ‘democratic activists’ as well as active democrats, 
in order to create and defend the ideological space for democratic alternatives.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION  
‘When participation meets the expectations of today’s citizens, they will 
get involved.’ 
(Power Inquiry, 2006:96) 
 
This study is an enquiry into democratic appetite, the question of how and why 
we learn to want to be democratically active. The impetus stems from a 
profound sense of democratic failure in the UK, a sense not only that the 
system we call democracy falls far short of that ideal but that we, citizens of a 
country which has been proud to call itself a democracy, indeed, to refer to our 
legislative system as the ‘mother of parliaments’, are not ourselves active 
democrats. As an activist and as a democrat, I see a lot that needs doing, and I 
see many people who care – but I also see political movements for justice or 
social transformation struggling to inspire action for change. I see unjust and 
often undemocratic laws pass which don’t appear to have a mandate – yet they 
pass, not because we want them, it seems, but because not enough of us stand 
up for an alternative. Too often, we do not enact the sovereignty of a democratic 
people governing ourselves. This has been called apathy, and yet throughout 
our own history and across the world there are countless examples of people 
taking control, fighting for democracy, for the right to self-determination, so 
together they can build the society they want to live in. Why not here? 
The question arises, how do citizens acquire that appetite for democracy, that 
belief in democracy – and, crucially, that belief in ourselves as democrats, a 
belief not only that democracy is worth fighting for, but that we are ‘the people’ 
who must fight for it? 
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 Image widely available on the internet; source unknown. 
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The disengagement I am describing is generally known as the ‘democratic 
deficit’, being associated with a decline in voter turnout and loss of trust and 
interest in formal political institutions. Recognised as a phenomenon across the 
established Western democracies, it is understood to threaten their legitimacy 
(Norris, 2011; Pharr & Putnam, 2000). Explanations divide into ‘demand-side’ 
and ‘supply-side’ theories, the former focusing on a loss of civic interest on the 
part of citizens (most influentially, Putnam, 2000), while the latter highlight 
systemic deficiencies within the democratic state (for example, Hay, 2007). 
Where ‘demand-side’ accounts have been critiqued as tending towards 
tautology (for example, explaining disengagement by describing it, op.cit.:40), 
‘supply-side’ approaches explore problems with the existing system (including 
extra-systemic social forces, most particularly global capitalism, see for 
example Crouch, 2004; Dryzek, 1996) and consider alternative – potentially 
more engaging – visions of democracy, along with possible strategies for 
achieving them (e.g. Smith, 2009; Fung & Wright, 2003; Barber, 1984). 
However, while arguably a more fruitful approach, this at times generates a 
focus on how we challenge imposed limits – which can presume the existing 
energy to do so (see for example, Coelho & von Lieres, 2010; Dryzek, 1996).  
However, some theorists have noted the connections between ‘supply’ and 
‘demand’ factors, in the sense that the system itself shapes citizen behaviour 
(notably, Eliasoph, 1998). As Carol Pateman (2012:10) puts it, ‘the capacities, 
skills and characteristics of individuals are interrelated with forms of authority 
structures’. This perspective finds a contemporary form in the ‘depoliticisation’ 
research agenda, which understands ‘anti-politics’ as a ‘societal phenomenon of 
declining interest and engagement in politics driven by neoliberal discourses, 
policies and institutions’ (Wood, 2105:2).2 In a sense, therefore, the democratic 
deficit is about how we learn to understand ourselves as democrats, about 
where both sets of actors in a state-citizen decision-making encounter agree 
that power lies. In this view, it is fundamentally about the location and 
enactment of sovereignty. Accordingly, the question of democratic appetite 
occupies a particular place in the literature. If, as these theorists suggest, it is 
the case that what we experience as democracy ‘turns us away’ from a sense of 
ourselves as democratic actors, what might turn us back? 
                                                                
2
 Fawcett & Marsh (2014:171) note, however, that there have been surprisingly few attempts to 
link this literature to work on political participation.  
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This question drew me to the idea of direct citizen involvement in the allocation 
of public funds, known as Participatory Budgeting, for two reasons. Firstly, the 
original participatory budgeting (PB) process, which between 1989 and 2004 
saw many thousands of citizens annually decide the Brazilian city of Porto 
Alegre’s entire investment budget, has gained global symbolic status as the 
‘nearest thing to a working example of participatory democracy’ (Wainwright, 
2003:30). It has spread across Latin America and more recently around the 
world, representing a tide of enthusiasm for more direct forms of engagement. 
Since 2004, this has included this country, making PB an ideal focus for an 
investigation into attitudes to and appetites for increased democracy in the UK. 
However, at the global level, PB has also been taken up by more conservative 
forces such as the World Bank (see Shah, 2007). Therefore, it is additionally of 
interest because it represents a site of struggle over conflicting values, which 
different actors with competing worldviews assign to the idea of ‘democracy’.  
This matters because controlling or shaping the definition of democracy, 
controls or shapes its operation, effectiveness and outcomes. Democracy is not 
an empty vessel or a neutral structure to be inhabited equally by different 
power-holders. How we as citizens and political actors theorise democracy 
affects how it is manifested in the world – and how it is manifested 
overwhelmingly affects how power is exercised and by whom. Thus, our 
conceptualisation of democracy is centrally pertinent to the question of who 
chooses to be democratically active, and why. 
In the sweep of democratic history, we can identify two primary orientations 
which have occupied this terrain, termed the ‘Order of Equality’ and the ‘Order 
of Egoism’ in Filippo Buonarroti’s account of the 1796 Conspiracy of the Equals, 
in which he presented equality as the fundamental goal of the French 
Revolution (Buonarroti, 1828). Porto Alegrean PB is located firmly in the 
tradition of the egalitarian narrative. Participatory democracy is closely 
associated with equality in two senses, firstly in its commitment to substantive 
equality, but (importantly) also because the idea of citizen capacity is 
foundational (see Pateman, 2012; Barber, 1984). Western representative 
democracies, on the other hand, belong to the contrasting (liberal) democratic 
narrative. The connections between this tradition of thought and capitalist social 
organisation (see Schumpeter, 1943) indicate a very different understanding of 
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and relationship to equality, as formal rather than substantive, and mandating 
an ‘expert’ political class instead of facilitating citizen decision-making. 
As an example – perhaps the modern-day example – of participatory 
democracy, Porto Alegrean PB has generated a great deal of academic and 
practitioner interest, exploring its democratic nature and associated outcomes 
(for example, Wampler, 2007; Baiocchi et al, 2005; Baierle, 2003; Abers, 2000; 
Santos, 1998). Fung & Wright (2003) present it as a ‘Real Utopia’,3 a prime 
illustration of ‘empowered participatory governance’. As PB spread, a second 
wave of literature took a comparative approach, identifying context factors 
associated with ‘successful’ or transformative PB (see Sintomer et al, 2012; 
Wampler, 2007; Avritzer, 2006; Cabannes, 2004). One of the primary context 
factors identified is the existence of a mobilised citizenry, capable of both 
cooperation and contestation (see Wampler & Avritzer, 2004); that is to say 
(perhaps unsurprisingly), PB generates the most significant transformative 
outcomes in the context of an empowered civil society. In this sense the PB 
literature itself, while clearly highlighting the role of PB as a ‘school for 
citizenship’ (Pontual, 2014), nonetheless often approaches what I have called 
the ‘democratic appetite’ of citizens as a context feature. 
While this analysis undoubtedly helps us understand the operation and 
limitations of PB practice, it also poses something of a problem when 
considering the democratic deficit of established Western democracies. 
Arguably, knowing that starting from a different context would offer a better 
chance of transformative outcomes is comparable to the suggestion that 
eradicating poverty would be easier if your country was rich! I am, therefore, 
fully in agreement with Gianpaolo Baiocchi, Patrick Heller and Marcelo Silva 
(2011:xii) when they suggest that there is ‘something defeatist … in the social 
scientific diagnosis that asserts that there are necessary preconditions for 
democratic empowerment’. In my view, their 2011 book, Bootstrapping 
Democracy, significantly moves forward the discussion about democratic 
outcomes by considering the impact of Brazilian PB processes in relation to 
their context. In this study, I consider UK experiences of PB in this light. 
                                                                
3
 The Real Utopias Project explores proposals for radical social change, through normative 
discussions of underlying principles and pragmatic problems of institutional design. PB is 
therefore an ideal case study. See http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~wright/RealUtopias.htm. 
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Such an approach is fruitful because democracy is arguably most usefully 
thought of as a journey, not a condition or a structure. This perspective 
suggests an iterative (interactive) relationship between action and concepts. 
Therefore, in this thesis, I identify threads in our democratic journey, in order to 
understand the process by which we arrived at the assumptions and system 
that we have, and the values, agendas and struggles which shaped that 
process. The aim of this endeavour is to arrive at a better understanding of what 
openings and possibilities might exist for re-imagining our democratic future. 
Situating the UK democratic deficit in this broader conceptual framework 
focuses attention on a number of key questions, which can be usefully explored 
through a close look at PB in the UK. Firstly, what are the associated values 
inherent in the different models of democracy represented by the existing UK 
system and the new participatory spaces? Secondly, what does this 
understanding tell us about the nature of the democratic deficit itself? Thirdly, 
what is the relationship between these values and citizen behaviour? And 
finally, what can this line of thought offer us with regard to determining an 
appropriate response to the democratic deficit?4 
THE UK EXPERIENCE OF PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING 
PB arrived in this country in the early 2000s, with a social justice NGO, Church 
Action on Poverty, playing a major role in its development. While the individual 
processes have been limited in scale (citizens disbursing discrete, often 
relatively small, pots of ring-fenced public funds), the movement quickly 
attracted broader state recognition. This resulted in the publication of a national 
strategy in 2008 (DCLG, 2008b). By 2010, over 100 local authorities reported 
that they had undertaken some form of PB (Hall & Röcke, 2013), with the most 
recent assessment suggesting that over £25 million have been spent using PB 
in the UK.5 In keeping with the nature of its origins, both state and civil society 
PB advocates (in many cases inspired directly by Porto Alegre) have radical 
democratic aspirations which reach beyond the limited scale of achievements to 
                                                                
4
 These questions also illustrate what I am not concerned with. My focus is on what encourages 
democratic activity, rather than, for example, theoretical models of democratic legitimacy or 
effective strategies for democratic action (i.e. what works in the democratic pursuit of particular 
goals). My starting point is a commitment to greater citizen involvement; my focus is therefore 
on how that is facilitated. 
5
 This figure is an estimate made by the PB Network in 2014, for use in their policy briefing 
series (PB Network, 2014a; 2014b). 
6 
 
date – PB in the UK has consistently been supported as part of a wider 
movement for participatory democracy.6 Thus, it presents a clear contrast to the 
democratic narrative embodied by its ‘host’, the UK’s existing representative 
system.  
Accordingly, the UK experience of PB affords a particular insight into the 
questions that I have raised because it has engendered an encounter between 
two distinct democratic narratives. This aspect of UK PB was facilitated 
because, unlike many of the new opportunities for citizen participation which 
have proliferated in recent years (Davidson & Elstub, 2014), it began life as a 
local (value-driven) innovation which spread and developed between 
municipalities, rather than as a nationally designed programme. PB processes 
which preceded national take-up and a corresponding drive towards 
codification7 offer a lens on what we might call ‘democracy development’, the 
process of democratic learning through experience. We can, therefore, learn 
from the journey that organisers, practitioners and participants take together. 
This journey is fundamentally about democracy, not council finance or 
community development; it is about who has the right to make the decisions 
that affect us, on what basis, and why. As people wrestle with learning about PB 
and how to achieve their vision for the process, their views of and assumptions 
about democracy are to some extent revealed. In this vein, it is relevant that as 
a ‘new’ decision-making structure PB has been a more open site for the 
expression of democratic values and aspirations. It carries less enculturated 
baggage regarding what we ‘know’ about democracy, and allows us to observe 
what might be possible in terms of citizen democratic engagement.8  
Crucially, PB in the UK is of interest in relation to the problem of the democratic 
deficit because it has generated a level of engagement (albeit on a scale in 
keeping with the nature of the processes) which belies the easy characterisation 
of the ‘democratic deficit’ as citizen apathy. The evidence presented here 
                                                                
6
 To illustrate, the volunteer-run PB Network describes itself as bringing together ‘individuals 
and organisations from across the UK who support participatory democracy’ (PB Network, 
2015). 
7
 See, for example, the ‘how-to’ guide produced in connection with Community First, an £80 
million government-funded grant scheme (PB Partners, 2013). 
8
 This study is not an evaluation of PB in the UK. I am primarily concerned with what the 
experiences reveal about democratic beliefs, values and practices (and by association, the 
democratic deficit), rather than whether they have been ‘successful’ according to either their 
organisers aims or externally imposed criteria. 
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suggests that the experience of a decision-making process which is rooted in 
more egalitarian democratic values can stimulate the democratic appetite.  
This study focuses on two UK cases, Newcastle and Bradford; both of which 
were amongst the earliest examples of PB in the country. Newcastle’s U-Decide 
programme (the local name for PB) has arguably been the most embedded UK 
process to date. As a flagship programme of the then Liberal Democrat 
administration, U-Decide benefited from strong local political commitment. It 
was supported by a permanent team of council officers, and ran for over five 
years.9  It is particularly of interest because officers, councillors and citizens all 
played central developmental roles in the programme, enabling a deep insight 
into the variation across their different perspectives and so into the nature of the 
‘democratic encounter’. Bradford, while a shorter lived experience (2004-2006), 
provides a contrasting case. Local organisers rooted PB in an approach which 
explicitly linked social justice and democracy, in the face of vocal (and ultimately 
decisive) opposition from the Conservative-led district council. 
INTRODUCTION TO THE CHAPTERS 
There are two distinct halves to this thesis. I begin with some broad reflections 
on the nature of what we understand to be democracy, with the aim of 
establishing a conceptual approach to the democratic deficit, before moving on 
to an empirical exploration of what we can learn about the democratic deficit 
through two UK PB processes. Thus, I present a detailed examination of very 
small-scale cases against the backdrop of larger historical processes, in order 
to make visible underlying narratives which can be lost in the fine grain of daily 
interactions (a robust engagement with the reality at local level being vital if we 
are to usefully understand the dynamics of the democratic deficit, this being the 
primary context for citizen action). As PB scholars Baiocchi et al (2011:39) note, 
‘democracy is first and foremost a local affair;’ citizens are most likely to 
encounter the state and exercise their democratic rights in local arenas. 
I begin with some methodological reflections. Chapter 2 introduces the engaged 
case study approach I have used, and considers synergies between 
participatory research and the values inherent in an egalitarian understanding of 
                                                                
9
 Though other areas have allocated more money using PB; for example, in 2008/2009, Tower 
Hamlets disbursed £1.2million of the core council budget in two rounds of PB. 
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democracy. The process was iterative in the sense that the conceptual terrain of 
democratic narratives which provide my analytical structure emerged through 
analysis of field data in Newcastle. 
In chapter 3, I present the egalitarian and elitist democratic narratives in 
historical perspective. The aim of this chapter is to explore modern democracy 
as a historical construct, through a key moment in its development. The 
American Constitutional debates offer perhaps the best example of a sustained 
and recorded debate between two very different visions of democracy, and 
moreover, illustrate an approach to representative democracy which has 
fundamentally shaped Western political history.10 A close look at these debates 
therefore helps us understand the distinctions between the two broad 
democratic tendencies, as well as the connections and cross-fertilisation 
between them – and, crucially, reminds us that these are debates, not ‘truths’. 
Struggles such as this over democratic meaning illustrate how different 
definitions of democracy rest on different views of human nature. By this, I 
mean different understandings of what we believe ourselves and others (the 
‘masses’ that we might trust or fear) to be capable of as democratic citizens. 
Each definition of democracy also implies a corresponding view of state and 
society, and importantly, a differing set of social goals – the competing agendas 
of the actors who are struggling for the meaning of democracy in practice. To 
understand democratic developments today, we need to understand the utopian 
visions which have inspired both narratives within democratic history. Chapter 3 
thus introduces key themes which I will explore throughout the study, with 
reference to different democratic contexts. These include differing perceptions 
of citizen capacity, and differing perceptions of the representative relationship. 
Chapter 4 takes up these themes in the context of the existing system in the 
UK. Alongside an overview of evidence for the existence and nature of the 
democratic deficit, I explore the extent to which the UK system can be 
considered a manifestation of the elitist democratic narrative. To this end, I 
consider the anti-democratic tendencies of assumptions and practices which 
inform democratic process in the UK (including those associated with the 
                                                                
10
 The same exercise could be undertaken through many different moments in democratic 
history, most obviously the French Revolution. In this vein, chapter 3 also reflects briefly on 
broadly contemporaneous events in Britain. 
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dominant neoliberal political and economic discourse). Reflecting on the 
limitations of the UK system in the light of values associated with the elitist 
democratic narrative, I argue that the ‘democratic deficit’ can in some sense be 
considered a success of the system, rather than a failure. In other words, the 
system’s tendency to limit citizen participation in favour of elite control is rather 
more in keeping with its foundational premises than is generally acknowledged. 
I conclude that the location of sovereignty, firmly held by Parliament in the UK, 
is a central element in understanding the democratic deficit, and thus in shaping 
our perception of what an effective response might comprise.  
Chapter 5 provides an equivalent exploration of the egalitarian democratic 
narrative, through the example of Porto Alegrean Participatory Budgeting. In 
this chapter, I consider the principles, practices and outcomes of participatory 
democracy as observed in Porto Alegre. I reflect on the coherence between this 
process and the values associated with the egalitarian tradition, again picking 
up the themes of citizen capacity and the nature of the representative 
relationship. Porto Alegre is not presented as a blueprint for a different 
democratic process, but as evidence that other (explicitly radical) 
conceptualisations of democracy are feasible, and as inspiration, what Baiocchi 
et al (2011:pxiii) have called ‘a broader imagination of the possible.’ I make the 
case that democratic motivation in Porto Alegre is closely connected to the 
belief that participation will ‘make a difference’ to social outcomes. I argue that 
this is a ‘citizen-eye view’ of democracy which prioritises the process of 
engagement (and therefore considers outcomes to be justified through 
participation, not vice versa). 
Given that chapter 5 reflects on what we in the UK can learn from Porto Alegre 
about democratic engagement and the location of sovereignty, in chapter 6 I 
return to the question of context in relation to transformative democratic 
experiences. With this in mind, I review findings from comparative PB literature 
regarding ‘ideal context factors’ for successful PB. These emphasise the 
importance of shared commitment and capacity on the part of civil society and 
political actors, alongside the degree of power available to potential PB 
processes. With reference to the UK, I consider the development of PB to date 
and suggest that, while our conditions are far from ideal, this serves to focus our 
attention on understanding how to make a difference from this starting point. 
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Accordingly, I review four significant implications of the UK context: 
‘representative habits of mind’ resulting from the dominant democratic culture, 
the ambiguous role of a professionalised voluntary sector increasingly oriented 
to service delivery rather than citizen voice, a tendency towards a depoliticised 
presentation of democratic reform arising from a political environment hostile to 
radical initiatives, and the difficulty of identifying sufficient operational autonomy 
to create sustained alternative experiences. This context provides a framework 
for analysing and understanding the UK PB experience. 
Chapters 7 and 8 present evidence from Newcastle’s U-Decide programme. 
Chapter 7 introduces the programme and reviews its key outcomes. U-Decide is 
a binding, direct decision-making space, with opportunities for deliberation and 
a central role for citizens. However, while it was strongly supported by the local 
elected state, it was nonetheless a discrete decision-making space, poorly 
linked in to the existing representative system. This notwithstanding, U-Decide 
provides compelling evidence than even a limited experience of more 
egalitarian democracy can have a powerful impact on citizens’ democratic 
appetite. Participation in U-Decide represented a marked increase on prior 
engagement mechanisms, had a positive impact on relationships between state 
and citizens, and fostered significant democratic learning. 
Chapter 8 reflects on the extent to which ideological tensions over the nature of 
democracy nonetheless ultimately constrained U-Decide’s potential as a 
transformative ‘supply-side’ response to the democratic deficit. I review citizen 
motivations for involvement in U-Decide, and make the case that an important 
aspect of the deficit may lie in the discrepancy between what is on offer and the 
basic democratic values held by citizens. There is an important exception to 
this, in the case of citizens who are used to representing their communities via 
existing, more traditional, engagement mechanisms, and who displayed what I 
have called ‘representative habits of mind’. I also consider the assumptions and 
actions of state actors, including elected representatives and officers advocating 
or supporting U-Decide, in order to evaluate the extent to which the programme 
in practice represents an attempt to subvert the existing context towards a more 
egalitarian model. The evidence suggests that activists’ efforts to enact an 
alternative democratic vision are to an extent hampered by persistent 
11 
 
‘representative habits of mind’, which, if they go unchallenged, can describe a 
limit to the transformative potential of processes such as U-Decide. 
In chapter 9, I present evidence from the complementary case of Bradford. 
Here, the PB experience was consciously located in a social justice framework 
which was explicitly critical of the status quo, and therefore somewhat less prey 
to insidious ‘representative habits of mind’. In Bradford, the response of citizens 
was unequivocal, with around 300 citizens attending a single decision-making 
event. Attendees showed a clear understanding of the difference between this 
process and the existing system, and articulated similar democratic values to 
those observed in Newcastle. However, the more direct challenge to the system 
elicited an equivalent state response, including some quite direct expressions of 
what we might call ‘elitist’ democratic values. This context affected the attempt 
to establish an alternative democratic experience in at least two ways. Firstly, it 
created a dynamic in which public sector PB activists, instead of facing 
outwards to citizens, focused on ‘making the case’ to the state (with an 
associated felt need to present the work as ‘unpolitical’). Secondly, and more 
dramatically, the open opposition of the state resulted in the termination of the 
programme. Bradford therefore illustrates how serious attempts to bring about a 
democratic alternative can run up against the UK system’s underlying values. 
Chapter 10 concludes that an important element of the democratic deficit 
consists in the gulf between citizen democratic values and the reality they 
encounter in the current UK system. Accordingly, a fruitful avenue for 
addressing the democratic deficit would be to develop increased opportunities 
for democratic experiences more informed by egalitarian values. I make the 
case that this is enabled by taking a ‘citizen-eye view’ rather than an 
‘engineer’s-eye view’ of democratic process. However, as I have argued that 
democracy is a site of struggle between competing ideological traditions, this 
requires ‘democratic activists’ not merely active democrats, activists who 
consciously and vigorously join the struggle for a different kind of democracy. 
12 
 
CHAPTER 2 
DOING DEMOCRATIC RESEARCH (METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS) 
This thesis contrasts two visions of democracy, one which emphasises citizen 
capacity and one which accords a special status to experts. In attaching value 
to the idea of citizen capacity, the egalitarian democratic narrative does not 
negate the role of expertise, but it does imply that expertise in the public realm 
should enhance rather than undermine citizen knowledge. Thus, a Porto 
Alegrean PB facilitator described how, as much as possible, ‘technical expertise 
was to be made subservient to the popular mandate, and not the other way 
round’ (Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2014:37). A belief in citizen capacity can therefore 
be said to have methodological implications for research. While we may judge 
different approaches to research to be suitable in different contexts, my aim in 
this process has been to strive for some coherence between my subject and my 
methods, in other words, to try and research democracy democratically.  
I have endeavoured to incorporate the idea of citizen capacity in this research 
process in two significant ways. Firstly, as I discuss below, knowledge about the 
social world is constructed out of different voices, experiences and perceptions. 
One aspect of democratic research is therefore to appropriately acknowledge 
the citizen contribution to knowledge creation. Accordingly, in order to enable 
the research to benefit from the experiential and practical knowledge and 
insights of the UK PB community, I chose a methodology which allowed for the 
extended involvement of research participants: case studies supplemented by 
sustained engagement with PB practitioners at the national level. I used 
participant observation and in-depth interviews, and included opportunities for 
participant reflection about the research. 
Secondly, research plays a part in the ongoing public conversation about how 
we live. This places an emphasis on democratic research as both useful (in 
terms of outcomes and appropriate questions) and useable (knowing matters as 
well as knowledge). In this view, the process of research can have a significant 
value alongside that of the knowledge it generates; arguably, this impacts on 
how we might understand ‘good’ or successful research. Later in this chapter, I 
consider the extent to which my approach to research has been successful in 
generating outcomes beyond a contribution to knowledge-creation. 
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This methodology is rooted in the notion that research is not neutral, but an 
action in the world which has consequences. Over recent decades many 
researchers have written about the political and situated nature of research (see 
Law, 2004; Denzin & Lincoln, 2003b; Reason, 1994; Haraway, 1988; Heron, 
1981). This position has moved from the margins to generate serious debates in 
the literature. We begin to see others writing in defence of ‘scientific and neutral’ 
social research, a position that might previously have been assumed rather than 
defended (Ristock & Pennell, 1996:4, see also Burawoy, 2009; Pawson, 2006; 
Hammersley, 2000). While these debates are well-documented elsewhere, in 
this chapter I briefly set out the assumptions and values which underpin my own 
approach, considering both the nature of knowledge and the purpose of 
research. I discuss how these inform my methodology of sustained ‘observant 
participant’ engagement across two case studies, outline the methods I have 
used, and reflect on their strengths and limitations.  
RESEARCH AS A DEMOCRATIC INTERVENTION: VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS 
I have suggested that knowledge about the social world is constructed out of 
‘different voices, experiences and perceptions’. Drawing on John Heron’s much 
referenced discussion of different ‘ways of knowing’, this implies more than the 
plain fact that human experiences are the raw data of social research. Heron 
suggests four types of knowledge: experiential (knowledge through lived 
experience), presentational (shaping experience into a communicable form 
such as art, dance or poetry), propositional (knowledge about things: the 
conceptual form of knowledge recognised by academia) and practical (knowing 
how to do something) (Heron, 1981; 1988; 1996; Heron & Reason, 2008). 
Heron’s theory explicitly recognises that knowledge is not the sole preserve of 
scientists. In this view, researchers are co-creators of knowledge, bringing one 
form of knowledge (propositional) to the knowledge-creation process, or, as 
Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln suggest (2003b:634-5), ‘jacks-of-all-trades’ 
piecing together a research bricolage out of the available stories and materials, 
in order to help in the ongoing, collective task of society-building. This contrasts 
with the view that (neutral) researchers ‘contribute to a developing body of 
knowledge whose likely validity is greater than that of lay ideas’ (Hammersley, 
2000:141), and presents the possibility that participants may be able to make a 
greater contribution to the research process than as informants alone. 
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This perspective on the nature of knowledge incorporates the understanding 
that knowledge is not only a ‘product’ but a process (of knowing, of meaning-
making). In other words, people co-create their reality through participation 
(see, for example, Reason, 1998:262; McNiff & Whitehead, 2002:18; 
Greenwood & Levin, 1998:82; Ristock & Pennell, 1996:4). This emphasises the 
identity of the knower. Where knowledge as object is stand-alone, knowing is a 
conduit between the individual and the world. Knowledge as object has value, 
but it is given life when a person connects it to the world. This view accords with 
a radical historicism which emphasises contingency (the view that social 
processes depend on choices made and agency exercised by the particular 
individuals involved) (see Bevir, 2010:5-7). Research, through understanding 
people’s choices and the consequences of those choices, allows us to explore 
what might be possible, arguably, to explore alternative futures.1 Therefore, 
knowledge as process, as understanding, could be considered a goal of 
research alongside knowledge as ‘product’. This does not diminish the 
importance of what is known, but also focuses attention on who knows it (and – 
given Heron’s broader conception of ways of knowing – how). 
All this is not, of course, to say that day-to-day understanding is the same as 
academic analysis. Zygmunt Bauman describes sociological knowledge as 
having four essential characteristics: ‘responsible speech’ (claims are made 
only where there is understood to be evidence), the size of the field (drawing on 
experiences beyond your own), the effort to ‘make sense’ (looking beyond 
individual intentions to the underlying web of human interdependency) and the 
attempt to de-familiarise the familiar (look beyond our taken-for-granted 
assumptions about what we know) (Bauman, 1990:12-15). An academic 
approach clearly can add value to the process of interpreting our reality. 
Critically, however, these characteristics are not (and should not be) the sole 
preserve of social scientists. This is fundamental to democratising research 
endeavours. As Bauman (1990:16) argues: ‘sociological thinking is a power in 
its own right, an anti-fixating power; it renders flexible again the world hitherto 
oppressive in its apparent fixity.’ Likewise, Paolo Freire (1972) links people’s 
                                                                
1
 This approach echoes Appreciative Inquiry (AI), which starts off with an idea of the future 
based on ‘what works’, in order to explore ways in which this can be developed further; AI’s 
‘anticipatory principle’ suggests that the way people think about the future will shape the way 
they move towards that future (Reed, 2007:27). 
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ability to analyse oppression in their own lives with their ability to challenge it, 
and to effect change.  
This understanding of knowledge and knowing implies associated research 
values, in that it foregrounds both the potential impact of research on 
participants, and the need to justify social research in terms of its purpose. In 
this view, a right to research is not assumed. In contrast, the postgraduate 
research textbook I was directed to as a new graduate student suggested that 
such a right exists in tension with the rights of research subjects: 
‘In many cases, social scientists face a conflict between two rights: the 
right to research and to acquire knowledge and the right of individual 
research participants to self-determination, privacy and dignity.’ 
(Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1992:78) 
The implication is that ethical considerations are introduced as a constraint on 
otherwise unlimited academic research freedom. However, if we understand 
knowledge to be a process, it is impossible to conceive of research – or 
researchers – as neutral. The goal of research is not to disinterestedly uncover 
the truth; rather, researchers are ‘knowers’ too, and we ‘know’ from a particular 
standpoint and in a particular way. The idea that the researcher stands outside 
their field of study, seeing everything from nowhere, is an impossible ‘god-trick’ 
(Haraway, 1991:189) which masks our responsibility for the consequences and 
uses of our research, and our own authorship of the particular ‘findings’ we 
create. As John Law argues: 
‘Since social (and natural) science investigations interfere with the world 
… things change as a result – the issue, then, is not to seek 
disengagement, but rather with how to engage.’ (Law, 2004:7) 
Thus, researchers who embrace a process-focused approach do so because 
we understand social research to have consequences, to be value-laden. 
Importantly, this does not mean biased (as has sometimes been implied, see 
Hammersley, 2000). Rejecting the possibility of neutrality does not mean 
rejecting a commitment to one’s own relationship with truth – in other words to 
honesty and integrity. It does, however, mean that social research is not a 
precise science, but an action in the world, a contribution to the ongoing 
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conversation of who we are and how we live. It is an intervention, and has 
tangible outcomes in terms of social change, which can be positive or negative. 
This is important because it suggests that the burden of proof should not rest 
with the case to limit research. Rather, active responsibility rests with the 
researcher to make a social and ethical (rather than purely academic) case for 
research. It is not enough to assume that because the topic researched is 
important that the research itself is important. Returning to my postgraduate 
textbook, rather than assuming a right to research, the researcher should 
perhaps justify research not against the rights of participants but in terms of 
their or other stakeholders’ rights or well-being. Importantly, if the case for 
research is made explicit rather than assumed, this can also help democratise 
the research process, as it facilitates debate over justifications for research. 
In this vein, there is a high level of awareness amongst participatory 
researchers of the potential negative impact of research, perhaps most 
dramatically captured by Reason and Rowan’s ‘hatred and horror about what 
traditional research does to those it studies [and] those who do the research’ 
(Reason & Rowan, 1981:xii). This is supported by the familiar sense of 
‘consultation-fatigue’ experienced by the much-researched, which is arguably 
not an outcome of being over-researched, but of the distrust and powerlessness 
associated with research which doesn’t impact on the things that participants 
want to change (Milne et al, 2008:5). 
More positively, many participatory researchers reflect on gains additional to 
formal research findings. To give a very brief and eclectic flavour of broader 
outcomes, collaborative research with indigenous Australians resulted in 
participants’ increased reflection and work on their own priorities (Mayo et al, 
2009:137); workshops for a participatory action research process in Guatemala 
unexpectedly evolved into constituted women’s organisations (Schrader 
McMillan, 2007:526); victims of state violence in Northern Ireland ‘regained a 
sense of control over their own experiences and memories’ through proactive 
engagement in action research (Lundy & McGovern, 2006:59-60), and, from my 
own experience, encounters within a collaborative research project on Bradford 
and Keighley’s so-called ‘White’ estates had practical outcomes including new 
youth activities across divided communities (Pearce & Milne, 2010:28-29). 
17 
 
Thus, and in keeping with a view of research as an active process of knowing, 
Lincoln & Denzin (2000:1055) suggest that we judge research processes 
‘pragmatically, by the conversations they invite, the empathy they generate, the 
action they start’. This has clear implications for how research is conducted. It 
focuses attention on the difference it makes, rather than simply the quality of the 
research findings. Moreover, it suggests a focus on collective elements of 
research design, in order to facilitate ‘conversations’, ‘empathy’ and ‘action’ (or 
social outcomes however defined). Methodologically then, there is a value to 
researchers reflecting on how research generates tangible outcomes, and 
seeking to incorporate this in research design.2  
In the following section, I discuss how I have considered these factors in 
relation to my research on participatory budgeting in the UK. 
PROCESS-FOCUSED RESEARCH: METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS  
The initial methodological implication of a process-focused approach to 
research is that, if methods are designed with the intention of generating aims 
including but not limited to the creation of knowledge, there needs to be clarity 
about these wider aims. As I have mentioned, I come to this research as a 
democratic activist. I want to understand the UK democratic environment better 
because I believe the democratic deficit matters. More specifically, I want to 
contribute to resourcing democratic activists (including myself), via an iterative 
understanding of our context, with the hope that we can learn more about what 
approaches might generate particular outcomes (for example, a more 
democratically active culture).  
PB in the UK is notable for the aspirations of its proponents, many of whom 
articulate a desire to radically improve democracy. Practitioners and activists 
consciously seek to establish processes which have the potential to generate 
the kinds of democratic outcomes claimed for PB internationally. Accordingly, 
they have an appetite for learning and development. Embedded research 
undertaken with and alongside this community has the potential to support 
practitioners and activists through exploring how particular processes connect 
                                                                
2
 While there are some points of coherence between this approach and the current UK 
Research Council ‘impact’ agenda, for example, in terms of encouraging researchers to think in 
terms of who might benefit from research projects, the emphasis on ‘end users’ does still 
suggest a primary focus on impact from the ‘knowledge-product’ of research, rather than a more 
democratic and process-oriented methodology (see RCUK, 2014). 
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with democratic outcomes. This entails an increased understanding of 
assumptions and perspectives about democracy. One of the reasons I chose 
PB as a lens through which to explore the issue of the democratic deficit was 
precisely because there is a shared interest in the question of how to build an 
appetite for democracy. As a result, I was able to collaborate with partners who 
believed the research had the potential to support their democratic goals. 
Accordingly, and in keeping with the democratic research values discussed 
above, I aimed for a research process which facilitated the inclusion of 
democratic activists’ analysis, voices and experience, allowing practical and 
experiential knowledge to be brought together with academic (propositional) 
knowledge, in order to maximise the knowledge and understanding shared and 
gained.3 In each case study, I identified key informants who had an active 
interest in the research, and met with them (either singly or as a group) to invite 
their research questions as well as their views on the areas of interest I felt 
were important. Throughout the research, I created ongoing opportunities for 
joint reflection (again, both through individual conversations and group 
meetings) on the progress and direction of the research. Their interest being 
primarily in the empirical UK aspect of the study, I shared findings (and 
discussed their use) with interested participants in each case study location, 
and with PB activists at the national level. 
A case study approach involving sustained participant observation therefore 
allowed me to work closely with interlocutors at both local and national level, 
whose own interest in deepening democracy led them to contribute insights to 
the research. An ongoing dialogue with research participants strengthens the 
research because assumptions, hypotheses, research questions and research 
findings are refined, discussed and ‘reality-checked’ throughout the process. 
Accordingly, the research provided a forum for reflection and enhanced 
awareness which connected directly with the democratic activity of participatory 
budgeting. This is likely to make the research more ‘useful and useable’, it 
being highly likely that increased insights are better facilitated by engagement 
with a process than by reading about it afterwards.  
                                                                
3
 This is not to suggest that activists and practitioners do not also have propositional knowledge 
of PB (or, indeed, that academics cannot have experiential or practical knowledge); such 
divisions are inevitably crude. 
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This approach was explicitly valued by actors within both case studies. In 
partnering with an academic researcher, they were seeking an academic 
perspective, to complement their experiential and practice-based knowledge. 
They were not looking for evaluation, but critical, empathetic and considered 
reflection (see Blakey & Jackson, 2010). Just as academics can value a 
partnership with other forms of knowing, which can ground and reality-check our 
conceptual understandings, so can reflective practitioners value a thoughtful, 
academic framework which can contextualise their experiential knowledge. In 
Newcastle, the opportunity to reflect on conceptual questions (for example the 
definition and purpose of participatory democracy, relative to representative 
democracy) was an important part of the research feedback process (see 
Blakey, 2009:16-17).4 
This level of involvement is encouraged by an acknowledged sense of shared 
purpose between researcher and participants: Lavie-Ajayi refers to the 
importance of having a 'compelling question which participants ... are hungry to 
answer' (2007:29). Shared goals help build trust, which allows the researcher to 
become a partner and in a sense a fellow actor, rather than an outside 
observer. Thus, I would describe the research I undertook as more ‘observant 
participant’ than ‘participant observer’. While not involved in process delivery or 
as a participatory budgeting participant, I have been a participant in the sense 
that I have a (known) position on radical democracy, and a commitment to the 
ongoing journey and development of PB. I research PB because I want to 
contribute to its healthy and vital development in the UK, and accordingly I work 
alongside the community of activists and practitioners who also want to develop 
and improve PB in the UK. 
I believe this increases the potential for the research and the researcher to play 
a role in debates and discussions within the context that is being researched. 
As I said, I strongly believe that trust and shared purpose do not undermine 
academic integrity and critical engagement, or preclude disagreement. Indeed, 
they can facilitate hearing disagreement. Criticism from a disengaged academic 
may be easier to dismiss, or more likely to produce a defensive reaction, than 
                                                                
4
 Participant observation record: research findings workshop, 22/09/2009. 
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critical engagement with a trusted partner.5 This coheres with the experience of 
participatory researchers using Appreciative Inquiry, who have found that a 
positive approach, free from ‘censure and blaming’, encourages the open 
discussion of difficulties (Reed, 2007:39). 
To give an example of how trust facilitated engagement of this type, sharing a 
conference paper containing critical reflections with research partners in 
Bradford led to an honest and fruitful discussion of the issues. This process 
affected both of our stances, in my case, acknowledging my responsibility for 
how local critics of the process might use public commentaries, and, in the case 
of the research partner, reflecting on the process in new ways (particularly in 
relation to the role of deliberation within PB).6  
Constructive engagement is supported by a sense of social processes as 
ongoing journeys. In other words, rather than evaluating a static snapshot of a 
social process, the research aims to understand what supports actors within the 
process in moving it closer to their individual visions, which may of course be 
varied and conflicting (research cannot require you to share a vision with the 
participants; there are inevitably multiple visions at work in any social process, 
as my research highlights).7 Critical reflection is thus offered in a spirit of uniting 
aims, practice and outcomes, which mitigates against it being received simply 
as a negative assessment or attack. Thus, shared purpose and trust can play a 
crucial role in generating positive outcomes from the research. 
Taken together, these methodological considerations informed the development 
of my research methods, which I describe below (I have chosen to present my 
methods chronologically, to emphasise the collaborative and iterative 
development of the research, rather than imposing a post-hoc design structure). 
MY APPROACH: A CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT 
My interest in UK participatory budgeting dates from the very early experiments 
in Bradford. As a fieldworker for an ESRC funded research project, Municipal 
Innovations in Non-governmental Public Participation: UK and Latin America, I 
was responsible for selecting a small number of case studies within the city of 
                                                                
5
 Arguably, a strident assertion of academic freedom (to say what you like) at times interferes 
with paying sufficient attention to the likelihood of people actually hearing what you say (though 
I am of course in favour of self-reflection, not censorship!). 
6
 Participant observation record: Bradford Vision, 11/06/2007. 
7
 I discuss this issue in-depth in chapter 8, with reference to the Newcastle PB programme. 
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Bradford. The study as a whole looked at new forms of urban participation in six 
cities, three in Latin America: Porto Alegre in Brazil, Medellin in Colombia and 
Caracas in Venezuela and three in the UK: Salford, Manchester and Bradford. 
While this study was not specifically about participatory budgeting, it included 
four examples of PB, Porto Alegre in Brazil, Medellin in Colombia and Salford in 
the UK, as well as the process I chose to follow in Keighley, a town within 
Bradford District. I selected the PB pilot because it was, in my view, Bradford’s 
most creative and far-reaching ‘municipal innovation’, and moreover, was of 
national importance as one of the earliest PB processes in the country. 
While I outline the process itself in chapter 9, I will introduce my main 
interlocutors here. The key individuals involved in initiating PB in Bradford were 
paid officers (working for the Local Strategic Partnership (LSP), a quasi-
autonomous public sector organisation). This reflects the nature of participatory 
processes in Bradford. The state developed and maintained the key 
participatory processes and engaged at a strategic level primarily with paid 
voluntary sector professionals. Community members were involved in the 
Keighley process as decision-making citizens, but not in a developmental role. 
As interlocutors, these actors had an interest in the research question and 
goals, and a sense of shared purpose in terms of democratic motivation. 
Importantly, they had a consciously political vision (though explicitly not party 
political) regarding the potential of PB to bring about social and democratic 
change; they are in this sense ‘activists’ as well as professionals.  
In following the Keighley PB process, I worked closely with a small number of 
key informants, who I invited to shape the research focus. These research 
partners were chosen according to their commitment to the goals of the 
research, and their centrality to the processes being explored. My research 
relationships with these key actors immeasurably enhanced the research 
process, and took the form of a series of informal conversations, which both 
followed and shaped the research process, and which, importantly, were an 
overtly two-way process. These were supplemented with more formal research 
reference group meetings which allowed for more collective reflection. Because 
in the Bradford case, PB was one of two processes explored through the 
research (the other being the more formal process of Voluntary and Community 
Sector (VCS) representation to the LSP boards), this group also included 
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informants who have not contributed directly to the research described here. As 
researcher, I shared my ongoing analysis of the data and invited the analysis, 
reflection and suggestions of my VCS and LSP colleagues. 
The research in Bradford involved, during the course of 2006, approximately 7 
months’ participant observation (reflecting the life of the PB process) and semi-
structured interviews with key informants, as well as the informal conversations 
with research partners described above. As I have said, a case study approach 
was essential in enabling the collaborative engagement of key actors with the 
research. Supplemented by the deeper reflection which is possible within 
interviews, participant observation facilitated both depth of understanding and 
breadth of perspective. In addition, it was particularly effective in revealing the 
synergies and dissonances in stated views, values and practices which 
emerged as significant in this study (indeed, it has been suggested that this is 
participant observation’s central claim to validity; Gillham, 2008:1).  
To this end, I became a member of the Keighley PB reference group, and 
worked alongside organisers, taking part in planning meetings and supporting 
the process. The PB pilot timetable coincided with the research timeframe, 
allowing me a close involvement in the PB development process itself. I 
proactively sought to ensure that I interviewed the main actors involved from 
across the spectrum of organisations, viewpoints and roles (in addition, I 
interviewed anyone connected with the process who expressed interest in 
sharing their views). It is important to emphasise that the research robustly 
explored a full range of perspectives and experiences, not only those of my 
research partners.  
Alongside ongoing conversations and ‘informal interviews’ with key research 
partners, I conducted 10 semi-structured interviews, involving 2 politicians, 5 
statutory officers and 3 VCS officers; and 18 ‘snapshot’ short interviews with PB 
voting day participants during the event.8 I attended numerous events, including 
7 process planning meetings, 3 community level meetings at which PB was 
discussed, 3 outreach events (door-to-door and school gate budget 
consultations), 1 sifting meeting (at which bids to the PB process were 
considered), ‘Keighley Decision Day’ and 1 evaluation meeting.  
                                                                
8
 Further details of these interviews are given in Appendix 1. 
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I conducted an initial thematic analysis of the Bradford data (using Nvivo to 
support the coding process), based around the needs of the Municipal 
Innovations project, and locally determined questions. These findings were 
formally returned to and discussed with a wider group of participants via a local 
workshop at the end of the research process. The findings of the Municipal 
Innovations research have been published as a research briefing for 
participations (‘Here the people decide’? New forms of participation in the city, 
Pearce et al, 2008) and as an edited volume: Participation and democracy in 
the twenty-first century city (Pearce, 2010). 
My involvement with PB in Bradford afforded me an excellent insight into the 
national development of participatory budgeting in the UK, as I developed close 
links with the lead voluntary sector organisation in the field, Church Action on 
Poverty’s PB Unit. This was reinforced through a sense of shared goals in 
relation to strengthening the democratic potential of PB in the UK, and through 
occasional volunteering with the Unit at events and conferences, and led to 
more substantial engagement. Between 2007 and the present, my involvement 
with the UK national PB field has included: 
 2007: support for the first national evaluation, a study hosted by the 
Municipal Innovations research project and undertaken by Kezia Lavan, 
a member of staff at the PB Unit; her findings are published in the report: 
Participatory budgeting in the UK, an evaluation from a practitioner 
perspective (Lavan, 2007); 
 2007-2010: membership of the National Participatory Budgeting 
Reference Group, the purpose of which was to oversee and support the 
development of PB in the UK (this was hosted by the Department for 
Communities and Local Government, and included civil servants, PB 
practitioners and the PB Unit); 
 2009-2010: joint project with the PB Unit’s research officer on methods 
for evaluating PB (for which I undertook 6 single or group interviews with 
PB practitioners in a variety of locations; this resulted in a participatory 
self-evaluation tool-kit and a report; Blakey & Jackson, 2009, 2010); 
 2010-2011: evaluation of a programme of 5 PB pilots for the Scottish 
Parliament (Blakey & Jackson, 2011); 
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 2012-2013: membership of PB Network steering group (volunteer-run 
advocacy network which formed following the closure of the PB Unit). 
My participant observation at national level therefore encompasses: attending 5 
national reference group meetings, 2 national PB conferences, 2 ‘Big Society’ 
PB events, 3 events relating to the DCLG funded national evaluation of PB, 2 
regional PB events in Yorkshire and the Humber (which I helped organise), and 
3 meetings of the PB Network (plus steering group meetings and 
teleconferences). In addition, I have carried out 6 interviews (with community 
members, council officers and one councillor) and 4 workshops (one with 
participation and evaluation stakeholders and 3 with PB practitioners) in relation 
to the self-evaluation of PB processes. I have had in-depth informal 
conversations with PB activists and other stakeholders from Eastfield in 
Scarborough, Tower Hamlets and Manton, all of which are considered to be 
particularly important examples of PB in the UK context.9 Finally, I carried out 
two focus groups with community members and statutory officers in Glenrothes, 
Scotland. Accordingly, I am well-placed to invite practitioner involvement in the 
ongoing use and development of my research on PB in the UK (including but 
not limited to this particular study). 
This work has played an immensely valuable role in this research, as through it 
I have achieved a broad understanding both of the dynamics of individual 
processes and of the national PB story (including motivations, goals and 
constraints), which contextualises the cases of Bradford and Newcastle. My 
extended engagement has led to ‘saturation’ in a grounded theory sense (to 
illustrate, I found that what I learned in Scotland cohered strongly with what I 
had already learned elsewhere). It is worth noting at this point that, while I have 
been closely involved with PB practice in the UK, my aim is explicitly not to 
promote or advocate for PB, but rather to understand what might be effective in 
addressing the democratic deficit (I believe an uncritical attachment to a 
particular approach limits rather than strengthens this endeavour). 
Through my knowledge of the UK PB scene, I selected Newcastle as my 
primary case study for this research (to be supplemented by the Bradford case). 
Both are interesting as early examples of UK PB processes, in which actors 
                                                                
9
 Eastfield has a high level of community control and input. Tower Hamlets is the largest single 
example of PB in the UK, dispersing 1.2 million pounds of the core council budget over 2 years. 
Manton has documented the connection between PB and mainstream voting behaviour. 
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were consciously creating new democratic systems; therefore both offer a lens 
on democratic assumptions and values. Both were also strongly committed to 
learning about PB and developing its potential, with key actors centrally 
engaged with the PB activist / practitioner community at national level. As a 
result, the model used in these cities has been developmentally significant in 
relation to PB elsewhere in the UK, indeed has arguably become typical (though 
it is important to note that the UK PB field is marked by significant local 
variation). Finally, both areas were actively interested in developing their work 
through research, an essential requirement for my research methodology. 
However, because my approach is based on the view that research can make 
visible a narrative which helps us to explore what is possible for the future, I 
believe any of the early locally-developed PB processes would have offered 
democratic insights. The Bradford and Newcastle processes are two significant 
examples which offer reflections and stories. They offer a lens to look through, 
and suggest possibilities.  
In Newcastle, as in Bradford, my methods included sustained engagement with 
key interlocutors, approximately 7 months’ participant observation, and semi-
structured interviews. During 2008 and 2009, I followed a total of 5 PB 
processes in Newcastle, two in Newburn ward, two in Denton ward, and one in 
Walkergate ward. In Denton and Newburn, the U-Decide team (a permanent 
grouping of council officers housed within the Social Policy Unit) set up citizen 
working groups to oversee the PB process, supported by officers and to an 
extent by councillors. I tracked the work of these groups, and that of associated 
council officers and councillors, during the planning process and event 
delivery.10 I provide an overview of the U-Decide programme and the Newburn 
and Denton processes in chapter 7. 
My research partners in Newcastle included the U-Decide team within the 
Social Policy Unit, and individual citizen working group members who 
expressed a particular interest in the research. Research planning took place 
through an initial meeting with the U-Decide team and ongoing conversations in 
which I sought to understand key actors’ areas of interest, and ascertain 
                                                                
10
 The Walkergate process was structured somewhat differently, being aimed at young people. I 
followed this process in less depth because it didn’t have a citizen steering group, but as its 
timescale coincided with that of the first Denton and Newburn processes, I included it in the 
research in order to gain a more complete overview of the work of the U-Decide team. 
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important questions for their work, for example, the question of building support 
for PB amongst colleagues in other departments. I drew up a research 
agreement with the U-Decide team, which detailed what we could expect of one 
another, and undertook to provide a report focused on their areas of interest, as 
well as verbal feedback. They agreed to facilitate access to other actors within 
the process and provide introductions. This led to a greater sense of ownership 
of the research and interest in the findings, as well as providing a ‘shortcut’ to 
relationships of trust and openness with others involved in the process. I believe 
this to be for two reasons. Firstly, the close nature of the working relationships 
between the U-Decide team and other actors meant their introductions were 
valuable. Secondly, negotiating process parameters and goals with the U-
Decide team made it easier to describe a clear link between the research and 
useful local outcomes to prospective participants. Through these links, and via 
‘observant participation’, I developed relationships with councillors and 
members of the citizen steering groups in Denton and Newburn wards.11  
Alongside ongoing conversations, I conducted 20 semi-structured interviews 
(including 7 joint or group interviews). These involved a total of 7 politicians, 7 
statutory officers and 15 citizens. In addition, I conducted 34 ‘snapshot’ short 
interviews with participants at PB voting events.12 As in Bradford, these reflect a 
full range of views, not only those of research partners (again, I invited people 
to participate based on their involvement with the programme). In Newcastle, I 
attended 1 process planning meeting, 2 sifting meetings (at which bids to the 
PB process were considered), 5 voting events and 7 evaluation meetings. I 
supported 1 outreach event (a PB roadshow). I volunteered at the events I 
observed, helping set up venues and clear away, facilitating deliberation when 
asked, and taking notes. 
As in Bradford, I also undertook local dissemination. I produced a research 
report for U-Decide organisers and participants, which focused on the questions 
they had identified as developmentally important for the programme (Blakey, 
                                                                
11
 Interestingly, I found a more consistently positive response towards my own needs as a 
student researcher from community members than as a paid academic from paid professionals. 
An occasionally sceptical undertone (from the latter) that academics gain professional benefit 
from practitioners’ work was frequently replaced by a desire to assist me in gaining a 
qualification. Community members on more than one occasion voiced the hope I had ‘got what I 
needed for my course’.  This is in keeping with a desire for a tangible outcome from the efforts 
and time they have contributed to the research. This suggests that such outcomes don’t have to 
be self-interested, but reinforces the view that they should be evident to research participants. 
12
 More detail on these interviews is provided in Appendix 1. 
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2009), and held a workshop to share and discuss findings with a wider group of 
research participants. This provided an additional opportunity for all key actors 
in the processes I followed (not only research partners) to discuss the research. 
Again as in Bradford, local dissemination in Newcastle was based on a first 
round of thematic data analysis, addressing the research questions of interest 
to participants in Newcastle, and supplemented by an inductive process of 
analysis. In addition to generating locally useful findings, this process clarified 
my own theoretical questions. Centrally, the first round of data analysis focused 
my attention on democratic traditions because it was evident that different 
actors brought widely different democratic assumptions and values to the 
process. It also crystallised the role of Porto Alegre within the research 
narrative, being not only the inspiration for PB in the UK (as I had previously 
characterised its role in this research), but also as illustrative of the egalitarian 
democratic tradition (complementing a review of the UK system, which both 
enabled a consideration of the nature of the democratic deficit and illustrated 
the representative narrative). Thus the data led me to in-depth theoretical 
analysis, not vice versa. In this sense, my approach to the case studies was 
primarily intrinsic (making sense of each ‘within its own world’), and only 
subsequently instrumental (illustrating how wider concerns are manifest in the 
case) (Stake, 2003:140-141). 
Following a more focused engagement with the relevant literatures, I returned to 
the data with an enhanced theoretical understanding, to explore the emergent 
questions more deeply. I conducted a second round of thematic analysis on the 
data collected in both case studies, based on the categories generated through 
my initial analysis and subsequent reading and thinking. I then reviewed each 
code created for patterns and exceptions across different groups of actors 
(highlighting, for example, the particular role played by the ‘experienced reps’ in 
the Denton case study). I was therefore able to select illustrative quotes which 
either epitomised the views of a larger group, or another significant perspective. 
The final (ongoing) stage of the research process has been to bring my analysis 
back to the UK PB activist-practitioner community, for ‘reality-checking’ and 
continuing discussion. This has included sharing the 4 UK PB chapters with key 
practitioners, who (I was delighted to hear) felt my analysis captured the 
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psychology of the situation, suggested new ways of thinking, and would 
hopefully be of use in building work on PB in the future. 
STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS OF A PROCESS-FOCUSED METHODOLOGY 
Engaging key research participants in the research process meant that insights 
from the research could be fed directly into discussions about how the PB 
process worked. For example, in Newcastle, when officers were developing 
steering group guidelines in response to live issues with representation and 
representativeness I reflected with them on relevant issues emerging within the 
research. In this, I didn’t shape the process directly, but was able to act as a 
‘communication resource’, sharing an (anonymised) range of views, alongside 
my own observations. This included raising questions about how participants 
were selected and observations about when steering group members were 
treated as representing the community (given that it was felt to be problematic 
that they acted as representing the community). Thus the research continuously 
fed back into real-life activities, as well as being shaped by the analysis of key 
informants. Together we developed a shared understanding of the questions we 
were all exploring – they in their work and me in my research.  
In a similar vein, collective elements of the research facilitated enhanced shared 
learning between actors (as well as providing reflective, nuanced data for the 
research). For example, semi-structured group interviews in Newcastle allowed 
community members to explore ideas they felt to be important about the PB 
process (in both wards, focus-group members independently came up with the 
idea of developing ward-wide projects to be funded through PB, as an 
alternative to competing for small grants). In Bradford, the research reference 
group offered a collective setting which allowed different views of both the 
research and the participatory processes being researched to be shared and 
discussed. This included international learning and sharing, with visiting Latin 
American researchers from the Municipal Innovations project discussing 
participation, activists and the role of civil society organisations with UK 
practitioners and activists. 
Importantly, process benefits were increased because I organised research 
feedback around locally determined questions, rather than according to the 
wider focus of my research. In Bradford this occurred as part of the Municipal 
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Innovations process, via the report ‘Here, the people decide’? New forms of 
participation in the city (Pearce et al, 2008). This was written for our research 
partners and participants, and shared and discussed at a one-day event in 
Bradford (as well as at similar events in Latin America). In Newcastle, I held a 
workshop to introduce, discuss and finalise my report, “People taking control” 
(Blakey, 2009). This was well attended by officers and community members. 
This approach again meant that research findings directly reached the people 
who could use them in developing the PB programme locally. 
Two reactions underlined for me the effectiveness of working with local actors 
on research design and dissemination. One officer from Newcastle’s permanent 
U-Decide team was particularly struck by a table in the report which juxtaposed 
officers’, community members’ and councillors’ understandings of their own and 
one another’s roles and responsibilities in relation to PB (Blakey, 2009:18). She 
said she suddenly understood how conflicts had unexpectedly appeared out of 
seemingly harmonious processes.13 I believe that local trust in the research 
(generated by attention to process) meant that these findings were heard and 
used. Thus, a senior officer commented that of all the research done on their 
work, this was the first time he felt the researcher fully understood what they 
were trying to do.14 It is important to stress that this did not mean the findings 
were wholly uncritical; rather it reflects a level of trust in the research which 
meant that challenging findings were heard and considered. I firmly believe this 
not to be simply a comment on the quality of this or other work, but related to 
the fact that I was exploring their questions, as well as my own.15  
This is of course a mutually beneficial process, as these conversations feed 
back into the research planning, data and analysis. My approach deliberately 
created spaces in which key actors probed my thinking and the direction of the 
research, and raised questions about ongoing PB processes. In terms of the 
robustness of the findings, relations of trust can lead to the breakdown of initial 
caution, generating more honest reflection, of value to both participants and to 
                                                                
13
 Participant observation record: research findings workshop, 22/09/2009. 
14
 Participant observation record: research findings workshop, 22/09/2009. 
15
 Though it is perhaps worthy of note that during the period I spent with the U-Decide team, no 
less than 5 other researchers gathering data for research on PB came and went, some 
spending as little as one half-day with local actors. On one occasion, I was strongly aware of 
other observers’ lack of context in how they understood the events they witnessed during their 
short visit (participant observation record: Grand Voting Event, Denton, 29/11/2008). 
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the research. To illustrate, partway through a thoughtful conversation about 
some of the ongoing issues within the programme, a council officer remarked 
that she had just remembered my role as researcher, and that it made her think 
about things in a different way.16 As I reflected at the time: 
‘You need participants to trust you and this can only be achieved by 
working alongside them, by a sense of shared objectives. People are 
very defensive at first – those with most invested anyway – even if they 
are interested in the research. They treat you as judge and jury, and are 
very careful to present ‘negative’ examples in a particular light. It’s so 
important to work on why you want to explore things, and for people to 
understand that this is within a supportive and constructive framework.’17 
Furthermore, an engaged methodology requires researchers to justify findings 
to people who know the context. This acts as a reality-check for developing 
theory as well as for researchers’ understanding of the data. While the variety of 
views held by different actors means it is highly unlikely everyone will agree, it is 
an opportunity to ensure that findings ‘make sense’ to those involved (to put it 
another way, findings must at least take account of their lived experience).  
It is important to note here that I am in no way suggesting that more 
conventionally conceived methodologies can’t or don’t deliver process benefits. 
Self-evidently, research can generate useful findings and outcomes whether 
conceived of as process-focused or ‘knowledge-product’ focused. Furthermore, 
in distinguishing between process-focused and product-focused research I have 
clearly sketched a false dichotomy for the purposes of exploring a 
methodological approach. Good research of all kinds includes attention to 
elements which I would conceptualise as process-focused, such as the quality 
of research relationships and the extent of participant engagement with the 
research. The point I wish to make here is simply that these factors are perhaps 
not always accorded sufficient recognition with regard to their role in generating 
positive research outcomes.  
Naturally, my approach also had its share of challenges and limitations. In 
Bradford, while my ongoing relationships undoubtedly shaped the research 
                                                                
16
 Participant observation record: Community Development Unit, 28/11/2008.  
17
 Participant observation record: 29/11/2008. 
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design and development in positive ways, the impact in terms of broader 
research ownership was more limited than in Newcastle. I believe this to be for 
two main reasons. Firstly, the research was one case in a set of six cities; 
accordingly, the parameters of the research questions were (though flexible) 
fairly well defined. Moreover, there was a parallel collective process between 
the six field workers and the principal investigator; the greater familiarity with the 
research and closer engagement of this group meant that it inevitably had a 
greater impact on the overall research direction (this did also bring positive local 
outcomes, including as I have mentioned cross-case learning, in particular the 
international exchanges around PB which the research facilitated). 
Secondly, unless a more actively participatory research process is followed 
(which lay outside the design of the wider research project), it can be hard to 
overcome prior conceptions of conventional research approaches. Even 
amongst my key research partners, I was more than once surprised to come 
across the implicit expectation that my support for their work through non-
academic dissemination or by encouraging use of the findings was at least 
partially motivated by the desire to acquire additional data.18 In reality, though 
these processes do often provide further insights, I consider this secondary. I 
view working in partnership throughout the whole life of the research as 
essential to the case for doing the research. The occasional preconceptions I 
encountered highlight the popular (and at times justified) view that academic 
research is essentially extractive, not interactive. My learning from this case 
study, and the greater freedom enabled by working more independently, 
informed my research design in the Newcastle case. 
While building good ongoing research relationships was an explicit aim within 
my research methodology, this brought its own dilemmas. When working in 
situations where there were conflicts or opposing views, it was at times a 
challenge to ensure that all actors continued to trust that I was equally open to 
their perspective. While moving closer to being an ‘observant participant’ can 
bring important benefits in terms of trust and willingness to engage with more 
critical findings, the expectation (or, more accurately, realisation) that as a 
researcher you have a view is perhaps acknowledged more openly or earlier. 
This might otherwise occur only at the point of dissemination. At one level, I 
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 Participant observation record: Bradford Vision, 05/12/2006. 
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believe this simply to bring into the open an inevitable dimension of all research. 
I have argued that all knowledge is positioned, context-dependent and 
intrinsically linked to the identity of the knower. However, it is clear that just as a 
sense of shared purpose impacts positively on trust and engagement, a sense 
of dissonant perspectives can have a correspondingly negative impact. This can 
impact negatively on the quality of the research to the extent to which it causes 
research participants to feel increased defensiveness or distrust, and therefore 
to reduce engagement.  
This may be characterised as a tension between personal openness and 
honesty (participation) and communicative openness to all views (observation). 
I tried to mitigate this in two ways. Firstly, I found it helpful to have clarity on my 
role as a communication resource, rather than as a neutral observer. As 
researchers, we consciously aim to hear a comprehensive range of available 
voices and perspectives. Reflecting these through the research process can 
allow us to play a useful role in increasing shared understanding. Secondly, I 
sought to maintain a focus on the shared aims which were agreed in advance 
through the research process, and relate the exploration of a range of views to 
these shared aims. Furthermore, as a researcher rather than an embedded 
actor, it was inevitable that a certain distance remained. It was clear that my 
role was supporting and observing rather than contributing to decision-making; 
the line between ‘participant observer’ and ‘observant participant’ was thus 
never fully crossed. This was helpful in terms of ensuring that I was seen to be 
open to all views. 
Embedded and multi-dimensional research relationships also raise an ethical 
issue, in that the research process becomes more organic and open-ended; in 
other words, less distinctly defined for participants. I addressed this by actively 
working to keep my identity as a researcher present in people’s minds 
throughout my involvement, and, where necessary, through anonymising the 
‘voices’ (easily recognisable by fellow participants unless care is taken) as well 
as formal identities of participants.19 In addition, I believe that the participatory 
nature of the research mitigates against the extremes of ‘invasive’ observation 
                                                                
19
 I do believe the research to be fundamentally ethical, in that it takes seriously the aspirations 
and goals of research participants, and does not subordinate these to an externally determined 
research aim. 
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research, where ‘subjects’ are more passively involved (see Gillham, 2008:91-
98; Adler & Adler, 1998:100-104). 
A further issue with my approach was the difficulty of equally involving actors 
who have different levels of engagement with PB. In the case of both Newcastle 
and Bradford, while councillors at times had limited engagement with the 
delivery of the PB processes (this was certainly not true in every case), I 
considered them to be an important voice in terms of PB’s overall democratic 
potential. In Bradford, this dynamic was repeated with community members, 
who were involved in PB as participants but tended not to have a sense of 
ownership of the process because they were not invited to share in process 
design and delivery. The problem this posed for my approach was that, 
because I aimed to build deeper research relationships based on shared 
purpose and aims, it was difficult to achieve equal levels of engagement from 
people who did not have the same ownership of the process being researched. 
This was not a problem with regard to formal data collection (for example, I 
found that most councillors were very willing to give interviews), but it did limit 
process benefits from the research. For example, the dissemination workshop 
in Newcastle was well attended by both officers and community members, but 
no councillors were present. Of course, this does not mean that councillors 
were not involved in such conversations elsewhere, simply that, to the extent 
that the research process was able to increase these reflective spaces, an 
important voice (unsurprisingly, the one that is also least present within delivery 
discussions) was missing. 
Overall, however, I believe these are limits to the extent to which I was able to 
increase ownership and voice within the research, rather than ways in which my 
chosen methodology detracted from ownership and voice, relative to a less 
engaged methodology. As with any social process, research is a journey, not a 
snapshot. The attempt to foreground research process alongside the creation of 
a knowledge-product can make a contribution in bringing us closer to the goal of 
engaged, useful and used research. 
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CONCLUSION 
In this research, two geographical case studies supplemented by national 
engagement provide a lens on the development and practice of PB in the UK. 
The methodology I have used to undertake this research process has 
generated significant local learning, reflected in a number of reports aimed at 
practitioners which help connect research findings with local PB development 
outcomes (Pearce et al, 2008; Blakey, 2009; see also Blakey & Jackson, 2010; 
Blakey & Jackson, 2011) and a PB self-evaluation tool-kit which translates 
learning into a more practical form (Blakey & Jackson, 2009). 
The research has also generated academic findings, which are grounded in 
experiential knowledge, and which form the basis of this study (see also Blakey, 
2008; 2010; 2011). A partnership does not require us to devalue conceptual, 
academic forms of knowing. Indeed, it explicitly encourages all of us, academics 
and practitioners, to place a clear value on both kinds of knowing. This can be 
counter-cultural, both in a practice setting which can sometimes regard 
academia as extractive and out of touch, and consequently not always useful, 
and in an academic setting which has at times been guilty of promoting a 
hierarchy of knowledge, in which academic knowledge is assumed to be more 
valid than other forms. It is not easy to overcome these dynamics, and I have of 
course only partially succeeded in doing so. However, I believe that the attempt 
can help us act as reflective, engaged researchers, with a contribution to make 
to processes of change.  
In the next chapter, I begin the story of this research with the conceptual terrain 
that the democratic narratives I witnessed in Newcastle led me to – the 
construction of democratic meaning. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DEMOCRATIC ‘TRUTHS’ IN THE MAKING 
You would be forgiven for thinking that democracy is not a contested concept, 
so prevalent is the view that the Western liberal representative system equals 
democracy. Fukuyama famously declared our times to be ‘the end of history as 
such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the 
universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human 
government’ (Fukuyama, 1989:4). Whilst history has tempestuously proved him 
wrong, there remains an unprecedented standardization of what is publicly 
recognised as 'democracy'.1 The definition used by Freedom House to 
‘measure’ democracy is narrow and specific, and captures what the vast 
majority in the West have been led to recognise as democracy: 
‘Political systems whose leaders are elected in competitive multi-party 
and multi-candidate processes in which opposition parties have a 
legitimate chance of attaining power or participating in power.’   
(Freedom House, 1999) 
Across the political spectrum, other modern definitions are remarkably similar. 
Schumpeter, a defender of elite power, defined the democratic method as ‘that 
institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals 
acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s 
vote’ (Schumpeter, 1943:269) while Ralph Miliband, a fierce critic of the 
capitalist democratic state, defined it as ‘political competition on a more-than-
one party basis, the right of opposition, regular elections, representative 
assemblies, civic guarantees and other restrictions on the use of state power, 
etc.’ (Miliband, 1969:21). Unsurprisingly, Margaret Thatcher was still more 
reductive in what she chose to celebrate about democracy. Where Schumpeter 
and Miliband either prescribed or observed (a crucial distinction) a limited role 
for the citizen who delegates rather than exercises power in modern 
democracies, she highlighted ‘tolerance, respect for the law and for the impartial 
administration of justice, and respect for private property’ as the key values for 
parliamentary democracy, over any mention of citizen power (Thatcher, 1988). 
                                                                
1
 Despite, of course, the extensive variety of conceptions of democracy that are core to 
democratic scholarship; Saward (2003:144-151) provides what he calls a ‘selective list’ of 34. 
36 
 
This twentieth century narrowing of mainstream definitions of democracy 
illustrates a purposeful contraction of the public character of democracy, which 
has formerly been more openly contested and debated. John Dunn reminds us 
in his history Setting the people free: the story of democracy that the health of 
Athenian democracy lay not least in their disagreements over what it was and 
what form it should take (Dunn, 2005:31). This suggests that to revive our 
moribund democracy, rather than signing up more people to this narrow vision, 
we need to reclaim the terrain of contesting democracy, to assert our different 
visions because they make a difference to the kind of society that ensues. 
Critically, today’s dominant understanding of democracy is no convergence of 
disparate ideas from varied places, which might reasonably have suggested 
Fukuyama’s 'end of history' thesis. Rather, it is the purposeful and global 
success of a hegemonising idea, a particular and narrow definition of 
democracy which links the legitimising force of collective public action invoked 
by the word democracy to a very specific set of practices and beliefs, which, as 
I explore in this chapter, are intimately connected with elite control and capitalist 
social organisation, the ‘order of egoism’, in Buonarroti’s terms. 
This narrative is associated with an economic view of social well-being, and is 
linked to a primarily individualistic view of human nature, a view of the state as 
safeguarding liberty, property and trade, equality as formal (equal opportunities, 
which is in essence a defence of inequality) and freedom as the individual 
capacity to act without constraint. In contrast, the narrative of equality is rooted 
in a sense of the potential in human nature for cooperation and collectivity. 
Accordingly, it suggests a view of the state’s primary function as advancing 
human happiness, equality as substantive (a claim to reduce material 
inequality) and freedom as a concern with human flourishing which requires us 
to tackle the constraints of birth, injustice and inequality.  
Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s description of the views of subjects against those of 
citizens chimes very much with these two narratives, and for the most part 
remains strikingly pertinent today:  
‘Subjects extol the public tranquillity, citizens the liberty of individuals; the 
former prefer security of possessions, the latter, that of persons; the 
former are of the opinion that the best government is the most severe, 
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the latter maintain that it is the mildest; the one party wish that crimes 
should be punished and the other that they should be prevented … the 
one party are satisfied when money circulates, the other party demand 
that the people should have bread.’ (Rousseau, 1762:84) 
Actually existing democracies are an accommodation between these two 
orientations, between an elite and a people, each representing a competing 
claim to power. They are the outcome of specific historical struggles by real 
actors with particular agendas, between multifaceted elites broadly defending 
the status quo and a kaleidoscope of revolutionaries struggling for social 
change (democratic change being generally associated with moments of 
struggle between entrenched privilege and power and uprisings for greater 
equality and justice). Thus Dunn, who describes how Athenian democracy 
operated as a means of containing the land hunger of the poor, refers to the 
‘winning offer’ from rulers to ruled, which is not fixed but endlessly renegotiated, 
combining the minimum recognition of claimed rights with extensive protection 
of the social order which keeps the elite in power (Dunn, 2005:146).  
In history, there have been key moments which have clearly shaped our 
democratic thought and practice, and which embody the struggles between 
these two broad orientations, none more significant than the late eighteenth 
century. The American and French Revolutions gave us the language and 
issues which have shaped our democratic present, and they embody the 
struggle between the narrative of individual self-interest, which claimed the 
banner of democracy during the American Revolution, and the narrative of 
equality, which claimed it during the French Revolution.  
Crucially, what happened in that turbulent era which began with the new hope 
of the American Revolution, and perhaps symbolically ended in the crushing 
defeat of the Paris Commune in 1871, is that democracy, historically associated 
with substantive equality, underwent a transformation. It began the era as an 
atrocious idea associated with mob rule and disorder (in the minds of Europe’s 
monarchist elites, at least), flowered briefly in the confidence and optimism of 
two new nations, but during that age of revolutions (Hobsbawm, 1975) the 
newly emerging elites redefined it in such a way as to make it at last an 
acceptable bed-fellow for substantive inequality. In so doing, they appropriated 
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a fresh reserve of political power at a moment when the historical sources of 
power and legitimacy which sustained their predecessors (aristocracy and 
divine right) were on the wane. 
Importantly, we can thus observe that the anodyne definition of democracy that 
history has bequeathed us, as representative not participatory, structure not 
activity, has had a relatively short existence. Throughout history, democracy 
has been more often associated with radical ideas and social unrest, democrats 
being commonly viewed as ‘dangerous and subversive mob agitators’ as late as 
the early nineteenth century (Williams, 1963:14). Before the 1848 ‘year of 
revolutions’, democracy was associated with socialism or communism by actors 
from right across the political spectrum; thus it was widely accepted that there 
was an intimate connection between democracy and equality (Christopherson, 
1966:295). This history shines through in today’s counter-hegemonic 
understandings of democracy, which place the democratic citizen centre-stage.  
José, a Participatory Budgeting activist from Porto Alegre, doesn’t ‘believe in 
any revolution which doesn’t start with conscious, aware citizens’, and stresses 
that democracy means the oversight of collective public action, not just making 
demands (Bruce, 2004:16). Likewise, the Zapatista revolutionaries in Mexico, 
who struggle not for democracy alone but for ‘democracy, liberty and justice’, 
pay tribute to the history on which they build: 
‘We then began encouraging the autonomous rebel zapatista 
municipalities; which is how the peoples are organized in order to govern 
and to govern themselves; in order to make themselves stronger. This 
method of autonomous government was not simply invented by the 
EZLN, but rather it comes from several centuries of indigenous 
resistance and from the zapatistas' own experience. It is the self-
governance of the communities. In other words, no one from outside 
comes to govern, but the peoples themselves decide, among 
themselves, who governs and how, and, if they do not obey, they are 
removed. If the one who governs does not obey the people, they pursue 
them, they are removed from authority, and another comes in.’      
(6th Communique of the EZLN, 2005) 
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Both these understandings of democracy begin with the citizen, not with the 
government. From this viewpoint, it is no surprise to observe that the 
democratic rights we have now were not the disinterested gift of the ruling 
classes, as Fukuyama disingenuously suggested when he argued that ‘the 
habits of democratic contestation and compromise, where the rights of the 
losers are carefully protected, were more readily learned first by a small, elite 
group with similar social backgrounds and inclinations, than by a large and 
heterogeneous society’ (Fukuyama, 1992:219) but are the consequence of 
working class struggles for justice (Engler, 2010:16). This is a significant 
historical association for radical democrats today, and one that today’s elites 
have a corresponding interest in forgetting. Predictably, this history has been 
obscured rather than celebrated. The redefinition of democracy and the 
essential severing of its connection to equality is a victory for liberalism and 
capitalism. 
In this vein, democracy today is often presented (by defenders of the status quo 
at least) as ahistorical, resting on something immutable, on a fixed ‘human 
nature’ (see for example, Masters, 1989; Fukuyama, 1992). As Bookchin 
(1989:29) puts it, ‘the trick of every ruling elite from the beginnings of history to 
modern times has been to identify its socially created hierarchical systems of 
domination with community life as such, with the result that human-made 
institutions acquire divine or biological sanction’. Thus, they are made to appear 
unchallengeable. It is the conscious hegemonic project of the powerful that we 
believe the ‘folklore of the new generation’, as Bauman describes neoliberal 
myths about society and humanity (Bauman, 1998:71-2).2 
However, as antifoundationalist Richard Rorty points out: 
‘‘Human nature’, ‘rationality’, and ‘morality’ are abbreviations for the kinds 
of human conduct we wish to encourage. To say that a certain course of 
conduct is more in accord with human nature or our moral sense, or 
more rational, than another is just a fancy way of commending one’s own 
sense of what is most worth preserving in our present practices, or 
commending our own utopian vision of our community’ (Rorty, 1996:334) 
                                                                
2
 I will explore this idea further in the following chapter. 
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Through this lens, the tendency of much modern democratic theory to present 
democracy as an apolitical structure rather than a struggle between two very 
political and value-laden visions, takes on a dangerous hue. This approach risks 
rendering invisible the values and agenda inherent in the liberal, capitalist 
model of democracy (that we all too often understand to be democracy). This 
terrain matters because how we collectively conceive of democracy, whether it 
is as a supposedly neutral structure or as an action – a claim to power, shapes 
the reality of our political processes and structures, and thus affects the ways in 
which (and extent to which) we are able to act as a citizenry, as a demos. Our 
conceptions of democracy shape our ability and capacity to act democratically; 
as a result they fundamentally shape our social reality. 
Throughout history, actors have fought with their words, actions, and lives for 
the meaning of democracy, for a definition or conception which would facilitate 
the kind of state and society that each hoped to achieve. Accordingly, in this 
chapter (as throughout the study) I focus on the writings of activist-theorists in 
order to uncover the close relationship between democratic theory and practice. 
It is the historically contingent outcomes of these very concrete contests for 
meaning which explain how we ended up here, where the word democracy, 
under whose banner rebels and revolutionaries have marched through history, 
has come to be synonymous with the electoral preservation in power of a social 
and economic elite. 
My aim in this chapter is not to provide an overview of democratic history, but 
simply to illustrate how commonly taken-for-granted (in the West at least) 
‘truths’ about democracy are in fact historically contingent, rather than fixed and 
inevitable, and to make visible the underlying values and goals which inform 
prevalent Western assumptions. The ratification of the American Constitution 
over the winter of 1787/88 offers a clear illustration of how such ‘truths’ were 
once passionately debated (I will also take a brief look at British developments 
in the same period, later in the chapter).  
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE TRIUMPH OF COMMERCE, REPRESENTATION, AND 
THE SOVEREIGN STATE 
On the 17th of September 1787, following a unparalleled rejection not only of 
colonial rule but of monarchical power as divinely ordained, the Federal 
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Convention of the United States adopted a Constitution which represents the 
birth of the United States as the first modern self-proclaimed democracy, and 
which spells out a vision of democracy which has shaped our lives ever since. 
The next eight months witnessed a fierce and fundamental debate over the very 
nature of democracy, as each state decided whether or not to ratify the 
constitution. The case for the Constitution has been captured in the Federalist 
Papers, 85 essays written with haste, passion and energy by Alexander 
Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, who argue the need for a large, 
empowered state with a brief for international commerce and the nation’s place 
on a global stage. Crudely, their case is intended to justify as democratically 
accountable the exercise of power by a representative government. 
The case against the Constitution can be read in the writings and speeches of a 
less tight-knit and less well-known group of their opponents, known as the Anti-
Federalists.3 This view was espoused by some high profile politicians and 
revolutionaries such as Melancton Smith (delegate to the Continental Congress) 
and ‘founding father’ Patrick Henry, alongside others who were less well-known 
or anonymous (writing under pseudonyms such as ‘John DeWitt’ and ‘Brutus’). 
There is more variation in these writers’ views than between Hamilton, Madison 
and Jay who sought to write with one voice under the pen-name ‘Publius’.4 
However, overall, the Anti-Federalists are concerned with domestic politics, with 
the effect that government has on its citizens, and thus fundamentally with the 
nature of the relationship between the state and the citizen. Their very different 
goal was the protection of emerging smaller scale democracies in which citizens 
could themselves exercise power. 
This historical moment perhaps comes closer to being the ‘social contract’ in 
action than any other time in history. For these writers and their contemporaries, 
the social contract was not a device to understand or legitimise existing 
systems, as it was for Hobbes and others who have come after him. It was a 
real and far-reaching choice. Indeed, the American protagonists’ own sense of 
                                                                
3
 As an aside, the terms ‘Federalists’ and ‘Anti-Federalists’ are something of a misnomer; the 
Federalists wanted a union based on one people, in effect one state, whereas the Anti-
Federalists, given this name because they distrusted the concentration of power at federal level, 
in fact wanted a more genuinely federal union of allied but independent states. 
4
 This was despite the fact that they would belong to different parties in the new government, 
illustrating the extent to which fundamental questions over the nature of democracy supersede 
‘party political’ distinctions. 
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being at a turning point in history leaps from the pages of their writing, their 
sense of responsibility to us and the future. The revolutionary pamphleteer Tom 
Paine declared that ‘birth-day of a new world is at hand’ (Paine, 1776:53) and 
that their actions were not ‘the concern of a day, a year, or an age; posterity are 
virtually involved in the contest, and will be more or less affected, even to the 
end of time, by the proceedings now’ (op. cit.:20). Likewise, Hamilton begins his 
arguments in Federalist 1 with the reflection that ‘it seems to have been 
reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide 
the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of 
establishing good government from reflection and choice’ (Federalist 1:11).5 
This is the core subject matter of their writing; what freedoms would they give 
up to what kind of state in return for which protections and rights? This was no 
abstract decision, no elegant thought experiment. Therefore, the outcome does 
not represent an ideal, but a hard-fought accommodation between different 
positions, interests and values. This is illustrated, for example, by Madison’s 
discomfort at finding himself in the position of recommending the compromise 
on slavery (Federalist 54). In this, the United States of the late 1780s is 
comparable to every other really existing democracy, our own included. 
Theoretical visions of democracy rest on relatively coherent values and views of 
human nature and the state; actual democracies, while they have a dominant 
underlying ethos, embody the struggle between competing values. These 
struggles have left their scars on the body politic in the form of inconsistencies 
and tensions, and other understandings of words and concepts such as liberty, 
equality and democracy itself, meanings somewhat left behind by history, but 
bearing a rich tradition nonetheless. This inclination in the development of our 
democracy, while it has perhaps been stunted, remains with us, offering a 
window of opportunity for challenging hegemonic thought. The ideological and 
practical construction of representative government in post-colonial America 
helps us comprehend the meaning of the democratic legacy we have inherited. 
The drama of the struggle between two different approaches to democracy 
illuminates the corresponding narratives of state, society and human nature, as 
well as different views on underpinning ideas such as liberty and equality. 
                                                                
5
 All page references for the Federalist Papers in this chapter relate to the 2008 Oxford 
University Press edition, Hamilton et al, edited by Lawrence Goldman. 
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However, the American Revolution is also an important moment because it 
inspired people. Democracy entered this period of history as a ‘dirty word’, and 
left it a legitimising force. Tom Paine, a key figure in terms of social and political 
change in England, America and France, was no dry theorist but a revolutionary 
who was read, whose words changed things, and whose words, as a result, the 
English state went to great lengths to suppress.6 Paine doesn’t describe 
America dispassionately, but presents it as an inspiration, an example to follow, 
celebrating French soldiers who were ‘placed in the school of freedom, and 
learned the practice as well as the principles of it by heart’ – and who carried 
them back to France (Paine, 1792a:146). The American Revolution established 
democracy as respectable and, crucially, possible. Previously, it was 
understood to be a form of government which required the highest virtue, 
motives and judgement. The Federalists rested their case on a pragmatic shift 
in understanding, that as democratic institutions are created by ‘fallible men’ 
[sic], they do not have to be perfect, just less imperfect than the alternative or 
preceding institutions (see Federalists 37-38). America is important because it 
has shaped us, but also because it reminds us that if we’re going to change the 
world, it helps to have inspiration. We need to see new ideas about democracy 
take shape and come alive. Indeed, this period of history reminds us why 
examples such as Porto Alegre are vital for democrats today. 
It is also worth remembering that while the Federalists were conscious of their 
historical importance, they could not of course predict the consequences of their 
beliefs and actions. Tom Paine belonged without a shadow of a doubt to the 
‘order of equality’, as we see perhaps most clearly in his tract Agrarian Justice – 
in essence a visionary design for a welfare state (Paine, 1797), yet he aligned 
himself with the Federalists, believing the emerging modes of commerce were a 
democratising force and would ensure peace and prosperity for all. We can see 
here the integral link between the form that America’s politics took and the 
beginnings of the expansionist moment for capital. This is no conspiracy theory; 
Paine is a symbol that, for some at least, democracy and capitalism’s journey 
                                                                
6
 The Rights of Man was outlawed in England because of establishment fears that the ‘French 
madness’ would spread, following plans for a cheaper edition (significant because it would be 
more accessible to the poor). A Royal Proclamation against seditious writing was issued in May 
1792, together with a warrant for Paine’s arrest, describing him as ‘a wicked, malicious, 
seditious, and evil disposed person’ (Paine, 1792b:367). Paine was in France working on the 
Republican constitution by the time the hand-picked jury outlawed him (Philp, 1995:xii-xiii).  
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together began in good faith. The value for us is not in simplistically ascribing to 
those actors a desire to end up here, but in tracing our story backwards, and 
understanding the choices that brought us to the democracy we have today, 
choices which had the effect of turning our democracy towards one path and 
away from others – choices that we perhaps at times forget we still have. 
As I have said, the outcome was not a clear-cut enactment of one vision to the 
exclusion of the other. The constitution itself was a compromise hammered out 
between many different factions and interests, as Madison discusses in 
Federalist 37, with the evident aim of encouraging dissenters to accept the 
compromises contained in the constitution (Federalist 37:179). After the event, 
the Anti-Federalists were still influential, Jefferson in particular being 
sympathetic to these views (Ketcham, 2003:20). Also, there were naturally 
differences of view within each side of the debate. Much has of course been 
written on this and other aspects of the American Revolution; here I am 
concerned only with the broad sweep of the different perspectives (which 
inevitably underplays important nuances and internal debates) in order to 
illustrate the evolutionary and value-laden nature of democratic theory in action.  
Finally, and unlike the coming revolution in France, this was not a social 
transformation which included the poorest as actors. These democratic 
struggles took place amongst the new elites who had so recently thrown off the 
moribund British aristocracy, against a backdrop of social ferment and unrest at 
all levels in society (see Ray Raphael’s 2001 book The American Revolution: a 
people’s history for a view of these events from the perspective of ordinary 
Americans of all classes, ethnicity and gender). Furthermore, in this uncharted 
territory it was not clear to the actors of the day how their momentous decisions 
about state and society would play out. In the following section, I consider the 
aims and concerns of each side, and explore the contrasting understandings of 
human nature, state and society that underpin them. 
FEDERALIST AND ANTI-FEDERALIST VISIONS AND GOALS 
In the winter of 1787-88, the view held by the Federalists largely prevailed at 
federal level. Accordingly, our current systems owe a great deal to their vision of 
an empowered political elite with an expansionist trade and commerce agenda, 
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checked by reference to a relatively politically inactive and contained populace.7 
Key figures amongst the Anti-Federalists have largely faded from historical 
view, whereas Hamilton, Madison and Jay went on to become the first 
Secretary of the Treasury, the fourth President and the first Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court, playing their part in embedding that vision of democracy in our 
collective psyche. 
These three were already prominent figures on the national stage by the time 
they wrote The Federalist Papers. Hamilton was renowned for his illustrious 
service as George Washington’s aide-de-camp during the Revolutionary War, 
Madison was a protégée of Thomas Jefferson who became the youngest 
delegate to the Continental Congress in 1779, while Jay was a wealthy lawyer 
who organised opposition to British rule, serving as president of the Congress 
from 1778. Importantly, they saw the federal government as the stage which 
they personally would occupy; it is the viewpoint from which they considered the 
ramifications of democratic design (they were potential rulers considering a 
polity, not first and foremost citizens viewing the system they would live under).8 
Fresh from an international power struggle shaped by the elites of England, 
France and Russia, and personally very conscious of the ongoing fragility of the 
new state for which they fought so passionately, they tended to look to the 
maintenance of the new territories international position. Thus, Hamilton defines 
the primary purpose of the federal state as defence and trade (Federalist 
23:114). As such, their concerns accord with the orientation towards 
individualistic self-interest in viewing the state as existing to safeguard liberty, 
property and trade. What powers would enhance their abilities to act in this 
arena? We can read here both a real concern for the territory’s independence 
and power in a still volatile and potentially hostile environment, and a subjective 
standpoint as the new elites who sought to hold power at this level, and who 
were fully conscious of the tinderbox of social unrest. The new settlers of 
America – of all social stations – had recently collaborated to throw off unjust 
rule, and were in no mood to accept new masters. 
                                                                
7
 It is worth noting that there is a great deal of distinction between state and federal politics in 
the US. While anti-federalist values have naturally played a much greater role at state level, it is 
with the federal level debates that this chapter is concerned. 
8
 A significant distinction, which I characterise as the difference between a ‘citizen-eye view’ and 
an ‘engineer’s-eye view’; I discuss this idea further in later chapters. 
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The goal of a strong national state is a consistent thread in Federalist writing. 
The Federalists do have concerns about unchecked government; emerging 
from the shadow of monarchy and colonial rule, they insist on the formal 
sovereignty of the people not the powerful. However, they prioritise commerce 
and trade, and understand an accountable but strong government to be 
necessary to promote and protect these. In laying out the aims of the Federalist 
Papers, Hamilton asserts by way of a foundational principle that ‘the vigor of 
government is essential to the security of liberty’ (Federalist 1:13), and later 
stresses that government must have the means to carry out the tasks entrusted 
to it (Federalist 26:148). Thus government is above all presented as the means 
to an end (the pressing need to secure the new territory against ongoing 
external threats as well as internal divisions), rather than as an end in itself: a 
collective expression of the popular will. 
Consciously nation-building (the dangers of ‘faction’ is another recurring theme), 
the Federalists thus sought to secure the legitimising force of democracy to the 
Federal rather than State government. Hamilton writes of the need to ‘extend 
the authority of the union to the persons of the citizens – the only proper objects 
of government’ with the explicit aim of ‘forming the characteristic difference 
between a league and a government’ (Federalist 15:76). This aim shaped the 
Federalists commitment to representative rather than participatory democracy 
(in their terms a republic rather than a democracy), due to the scale of the 
political entity they wished to legitimise as a single democracy, namely the 
union as a whole, rather than individual states. Madison states this clearly: 
‘In a democracy the people meet and exercise the government in person; 
in a republic they assemble and administer it by their representatives and 
agents. A democracy, consequently, must be confined to a small spot. A 
republic may be extended over a large region.’ (Federalist 14:68). 
This illustrates how the Federalists’ goal of nation-building requires this form of 
‘democracy’. This goal was closely linked to their agenda for trade and 
commerce, rooted in the attempt to strengthen a fledgling state, and prepared 
the ground for later capitalist expansion. However, it is worth noting that the 
relationship between a large polity and representative government was one 
which the Federalists wholly approved. They favoured representative 
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government because it enabled the large polity they were committed to, but 
equally they regarded the fact that a large polity required representative 
government as a positive part of the case for a large polity, because it contained 
the turbulence of the multitude. Again, Madison makes the case explicitly: 
‘It clearly appears that the same advantage which a republic has over a 
democracy in controlling the effects of faction is enjoyed by a large over 
a small republic – is enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it. 
Does this advantage consist in the substitution of representatives whose 
enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local 
prejudices and to schemes of injustice? It will not be denied that the 
representation of the Union will be most likely to possess these requisite 
endowments.’ (Federalist 10:54). 
In striking contrast, the Anti-Federalists were more likely to be found amongst 
the local elites within individual states, who feared the loss of their autonomy to 
a distant federal power which might neither understand nor value their individual 
circumstances. Thus a key reason they opposed the Federalists and favoured 
democratic power at state level was precisely because it gave greater scope for 
participation, or at least representation in the spirit of delegation by the people 
rather than representation of the people, than the Federalists wished to enable.9 
Critically, operating from a viewpoint at state level with a more localist agenda, 
they wished to retain space for dissent between states, which the Federalists 
consciously wished to minimise. 
While the Anti-Federalists do not represent the ‘order of equality’ in simplistic 
terms as I have presented it, they do stand for a more localised participatory 
understanding of democracy than that espoused by the Federalists. In the 
following discussion, I do not dwell on the exclusions which the Anti-Federalists 
take for granted; women, slaves and the poorest do not visibly count as 
democratic actors in their writings. This is not to downplay the importance of 
these exclusions; my aim is rather to explore the different conceptions of human 
nature, state, liberty and equality which correspond with different perspectives 
on ‘the people’ (and it is certainly not in the exclusion of women and the very 
                                                                
9
 They therefore regard themselves as citizens evaluating the structures by which others seek to 
exercise power in their name; to the extent that this is the case, their arguments reflect what I 
have termed a ‘citizen-eye view’. 
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poorest sections of society that the Anti-Federalists differed from the 
Federalists).  My intention is not to romanticise the Anti-Federalists, but to 
identify threads of democratic thought which were constrained by the structural 
triumph of the Federalists’ particular vision of representative government. 
Anti-Federalists writings clearly demonstrate their affinity and preoccupation 
with the ‘middling classes’ rather than ‘the people’ as a whole, as we would 
understand the term today (Melancton Smith asserts that ‘the substantial 
yeomanry of the country are more temperate, of better morals and less ambition 
than the great’, 21st June 1788:344). Their concerns are not primarily outward-
looking, the position of the state within the world or the freedom of the powerful 
to act on behalf of the state, but focus on the relationship between power-
holders and the people (as they understand them). 
Crucially, for the Federalists, democracy is a justification for elite power, whose 
scope and direction they are concerned with. For the Anti-Federalists, 
democracy is power. They are interested in democracy as a system for 
decision-making, not only as a source of legitimacy. Their concern is with the 
autonomy and political activity of the individual (by which they generally mean 
the ‘middling classes’ with whom they identify) rather than the autonomy of 
statesmen.10 Theirs was a vision of small republics where virtuous, self-reliant 
citizens managed their own affairs; the stage they sought to occupy was not 
international, and so they rejected the political and commercial ambitions of the 
Federalists.  
TWO VIEWS OF ‘THE PEOPLE’: DEMOCRACY AND CLASS IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 
Given their context, it is unsurprising that for the Federalists, ‘the people’ appear 
as an abstraction, a construct in democratic theory which confers legitimacy. In 
their writings, ‘the people’ do not appear as a capable, self-determining force of 
government. They are appealed to; they do not initiate action. Hamilton asserts 
that the consent of the people is the ‘pure, original fountain of all legitimate 
authority’ but defines the consent of the people as ratifying systems of 
                                                                
10
 While the Anti-Federalists’ challenge to Federal authority aimed to bring the seat of power 
closer to the individual, it also illustrates how each new settlement creates a new power 
dynamic, a new elite which must then be challenged and unsettled. In this sense, the enactment 
of democracy is best understood as a journey, an ongoing series of claims to be exercised by 
the disenfranchised in each society; it has no endpoint.   
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government, not decision-making (Federalist 23:113). The legitimising power of 
democracy was specifically and narrowly defined during this moment of history 
in a way we have come to take for granted. This thread recurs. Madison warns 
against ‘too frequent appeals’ to the people (Federalist 49:251), and praises 
representation as ‘a defense to the people against their own temporary errors 
and delusions’ (Federalist 63:310). 
For the Federalists, human nature can appear as individualistic and ultimately 
selfish, a force to be restrained. ‘Men’ [sic] are ‘ambitious, vindictive and 
rapacious’ (Federalist 6:29), and have ‘so strong [a] propensity to fall into 
mutual animosities’ that ‘the latent causes of faction [dissent and group conflict] 
are thus sown in the nature of man’ (Federalist 10:50). Madison puts it explicitly: 
‘what is government but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men 
were angels, no government would be necessary’ (Federalist 51:257). People 
as an idea are the source of power, but in the mass they have the shades of a 
mob to be feared. He warns of ‘the danger of disturbing the public tranquillity by 
interesting too strongly the public passions’ (Federalist 49:251), arguing that 
while democracy is control by the reason of the people (in the person of elite 
representatives), government should control the passions of the people as a 
whole. It is self-evident that such a view of humanity shapes the corresponding 
assumptions made about democracy. When actual people make an 
appearance, they are to be contained. 
Thus, the contrast between the picture presented of representatives’ qualities 
and that of the masses reveals a seemingly contradictory view of the potential 
within human nature. Madison says that while there is good and bad in human 
nature, ‘republican government presupposes the existence of [qualities 
justifying esteem and confidence] in a higher degree than any other form’ 
(Federalist 55:277-8). Indeed, Hamilton describes the purpose of the essays as 
to persuade ‘wise and good men’ [sic] that they should give their consent to the 
new Constitution (Federalist 1:12). Thus, Madison commends ‘the substitution 
of representatives whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render 
them superior to local prejudices and to schemes of injustice’ (Federalist 10:54). 
Here we see how far this incarnation of democracy (which we have inherited) 
has moved from the Athenian model of citizen control. For the Athenians there 
was a clear distinction between involving experts as advisors on technical 
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matters, and as decision-makers. The ‘universality’ of civic virtue (which was not 
innate but learned in the polis) was seen as critical to democratic practice 
(Meiksins Wood, 1995:192-4).11 Accordingly, Aristotle believed that 
representation by election was anti-democratic because it favoured the elite. It 
was used when technical expertise was needed (for example, generals 
commanding military action), but usual democratic practice rested on selection 
by lot. Selection implies that all citizens have the potential for civic wisdom; 
election accords with the idea of expert rule and a politically incompetent mass. 
By contrast, within the Federalist Papers there is a distinct theme of reassuring 
the elite that the constitution contains rather than advances the emergent power 
of the people, stated unambiguously by Hamilton in Federalist 36: 
‘The representation of the people … will consist almost entirely of 
proprietors of land, of merchants, and of members of the learned 
professions, who will truly represent all those different interests and 
views [of the various classes].’ (Federalist 36:168). 
Tellingly, this discussion occurs in a series of essays on taxation, the clear 
implication being that the poor will not be allowed into power to tax the rich. 
Madison assures his readers that: 
‘Mechanics and manufacturers will always be inclined, with few 
exceptions, to give their votes to merchants in preference to persons of 
their own professions or trades … they know that the merchant is their 
natural patron and friend; and they are aware that however great their 
confidence they may justly feel in their own good sense, their interests 
can be more effectually promoted by the merchant than by themselves. 
They are sensible that their habits in life have not been such as to give 
them those acquired endowments, without which in a deliberative 
assembly the greatest natural ability are for the most part useless; and 
that the influence and weight and superior acquirements of the 
merchants render them more equal to a contest with any spirit which 
might happen to infuse itself into the public councils, unfriendly to the 
manufacturing and trading interests.’ (Federalist 35:165). 
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 Universal across those considered citizens, of course.  
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Democracy in this tradition is about strong government, not a strong citizenry. 
The Federalists do not believe the people as a whole are capable of effective 
decision-making (thus, during the 1787 Constitutional Convention, Hamilton 
described ‘the mass of the people’ as ‘turbulent and changing; they seldom 
judge or determine right’; Zinn, 1996:95). We the masses confer legitimacy, but 
the business of politics is best done for us by our betters. Representative 
democracy has not failed to erode elite control. It has succeeded in the aim it 
was designed to achieve. This is not the democratic rhetoric we hear today, but 
our Western systems of government remain very close to the one designed by 
the Federalists to protect us from ourselves. To underline the intention that 
representative government separates the people from power, Madison stresses 
that the distinction between the American government and ancient democracies 
‘lies in the total exclusion of the people in their collective capacity’ in the new 
American system, not the absence of representation in Athens (Federalist 
63:313; emphasis in original). In other words, both systems utilised 
representation, but Madison makes clear that the new American democracy is 
different because it only uses representation; there are no opportunities 
alongside this for the collective, direct articulation of the popular will.12 
Importantly, this view of representation is in direct opposition to the right of 
recall, which as we will see is a strong Anti-Federalist theme, and recurs in 
modern democratic alternatives such as participatory budgeting (and of course 
is still present at State level in the US). The representative model of democracy, 
promoted by the Federalists and embedded in the UK, draws on Edmund 
Burke’s famous dictum that ‘your representative owes you, not his industry only, 
but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to 
your opinion’ (Burke, 1774). What is critical here is that the right of recall retains 
real power with the people as a whole; Burke’s view in contrast defends and 
codifies the removal of that power. 
While ‘the people’ do not appear as active political agents in the pages of the 
Federalist Papers, of course this is exactly what they were, as the Federalists 
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 It is important to note, therefore, that a critique of ‘representative democracy’ is not a 
condemnation of representation, per se. Rather, it is a critique of a particular model of 
representation, one which is based on the substitution of expert decision-making for popular 
control, rather than, as in the Anti-Federalist understanding and in Porto Alegre, a delegate 
model whereby representatives convey rather than replace the wider views of citizens. 
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were fully aware. The Constitution – and its defence by the Federalists – was 
written in the closing days of the American Revolution, and despite history’s 
preoccupation with heroes and generals, it was a Revolution made by the 
common people as much as the great, people who in the absence of an 
American civil police force had been enforcing social norms and justice through 
collective public action for decades, tearing down bawdy houses, liberating 
impressed seamen and rioting against unjust taxation (Raphael, 2001:12). The 
Revolution itself was moved forwards through massive uprisings of the people, 
against which the British Army was powerless, notably in Massachusetts in 
1774, where tens of thousands of rural folk participated in a spontaneous 
uprising with no leaders, decisions being made by participants. While rich and 
poor worked together against the colonial powers, class dynamics did not 
simply evaporate. ‘Shirtmen’ signed up but refused to take orders from their 
‘betters’ and many soldiers insisted on democratic decision-making (op. cit.:59, 
94-96). The Boston tea party symbolises how the social resentments of the poor 
against the extravagances of the rich dovetailed with a strategic resistance to 
the tax on tea: a conspicuous luxury good (op. cit.:17). 
Gouverneur Morris, author of large sections of the Constitution, witnessed a 
crowd action on the eve of the Revolution and wrote as follows to John Penn (a 
signatory in 1776 to the Declaration of Independence): 
‘These sheep, simple as they are, cannot be gulled as heretofore. In 
short, there is no ruling them; and now, to leave the metaphor, the heads 
of the mobility grow dangerous to the gentry; and how to keep them 
down is the question … The mob begin to think and to reason. Poor 
reptiles: it is with them a vernal morning, they are struggling to cast off 
their winter’s slough, they bask in the sunshine, and ere noon they will 
bite, depend upon it. the gentry begin to fear this … I see, and I see it 
with fear and trembling, that if the disputes with Great Britain continue, 
we shall be under the worst of all possible dominions; we shall be under 
the dominion of a riotous mob.’ (Morris, 20th May, 1774). 
Democracy was not handed down by the elite, it was demanded by the people, 
a people who had witnessed the assertion of self-determination by a nation, and 
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now asserted their own right to self-determination, as Ebenezer Fox, who at the 
age of twelve ran away to join the revolutionary forces, later recalled: 
‘Almost all the conversation that came to my ears related to the injustice 
of England and the tyranny of government. It is perfectly natural that the 
spirit of insubordination that prevailed should spread among the younger 
members of the community. We made direct application of the doctrines 
we daily heard, in relation to the oppression of the mother country, to our 
own circumstances.’ (Fox, 1838:17-18) 
In the aftermath of the armed struggle against the British, the assertion of 
popular power continued. This has come to be symbolised by Shay’s Rebellion, 
a 1786 Massachusetts insurrection which challenged the decisions of the 
legislature in Boston, and which was regarded by ‘men of means [as] the 
opening of a war of poor against rich' (Mee, 1987:39). These events were fresh 
in the minds of the Federalists, who referred to them directly as evidence of the 
potential for ‘tyranny on the ruins of order and law’ (Federalist 21:102). 
It would be hard to overstate the importance of a class-based reading of this 
chapter of our democratic history, despite the fact that many contemporaneous 
voices ridiculed the idea that class distinction existed in America (as Melancton 
Smith points out, 1788:344). Hamilton asserts that ‘in a political view [the landed 
interest is] perfectly united from the wealthiest landlord to the poorest tenant’ 
(Federalist 35:166). While acknowledged class consciousness may be in short 
supply in the pages of the Federalist Papers (indeed, class interests are flatly 
denied), class analysis was clearly not absent from the aims of the Federalists. 
By contrast, for the Anti-Federalists, power and class consciousness emerge as 
a theme; the corresponding view of human nature is naturally very different to 
that of the Federalists. People appear as refreshingly capable (at least the 
middling classes with whom the Anti-Federalists identified); their involvement in 
decision-making is to be facilitated not contained. Their writings reveal a sense 
of cooperative and collective potential within human nature, and democracy 
emerges as the mechanism to nurture and facilitate this. This is key to the 
democratic narrative oriented to equality, and is echoed in the development of 
Tom Paine’s thought through the French Revolution. In The Rights of Man, Part 
2, he links a faith in the public capacity for government with the scope for real 
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deliberation: ‘when public matters are open to debate, and the public judgement 
free, it will not decide wrong, unless it decides too hastily’ (Paine, 1792a:244), 
and vehemently rejects the anti-democratic view symbolised by Burke’s defence 
of monarchy as a ‘contemptible opinion of mankind … a herd of beings that 
must be governed by fraud, effigy and shew’ (op. cit.: 226). 
This more nuanced view of human nature is also expressed in the Anti-
Federalists’ clear awareness of the effect of power on the power-holders. 
Rather than presenting a crude distinction between good men and a fearsome 
mob, they are alive to the importance of learned behaviour and political culture 
(both negative in the sense of power corrupting and positive in the sense of 
learned civic capacity). This is a more nuanced view of human nature, but also 
an interesting reflection on the nature of class. The Anti-Federalists were not 
talking about an established aristocracy, but an elite making a place for itself in 
the new society (though of course often rooted in historical privilege). These 
discussions are concerned with the mutually reinforcing relationship between 
power and class, rather than a simplistic reading that class determines power.  
REPRESENTATION AND THE STATE: DIFFERENT MODELS, DIFFERENT AIMS 
These foundations give rise to very different views of representation and 
democracy. As we will see, Anti-Federalist concerns regarding representation 
are around how to structurally support good representation, and guard against 
the opposing potential for self-aggrandisement, which they understood to be a 
danger attendant on distance between representatives and the people. Where 
the Federalists envisioned a strong government to contain the mob, the Anti-
Federalists reasoned that if basic human decency, most visible at community 
level, could directly and continuously affect government, then the tendency of 
government to abuse power could be contained. Here we see a difference in 
conceptions of democracy whose significance can scarcely be exaggerated. 
Government is to learn from the people, not the other way around. 
At a fundamental level, the Anti-Federalists’ understanding of human nature 
allowed them to ask if it was possible to found society on positive collective 
aspirations and community bonds within society as a whole, rather than trying to 
harness the energy of competing greed and self-interest. In their view, this is 
the root of the importance which the Federalists attach to a balance of powers 
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between different sections of the elite (see Federalist 10 and Federalist 51). 
Anti-Federalist writings present these negative traits as a result of systems of 
government and power, rather than the starting point for designing democracy. 
‘John DeWitt’ describes this clearly: 
‘It cannot be doubted … that there is a charm in politicks. That persons 
who enter reluctantly into office become habituated, grown fond of it, and 
are loath to resign it. They feel themselves flattered and elevated and are 
apt to forget their constituents, until the time returns that they again feel 
the want of them. They uniformly exercise all the powers granted to 
them, and ninety-nine in a hundred are grasping at more.’       
(‘DeWitt’, 5th November 1787:313). 
Power is seen to affect the nature of those subject to it as well as those who 
exercise it, with oppressive rule understood to erode the self-respect, capacities 
and virtues of the people (Ketcham, 2003:19). Melancton Smith contends that 
‘the same passions and prejudices govern all men: the circumstances in which 
men are placed in a great measure give a cast to the human character’ (21st 
June 1788, p.344). Similarly, The Rights of Man, written in defence of the 
French Revolution (which fundamentally linked democracy and equality), is 
infused with Paine’s belief that society shapes human nature. He says ‘there is 
existing in man, a mass of sense lying in a dormant state’ which revolution, the 
experience of freedom and democracy, brings forth (Paine, 1792a:228). Paine 
clearly believed in the social development of capacity for government.  
It is this view of human nature as shaped by circumstance which generates the 
Anti-Federalist view of representation. Where the Federalists are concerned 
with the autonomy of elite representatives, whom they trust more than they do 
‘the people’, the Anti-Federalists’ over-riding concern is with the responsiveness 
of representatives to the people whom they represent. There is a strong sense 
of distrust of distant government, whose interests easily deviate from those of 
the people, unless representatives are known, recallable and responsive.13 
                                                                
13
 There are of course layers of complexity regarding the values informing views on democratic 
structure, as exemplified by the current dominance of this terrain in the US by the libertarian 
Right, who have arguably engaged more strongly with the ‘anti-government’ tradition of the Anti-
Federalists than with their 'pro-democracy’ standpoint (a distinction I discuss briefly later).  
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The Anti-Federalists are primarily concerned with trust within the representative 
relationship, not accountability and transparency, a core concern of the 
Federalists and also within our political system today. We conflate these with 
trust; the Anti-Federalists distinguished them, and sought to describe a system 
in which actual trust could flourish, based on ‘such dialogue, empathy and even 
intimacy that the very distinctions between ruler and rule would tend to 
disappear’ (Ketcham, 2003:19). Trust is based in knowing your representative; it 
is important to note that accountability and transparency as we understand 
them today are a substitute for knowledge and trust. Thus Anti-Federalists 
argued that representatives must have an ‘acquaintance with the common 
concerns and occupations of the people, which men of the middling class of life 
are in general much better competent to, than those of a superior class’ (Smith, 
21st June 1788:342). This meant that: 
 ‘A fair representation … should be so regulated, that every order of men 
[sic] in the community … can have a share in it – in order to allow 
professional men, merchants, traders, farmers, mechanics, etc., to bring 
a just proportion of their best informed men respectively into the 
legislature’ (‘Federal Farmer’, 1787:265).14 
With too great a distance between representative and citizens, whether 
geographically, by virtue of representing too great a number of people, or 
because the elite presumes to represent the whole of the people, 
representatives are understood to, ‘however well disposed, … become 
strangers to the very people choosing them, they reside at a distance from you, 
you have no control over them, you cannot observe their conduct’ (‘DeWitt’, 5th 
November, 1787:315). In this vein, Anti-Federalists also argued for frequent 
elections, non-continuous periods of office, so that ‘persons habituated to the 
exercise of power should ever be reminded from whence they derive, by a 
return to the station of private citizens’ (‘DeWitt’, 27th October, 1787:197), and 
that while in office, ‘every man employed in a high office by the people, should 
from time to time return to them, that he may be in a situation to satisfy them 
with respect to his conduct and the measures of administration’ (Smith, 
                                                                
14
 A lengthy series of anonymous articles entitled Letters from the Federal Farmer were 
published in the Poughkeepsie Country Journal between November 1787 and January 1788. 
These were long thought to be the work of Richard Henry Lee, but were more probably written 
by Melancton Smith (Ketcham, 2003:256-7). 
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1788:351). The recurring theme is that representation must be substantive, not 
formal. They placed their faith in the vigour of the ruled, not in the rules 
themselves. Thus, democracy rests ultimately on action not structure. 
For the Anti-Federalists, therefore, representation is understood in the sense of 
being a delegate, mandated and instructed by citizens. Citizens have an active, 
not passive role in decision-making. ‘Brutus’ (29th November, 1787:328) 
discusses this issue at length, pointing out that if you do not know your 
representative, they cannot explain to you the motives for their decisions. 
Crucially, he points out that representatives you do not know ‘will not be viewed 
by the people as part of themselves, but as a body distinct from them, and 
having separate interests to pursue’ (ibid.). Likewise, Bryan (1787:236) 
denounces the Federalist model of representation because ‘it would be in 
practice a permanent aristocracy’ (in the Rousseauian sense of rule by an elite, 
rather than our modern understanding). What is fascinating here is that what 
our society tends to take for granted, the existence of a separate political class 
– politics as the activity of politicians – the Anti-Federalists saw as grounds for 
concern, something to be challenged.15 
Specifically, they contested the right presumed by the elite to rule over a people 
they considered inferior, threatening or less capable. Thus, Bryan condemns 
‘the wealthy and ambitious, who in every community think they have a right to 
lord it over their fellow creatures’ (Bryan, 1787:229) and calls the proposed 
constitution ‘the most daring attempt to establish a despotic aristocracy among 
freemen, that the world has ever witnessed’ (op. cit.:232). Overall, the Anti-
Federalists proposed a model of representation in which the citizen was 
engaged and active, and whereby the representative was constrained from 
divorcing or distancing himself from the citizens he (and it was he, of course) 
represented; a model which stands in stark contrast to the empowered and 
permanent political elite which unquestionably characterises British democracy 
today, as I will discuss in the following chapter. 
                                                                
15
 It is interesting to note that the process for ratifying the Constitution specified by the 
Constitutional Convention was an elected state convention of ‘representatives’. However, the 
state of Rhode Island rejected this approach, substituting their preferred method of an ‘orderly 
assembly’ of the people. Through this more participatory approach, the Constitution was 
rejected (Rhode Island ratified the Constitution in 1790 under threat of isolation and possible 
dismemberment) (Fishkin, 1995:26-29). Apparently, representative decision-making of the type 
espoused by the Federalists was approved more easily by a body of such representatives, than 
through the wider engagement of the people. 
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Given this class analysis, it is easy to comprehend that for the Federalists, the 
state at the level of the Federal Union was ‘us’ while for the Anti-Federalists it 
was ‘them’. The Federalists feared the lower classes as ‘them’ and sought to 
create distance between rulers and ruled, where the Anti-Federalists embraced 
at least a limited section of the people as ‘us’, and sought to decrease distance 
between the two. While without doubt an oversimplification, the point of this 
broad brush observation is to underline the importance of viewpoint in shaping 
our understandings of democracy. As I have pointed out, the Federalists saw 
themselves in the new government; they were harnessing the legitimising force 
of democracy to increase the freedom and power of the fledgling and still fragile 
state (Hamilton tells us that ‘energy in the executive is a leading character in the 
definition of good government’, Federalist 70:344), while preventing a repeat of 
past excesses through democratic accountability. The state, for the Federalists 
as for the monarchs before them, remained a vehicle for ensuring trade and 
national prominence, and strengthening the territory against outside threats. 
To this extent, their view of the democratic state is arguably less of a break with 
the hierarchical, monarchist tradition than that of the Anti-Federalists, who 
distrust government for historical reasons but are concerned via democracy to 
shape it, to make it less ‘them’ and more ‘us’. Accordingly, their view of the 
purpose of the state is distinctly different from the Federalists, and more 
focused on creating the conditions for the satisfaction of citizens’ needs. The 
Federalists looked outwards and upwards – the Anti-Federalists looked to the 
people of the democracy. Government is not to be their voice on a larger stage, 
but a vehicle created to ensure they can meet their needs.16  
We cannot understand these themes without understanding the context of the 
time, a period in which government was monarchic, despotic, hitherto almost 
wholly associated with oppression. Thus, the Anti-Federalists could be anti-
government, but pro-democracy, and so they tried to conceptualise democracy 
in a way which increased the possibility of non-oppressive government. 
Crucially, and despite their limited understanding of ‘the people’, they were 
interested in the democratic exercise of power, not only the democratic holding 
                                                                
16
 This illustrates the significance of the distinction between an ‘engineer’s-eye view’ and a 
‘citizen-eye view’. 
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of statesmen to account, which is the dominant view of citizenship bequeathed 
to us by the American Revolution.  
LIBERTY, EQUALITY AND DEMOCRACY 
These two very different understandings of the purpose of the state are closely 
bound up with different visions of equality and liberty. A brief examination of 
both helps us to understand how these three concepts, the goals you wish to 
achieve via the state, and the kinds of equality and liberty you hope to achieve, 
require very different characters of democracy. 
This period of history has bequeathed to us a very specific view of equality, 
clearly described by de Tocqueville in his contemporaneous review Democracy 
in America. This represented an important shift from the period before. As we 
have seen, democracy and equality were in general seen as synonymous prior 
to the age of revolutions. The link between the two was not broken by the 
American Revolution, but equality was fundamentally redefined, in order to 
make democracy acceptable to the new elites. The rehabilitated notion of 
equality which emerged alongside the newly respectable concept of democracy 
is significantly about political, not substantive, equality: 
‘In the United States the citizens have no sort of pre-eminence over one 
another; they owe each other no mutual obedience or respect; they all 
meet for the administration of justice, for the government of the state, 
and in general, to treat of the affairs that concern their common welfare; 
but I never heard that attempts have been made to bring them all to 
follow the same diversions or to amuse themselves promiscuously in the 
same places of recreation.’ (De Tocqueville, 1840:300) 
For de Tocqueville, this is clearly explained by the understanding that ‘no state 
of society or laws can render men so much alike but that education, fortune, 
and tastes will interpose some differences between them’ (ibid.). Thus the goal 
(in terms of equality) of this democratic vision is more limited than that 
espoused even by the Anti-Federalists and very much more limited than that 
espoused during the French Revolution, where the conceptualisation of 
democracy began with substantive equality as a goal. The quote above 
illustrates how, for the Federalists, democracy was clearly not intended to erase 
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material inequality. In Federalist 10, Madison puts forward as an argument for a 
large territory the assurance that ‘a rage for paper money, for an abolition of 
debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked 
projects, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a 
particular member of it’ (Federalist 10:54-55). 
In contrast, the Anti-Federalist understanding of democracy offers a very 
different perspective on the relationship between democracy and equality: 
‘A republican, or free government, can only exist where the body of the 
people are virtuous, and where property is pretty equally divided; in such 
a government the people are the sovereign and their sense or opinion is 
the criterion of every public measure; for when this is changed, ceases to 
be the case, the nature of the government is changed, and an 
aristocracy, monarchy or despotism will rise on its ruin.’          
(Bryan, 1787:231) 
The perceived close relationship between democracy and substantive equality 
preceded the American Revolution, flourished briefly in France, but ultimately 
has (thus far) lost the contest for supremacy. In the American Revolution we 
see the early capitalist substitution of political equality for substantive equality. 
The popular view of democracy was materially changed here. The taken-for-
granted truth of the time, that too much inequality will result in the undemocratic 
exercise of power by the powerful, was challenged and another ‘truth’ took its 
place: political equality can co-exist with material inequality. As we will see in 
Chapter 5, proponents of participatory budgeting see the ‘inversion of priorities’ 
(public spending as contributing to increased equality) as a vital component of 
its democratic credentials. We can see that in this sense, participatory 
democracy does not merely involve more people in the democratic process; it is 
engaged in a much more radical project. It redefines how democracy is 
popularly understood – reclaiming a tradition of democracy oriented to equality. 
Definitions of equality are of course closely tied to associated definitions of 
liberty. The prevailing legacy of the American Revolution champions personal 
liberty. This is understood as the individual capacity to act without constraint, 
and so breeds suspicion of too great a sense of responsibility to and for others 
(which a concern with substantive equality requires). However, it must be 
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remembered that this came with an important caveat: that states and individuals 
must give up some liberties in order to gain the protection of the state with 
regard to other liberties. Hamilton makes this case most clearly in Federalist 8, 
arguing for an empowered central state in order to protect against infighting 
between regions – which the Federalists anticipate following from too much 
liberty at state level (Federalist 8:39-43): ‘the vigor of government is essential to 
the security of liberty’ (Federalist 1:13). 
Similarly, modern liberal democracies champion freedom for the individual 
through markets rather than through active democracy, despite a practical 
reliance on the state to ensure the operation of the capitalist market, which is 
understood as a non-negotiable role of the capitalist democratic state (see 
Miliband, 1969). Thus, in both cases the ideal of liberty is consciously used to 
justify reduced democratic control. The relationship between democracy, liberty 
and equality, when the democratic narrative is oriented to possessive 
individualism, requires a definition of democracy which allows for political 
equality without requiring substantive equality – and which creates citizens who 
can much more easily exercise individual rather than collective freedom. 
A more substantive vision of equality requires a very different understanding of 
both liberty and democracy, a question that would come to the fore in France. 
Liberty, viewed through the lens of the order of equality, becomes a concern 
with human flourishing, which necessitates tackling constraints on the poor. 
Democracy must facilitate a collective freedom, to counterbalance the individual 
exercise of power by the elite. If, as for the Federalists, we see the state as 
separate from the people, an increase in state power reduces liberty (Madison 
discusses the tension they saw between the ‘stability and energy of 
government’ and ‘liberty and the republican form’, Federalist 37:176). If, on the 
other hand, our conception of democracy allows us to view the state as ‘us’ then 
state power, exercised collectively, can increase liberty (understood as human 
flourishing). These views of freedom are clearly in tension. Prioritising the 
freedom to act without constraint as a primary good (deliberately?) undermines 
collective action, through which a group acting together can increase their 
options and opportunities, and thus the freedom to make choices. 
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With this understanding, we can see the difference between the Federalists’ 
view that government shouldn’t ask the people too many questions (‘every 
appeal to the people [carries] an implication of some defect in the government’, 
Federalist 49:251) and the opposing view that ‘the fundamental principle of a 
free government [is] that the people should make the laws by which they were 
to be governed’ (Smith, 20th June 1788:341). To return to the views of the state 
which accord with these very different views of liberty and equality, it is 
evidently possible to understand the state as either a necessary evil, or a 
collective achievement. For the Federalists, democracy is a check on the 
tendency of the state to abuse power. For the Anti-Federalists, there is a hope 
that a state can be built in which government is close enough to the people to 
trust and use for public benefit (Ketcham, 2003:18). 
What matters for us as democrats today, therefore, is the understanding that 
our taken-for-granted truths about democracy were once contested, but that as 
a result of specific historical factors, not least the fragility and turbulence 
besetting the fledgling federal government, the scene was set for a centralised, 
‘trade and empire’ model of democracy, with its structural requirements for 
passive, contained citizens. Faith in an active and collective citizenry, and 
concerns about the effect of power on a permanent elite, were downplayed. In 
this critical moment for democratic theory, which of course does not stand alone 
but has been acted out in many different historical contexts and moments, both 
sides agreed that representation is a substitute for democracy. Representation, 
though clothed in the language of liberty and associated with the overthrow of 
monarchy and oppression, was introduced to strengthen elite control.  
DEMOCRATIC NARRATIVES IN THE UK 
The late 18th and early 19th centuries were a time of democratic ferment in the 
UK as well as America and France. As context for the following chapter’s 
examination of the state of British democracy today, I will briefly look at some of 
the threads of the two democratic narratives as they unfolded in the UK. It 
would, however, be impossible to discuss this period of history in the UK without 
at least a passing reference to the immense significance of the French 
Revolution, which was then unfolding just across the Channel. 
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While the global hegemonic dominance of representative democracy epitomises 
the triumph of the democratic narrative concerned with possessive 
individualism, the democratic orientation towards equality flourished briefly and 
dramatically with the French Revolution, a vital chapter in the story of 
democracy for many reasons. For the first time since the ancients, the word 
democracy was used in a positive sense (Christopherson, 1966:2); as we have 
seen, in America it was considered unworkable, a representative republic being 
substituted in its place. The French Revolution asserted the centrality of equality 
to democracy, in a way which the American Revolution did not do. Crucially, it 
changed what people then and since have believed is possible. Rousseau, one 
of the central theorists of the Revolution, declared that ‘man is born free, and 
everywhere he is in chains’ (Rousseau, 1762:5). A modern reader focuses on 
the chains; for contemporary readers it was rather the notion that man was born 
free that was both radical and intoxicating. Ideas that we take for granted were 
novel in 1789. One of the most revealing things about The Rights of Man, 
Paine’s great defence of the French Revolution (1792a), is the amount of time 
and detail devoted to persuading the reader that democracy is superior to 
monarchist government.  
The inspiration of the French Revolution is both symbolic and concrete. The 
Jacobin Constitution of 1793 was the first genuinely democratic constitution 
proclaimed by a modern state, based on universal male suffrage, granting 
substantive rights and asserting at the outset that the aim of government is the 
public good (The Constitution of 1793, reprinted in Hardman, 1999:173-177). 
While there are many debates over the extent of democratic innovation within 
the Revolution (see Hampson, 1983a), what is perhaps most important for our 
story, is how the people felt about the Revolution. It was born in hope, with a 
people who believed they could make the world anew. It aroused fear in elites 
around the world, but that was essentially because it profoundly inspired the 
poor, not least the British working classes who read Tom Paine avidly and 
defiantly. Seemingly for the first time, the poor could change the course of 
history; they could claim rights and citizenship alongside and over an elite who 
had pressed them into the dirt, broken their bodies for punishment and sport, 
and who had lived in ostentatious wealth while they could barely afford to eat 
even the poorest contaminated bread. To begin with, the Revolution was 
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bloodless, and based in a belief in the virtue of men (Hampson, 1983b:150-
153), in the terms of our narratives, on a belief in the potential and capacity 
within human nature. The French Revolution represents a model of democracy 
in which sovereignty resides solidly with the people, not the state. Significantly 
for British democracy, it dramatically confirmed for the English elites that 
sovereignty must at all costs reside in Parliament not the people.  
Their fears did not stem only from observation of what was occurring in France; 
the domestic mood was likewise distinctly revolutionary. The 1790s to the mid-
nineteenth century in England was a concentrated period of agitation for greater 
substantive social and political equality, the awakening of a sleeping democratic 
tradition rooted in dissenting religious movements such as Wesleyanism and 
political movements such as the Levellers and the Diggers who fought for 
popular sovereignty and land justice. This was one factor in the English social 
context of that period, a growing political consciousness which flourished in 
certain sections of working communities. These included the artisan class 
whose culture of intellectual enquiry and mutuality, self-esteem and desire for 
independence, played a significant role in shaping political radicalism, and 
skilled workers such as weavers whose social egalitarianism fostered collective 
demands for improvement (Thompson, 1963:259-346). Secondly, social unrest 
and political agitation were intensified by the gathering pace of industrial 
change, which affected standards of living not only in a material sense but 
critically in terms of self-determination also (op. cit.:347-384). Finally, the 
agitation for democratic change, given urgency by exploitation and need, was 
also given hope by events across the Channel. 
The English unrest was not disaffected rioting, but the structured growth of a 
new political consciousness. EP Thompson’s unrivalled 1963 study The Making 
of the English Working Class gives a wealth of examples, from orderly food riots 
to enforce reasonable prices to the Chartist movement for political reform (as 
does John Foster’s 1974 review of radical activity in three English towns). For 
the purposes of this chapter, three brief illustrations will suffice: the significance 
of Paine’s Rights of Man, the role of popular debating clubs and the Luddite 
Rebellion of 1812. 
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Firstly, Rights of Man was read as a ‘foundational text’ by the working class 
(Thompson, 1963:99). Part 2 was published in 1792; by the following year sales 
had reached 200,000 within a population of 10 million (op. cit.:117). Paine’s 
name was a household word, and his outlawing only intensified the efforts with 
which radical booksellers endeavoured to keep his banned works in circulation. 
What is significant here is the importance of theorising democracy in a radical 
and public form. This is a conscious movement for political change, rooted in a 
popular understanding of democracy. 
As I’ve said, Paine’s writings belong to the egalitarian narrative of democracy, 
which is rooted in a belief in the cooperative and collective potential of human 
nature. The development, from 1791 onwards, of popular debating clubs such 
as the London Corresponding Society exemplifies self-education and collective 
reflection in the pursuit of social and political change (indeed, they bring to mind 
the intellectual ferment of Paris in the years leading up to the 1871 Commune). 
Thus, the clubs developed a distinctive political structure, strategy and culture 
which supported English political radicalism through to the Chartists 
(McCalman, 1987), holding debates on such subjects as whether the French or 
English Constitution was more calculated for the glory of the respective empires 
and the happiness of individuals; whether the French Revolution, the ousting of 
James II, or the American Independence was the most striking instance of 
opposition to political tyranny; and the causes of the unequal representation of 
the people in the House of Commons (Thale, 1989:61). In such forums, radical 
political ideas developed and were rooted in popular ownership. 
If the debating clubs symbolise citizenship capacity, my final English illustration, 
the Luddite Rebellion of 1812, is arguably the epitome of these ideas in action: 
active democratic agency. The view that history has handed down to us is that 
of a reactionary force, resisting progress and development. However, the 
historical evidence paints a very different picture. The Luddites were an 
organised political force with a coherent political agenda centred on social 
justice and democratic struggle (Reid, 1986; Dinwiddy, 1979; Thompson, 
1963:569-659). The same croppers (skilled workers in the woollen trade) who 
would undertake a targeted campaign of machine-breaking, made proposals for 
the gradual introduction of machinery and development of alternative 
employment for displaced men, and along with the weavers, were said to have 
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raised between £10,000 and £12,000 in the three years from 1803 to 1806 (an 
actual figure, not its equivalent in modern money) for parliamentary struggle to 
retain protective legislation covering the woollen industry (Thompson, 1963:575-
6). Indeed, a Luddite letter to insurers informed them of the intention ‘to petition 
parliament for our rights; and, if they will not grant us them, by stopping the 
machinery belong us [sic], we are determined to grant them ourselves’ (op. 
cit.:578). Direct action is consciously anticipated as an integral part of the 
democratic struggle, not separate from it. 
Moreover, Luddism was a genuine people’s movement with broad support, and, 
importantly, it was at least partially successful, wages rising as a result (op. 
cit.:608; Foster, 1974:43). It was a democratic moment which also worked as 
democratic education, in the sense that it was both radical and radicalising. 
Luddism thus helped develop industrial working class consciousness, a means 
by which workers came to understand democratic control as a necessary route 
to the improvement of their condition (Dinwiddy, 1979). Democracy here is 
taken not given, and it is inalienably linked to substantive justice and a concern 
with human flourishing. The clash of values inherent in the industrial revolution 
is represented by artisans struggling not only for material standards of living but 
for independence and community, against the factories which subsumed both to 
economic gain. The Luddite Rebellion is not an isolated example, but perhaps 
the definitive illustration of a groundswell of Jacobin and collectivist radicalism 
which built from the 1790s to the Chartist movement of the 1830s, arguably 
coming close to revolution in both 1819 and 1832 (Thompson, 1963:737). 
It is instructive that the blossoming egalitarian vision of democracy, from the 
decade of the French Revolution onwards, met with an unequivocal response 
from state and elite power. State repression included the suspension of Habeas 
Corpus, emergency legislation regarding treason, ‘seditious meetings’ and the 
publication of anti-monarchist literature as well as the infamous Combination 
Acts (Emsley, 1985). The summer of 1812 saw 12,000 troops in the disturbed 
counties, a deployment which indicates the scale of the state response, and 
prefaces the Peterloo massacre of 1819. Less official repression included the 
widespread victimisation of English Jacobins and political radicals, and elite 
attempts to orchestrate a backlash: the reactionary Association for Preserving 
Liberty and Property Against Republicans and Levellers financially sponsored 
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‘riots’ in three hundred English towns against The Rights of Man (Nelson, 
2006:229; Foster, 1974:35). Behind this reaction, as we saw in America, lay a 
fear of the awakening labouring classes and profound disquiet at the 
association of political and economic demands inherent in an egalitarian vision 
of democracy. It is no accident that this period also sees the early stages of the 
capitalist ideological separation of politics and economics, with the aim of 
placing industrial capital beyond the reach of redistributive political intrusion. 
Over the following decades, the struggle between popular democratic 
movements such as the Chartists and elites aiming to defuse revolutionary 
demands shaped the democratic system that we have inherited. The Chartists, 
like the Luddites, brought the two democratic narratives head-to-head as they 
struggled for economics to be subject to popular control, via law-making powers 
for those affected, versus the agenda to free economics from political control 
(free trade as the proposed remedy for hardship). Interestingly, the Suffragette 
movement would later divide along these broad ideological lines, again 
illustrating the struggle for two very different forms of democracy. 
Critically, while these struggles did result in hard-won concessions, the UK 
(unlike other representative democracies) never experienced a modern 
revolutionary moment; advances were therefore piecemeal and gradual rather 
than comprehensive. In other words, elite social forces succeeded in containing 
revolution and as a result, the existing highly centralised and hierarchical 
system stayed intact. Representative democracy was grafted onto a system 
which remains fundamentally monarchic in character, as evidenced by its 
uncodified constitution, exceptionally high levels of centralisation without 
serious checks on the executive, an unproportional electoral system, and a 
hereditary second chamber, an element of which has persisted to this day 
(Gamble, 1999). Thus, and in keeping with its monarchist roots, it is a central 
feature of UK democracy that sovereignty is ineluctably located with Parliament, 
not the people. Dicey’s 1885 examination of British constitutional arrangements 
was concerned precisely with the question of how to reconcile the embedded 
and inflexible idea of a sovereign parliament with the ascendant concept of a 
sovereign people which democracy implied. In the next chapter I will consider 
how effective that reconciliation has proved.  
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CONCLUSION 
Overall, the American Revolution provides us with at least two very pertinent 
lessons. Firstly, it helps us to understand that democracy is not a structure or 
even a singular value. Rather, it is best understood as a claim. How we define it 
reveals what it is that we are claiming (and vice versa of course). The 
Federalists were claiming the right to national self-determination but also sought 
to preserve decision-making as a bounded elite activity. The Anti-Federalists 
claimed the right of the individual to be represented in the sense of being 
present in government. They sought to assert the sovereignty of (a section of) 
the people, not the government. 
A secondary lesson is that it teaches us to be inquisitive about what our 
present-day elites are claiming when they champion the self-same structures 
that were created to maintain elite rule. Eric Hobsbawm refers to the class 
solidarity of the English elite, which acted against the spread of the ‘appalling’ 
ideas from France (Hobsbawm, 1975:65). A class reading of that expansionist 
moment for democracy raises the question of why elites have fought against 
democracy in the past, but Western elites are generally amongst its public 
champions today. Understanding that representative democracy was designed 
to maintain elite control allows us to understand what has changed. As we will 
see in the following chapter, representative democracy appears in this sense to 
have been something of a success. 
The original conception of democracy as equality has been on the losing side of 
history. Robespierre and the Terror live on more vividly in popular 
consciousness, linking equality with violence, than either the achievements of 
the Revolution or even state violence which eclipses the Terror in scale. 
Hobsbawm, while not underestimating the Terror, refers to it as ‘relatively 
modest by the standards of conservative repressions of social revolution such 
as the massacres after the Paris Commune of 1871’ (Hobsbawm, 1975:68). 17 
The Paris Commune stands as a shining moment in the narrative of democracy 
as equality: a socialist committee gained power but, though immediately and 
                                                                
17
 Furthermore, as contemporaneous activist-theorist John Thelwall argued during the Terror, 
‘the excesses and violences in France have not been the consequence of the new doctrines of 
the Revolution; but of the old leaven of revenge, corruption and suspicion which was generated 
by the systematic cruelties of the old despotism’ (Thelwall, cited by Thompson, 1963:174). 
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continuously beset by violent state opposition, did not simply rule but called 
elections. 230,000 people elected the 92 members of the Paris Commune, of 
which 24 were workers (Mason, 2008:68-9). The Commune was born out of two 
years of public meetings, in which working people debated ideas and theorised 
social revolution. It was an anarchist, socialist and feminist struggle for social 
revolution, and it was crushed within two short months. In the final ‘bloody week’ 
of fighting as the Commune was destroyed, between 15 and 17 thousand 
Parisians were killed, and in the ‘official’ massacres which followed, historians 
believe over 30,000 more were summarily shot (Greer, 1966:26; Hobsbawm, 
1962:168-9). In the same city during the 18 months of the Terror, 2,639 were 
guillotined (Greer, 1966:38). Popular violence is more to be feared than elite 
violence, it seems.  
As the American constitutional debates illustrate, today’s hegemonic 
understanding of democracy did not win purely by force. Partly, it has gained 
ground because its proponents won the terrain of ideas (though of course elites 
generally have little problem generating decisive coercive power too). Ellen 
Meiksins Woods describes how elite events are celebrated over moments of 
popular control or struggles for equality, for example, the ‘Glorious Revolution of 
1688’18 and the Magna Carta (Meiksins Wood, 1995:213) over the rich social 
history I touched on earlier. 
Thus the myths which serve the order of egoism live on, the people as mob, the 
elite state as protector and defence against our baser, selfish tendencies. The 
histories which carry a vision of a different world are left to gather dust. The very 
ubiquity of popular assumptions about democracy masks this turbulent history, 
and can weaken current struggles for greater democracy, indeed for justice, 
solidarity and equality. Understanding the ideological construction of our taken-
for-granted assumptions, arguably myths, about democracy reveals it to be 
changeable, a social construct we can redesign. The historicity of democracy 
reveals the possibility of change. Historical contingency denies the inevitability 
or permanence of the status quo, and – appropriately – foregrounds democratic 
                                                                
18
 A ‘revolution’ whose democratic credentials consist in forcing the monarch to share power 
with the aristocracy not with citizens – and which actually asserted the right of lordship to 
dispose of property and servants at will (Meiksins Wood, 1995:205). 
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agency. Our active participation changes outcomes. We are neither agents of 
inexorable forces, nor irrelevant. 
As Bauman suggests, we take the ‘folklore’ to be truths, and it is for this reason 
that a historical understanding represents an opportunity for democratic 
activists. We can reject these ‘truths’, and articulate our own, which honour 
different traditions and uphold different values. Of course, democratic ‘truth’ is 
no more on the side of equality than it is on the side of possessive individualism 
(in the sense that there is a logic to both narratives). Defining democracy is 
simply one terrain on which we contest the world we wish to live in; it helps to 
be clear about what we are fighting for and why – and what we are fighting 
against. Redefining democracy in keeping with egalitarian values helps us to 
reset our social destination.  
The vital implication is therefore that it makes little sense to be simply ‘pro-
democracy’. To be effective, democrats have to be pro a particular kind of 
democracy, and in this way they champion a particular set of values and 
understandings implicit in that vision of democracy. We need to be clear what 
we are claiming, and what we are trying to justify; in other words, what society 
we are trying to create. Democracy is not a ‘right’ to be granted to us, it is a 
claim by us. It is a claim for power – but for whom? It can be a claim for justice 
and equality – it can be a defence of inequality. In assessing and championing 
different models of democracy today, we have a choice between orienting 
ourselves towards equality or towards possessive individualism. The democratic 
models we live under are not neutral, but are part of the history of these 
traditions. This issue is a vital element of the context for understanding who 
chooses to be democratically active in the UK today, and why. If our system of 
democracy is presented as neutral and equally inviting to all, but in fact carries 
hidden values and social goals, we can begin to understand how and why some 
actors may be more easily engaged with this particular system than others. 
In order to engage a wider spectrum of citizens, and thus a wider spectrum of 
democratic aims and goals, we need to reclaim the terrain of contesting the 
meaning of democracy. We need a much more public understanding of the 
values embedded in the systems we live under, and in possible alternatives. To 
further this endeavour, we can supplement mainstream democratic histories 
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and understandings with a rich alternative history of inspiration, a radical 
democratic tradition which can broaden our current perceptions of what it 
means to be democratically active.  
The aim of this chapter has been to historicise taken for granted truths about 
democracy which condition our thinking today, and to open up an alternative 
lens through which to understand the problem of democratic disengagement in 
the UK today. Chapter 5 will pick up the narrative of equality through one very 
significant present-day democratic inspiration, Participatory Budgeting in Porto 
Alegre, but in the following chapter, I first explore the current UK democratic 
system in the light of both these orientations, and ask where our ‘democratic 
deficit’ actually lies.  
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CHAPTER 4 
CITIZENS OR SUBJECTS: IDENTIFYING THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT IN THE UK 
It has become something of a truism in the West that people aren’t interested in 
politics, with the idea of ‘apathy’ providing a convenient shorthand for the 
impression that many citizens are not actively engaged with the democratic 
process. This is rooted in strong evidence that increasing numbers regard 
politics and politicians with a jaundiced eye, many choosing not to vote. 
Alongside a steady stream of academic research and analysis around this issue 
(see, for example, Norris, 2011 & 1999; Hay, 2007; Stoker, 2006; Crouch, 2004; 
Pharr & Putnam, 2000), there is an increasing willingness on the part of 
politicians to publicly acknowledge the extent of the problem, perhaps brought 
to a head in the UK by the 2009 expenses scandal. In this vein, Conservative 
party leader David Cameron began his pre-election conference speech of that 
year with the words: ‘we all know how bad things are: massive debt, social 
breakdown, political disenchantment’ (Cameron, 2009), while in the run-up to 
the preceding election in 2005, former Foreign Secretary Robin Cook wrote of 
the ‘awkward truth … that the public no longer like the way the major parties do 
business’ (Cook, 2005). 
Analysis of the problem varies, but there is a broad consensus that the 
established Western democracies, including the UK, are suffering from a 
democratic deficit and resultant crisis of legitimacy. While the doomsday end-of-
democracy scenarios of the 1970s (e.g. Crozier et al, 1975) have proved 
unfounded, a variety of serious and negative consequences for democracy are 
detected or anticipated. These include a loss of accountability and scrutiny, if, 
as Pippa Norris puts it, ‘a disillusioned public will not function as a check on 
authoritarianism’ (Norris, 1999:268), the unequal division of resources as a 
result of excluded communities (Parry et al, 1992:6-9), shriller, less balanced 
politics in the absence of citizen deliberation (Putnam, 2000:341-2) and a 
deterioration in the ability of governments to govern effectively, if they cannot 
command citizen resources and sacrifices (Huntington, 1975:30-32). In other 
words, there is a clear and prevalent view that disenchantment is real, and it 
matters. 
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This ‘democratic deficit’, as it has become known, is of course the primary 
causal context for the question of what motivates democratic activism. We live 
under a system which to all appearances doesn’t inspire the majority of people 
to engage in formal democratic citizenship. In order to understand what might 
make a difference, we need to ask why this is. The difficulty is that while there is 
widespread agreement on the existence of the problem, there is much greater 
divergence in terms of analysis. Forming a view on the likely causes of 
disenchantment is crucial because different perspectives on causes inevitably 
lead us towards different judgments about what is likely to be effective in 
revitalising politics, and thus towards different proposed solutions.  
Earlier investigations into the existence of the problem included empirical 
studies such as Almond & Verba’s landmark 1963 survey The Civic Culture, 
alongside analysis such as the 1974 Miller-Citrin debate over whether the 
evidence suggested dissatisfaction with specific leaders or a more diffuse 
reduction in support for the system as a whole (Miller, 1974a; Citrin, 1974; Miller 
1974b). These have largely given way to explorations of the cause of reduced 
political trust. Many theories relate to broad ongoing changes in advanced 
industrial societies such as the impact of globalisation, or declining social capital 
connected to the increasing individualisation of modern life (for succinct 
overviews of the theoretical literature, see Hay, 2007; Dalton, 1999; Fuchs & 
Klingemann, 1995), including a recent spike of interest in ‘depoliticisation’ 
(reduced citizen engagement as a response to governments placing an ever-
increasing range of issues beyond direct political control, see Wood, 2015). 
While there is a high level of agreement that far-reaching social changes are 
implicated in the rise of political disenchantment, perceptions of the relationship 
between these dynamics are more varied. Crozier, Huntington & Watanuki’s 
Crisis of Democracy report for the Trilateral Commission judged that the 
problem was unrealistic levels of expectation (Crozier et al, 1975), and echoes 
of this can be heard still (see Stoker, 2006; or for a notably forthright example, 
Flinders, 2012). A more common contemporary assertion, which similarly 
implicates citizens as in some way ‘to blame’, suggests that people do not 
participate because of apathy, understood as a generalised decline in civic 
engagement (connected to the ongoing individualisation of modern life, as 
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mentioned above). The most influential articulation of this premise is Putnam’s 
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (2000). 
Locating the problem ‘with the people’ can lead to somewhat bizarre 
conclusions, for example that the problem for democracy is excessive 
democracy, and that the required remedy – purportedly to improve democracy – 
is to reduce demands by the people (see Brittan, 1975; Flinders, 2012). 
Regarding apathy, the implied solution is of course for people to be less 
‘apathetic’, or (somewhat more positively) for the state to promote and 
encourage active citizenship.1 Colin Hay (2007:39-40) refers to this family of 
interpretations as ‘demand-side’ theories of political disengagement, and notes 
that these interpretations are not only widespread amongst political analysts but 
‘exceptionally convenient’ for political elites, who are as a result able to focus 
attention – and blame – on citizens who fail to participate, rather than their own 
failure to provide something worth participating in (a possibility which could be 
inferred from the preceding chapter’s analysis).  
Conversely, a second group of theorists (including Hay) conclude that political 
disenchantment indicates a more deep-seated problem with governments’ 
responsiveness, in other words, dissatisfaction with the functioning of 
democratic institutions. This generates a very different emphasis on fixing the 
system so that it becomes more responsive to demands. In this vein, 
Klingemann (1999:32) argues that dissatisfaction with the existing system is not 
a threat to democracy but a force for improvement, or as Hay (2007:155) puts it, 
‘democratic polities get the levels of political participation they deserve’. If the 
public are right to criticise the operation of representative democracy, the 
implied solution is to improve that operation.2 
                                                                
1
 This ‘solution’ can be found in many UK (and other) government initiatives, and academic 
analyses. I will return to the promotion of active citizenship in chapter 6, where I look at the 
trend to participatory initiatives as context for the development of PB in the UK. 
2
 Some theorists (including voices espousing this perspective) caution against a problematic 
strand in this literature, to the extent that it can stray into the ‘demonisation of politics and 
politicians’ (Fawcett & Marsh, 2014:176). However, this arguably reflects an assumption that 
‘politics and politicians’ (of the kind we have come to take for granted) are a necessary feature 
of the system. Thus, Hay (2014:301) suggests that ‘if political elites are, indeed, instrumental 
self-serving utility-maximisers … then depoliticisation is the best we can hope for; if political 
elites are capable of exhibiting other motivational traits, however, then the scenario is an 
altogether different one’. The point here for me, akin to the Anti-Federalist view that particular 
approaches to representative power shape behaviour, is that the idea of ‘political elites’ is itself 
problematic. Taking this as a primary concern moves the emphasis away from ‘demonisation’ 
and towards fundamental systemic change (as I discuss in this chapter). 
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For democrats in the more collective and egalitarian tradition explored in the 
previous chapter, the second perspective is clearly more fruitful than the 
aspiration to limit disruptive expressions of democratic activism. However, in 
this chapter I argue that while this distinction is necessary, it is not sufficient. 
We need to move a stage further, beyond the dichotomy of locating the 
problem, and thus the solution, in either the people or the system. Reflecting on 
our two broad narratives of democracy, the central issue is the location of power 
and sovereignty. Defining the problem as citizen apathy unambiguously locates 
the democratic deficit with the people. However, while a concern with the 
responsiveness of the state (which is indubitably well-founded, as this chapter 
explores) importantly identifies a different location for the deficit, it is crucial to 
note that a challenge to the location of sovereignty is not in fact intrinsic to 
either approach. As we have seen, a central feature of UK democracy is that 
sovereignty is ineluctably located with Parliament, not the people. This has very 
definite implications for the roles of citizens and the state. Within this model, the 
job of government is to listen and to act. The job of the people is to elect a 
government, with an ancillary function of informing government and conveying 
their needs and preferences. This is clearly and instructively set out in the 2001 
White Paper House of Lords: Completing the Reform (HMG, 2001). This states 
that ‘the settled principles of our democracy’ enable ‘the people to give a clear 
and unequivocal answer to the question "Whom do you choose to govern you?"’ 
Thus, the undeniably vital task of holding government to account, demanding 
that it listens better and responds more effectively, only goes so far in 
addressing the problems of our democracy. An alternative approach, with 
different underpinning values and a more participatory conception of 
democracy, is to see the citizenry as the appropriate location of power and 
sovereignty. The job of citizens in this view of democracy is not to influence but 
to exercise power. The job of the state is therefore to facilitate opportunities for 
collective access to decision-making. If we choose to embrace this narrative of 
democracy, the essence of the deficit resides centrally in the fact that power 
and sovereignty are not accessible to the majority of citizens.  
The aim of this chapter, as with the last, is to look beneath some of the analysis 
of the deficit to underlying values and assumptions about democracy and 
sovereignty in the UK (in the following chapter I will go on to look in more depth 
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at the values and assumptions inherent in a more participatory understanding of 
democracy, which does seek to locate sovereignty with citizens rather than the 
state). I begin with a brief review of the evidence for the deficit, placing this 
alongside a second body of research on active citizenship outside the formal 
democratic system. This evidence calls into question the easy verdict of ‘apathy’ 
and focuses our attention on why such activism is found outside our democratic 
system more than within it. With this as context, I explore the implications of the 
centralised, hierarchical legacy outlined in the previous chapter for democratic 
activism today, considering the nature of the Westminster model, and the extent 
to which we can consider it meaningfully democratic. Reflecting on the realities 
of our democratic system in the light of the two narratives which help us to 
understand democratic history, I consider the anti-democratic character of 
neoliberal capitalism: a review which suggests that the current limitations to UK 
democracy are only too congruent with a democratic history shaped by 
possessive individualism. To conclude, I return to the question of sovereignty, 
and reflect on how this perspective informs our attempts to reinvigorate 
democratic practice.  
A DEMOCRATICALLY DEFICIENT PEOPLE? 
The idea of the ‘democratic deficit’ is frequently used to refer to political 
disenchantment on the part of citizens. There is extensive evidence that the UK 
democratic system itself is also ‘in deficit’ (as I will explore later in the chapter), 
but even on a more limited citizen-focused definition, the evidence for the 
existence of a deficit is compelling. Commonly cited indicators of the democratic 
deficit include voter turnout, membership of political parties, trust in politicians, 
trust in the system (institutions and processes), and citizens’ belief in their ability 
to influence decisions (in other words, to have an effective democratic role). A 
brief glance at each of these displays a state of affairs within UK politics which 
democrats should at the least find revealing, though not necessarily troubling.3 
There have been a considerable number of large-scale studies investigating 
public attitudes to politics in the UK, which provide important sources of 
evidence regarding the democratic deficit, and overall add up to a persuasive 
                                                                
3
 Arguably, if it is the case that we are not living under an adequately democratic system, it is a 
necessary first step towards change that citizens should be aware of that, and be appropriately 
dissatisfied. 
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portrait of democratic dissatisfaction.4 These include the Government-run UK 
Citizenship Survey, which provides useful evidence of public attitudes, 
experience and behaviour in relation to politics and democracy for the years 
2001-2011,5 the British Social Attitudes Survey, an independent annual 
investigation into attitudes and values which began in 1983 and the Citizen 
Audit, an in-depth ESRC-funded research project. Many theorists have 
analysed these and similar data sets, offering empirically grounded reviews of 
the evidence for the deficit in the UK (see for example, Stoker, 2010 & 2006; 
Hay, 2007; Pattie et al, 2004). My aim here is not to replicate this work, but to 
acknowledge the extensive empirical work which has verified a decline in 
political engagement and trust over time, or, as Gerry Stoker puts it, a rise in 
‘anti-politics’ (Stoker, 2010:44). What follows is simply a snapshot of the current 
state of political disengagement, drawing on this comprehensive literature. 
The primary single issue most commonly identified with the democratic deficit is 
the declining level of voter turnout, perhaps because it is the most central to 
ideas of democratic legitimacy inherent within our model of representative 
democracy. There is a very high degree of consensus over the evidence for a 
consistent and long-standing decline in electoral turnout (see for example, Lee 
& Young, 2013:64; Hay, 2007:13-20; Clarke, 2002: 13-15). Fewer people voted 
in the 2001, 2005 and 2010 elections than they ever have in the past, with a 
trough of 59% in 2001, compared to a peak of 84% in 1950 (Lee & Young, 
2013:64). Although these figures illustrate rather than prove the decline, they 
are consistent with all the available evidence for a slow but accelerating trend.6 
While voter turnout is declining globally, the UK’s figures are amongst the 
lowest in the EU,7  with non-voters significantly outnumbering those who voted 
                                                                
4
 While the UK is the focus of this chapter and indeed this thesis, there are of course many 
comparable studies and analyses which reflect on political disenchantment globally. It is worth 
noting that the picture within the UK is very much consistent with trends in similar, ‘advanced’ 
democracies. See edited volumes by Norris, 1999, and Pharr & Putnam, 2000, to locate the UK 
within an international context. 
5
 The Survey was cancelled in 2011 by the incumbent Conservative-led administration; with cost 
given as the reason. 
6
 A trend bucked by the 2014 Scottish Independence referendum, which saw a turnout of 
84.5%; suggesting a connection between perceived impact and turnout, as this chapter argues. 
7
 Declining turnout is observable in across the spectrum of advanced Western democracies. 
However, while the UK is our focus here, it is worth noting that different political systems do 
appear to generate different levels of turnout, with social democratic polities generally enjoying 
a higher level of turnout than market oriented democracies. Comparable levels of decline do not 
produce a convergence in turnout, rather the differential is maintained (Hay, 2007:15). This is 
important, as it focuses our attention on both system specific and broader factors. Appropriately, 
both are considered in this chapter. 
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for the winning party in the 2001, 2005 and 2010 general elections. Thus, in 
2001, 10.7 million people voted Labour and 18 million didn’t vote. In 2005, 9.5 
million voted Labour and 17 million didn’t vote. In 2010, 10.7 million voted 
Conservative and 15.9 million didn’t vote.8 Perhaps more tellingly yet, these 
figures conceal a more dramatic decline in voter turnout when disaggregated by 
age, as older voters are disproportionately represented in electoral turnout (Lee 
& Young, 2013:71-76; O’Toole et al, 2002). The data strongly suggest that, 
rather than a propensity to vote developing with age, the initial decision to vote 
or not vote is a remarkably good predictor of lifetime habits, carrying with it the 
implication that voter turnout will continue to decline. 
Turning to more active engagement, while party membership has always been 
a minority activity, it is not only an expression of citizenship, but also a pool of 
activists who have traditionally promoted broader engagement with the system 
(for example encouraging voting), and acted as a link between citizens and their 
representatives. Thus declining party membership is both an indicator of 
disenchantment, and potentially an exacerbating factor in terms of wider 
disengagement – and decline it has, plummeting from 3.8% of the UK electorate 
in 1983, to just 1% in 2010 (McGuinness, 2012:2).9  
Crucially, this changing political behaviour is accompanied not by indifference to 
the practice of politics but by explicit distrust. Politicians as a group are viewed 
as one of the least trustworthy professions (Pattie et al, 2004:37). According to 
annual surveys conducted by Ipsos/MORI (2013) the number of people who 
trust politicians to tell the truth hit a low point of 13% in 2009 (the height of the 
expenses scandal), and has risen no higher than 23% since the surveys began 
                                                                
8
 Figures calculated from electoral statistics available at 
http://www.ukpolitical.info/Historical.htm. 
9
 Membership of the two main parties peaked in the 1950s, with the Conservatives reporting 2.8 
million members, and Labour 1 million, though records at this point may have been 
exaggerated. See McGuinness, 2012, for a brief overview. There is of course an interesting 
‘sub-plot’ relating to the fortunes of smaller parties. For example, in early 2015, there has been 
a significant surge in Green Party membership, which is arguably linked to the idea of ‘different’ 
politics: ‘the wider perception that the Greens dare in the name of a better society’ (Hutton, 
2015). The Green Party itself considers this a causal factor, as the leader Natalie Bennett 
articulates: ‘Green Party membership is soaring [as] more and more people are recognising that 
the politics of the future doesn’t have to look like the politics of the past’ (Bennett, 2015). The 
Green Party is also bucking the trend of youth disengagement; around a quarter of new 
members are under 30 (Ramsay, 2015). The rise of smaller parties is of course not a new 
phenomenon (see Copus et al, 2009, for a discussion of the issues in relation to UK politics). 
However, the relevance to the argument I am making here is more about whether citizens’ 
reasons for voting for a smaller party relate to reinvigorating politics, than about whether this 
strategy is likely to be successful (or, indeed, whether it has proved so in the past). 
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in 1983. More fundamentally, trust is low not only in politicians but in political 
institutions such as Parliament itself. This rose no higher than 38% across the 
whole of the Citizenship Survey time-period, again with a low point of 29% in 
2009 in the wake of the expenses scandal (DCLG, 2011:10). This finding is 
supported by other studies including the Citizenship Audit, a third of whose 
respondents declared themselves strongly dissatisfied with the country’s 
traditional democratic institutions and procedures (Pattie et al, 2004:40), while 
the British Social Attitudes Survey reports that the number of people who say 
they ‘almost never trust governments’ has increased from 11% in 1986 to 32% 
in 2012 (Lee & Young, 2013:690). 
Significantly, the evidence demonstrates not only a low level of belief in the 
ability to influence decisions, but a substantial gap between democratic appetite 
and experience. In 2011, 74% of Citizenship Survey respondents believed it 
was important for them to be able to influence local decision-making, but only 
38% of respondents actually felt they could; in relation to decisions affecting 
Britain nationally, just 22% believed they had some influence (DCLG, 2011:2).  
Other studies echo the finding that few people believe that government takes 
notice of their opinions, and, more troubling still, suggest that less than half 
think government listens even to majority opinion, or takes decisions in 
accordance with majority wishes (Pattie et al, 2004:43-45). This complicates the 
possibility of interpreting these figures as inflated by a dissatisfied minority 
(which would perhaps be an inevitable feature of a majoritarian system). Put 
simply, many people think it matters that they, the people, should be able to 
influence decisions, and they think those decisions matter, but they believe they 
can’t influence the decisions. It is hard to say in what sense this could be 
described as democracy, but it doesn’t look much like apathy either. 
Also of concern is the evidence that there are differential patterns in all forms of 
conventional political engagement which mirror social disadvantage. Pattie et al 
found that: 
‘The poorest members of society, manual workers, and those with fewer 
years in full time education are more likely to be politically inactive, and 
the richest, those in professional and managerial occupations and the 
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best educated are more likely to be politically active’ (Pattie et al, 
2004:85). 
Thus, we may extrapolate that the current operation of our form of democracy is 
likely to be skewed towards reinforcing social hierarchies, as opposed to the 
equal opportunities for political voice which are implied by the ideal of 
democracy, a conclusion unhappily in keeping with the analysis presented in 
the previous chapter. 
It is worth noting that while there is a broad consensus regarding a marked 
deterioration in engagement over time, both in the UK and more generally in the 
West (see Pattie et al, 2004:44; Putnam, 2000:31-32; Dalton, 1999), there 
remains some debate over the extent to which this is a new phenomenon. While 
not disputing the decline in political engagement, Robert Pinkney quotes a 
newspaper cutting from 1921 which refers to ‘death by bad citizenship’ and one 
from 1946 which assert that ‘very few people bother to vote in local elections 
[and] few could name more than an odd one or two councillors’ (Pinkney, 
2005:39), with an implied conclusion that perhaps the concern is exaggerated if 
the situation is little worse now than it has ever been. Challenging this view, 
Stoker (2010) provides a useful and persuasive overview of changes in political 
satisfaction since Almond & Verba’s study in 1963, concluding that while (low) 
levels of interest in and knowledge of formal politics remain relatively static, 
British citizens have over time lost faith in our capacity to influence decisions, 
and in the capacity of the government to respond. 
While the evidence for decline over time is convincing, it is worth reflecting that 
the contention that there has always been dissatisfaction in no way undermines 
its importance to the health of our democratic processes. The analysis in the 
previous chapter not only supports the view that there has never been a golden 
age of participation, but also that there has never been a golden age of 
democracy – only an active accommodation between different forces and 
values, within which the development of representative democracy embodies 
not only a burgeoning democratic energy but also elite attempts to respond to 
and defuse this. A decline in trust and engagement is compatible not only with 
the hypothesis that the practice of politics has worsened but also with the (not 
necessarily contradictory) hypothesis that the emergence of mass democracy 
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post World War Two was accompanied by hopes and expectations which were 
ultimately not fulfilled (an idea inherent in Norris’ 1999 edited collection, Critical 
Citizens).10 The combination of an informed understanding of the origins of 
representative democracy with an empirically-grounded awareness of the 
changes in democratic engagement points to a deeper malaise than either 
‘unrealistic expectations’ or ‘apathy’.  
To conclude this review of evidence relating to engagement, and in order to lay 
to rest the idea of apathy as a primary factor in democratic disaffection (already 
problematised by the evidence considered so far), it is worth briefly reviewing a 
second body of evidence which presents a clear picture of a citizenry active 
outside the realm of formal politics. The ‘demand-side’ explanations of 
disengagement, with their implied judgment – not to say blame – of citizen 
behaviour, suggest a public whose disengagement from formal politics is typical 
of their more general social and political disengagement. However, and in 
contrast to Putnam’s highly influential hypothesis that social disengagement 
generates political disengagement, Newton’s contemporaneous review of 
empirical evidence regarding both political and social trust concludes that there 
is no strong evidence to suggest that the decline in political capital (i.e. trust) is 
the result of a decline in social capital (Newton, 1999:186). 
It is clear that the verdict of apathy is only one of a variety of interpretations 
which can be placed on the plain facts of disengagement. To give one example, 
Ronald Inglehart relates the generational trends in electoral turnout, not to a 
disengaged youth, but to the emergence of a younger generation which is less 
deferential to authority, and exhibits a marked decline in trust for hierarchical 
institutions, but more positively demonstrates higher levels of trust in people 
(Inglehart, 1999:246-247). Similarly, research into young people’s conceptions 
of the political portrays non-participation as a political act; the evidence 
suggests that if young people do show signs of disengagement, this reflects 
their perceptions of how politics is organised, as opposed to a lack of interest 
(O’Toole, 2003:349; see also Henn et al, 2005).11 
                                                                
10
 In relation to the ‘sub-plot’ of smaller parties mentioned earlier, it is plausible that their 
fortunes may also be affected by this dynamic. 
11
 This analysis found an expression in popular consciousness via Russell Brand’s 2013 New 
Statesman article, in which he argued that we are disenchanted not apathetic (Brand, 2013). 
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This approach to the facts of disengagement is supported by evidence about 
changing, rather than declining, forms of participation. The Citizenship Audit 
found that citizens ‘are engaged in a multiplicity of political activities beyond the 
traditional; three in every four people are engaged in political activity, defined as 
attempting to influence rules, laws or policies’ (Pattie et al, 2004:107). These 
activities include donations to campaigning organisations, signing petitions and 
ethical purchasing decisions. The last is at times made light of as atomised or 
‘lifestyle’ politics; however, this is to overlook the fact that boycotts and 
preferences (such as for fairly traded goods) are a form of collective action, 
often coordinated by a campaigning organisation whose aims are espoused by 
their supporters. In a similar vein, the British Social Attitudes survey reports a 
significant rise in non-electoral participation, such as contacting the media or 
going on a protest (Lee & Young, 2013:67-68), while Inglehart (1999:42) 
distinguishes elite-supporting participation, which has fallen, from elite-
challenging participation, which has been on the rise since the 1980s (in 
Dalton’s characterisation, ‘duty’ elements of citizenship are increasingly 
replaced with ‘engagement’ norms, particularly amongst younger citizens; 
Dalton, 2008). It is in keeping with this analysis that the UK has seen a rise in 
protest movements which often seek to defend the hard-won provisions of the 
Welfare State, as well as resisting elite visions of economic ‘development’ 
(Chesters, 2009:373). This reinforces a picture of changing rather than declining 
participation, as action on these very mainstream issues moves outside the 
state into other areas of citizen activity. 
The picture at the micro-political level (attempts to influence or challenge in 
relation to issues such as health and education in our own lives) is also more 
positive than that at the macro-political level (e.g. policy). In addition, many 
groups that are under-represented at the macro level, for example Black voices, 
are comparatively strong at the micro level (Pattie et al, 2004:125). Similarly, 
levels of both formal and informal volunteering on a regular basis (at least once 
a month) are relatively high, at 25% and 29% respectively in 2010-2011 (DCLG, 
2011:9). Corroborating this, the Citizenship Audit found that people’s sense of 
civic obligation encompasses obedience to the state, a willingness to undertake 
voluntary actions, such as participating in a neighbourhood watch or a local 
renovation project, and a willingness to engage in civic service, such as going 
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on a jury or giving blood, but for most does not extend to more formal roles such 
as local councillor or school governor (Pattie et al, 2004:53). Thus the 
conclusion of the British Social Attitudes Survey’s 30 year review appears 
justified: despite the fact that there are no real signs of recovery in political trust, 
there are signs of increasing engagement with politics in a variety of forms. Lee 
& Young, 2013:78). John et al (2011) draw an even stronger conclusion based 
on their analysis of Citizenship Survey data: a lack of political trust positively 
incentivises alternative forms of civic action. 
While this evidence of broader political engagement discredits the easy 
judgement of apathy, it does not of course refute or even ameliorate the 
evidence of formal political disengagement. Our task is to understand the 
growing gap between the numbers willing to engage in formal and informal 
politics, a central question to which I will return in later chapters, with reference 
to the experience of Participatory Budgeting in the UK. 
The Citizenship Audit team make the point that micro-politics are ‘real politics’ 
for many people (Pattie et al, 2004:126), the implication being that more formal 
political arenas feel distant and less relevant.12 This brings us to a crucial point. 
In the context of a concern with what motivates people to engage politically, the 
question of whether we as analysts or observers judge them to be making the 
‘right’ choice about what is effective political action is not the most important 
issue. This is not to dismiss the importance of thinking strategically about how 
to achieve our ends politically – simply, it is a different issue. My question here 
is around what motivates engagement; debates about how best to engage 
follow this. The important point here is about seeing from the citizen’s 
perspective, rather than the ‘system’ perspective, an idea I will return to later in 
the chapter. What matters is that we have evidence of a willingness to engage 
when it is felt (by the protagonist, not a commentator) to be worthwhile (this 
could be understood in a variety of ways, for example, effective or rewarding). 
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 This judgement is reinforced by Nina Eliasoph’s very detailed study of everyday ‘political talk’ 
in the US, Avoiding Politics (Eliasoph, 1998), which documents the conversation and practices 
of several groups of US citizens, some socially but not politically active, some active at local 
level and some involved in issue-based campaigns. Eliasoph concludes that ‘apathy’ (so-called) 
is rooted in a sense of powerlessness. For example, the desire to ‘keep your belief in 
democracy afloat’ requires you to focus on ‘close to home’ issues and ‘not care’ about larger 
issues, because in a democracy you should be able to affect issues you care about (op. cit.:82). 
Similarly, in her classic work, Participation and Democratic Theory, Carol Pateman (1970:104) 
links political apathy with low feelings of political efficacy. 
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Secondly – and related – we gain a sense that formal political activity is 
decreasingly felt to be an effective or attractive route to change by an increasing 
number of people. The following section will examine some key factors which 
might help explain this attitude.  
A DEMOCRATICALLY DEFICIENT SYSTEM? 
As I suggested in the introduction to this chapter, the simple but crucial question 
at the heart of understanding the democratic deficit is this: to what extent are 
British citizens justified in their dissatisfaction with the UK democratic system? 
The evidence presented so far indicates disengagement from formal politics but 
not apathy. In the following section, I consider a number of what Colin Hay 
would term ‘supply-side’ causes of disengagement: whether the government 
actually does what people want, the hierarchical and centralised nature of 
British democratic structures, and the limited role assigned to citizens within 
them (including the dynamics of the political party system and the nature of our 
representation). My focus in this section is on domestic, system-specific issues 
(I will discuss the extent to which neoliberal capitalism imposes more general 
constraints on democracy later in the chapter). 
First, a caveat: the UK is, by any established definition, a democracy. Leading 
international indicators for democracy place Britain at or near the summit 
(Beetham et al, 2003:334). We have free and fair elections, rule of law, an 
active civil society, protection for social and political rights (though in all cases 
we must of course add the qualifier ‘relatively’). However, Beetham’s more 
nuanced qualitative approach to democratic auditing reminds us that democracy 
cannot be measured as a total good, but rather assessed as a series of ‘more 
or less’ continuums over a variety of aspects of democracy (ibid.). In other 
words, democracy is not a yes / no condition. It does not undervalue the 
importance of hard-won, yet flawed and still threatened democratic rights, to ask 
if our democracy could be improved. Given the rather self-congratulatory public 
image of UK democracy (as expressed by Winston Churchill when he said: ‘if it 
be true, as has been said, that every country gets the form of government it 
deserves, we may certainly flatter ourselves’),13 my focus here is on the extent 
                                                                
13
 Speech by Winston Churchill to the House of Commons, 15
th
 May 1945, quoted by Wright 
(2003:2). 
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to which our system falls short of democratic ideals, in order to understand the 
extent of legitimate causes for dissatisfaction.  
To begin with, let’s take the issue of satisfaction with government performance. 
At the most basic level, if democracy is rule by the people, it is hard to quarrel 
with the view that ‘the people’ should be satisfied with what ‘we’ do. 
Unfortunately, we do not have to go far to find evidence that there is a 
significant level of dissatisfaction with government performance. Kenneth 
Newton and Pippa Norris make a strong case that the declining trust outlined 
above is related closely to institutional performance (Newton & Norris, 2000), a 
view supported by Arthur Miller and Ola Listhaug’s analysis that declining trust 
relates to perceptions of outcomes, specifically procedural justice (in other 
words, the perception that the system generates unfair outcomes) (Miller & 
Listhaug, 1999). Certainly, we can reasonably claim that the UK government 
regularly takes action which does not enjoy majority support. In his Democratic 
Audit, David Beetham (2003) refers to ‘policy disasters’ which flout public 
wishes, in making the case that the UK government is strong but not effective. 
To take one very pertinent example, which I will revisit later in the chapter, at 
the height of the privatising Thatcher administration, a majority opposed the 
sell-off, favoured increased taxes and wanted properly run and financed public 
services (Kavanagh, 1987:292-297).14 In a similar vein, the 2014 British Social 
Attitudes survey found widespread support for the idea that any democracy has 
a commitment to protect all its citizens against poverty, but that more than 1 in 3 
(38%) don’t believe the British government does this (Butt & Fitzgerald, 2014). 
However, it is important to be careful here. The picture is complicated, and it is 
vital to disentangle support for particular administrations from the wider issue of 
support for how our particular democratic system operates in practice. Rather 
than presenting a raft of detail around particular policies, I want to make a 
somewhat broader point. Russell Dalton distinguishes a healthy (representative) 
democratic cycle of dissatisfaction leading to new leaders and a temporary 
confidence in government, which gives way to dissatisfaction again, from a 
more deep-seated scepticism (Dalton, 1999:62). While he argues persuasively 
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 The figures quoted earlier, demonstrating how non-voters consistently outnumber supporters 
of the winning party, help explain how this situation can arise (as well as shedding light on the 
fact that many people do not believe that government listens even to majority opinion). 
86 
 
that the evidence does support a verdict of increased scepticism, I suggest that 
from a democratic point of view, even the cycle itself is inherently problematic. If 
this is an ongoing situation, where a change of government does not ultimately 
result in citizens’ desired outcomes, then it is reasonable to see this as a 
structural concern. Moreover, this issue is clearly exacerbated in a situation 
where the major parties offer a limited range of policy choices, as has been the 
case in the UK since the mid-1980s. 
The cycle may be a necessary part of representative democracy, but it is a 
central tenet of my overall argument that we don’t have to confine our 
judgments about the health of democracy to the idea of healthy representative 
democracy. In the light of this, it is possible to interpret the cycle as simply 
relating to our belief that what we have is: a) democracy and therefore b) the 
best possible system of government. In later chapters, I explore the extent to 
which new ideas about what is possible, indeed about what democracy is, have 
the potential to transform this situation. 
The second ‘supply-side’ issue I want to address offers some perspective on 
why many people may be dissatisfied with government performance. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the UK democratic system is majoritarian 
rather than proportional, maintained through a winner-takes-all voting system 
and a limited balance of powers. The executive gains the full resources of the 
state once a Commons majority is obtained.15 This is because, within 
Parliament, there is a striking absence of constitutional checks and balances 
(which might represent a wider spectrum of views) on the executive. 
Matthew Flinders and Alexandra Kelso describe how ‘the near complete fusion 
of the executive and legislature existed by design rather than by accident; the 
parliamentary state was designed and intended to be a power-hoarding rather 
than power-sharing polity’ (Flinders & Kelso, 2011:254), further spelling out that: 
‘Parliamentary government, as it emerged out of the 19th century, was 
explicitly intended to deliver ‘strong government’. As a result, the House 
                                                                
15
 Tony Wright (2003: 59) discusses how this strong executive power is combined with weak 
‘delivery mechanisms’. In other words, despite its strength, it’s hard for government to engineer 
the outcomes it wishes to see. Detailed analysis of the effectiveness of government is 
somewhat outside the scope of this study – my concern here is rather with the democratic 
legitimacy of government – however, it is easy to see how obvious power without clear delivery 
on outcomes can contribute to a prevalent lack of faith in politics.  
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of Commons was never empowered, resourced or intended to exert a 
constant or arduous role in relation to scrutinising the executive; it was 
designed to wield a latent power that would only be deployed in the most 
serious cases of error or omission.’ (Op. cit.:263) 
In their view, the ‘constitutional tensions and reforms of the mid to late 19th 
century established a legislature that was designed and intended to play a 
largely acquiescent role in all but the most extreme circumstances’ (op. 
cit.:259). As discussed in the previous chapter, this is a system in which 
democratic legitimacy has been grafted onto a power structure which remains 
monarchic in character. The role of citizens is therefore severely limited. It’s 
worth emphasizing that the idea of ‘strong government’ is inherent in the 
system, not simply a matter of party politics (see Amery, 1948 & Laski, 1951, for 
Conservative and Labour post-war defences of concentrated executive power).  
Unusually, in the UK, the executive power thus secured includes absolute 
power over the constitution. Contrary to popular wisdom, we don’t have an 
unwritten constitution; rather, our constitution has been written in a piecemeal 
and haphazard fashion over the centuries and across many different pieces of 
legislation. This has two important implications. Firstly, it is all but impossible for 
ordinary citizens to disentangle, understand, and more importantly, use the 
constitution as a check on the executive. Secondly, constitutional laws have no 
special status – any government can unmake constitutional laws at any time, a 
state of affairs which grants British governments an unmatched degree of power 
relative to most other democracies. Tony Wright reminds us that in the UK, the 
‘balance of powers’ historically refers to the Commons, the Lords and the 
monarch (Wright, 2003:19), rather than the rather more democratically 
justifiable executive, legislature and judiciary. As an academic and serving MP, 
Wright suggests that the question of protection against arbitrary government 
remains central (Wright, 2003:22). As we have seen, what our system 
represents above all else is a sovereign Parliament. Dicey’s 19th century 
attempt to reconcile this with the idea of a sovereign people – that a sovereign 
Parliament will only do what a sovereign people wants – is immediately 
problematised by the earlier discussion around dissatisfaction, and still more so 
by a look at what ‘majority’ means in the context of UK politics. 
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The ‘first-past-the-post’ voting system means that it generally only requires a 
minority to vote for a winning candidate at constituency level. Thus, in 2010 the 
Conservative Party won 47% of the seats with a 36% share of the vote; even 
more troublingly, in 1951 they gained a majority of seats and formed the 
government despite winning over a million fewer votes than the Labour Party, 
and in 1974 Labour formed the government despite polling fewer votes than the 
Conservatives (G Thompson, 2010:128). When we include non-voters in the 
majority who did not support the government, figures are as follows. In 2010, 
the Conservative Party’s support was around 23.4% of the electorate, given a 
65% turnout. In other words, 3 out of every 4 eligible voters – 34.9 million out of 
an electorate of 45.6 million – did not vote for the winning party (who then wield 
extensive power with limited checks and balances). In 2005, this figure was 
34.6 million out of an electorate of 44.2 million, and in 2001, 33.6 million people 
out of an electorate of 44.4 million did not vote for the winning party. Even in the 
case of Labour’s landslide 1997 election success, 30.2 million out of an 
electorate of 43.7 million did not vote Labour.16 
The situation is compounded at Parliamentary level, as extensive governing 
power is then delivered into the hands of the winning party, regardless of the 
size of their share of the vote, via a concentration of centralised executive 
power in a single party cabinet (Lijphart, 1999:10-18). Opposition minorities (or 
indeed majorities) may be disenfranchised twice, within their constituencies, 
and then again within Parliament. If, following the narrative presented in the 
previous chapter, we take an egalitarian, collective approach to democracy, 
then all this is quite damning. The highly centralised and hierarchical character 
of UK democracy additionally generates a number of corollary issues, which 
also serve to illustrate the limits to UK democracy.  
The essence of a centralised system is that power (and thus sovereignty) is 
held at a distance from the citizen. In the UK context, the first stage of this 
remove can be found in the relative powerlessness of local government. While 
local government was never a significant alternative power-base to national 
government, its further incapacitation was a facet of the Thatcher ‘revolution’ 
which is entirely in keeping with the embedded commitment to strong 
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 Figures calculated from electoral statistics available at 
http://www.ukpolitical.info/Historical.htm.  
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government (despite the neoliberal anti-state rhetoric), and which was not 
interrupted by New Labour (Jenkins, 2007; Lowndes, 2002).  This centralisation 
is reinforced by an accelerating trend towards non-elected local governance in 
fields such as health, development and education, overseen from the centre, at 
the expense of elected local government (Wilson & Game, 2006:16-17). 
Moving even further from central government to the level of individual citizens, 
the role prescribed for us within the system is predictably limited. We have 
already seen that relatively small numbers of individual votes are needed to 
secure a powerful national governing majority. For opposition voters in secure 
constituencies, this effectively devalues their primary individual exercise of 
democratic authority. Beyond this very symbolic disenfranchisement, there are 
particular features of the system which further reduce the democratic salience 
of the individual citizen, as I will discuss below. These include: the democratic 
limitations of political parties, the ‘myth of the manifesto’, the nature of political 
representation in the UK, and the existence of a permanent political class.  
Turning first to the role of political parties, it is fair to say that in the UK we are 
used to understanding competition between parties as synonymous with the 
practice of democratic politics. The democratic rationale for party politics is the 
facilitation of collective action, perhaps most famously articulated by Edmund 
Burke, who said in defence of parties, ‘when bad men combine, the good must 
associate’ (Burke, 1770). In twentieth century UK politics, party politics has had 
a class character, with hugely important democratic outcomes. For example, the 
formation of the Labour party shaped the development of mass democracy 
which played a vital role in the post-war creation of the welfare state. However, 
as Vernon Bogdanor (2004) describes, not only has the two-party system had a 
relatively short existence but its creation was actively fostered and supported by 
the political elites of the day, the significant implication being that other modes 
of democratic organisation were (and are) possible, even within the context of 
British representative democracy. As with any historical democratic construct, 
the party political model has embedded tendencies. 
In this vein, we can identify a number of anti-democratic biases. Primarily, the 
internal democracy of parties is critical. If, as Burke implies, political parties aid 
democracy because they facilitate the translation of individual aims into the 
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public policy-making forum, then the extent to which the internal processes of 
the parties are democratic matters. While internal decision-making between 
parties of course varies, there is a wider dynamic, in that the representative 
functions of parties are declining relative to their institutional functions (Bartolini 
& Mair, 2001), a process of professionalisation which shifts parties from 
organisations rooted in civil society, to being a privileged part of the machinery 
of government (Katz & Mair, 1995). In others words, they increasingly serve the 
needs of government, rather than the needs of citizens. This problematises their 
declared role as a conduit for citizens’ democratic participation. Indeed, the 
ostensible role of parties as formulating policies ‘in response to the desires of 
their mass membership’ is arguably a myth – the evidence has long suggested 
that no democracy does or could function this way (Brittan, 1975:133).  This is 
supported by the displacement of internal democratic mechanisms by the tools 
of political marketing and ‘brand creation’ (Scammell, 1999, 2007), illustrating 
how party politics is characterised by a top-down process of dissemination and 
persuasion rather than a bottom-up process of agenda-formation.  
Furthermore, the party system roots its claim to legitimacy in the doctrine of the 
mandate and the manifesto. In other words, democracy is served by party-
controlled government because, when in government, parties enact the policies 
in the manifesto they fought the election on. Of course, the ‘package deal’ which 
the manifesto implies obscures any knowledge of which policies are supported 
and which not (Wright, 2003:72), illustrating how wide the gulf between the 
position of the individual citizen and the practice of government may be. 
Similarly, the operation of accountability mechanisms is relatively inaccessible 
to ordinary citizens. Flinders & Kelso describe a complex, fluid environment 
‘beneath the observable ‘reality’ of parliamentary parties’: informal channels 
including party caucuses, all-party groupings and ad-hoc meetings between 
ministers and members. They argue that ‘the outward appearance of a strong 
and stable executive governing through a pliant and docile legislature may on 
occasion therefore veil the existence of deep parliamentary divisions that are 
played out largely beyond the public eye and are not recorded in the official 
legislative record’ (Flinders & Kelso, 2011:262). While for Flinders & Kelso, this 
indicates that accountability is working better than we might think, I suggest that 
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to the extent this is an accurate description, it captures how the individual 
citizen is excluded from an active role in holding government to account. 
As I have said, my aim here is not to suggest that political parties serve no 
democratic function, but rather to highlight the limitations of processes and 
structures which the public imagination can too often equate completely with 
democracy. We may consider the nature of representation in the same spirit. 
Firstly, representation in the UK is closely tied to the party system. This creates 
a danger that MPs are under pressure to represent their party rather than their 
constituents (particularly in the light of the issues described above). Thus, in 
1997, new prime minister Tony Blair told first-time Labour MPs that their job 
was to be ‘ambassadors’ of government in their constituencies (Wright, 
2003:82) clearly illustrating the expected direction of representation.17 
Secondly, the structural distance between representatives and citizens has at 
least two consequences which could be said to compound the systemic 
democratic deficit. Arguably, it is this distance which enables the media to play 
such a pivotal role in shaping political opinions (Herman & Chomsky, 1994; 
Stevens & Karp, 2012). The rise of ‘celebrity politics’ is an associated 
development (Marsh et al, 2010). An obvious corollary to the enhanced role of 
the media is the ascendant power of ‘spin doctors’ in directing political activity, 
which in turn privileges presentation over policy (Moloney, 2001), further 
reducing opportunities for the individual citizen to discursively influence 
democratic agendas. This is an important distinction. Political parties remain 
voter-focused in the sense that they are responsible to public opinion, but in this 
interaction, the voter is passive. This is very different from having the 
opportunity to actively participate in political agenda-formation (James Fishkin, 
in his 1995 book The Voice of the People, suggests that Western systems of 
representative democracy produce ill-informed publics, and then listen to them).  
In a similar vein, we can also see that adversarial politics are not an aberrant 
feature of this situation but an innate aspect of it. Such ‘yah boo’ politics are 
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 A vignette from my research in Newcastle illustrates the distance which the party system 
creates between the state and the citizen, and its inherent representational difficulties. A local 
PB activist who had previously been a councillor described how people think she’s still a 
councillor, and she has to explain that she isn’t, ‘because nae bugger voted for me!’ This 
prompted the following responses from her fellow citizens: ‘it wasn’t you they didn’t vote for, it 
was the labour’ … ‘I mean, we were just sorry that it was your turn’ (interview 26, group 
interview, Newburn working group members, 16/02/2009.).  
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often presented as a cause of dissatisfaction, when this is more accurately 
understood as an effect of the democratic limitations of the system itself. 
Significantly, this has a bearing not only on democratic participation but on 
democratic learning, too. By and large, we really don’t learn to discuss, form 
opinions, to be democratic citizens in a meaningful sense, from the customary 
behaviour of our politicians. Barber critiques political talk in adversarial systems 
as reducing communication to the articulation of interests rather than the 
‘difficult art of listening’, indeed to a form of aggression (Barber, 1984:174-175). 
I will return to the question of how we learn democracy – as well as what we 
learn (and what we could learn) – in later chapters. 
To summarise this family of issues, which indicates the systemic limits to the 
role of the individual citizen, it is only necessary to say that a permanent and 
professional political class is an intrinsic element of the UK democratic system. 
It is instructive to recall that this feature was actively debated with regard to the 
US constitution. Indeed, the Federalist proposal that the role of citizens should 
be ratification not decision-making was castigated by the Anti-Federalists as 
antithetical to democracy. The essence of this situation is that it locates political 
agency outside the people as a whole. Politics is what politicians do. It is not, by 
extension, what citizens do. This is spelled out by Schumpeter, who echoes the 
Federalists when he insists that ‘the voters outside of parliament must respect 
the division of labour between themselves and the politicians they elect … they 
must understand that once they have elected an individual, political action is his 
business and not theirs’ (Schumpeter, 1943:295). 
Schumpeter’s portrayal of politicians as neither ideologues nor as 
representatives, but as professionals who deal in votes as businessmen deal in 
oil (op. cit.:285) remains both a descriptive and normative account of Western 
representative democracy. This underlines the presumed location of power, 
agency and sovereignty embedded within the system. Thus, we can see the 
central relevance of this issue to our question of democratic motivation. It has 
been argued that the negligible role for individual citizens produces a ‘rationally 
ignorant’ public; there is no incentive to inform ourselves, because our input 
does not make a significant difference (Fishkin, 1995:21). Chomsky reaches a 
different conclusion with similar consequences, describing how voter turnout in 
Haiti dropped to 5% following the external imposition of neoliberal ‘reforms’ – he 
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suggests as a result not of their ignorance but rather their clear understanding 
of the value of their participation (Chomsky, 1999:106-9). Taking a ‘citizen-eye 
view’ of the democratic system, is it rational for me to participate if I cannot 
make a connection between my participation and the social and political 
outcomes that I care about? 
Before I move on to the question of wider constraints on our democracy, it is 
worth reiterating two of the system-design issues explored in the preceding 
chapter. Firstly, the underlying rationale for representation reflects belief in a 
politically incompetent mass prone to hysteria and error. This is a system rooted 
in deep scepticism about citizens’ ability to take a more active role. Secondly, it 
is a system designed to contain rather than facilitate the collective exercise of 
political freedom. The primary role which is allocated to citizens, that of voter, is 
inescapably individual. The opportunity for collectivity is formally regulated 
through political parties, and as we have seen, there are limits to this too, in 
terms of active mass participation. Both of these fundamental orientations – 
elitism and individualism – emphasise the location of sovereignty and power 
with Parliament rather than ‘the people’. 
DEMOCRACY AS POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM?  
Up to this point I have discussed domestic, structural limits to democracy. The 
impact of neoliberal economic globalisation is a separate and much discussed 
aspect of the democratic deficit (see for example, Gould, 2010; Crouch, 2004; 
McMurtry, 2002; Leys 2001). Over the time period in which we have seen a 
marked deterioration in indicators of democratic health, we have also witnessed 
the global expansion of capitalist financial organisation, and the corresponding 
extension of consumerist norms into social life (Streeck, 2012). While a detailed 
examination is outside the scope of this study, I will briefly review the perceived 
relationship between capitalism and democracy (ideologically speaking, 
neoliberal economic globalisation is not a new phenomenon, but simply writes 
large existing ideological truths and value-driven practices), in order to make 
three key points which are particularly pertinent to an exploration of the UK 
democratic deficit. 
Firstly, the democratic deficit has been facilitated by neoliberal doctrines, in 
particular the false separation of politics and economics. Secondly, perhaps the 
94 
 
most insidious aspect of this neoliberal folklore is not that is either ‘true’ or 
‘false’, but that it can be a self-fulfilling prophecy (if we let it). Finally, there is a 
conscious anti-democratic agenda at work here. These three points are 
important because they indicate possibilities for intervention, as opposed to 
understanding neoliberal economics (both domestic and globalising) as an 
external and impervious limit to democracy. 
For much of the twentieth century, formal democracy has commonly been 
understood to be dependent upon capitalist economics. As David Beetham 
(1997:77) puts it: ‘the conventional wisdom in Anglo-American political science 
… is that a market economy is a precondition for democratic political 
institutions, and that therefore economic liberalization and political 
democratization as processes go hand-in-hand’. This argument is based on the 
observation that all liberal democracies coexist with market-oriented systems of 
private enterprise (Lindblom, 1977:161-2). 
Classically, the argument has been made that affluence is a prerequisite for 
democracy, because ‘only in a wealthy society in which relatively few citizens 
lived in real poverty could a situation exist in which the mass of the population 
could intelligently participate in politics and could develop the self-restraint 
necessary to avoid succumbing to the appeals of irresponsible demagogues’ 
(Lipset, 1959:75). Thus, in his influential 1959 article, ‘Some social requisites for 
democracy: economic development and political legitimacy’, Seymour Lipset 
focused on the role that relative prosperity and education (understood to be 
generated by economic development) played in developing the talents of the 
‘lower strata’. These citizens were seen as a threat to democracy because of 
their tendency to revolt and extremism. The orthodox view of this relationship 
emphasises the ‘middle-class values’ produced by capitalism (as noted in the 
previous chapter: Fukuyama’s ‘small, elite group’ learning ‘habits of democratic 
contestation and compromise’, 1992:219). A later version of this argument 
suggests that democracy is impossible without private ownership, because 
private property provides the only secure basis for political opposition and 
intellectual freedom (Schlesinger, 1997:7). Perhaps more bluntly, Joseph 
Schumpeter’s Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1943) makes the case 
that capitalism fosters a ‘workable’ democracy which rests on competition by 
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politicians for the people’s vote, rather than an idealistic, and in his view 
unstable and unrealistic, vision of democracy as rule by the people.  
This orthodoxy notwithstanding, a more critical perspective has always 
coexisted, which has emphasised the co-dependent development of a liberal 
democracy which serves the needs of capitalist economics (classically 
expressed by Ralph Miliband’s The State in Capitalist Society, 1969). A related 
perspective highlights the role of the organised working class (accelerated by 
capitalism) in demanding democracy (Rueschemeyer et al, 1992; see also EP 
Thompson’s The Making of the English Working Class, 1963). Thompson’s 
detailed historical study challenges the assumption that wealth and democracy 
are causally linked, documenting instead the detrimental impact of economic 
‘development’ on living standards, and the relationship between this and 
increased demands for democracy. This view accords with the analysis 
presented in the previous chapter: democracy as a site of contestation between 
different social pressures. The basic tenet of this critical case is that key 
elements of capitalist ideology (exacerbated within neoliberal formulations) are 
fundamentally anti-democratic (for two detailed analyses, see Dryzek, 1996; 
Meiksins Wood, 1995). In the interests of brevity, I will concentrate on three 
features: the ideological separation of politics and economics, neoliberal value 
hierarchies, and assumptions within capitalism about human nature. 
The defining principle of capitalism is that politics and economics are separate 
spheres, a post-feudal tradition of allowing market forces to operate freely, 
which stretches back to the times of Adam Smith (Smith tended to the view that 
the social consequences of unrestrained markets were a necessary price for the 
creation of national wealth).18 This principle immediately raises a number of 
structural questions, such as the appropriateness of wealth creation as a 
primary social goal, and debates over the nature of the relationship between the 
liberal markets and wealth creation. However, my concern here is more 
narrowly with the ways in which it is fundamentally problematic from a 
democratic point of view. 
                                                                
18
 It is of course worth remembering that Adam Smith considered his two major works, The 
Wealth of Nations (1776) and The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), as parts of an integral 
whole. The Theory of Moral Sentiments deals with Smith’s conception of human nature and the 
need for social control (including internalised control in the form of moral norms) beyond the 
market.  
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Chomsky puts it bluntly, the basic neoliberal rule that government should get 
out of the way of the market implies that, insofar as the government is 
democratic, people should get out of the way too (Chomsky, 1999:20). As Ralph 
Miliband (1969:52-53) and others have argued, the depoliticisation of economic 
life is in fact the clandestine importation of economics into public life (this 
underpins a key strand of thought in recent depoliticisation debates; see Wood, 
2015; Foster et al, 2014; Flinders & Wood, 2014).19 In other words, the case 
that economics are outside the realm of politics is a quintessentially political 
agenda to remove very significant areas of life (for example, wages, standards 
of living, working conditions and material inequality) from direct public control. 
This is facilitated by an intrinsic hierarchy of values, the promotion of economy, 
efficiency, and effectiveness to the suppression of other values. Clearly, there 
are other values we can choose to judge action and policy against, such as 
justice, inclusion or equality, but these are relegated within the hegemonic 
discourse. There is an unambiguous conflict here, of the ends we strive for, not 
merely the means by which we hope to get there, as public choice theorists 
(who advocate the application of neoliberal economic hypotheses to the field of 
politics) themselves agree. William Mitchell (1988:50) identifies that criticism of 
public choice theory rests on a clash of values: efficiency versus fairness. While 
a full discussion of neoliberal values is beyond the scope of this chapter, it is 
important to note the implication that if certain values are mandated as the 
yardstick for judging public policy (see Pollitt, 1990), then it is clear that a range 
of options are being artificially held outside the arena of democratic 
contestation.20 For example, with regard to water or welfare, should economy or 
justice be the touchstone value? Citizens may debate the answer to this 
question, but there is clearly a debate to be had, and in a democracy this should 
not be suppressed. 
We can see this clearly via the issue of privatisation. Nationalisation is a 
democratic statement about the right to debate, control and – crucially – choose 
the aims of economic production and public services. Privatisation insists that 
the ends must be those determined according to capitalist values, such as 
                                                                
19
 Within this literature, Fawcett & Marsh (2014) challenge the widespread assumption that such 
‘depoliticisation’ is to a significant degree a ‘new’ phenomenon. 
20
 Thus, for example, a World Trade Organisation ministerial declaration notes that the WTO will 
not take into account values other than trade and economics, such as the preservation of rural 
life, environmental concerns or animal welfare (Singer 2002:70). 
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efficiency over fairness. For example, a privatised rail system has an imperative 
to cover costs and generate profit. Democratic control of the railways permits 
the choice to provide a service to isolated communities at a cost met by the 
taxpayer. Similarly, Nick Clegg, deputy Prime Minister in the coalition 
government which insists 'there is no alternative' to the cuts, focuses on 
administration not agenda-setting when he says: ‘given that Local Authorities 
are being asked, financially speaking, to do more with less, we should give 
them much more freedom as possible [sic] over how they do it’ (Clegg, 2010, 
emphasis added). This illustrates the fact that removal of policy areas from 
democratic control does not reduce the political salience of economics, but on 
the contrary means that the doctrines of mainstream economics become a more 
powerful (because unmediated) force in people’s lives. Democracy is properly 
understood as a series of genuine dilemmas about what action to take. And yet 
the economic model of politics cedes the determination of outcomes to the 
market – eroding conscious political control over outcomes. 
In short, democracy requires us to believe that economic structures are political 
and subject to our control. Capitalism requires us to believe that economics are 
governed by natural laws, non-political and not subject to our control. Thus, a 
more substantive view of democracy inspires us to understand economics, not 
as separate from politics, but as the proper business of politics.21 Conversely, a 
narrow view of democracy is in danger of relegating government to being the 
political arm of business. Socialist politician and founder of the NHS, Aneurin 
Bevan, provides a striking image to illustrate the poverty of this view: if 
government has responsibility without power, ‘its authority is reduced to that of 
a public mourner for private economic crimes’ (Bevan, 1952:49). Taking a view 
of democracy which places equality centre-stage, it is clear that we have the 
option to make differently normative theoretical choices about economics. 
It is worth noting at this point, following the discussion in the last chapter, that 
forming a judgment on whether you see democracy and capitalism as 
compatible very much rests on your definition of democracy. Writing from a 
neoliberal viewpoint, John Mueller (1992:984) argues that ‘democracy has been 
able to become established and accepted because, despite the assertions of 
                                                                
21
 A discussion that is at the heart of the study of ‘political economy’, a subject recognised by 
both Hayek and Marx. 
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many of its advocates, in practice it has very little to do with political equality – 
indeed, effectively it relies on, and celebrates, political inequality’. Indeed, he 
acknowledges that the same ‘virtuous and talented, and wealthy and wellborn’ 
people are in power, and describes the emphasis placed on ‘the occasional 
political success of upstarts raised in log cabins’ as the work of ‘democratic 
myth-builders’ (op.cit.:998). Similarly, Schumpeter (1943:262 & 283) suggests 
that ‘the typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental performance as 
soon as he enters the political field … he becomes a primitive again; … party 
and machine politicians are simply the response to the fact that the electoral 
mass is incapable of action other than a stampede’. On these grounds, he 
opposes the idea of democracy as rule by the people and instead defends a 
conception of democracy as a political marketplace which primarily serves to 
remove the people from the sphere of power, relegating them to choosing (and 
explicitly not controlling) their rulers (op. cit.:269-283). 
It is perhaps necessary to remind ourselves at this point that these extracts are 
taken from defences of democracy which seek to demonstrate the compatibility 
between democracy and capitalism. While it is true that there may be more 
nuanced defences of liberal democracy, these older and blunter formulations 
are useful to examine because they expose the underlying values behind 
precepts which have not been abandoned. It is rather too easy to assume that 
the hegemonic truth that (liberal) democracy and capitalist economics are 
compatible retains something of the idea of more substantive equality implied 
by popular understandings of democracy. 
Democracy, as our society defines and understands it, is within the capitalist 
system. It is not above or outside it. In essence, this gives the capitalist state a 
function which is ideologically not accessible to democratic control. In removing 
hugely significant policy areas from democratic control, capitalist ideological 
formulations therefore exacerbate the ‘limited role’ for citizens discussed earlier, 
with the same logical implications for participation.  
Thus far, I have sought to draw out the anti-democratic quality of capitalist 
ideological tenets. It is also worth reflecting briefly on how persuasive they are 
as a worldview, as context for the discussion of alternative understandings of 
democracy, which follows in chapter 5. While this topic can only receive the 
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most cursory treatment here, it is important to problematise these hegemonic 
ideas, because if these assumptions do not accurately reflect the world we live 
in, then it is practical, instead of hopelessly idealistic, to imagine alternatives. It 
is no accident that ‘there is no alternative’ is a neoliberal rallying cry. 
Though consciously presented as ‘common-sense’, the case has been strongly 
made that public choice interpretations of politics are both theoretically and 
empirically flawed (Hay, 2007:101-109; Self, 1993; Dunleavy, 1991). More 
significantly perhaps, public choice theorists themselves acknowledge that their 
theoretical models do not explain the empirical evidence (for example voting 
patterns), and devote time to explaining why this might be (Mueller, 1989:364-
368; Brittan, 1998:107). Orrell (2010:129) observes that a great many model-
based papers don’t even mention economic data. A theory that does not easily 
explain readily observable phenomena cannot claim to be descriptive, but 
should be clearly regarded as normative. 
While political theorists do offer more sophisticated analyses of economic 
behaviour, it is important to understand that this masks the fact that economic 
risk models are based precisely on these simplistic assumptions (as are public 
choice models). Orrell (2010) describes how neoclassical economics are based 
on an explicit comparison with Newtonian physics, presenting people as 
independent particles which bump into each other but are otherwise 
unchanged. The mathematical models of both neoliberal political theory and 
mainstream economics rest on this assumption, to facilitate the mathematical 
prediction and analysis of human behaviour, just as physical patterns are 
predicted. To the extent that we do not believe human behaviour works like this, 
we should not believe in the ‘laws’ of economics, and arguably we should not 
believe in the approaches to democracy that flow from them. 
Given the basis of the models, it is perhaps no surprise to observe that the 
world does not in fact behave as mainstream economic forecasters expect it to, 
as illustrated by the 2008 financial crisis. While some alternative economists did 
anticipate a crisis (see Shutt, 1998), according to mainstream economic laws, 
the events of 2008 should not have happened. The chief financial officer at 
Goldman Sachs reported that events which would not be expected to happen 
once in the duration of the universe happened every day for a week (Orrell, 
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2010:2). For investor George Soros, an industry insider, the crash happened 
precisely because powerful people acted as if the myths were true: 
‘The salient feature of the crisis is that it was not caused by some 
external shock like OPEC raising the price of oil. It was generated by the 
financial system itself. This fact - a defect inherent in the system - 
contradicts the generally accepted theory that financial markets tend 
toward equilibrium and deviations from the equilibrium occur either in a 
random manner or are caused by some sudden external event to which 
markets have difficulty in adjusting. The current approach to market 
regulation has been based on this theory, but the severity and amplitude 
of the crisis proves convincingly that there is something fundamentally 
wrong with it.’ (Soros, 2008) 
Accordingly, there is convincing evidence that these assumptions mislead us 
about what works in terms of governance. Joseph Stiglitz, former Chief 
Economist of the World Bank asserts that ‘globalisation today is not working for 
many of the world’s poor; it is not working for much of the environment; it is not 
working for the stability of the global economy’ (Stiglitz, 2002:214). Indeed, the 
market itself does not work as ‘ideal’ markets are said to, as evidenced by 
market failures (Gould, 2010:55 & 58) and the persistence of values other than 
economy and efficiency, for example fairness (Self, 1993:201-203). It is 
therefore questionable whether a ‘political market’ (the public choice vision of 
politics as a market in which political parties and government departments are 
understood as analogous to companies) would work in ideal fashion either. 
Furthermore, to the extent that neoliberal economic postulates are opinions 
rather than laws, democrats should emphatically reject their removal from 
democratic control (and so increase the salience of citizen participation). 
Likewise, research into the assumed truth that governmental freedom is 
severely curtailed by neoliberal economic globalisation has produced results 
that are perhaps surprising. Cooke & Noble (1998) found a positive correlation 
between levels of foreign direct investment with high education and wages 
(arguably linked to productivity), and a negative correlation between investment 
and low education and wages. Similarly, Hay observes a high correlation 
between ‘stateness’ (state expenditure as % of GDP) and financial openness, 
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concluding that the character of one’s labour market and the generosity of one’s 
welfare state remain matters of domestic political choice (Hay, 2007:145-6). 
Layna Mosley’s detailed empirical study (2005) suggests that while neoliberal 
economic globalisation has caused convergence on the size of deficits, richer 
countries retain control over taxation and welfare (poorer countries have less 
autonomy due to the constraints imposed by international financial institutions). 
This evidence is in keeping with the analysis that, rather than markets 
constraining states, the opposite is in fact true, international markets couldn’t 
operate without the acceptance by most politicians that intervention is to be 
eschewed (Gould, 2010:59). Thus, John Gray (1998) provides a detailed 
description of the political will which is necessary to construct and sustain free 
markets, and Foster et al (2014) argue that economic depoliticisation (moving 
economic decisions outside the acknowledged realm of political deliberation, as 
discussed above) consciously masks a ‘rolling forward’ of the state. 
This is of course also reflected at the domestic level, as capitalism requires the 
state to protect markets (see for example, Gould, 2010; Miliband, 1969). This 
includes: keeping social ‘order’, competing internationally, inducing businesses 
to invest, and securing finance for all these activities. In practice, these things 
take precedence over alternative, democratically expressed, goals (Dryzek, 
1996:37). John Gray describes the centralisation of power that Thatcher’s 
government, though publicly committed to a smaller state, found necessary in 
order to construct a free market, not least because only a strong, centralised 
state can wage war on the institutions (for example, unions) which traditionally 
stand between individual citizens and market forces (Gray, 1998:26; Dryzek, 
1996:68). This increases the distance between the citizen and the operation of 
power, and fosters the ability of government to pursue a predetermined agenda. 
In keeping with this analysis, Helen Thompson (2010) identifies that the 2008 
crisis revealed what had always been true: states have regulatory power they 
choose not to use. Thus, Mosley (2005) concludes that the ‘race to the bottom’ 
is more likely to be linked to a normative agenda to shift decision-making from 
the political arena to the market (or a scapegoat to cover policy mistakes), than 
the result of necessity. To the extent that this is true, Western governments 
(including Britain) did not reluctantly and regretfully find their democratic hands 
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tied; they ceded – and go on ceding – control of the economy by choice, and to 
the extent that they do so, they further embed an individualistic, marketised 
understanding of democracy to the detriment of a collective, egalitarian vision. 
Gould (2010:63-64) specifically attacks the Left for giving up this ground, and 
accepting the doctrine rather than presenting a meaningful alternative. 
Alongside ideological commitment, there is a strong case that politicians choose 
power without responsibility, in order to create an electoral shield against the 
consequences of their policy choices (Burnham, 2014, 2001; Murphy, 2011). It 
is easy to see how this coheres with a professional political class for whom 
political success is a goal in itself (prompting the question of whether this might 
be different in the context of a more citizen-based, participatory democracy).  
As a last reflection on the extent to which neoliberal economic globalisation 
narrows our sphere of democratic action, we may take note of the instances in 
which the elites who promote these ‘truths’ flout the rules in their own cases 
(Chomsky, 1999:30-39; Self, 1993:198-201; Bevan, 1952:67). Stiglitz (2002:6-7) 
describes his experiences at the World Bank; the West pushed poorer countries 
to eliminate trade barriers while keeping up their own, declined to open up their 
own markets to developing countries, retained quotas on multiple goods from 
textiles to sugar, and continued to subsidise their own agriculture while insisting 
the poor eliminated their subsidies. The fundamental importance of this 
reflection is that democratic choices are possible, but there is a critical question 
over who is encouraged to make them within existing political systems. 
This connects to the next point I want to make about the anti-democratic 
dynamics of a neoliberal framework for democracy. As I have said, an essential 
issue is not whether economic rationality is true or false, but that it can to a 
certain extent be self-fulfilling. I have argued that what we understand by 
democracy is not given but is shaped by historical struggles. We are born into 
an ideological inheritance which we can shape but which also shapes us. This 
is also true of our conceptions of citizenship, and at a fundamental level, our 
own human nature. I can put it no more eloquently than Aneurin Bevan, who 
describes his formative experiences as a young miner in a South Wales colliery: 
‘My concern was with the one practical question, where does power lie in 
this particular State of Great Britain, and how can it be attained by the 
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workers? … The circumstances of our lives made it a burning luminous 
mark of interrogation. Where was power and which the road to it? It will 
be seen at once that the question formulated itself in different fashion for 
us than it would have done in a new, pioneering society or in the mind of 
someone equipped by a long formal education … I don’t mean by this 
that we were necessarily less selfish. It was merely that the texture of our 
lives shaped the question into a class and not an individual form. We 
were surrounded by the established facts of the Industrial Revolution. We 
worked in pits, steel works, foundries, textiles, mills, factories. These 
were the obvious instruments of power and wealth … [and] we had a 
long tradition of class action behind us stretching back to the Chartists. 
So for us power meant the use of collective action designed to transform 
society and so lift all of us together … individual ambition was overlaid by 
the social imperative. The streams of individual initiative therefore flowed 
along collective channels already formed for us by our environment.’ 
(Bevan, 1952:21-22) 
This illustrates how ‘human nature’ is not fixed, but is moulded by the society 
we create. The neoliberal capitalist perspective both assumes and promotes an 
individualistic and selfish cast to human nature, driving an individualistic, 
consumption-oriented dynamic in tension with the enactment of democratic 
citizenship. Since the 1980s, public choice theory has exerted a great deal of 
influence over British and American democratic practice (for useful introductions 
see Dryzek, 1996:96-113; Dunleavy, 1991; Mueller, 1989). Normatively, public 
choice theorists advocate opening up political problems to the market, which is 
understood to aggregate individuals’ fixed preferences (see Arrow, 1963) more 
efficiently than democratic systems, because it permits a more direct expression 
of preferences. It is argued that as voters people are ignorant of economic 
costs, but as consumers they ‘know costs and pay prices’ (Seldon, 1998:26). 
As we have seen, different models of democracy are based on different ideas 
about human nature, but perhaps none quite so extreme as that within public 
choice theory, which is predicated on the idea of ‘man’ as ‘an egoistic, rational 
utility-maximiser’ (Mueller, 1989:2), in other words, rationally self-interested and 
skilled at assessing costs and benefits: usually understood in material terms, 
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with little reference to consequences or collective responsibility.22 On this basis, 
theorists construct mathematical models to predict and critique political 
behaviour, which have heavily influenced public policy since the 1980s.  
Public choice’s presumption of fixed preferences generates a view of citizens as 
political consumers, ‘shopping’ for their desired electoral or social outcomes. 
Here, ‘we’ is no more than an aggregation of ‘me’s’, and citizenship an 
abstraction, a set of duties and rights rather than an active mode of being. 
Citizenship and consumption are in tension: as a consumer, we are propelled 
towards individual action, as a citizen, towards collective action. Through the 
assumed superiority of economically ‘rational’ behaviour, we learn to reproduce 
this in political life. In markets, we express discontent by taking our business 
elsewhere, rather than by joining a collective attempt to make things better. The 
citizen is replaced by the consumer who can make choices but not give voice 
(see Clarke et al, 2007).23 This is critical in understanding the democratic deficit: 
if we, the people, learn to ‘take our business elsewhere’, there is no polity left.24 
Importantly, as with Bevan’s socially constructed collective behaviour, valorising 
greed and the pursuit of material self-interest generates individualistic social 
behaviour. Thus, Dryzek (1996:93) documents how British society became 
much more aggressively individualistic as a result of Thatcher’s policies, and 
Streeck (2012) traces the historical shift from states seeing people as citizens to 
seeing them as customers, and encouraging them to see themselves that way 
too. Bauman (1998:79-80) reflects that ours is a consumer society, not simply in 
the evident fact that we consume, but because ‘the way present day society 
shapes its members is dictated first and foremost by the duty to play the role of 
the consumer; the norm our society holds up to its members is that of the ability 
and willingness to play it’. This matters because a society which increasingly 
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 David Orrell discusses the gendered nature of mainstream economics, which celebrates 
normatively masculine traits such as detachment, mathematical reasoning, formality, and 
abstraction, over supposedly feminine traits such as connectedness, verbal reasoning, 
informality, and concrete detail (Orrell, 2010:159). 
23
 The public choice formulation is a strong example of liberal models of citizenship, which are 
similarly predicated on the idea of a fixed individual who possesses rights and duties. See 
Elster, 1997, for an overview of the different and competing behaviours encouraged by ‘the 
market and the forum’. 
24
 As the next chapter will explore, participatory democrats in the more egalitarian tradition are 
interested in the development of a different model of citizenship based in collective democratic 
processes, which rests on the idea of democratic learning. In this view, citizenship is based in 
relationships and a search for common values, a political community in which mutuality and 
cooperation in pursuit of collectively negotiated goals are possible. 
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embraces consumption over citizenship becomes a more hostile environment 
for egalitarian democracy.  
At a more public level, the ideology can also be self-fulfilling in terms of its 
impact on policy discourse and the range of options available. Thus, we can 
identify a clear and depoliticising continuity of British economic policy from the 
1980s onwards (Buller & Flinders, 2005; see also Burnham, 2014). The creation 
of ‘quasi-markets’ (the attempt to put economic values on other goods such as 
the environment) is a striking example of how this becomes not only a 
constraint on democracy but self-fulfilling in terms of publicly acceptable 
discourse. This is an attempt from within the paradigm to counter its negative 
effects, but ultimately it does so by shoring up its foundational myths, creating a 
vicious circle of negative learning. As Susan George (1997:52-3) puts it, ‘we 
used to laugh at the idea that market mechanisms could solve social problems: 
such things are now said every day with a straight face'. We have been 
conditioned to understand the business of democratic politics – the collective 
endeavour of humanity to govern ourselves and live well together – to be the 
'politics of business', subject to market ‘laws’.  
Crucially, this is not an inadvertent side-effect of the ideology. The role of 
thinktanks and other institutions in consciously promoting neoliberal ideas is 
well-documented (Stiglitz, 2002; George, 1997). In other words, there is an 
active campaign to ‘wage the war of ideas’; the subtitle of an Institute of 
Economic Affairs publication which encourages that endeavour:  
‘Through research, advocacy and education, … thinktank leaders have 
successfully introduced classical liberal ideas into critical public debates, 
directly influencing public polity outcomes and legislation; the policy 
successes of these thinktanks include minimising barriers to business 
creation and market entry, creating stable financial structures, promoting 
free and open trade, reducing wasteful government spending and 
unnecessary taxes, and providing increased choice in education.’  
(Dyble, 2008:29) 
The author expresses her ‘hope that their stories will encourage you to wage 
the war of ideas in your own country … in response to the rising tide of 
socialism and expanding government intervention and control’ (Dyble, 2008:26).  
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Thus, Susan George concludes that: 
‘Neoliberals understood … that to transform the economic, political and 
social landscape they first had to change the intellectual and 
psychological one; … imperceptibly, nearly everyone will come to feel 
that certain ideas are normal, natural, part of the air we breathe.’  
(George, 1997:48).  
In short, capitalism believes in competition but it doesn’t like competitors. The 
struggle for democracy may depend on articulating and activating visions which 
grow out of the narrative of equality, and which challenge the idea of democracy 
as compatible with possessive individualism. 
CONCLUSION 
Earlier in the chapter, I quoted from Matthew Flinders and Alexandra Kelso’s 
paper on the development of our parliamentary system at some length, not only 
because it clearly expressed the democratic limits of our parliamentary system, 
but because it is also a fascinating example of the limits of our democratic 
imagination. This detailed and accurate critique of the democratic pretensions of 
the UK system occurs in the context of a robust challenge to the near-
consensus around the idea of a democratic deficit. In a trenchant critique of 
what they refer to as pervasive ‘lazy thinking’ around the democratic deficit, 
Flinders & Kelso argue that dissatisfaction can come from unrealistic 
expectations as well as from inadequate practice. The main thrust of their case 
is that the ‘parliamentary decline thesis’ is over-stated because scholars have 
‘failed to acknowledge that parliamentary democracy was founded on the 
principle of ‘strong government’ and did not therefore include a proactive or 
assertive role for the legislature … and therefore [scholars have] contributed to 
the erosion of political support’ by raising false expectations (Flinders & Kelso, 
2011:251). They appear to suggest that because the system has always been 
this way, it is misguided to raise an alarm. 
Following the arguments presented in the previous chapter, I draw a very 
different conclusion from the same facts. A conscious awareness that people 
assume the system to be more democratic than it actually is, could be taken as 
a democratic opportunity. The UK has evident democratic limitations, but what 
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is significant is that these limitations exist for very definite reasons which are not 
widely discussed. At least part of what we understand to be the democratic 
deficit – that it has retained elite control and limited popular participation – is 
simply that it still fulfils the aims it was designed for.25 If the cracks are 
becoming more visible (perhaps in part due to increasing pressures on national 
governments, perhaps in part due to better access to information by a more 
critical public), and we can understand – as Flinders & Kelso have so accurately 
described – that these cracks are not failings in the system but integral aspects 
of its design, then there is a chance that this might help free our democratic 
imaginations. The current situation is compounded because few people have 
direct experience of other forms or models of democracy. Hay’s review of 
attitudinal survey data suggests not that most people don’t want something 
better but that they currently can’t conceive of anything better (Hay, 2007:33). 
While the workings of global capitalism are significantly beyond the scope of 
this study, it is worth pausing here a moment. The assumptions I have explored 
in this chapter, which are presented as truths and laws, govern much of our 
lives. They affect how our governments behave, they affect how we see 
ourselves, they affect how we are invited to be democratically active as citizens, 
and they affect what is understood to be possible as a democratic system. 
Through a very brief glance at these assumptions, my aim (as with the 
understandings of democracy considered in the last chapter) has been to 
cultivate space for seeing differently, to remind ourselves that our taken-for-
granted truths come with embedded values and agendas, which we are free to 
reject. Those of us who identify with the egalitarian tradition of democracy, 
rather than the more elitist tradition described in this chapter, can embrace and 
promote other kinds of rationality than economic rationality, other kinds of 
democracy than that associated with possessive individualism. 
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 Consider this extract from John Mueller’s defence of liberal democracy, printed in the 
American Journal of Political Science in 1992: ‘first, while it is true that the rich form a minority of 
the electorate, their money and status can be parlayed into substantial political influence. As 
suggested, the simple arithmetic of the ballot box is only a portion of the democratic effect – and 
perhaps not even a necessary one. Elsewhere, a sort of weighted voting takes place, and the 
rich enjoy influence far out of proportion to their numbers’ (1992:989). Astonishingly, the context 
of the extract demonstrates that this is intended as reassurance that the mob will not rule as 
tyrants, rather than critique (his next point is that the poor show a ‘rough appreciation’ that the 
rich are good for society). 
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John Dunn talks about democracy as our political identification, the term 
tenaciously retaining the meaning that ‘we the people’ rule ourselves. He 
argues that, today, this is a ‘bare-faced lie’ and that ‘the history of modern 
politics has been a long, slow, resentful reconciliation to this obvious falsehood’ 
(Dunn, 2005:51). This is centrally at the heart of the democratic deficit. What it 
means is that, in Western democracies such as the UK at least, the democratic 
promise does not equal either the experience or the anticipated results. What is 
going on here is quite simply an exaggerated conflation of ‘the system we have’ 
with ‘democracy’ as an ideal; as with demand-side theories of disengagement, it 
is certainly convenient for elite interests that this should happen. 
The 18th century struggles I explored in the previous chapter demonstrate that 
democracy is an immensely powerful legitimising idea, which benefits those 
who can harness it. However, if, as I have suggested, we see each different 
model of democracy as an accommodation between different interests and 
agendas, then it is clear that different actors will have different aspirations. 
Those power-holders who are privileged by the status quo may want to solve 
the problem of legitimacy without undermining their power. Democratic activists 
may want to reform structures of power and expose the failings of the system. 
Others – disillusioned with democracy and living in a society which valorises 
and encourages identification as an individual and as a consumer – may make 
the ‘rational’ choice to live private lives rather than engage in active citizenship.  
Thus, while the evidence suggests grounds for optimism in terms of so-called 
citizen ‘apathy’, the inherently limited nature of our democratic system poses 
two key questions in considering the democratic deficit. Firstly: to what extent 
are those who currently wield power within this system genuinely interested in 
exploring other ideas about democracy – specifically, ideas which pose a 
fundamental challenge to the location of power and sovereignty, and to our 
taken-for-granted ‘truths’ about democracy? An obvious response to this is to 
point out that democracy is taken, not given. However, this prompts the second, 
more difficult, question: given that the choice not to engage with a system 
originally intended to contain and limit your participation appears intelligible, 
arguably even rational, what would make enough of us want to stand up and 
take it – when our experience has taught too many of us that ‘democracy’ isn’t 
inspiring, perhaps isn’t even relevant to our day-to-day lives? 
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These questions illustrate that the solution too is about the location of power. 
Gerry Stoker (2010) proposes a ‘design science’ arm of political studies to 
improve the democratic process; understandably, he wants the experts to take 
responsibility for solutions not just critiques. Similarly, the state – also a set of 
political ‘experts’ – wants to shape how people participate. This might be 
described as an ‘engineer’s-eye view’: the plausible desire to ‘fix’ the faults. A 
focus on the location of power and sovereignty, however, suggests that 
democracy actually requires a ‘citizen-eye view’, that the most promising route 
to democracy is likely to be through organising ourselves to make it better, not 
waiting to be asked, rejecting the idea that democracy is ‘not our job’. If the 
problem is that power and sovereignty are held at a distance from the people, 
then perhaps we simply need to be democratic, to exert power and sovereignty. 
Unfortunately, the solution that this analysis leads towards starts to sound a 
little like Catch-22: perhaps we’ll demand better democracy when we are 
actually doing it. Accordingly, understanding our system of democracy as a 
value-laden historical construct, which we shape but which also shapes us, 
leads me as a democratic activist to believe that the key issue is not ‘how do we 
bring more people into the system?’, but ‘how do we get to grips with the idea of 
nurturing more insistent demands for democracy?’ It is apparent from the 
evidence presented in this chapter that an appetite for democracy does exist; 
this is demonstrated both from the relative health of more action-oriented citizen 
activities and from the levels of dissatisfaction. The question is, how do we 
translate dissatisfaction into a more vocal demand for better democracy? 
In the next chapter, I look at one modern day example of ‘doing democracy 
differently’ in order to learn something about the appetite for democracy, and 
something about ‘thinking democracy differently’. Participatory Budgeting in 
Porto Alegre recasts the relationship between citizens and the state, centrally 
addressing the location of power and sovereignty, and furthermore provides a 
living education in democratic culture. I also explore the story of how PB came 
about – the accommodation and struggles that it represents – as well as how it 
is defended, and by whom. In chapters 6 to 9, this story will come together with 
the democratic system in the UK, as I consider what happens to an egalitarian 
participatory democratic innovation such as PB in the context of our more 
individualised, centralised and hierarchical system.  
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CHAPTER 5 
ANOTHER DEMOCRACY IS POSSIBLE: LESSONS FROM PORTO ALEGRE 
In 2001, the Brazilian city of Porto Alegre hosted the first World Social Forum, a 
gathering of social movements and civil society groups ‘opposed to 
neoliberalism and to domination of the world by capital and any form of 
imperialism’, who think and debate together, formulate proposals and boldly 
proclaim that ‘another world is possible’ (World Social Forum, 2002). Porto 
Alegre was a natural home for the Forum because, more than ten years earlier, 
the people of the city embarked on their own contribution to ‘another world’, a 
contribution which has put Porto Alegre firmly on the radar of activists and 
scholars interested in alternative forms of democracy. Participatory budgeting, 
as developed under the Workers’ Party administration in Porto Alegre, is a 
distinctive and inspiring form of direct democracy: citizens hold actual decision-
making power over public funds, rather than influence, as is the case in a 
representative system (for example, that of the UK).  
In common with most of Latin America, Brazil differs immensely from the UK in 
its democratic history, having experienced both colonialism and a more recent 
period of military dictatorship. Significantly, it has thus been through a modern 
‘revolutionary moment’, a new Constitution coming into force in 1988 after 
millions of Brazilians took to the streets to demand democratic elections and an 
end to twenty years of military dictatorship. The 1988 constitution explicitly 
acknowledged that sovereignty could be exercised by ‘people’s initiative’ as well 
as by means of a vote, and indeed required popular participation in the 
formulation of some policies.1 
The overthrow of the dictatorship meant that democracy itself was again 
publicly negotiable, not only in the formal sense that the Constitution redefined 
political structures, but in a broader societal sense via the existence of a mass 
popular movement which was actively theorising democracy through its values, 
actions and demands. The collective effort to replace dictatorship with 
                                                                
1
 Article 14 of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution states that ‘the sovereignty of the people shall be 
exercised by universal suffrage and by the direct and secret voting, with equal value for all, and, 
according to the law, by means of: 1) plebiscite, 2) referendum, 3) people's initiative. Article 27 
states that ‘the law shall provide for people’s initiative in the legislative proceedings of the 
states’, while articles 198 and 204 specifically require popular participation with regard to health 
and social security (Brazil Government, 1988). 
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democracy created space to reflect on and debate good democratic process (in 
precisely the way that reifying the UK’s ‘mother of parliaments’ does not). This 
process involved both an active pro-democracy movement and significant anti-
democratic forces (with attendant undemocratic legacies, most notably a 
tenacious tradition of clientelist political practices). As with the US constitutional 
arguments of the eighteenth century, participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre is a 
clear demonstration of democratic debates in action.  
In terms of understanding who is democratically engaged in the UK and why, 
the story of participatory budgeting (PB) in Porto Alegre generates useful 
insights for at least three reasons. Firstly, it is a modern (and rare) instance of 
the egalitarian democratic tradition, and as such, is a valuable reference point 
when considering the issues raised in the last chapter. As we will see, the core 
principles and practices of Porto Alegrean PB rest on very different assumptions 
and values to those underpinning UK democracy. Secondly, as an empirical 
example of egalitarian democracy, it illustrates what outcomes may be possible 
within this orientation, both in terms of substantive changes (things being done 
differently as a result of participation via PB) and democratic outcomes such as 
engagement levels and a growth in citizenship. This again offers a pertinent 
reflection on the more individualistic, representative tradition of the UK. Finally, 
the Porto Alegre experience has inspired increasing numbers of localities to 
develop and deepen their own democratic processes, sparking many similar 
participatory innovations worldwide, including the Newcastle and Bradford 
experiences documented here. Since its inception in Porto Alegre, PB has 
spread to an estimated 1,200-2,800 localities worldwide (Sintomer et al, 
2013a).2 This in itself prompts an enquiry into what it is about this particular 
development that generates such enthusiasm. 
It is also noteworthy that PB has attracted interest from organisations as 
intriguingly diverse as the Occupy Movement and the World Bank (Hetland & 
Martin, 2012; Shah, 2007), and has taken a variety of forms, from participatory 
grant-making processes of a few thousand pounds to annual processes 
distributing many millions, from consultative events to genuine power-sharing, 
and from small neighbourhoods to city-wide schemes (Sintomer et al, 2013a; 
Cabannes, 2004). As with any democratic innovation, each system represents 
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 The figure depends on the criteria used (see Sintomer et al, 2012:2-3). 
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an accommodation between the democratic aims and values of the actors 
involved, and the values and assumptions which are embedded in the local 
social and political context. The diversity amongst its supporters therefore 
underlines the need to examine the agendas and values in each local 
expression of PB (an issue I will revisit in the following chapters). 
Finally, PB in Porto Alegre contributes analysis as well as evidence to the story 
of democratic engagement. The broader context of growing (and growing 
awareness of) disenchantment with established representative democracies is 
reflected not only in the democratic deficit literature discussed in chapter 4, but 
in contemporary attempts to theorise alternative models of democracy: the 
activist-theorists of Porto Alegre provide a distinctive voice within this literature. 
The wide variety of practices gathered under the name of ‘participatory 
budgeting’ do not all have the same underpinning values and assumptions, and 
thus reflect an equally broad spectrum of democratic understandings. However, 
the aim of this chapter is to explore the normative framework for one concrete 
expression of egalitarian democracy, and to understand how this connects with 
democratic motivation, not to review or evaluate the global phenomenon that 
PB has become. For this purpose, Porto Alegre is an obvious choice.3 Not only 
was it the original and longest-running example, but there is a clear 
convergence in the literature that it represents one end of the scale in terms of 
deepening democracy (Marquetti et al, 2012; Goldfrank, 2007; Baiocchi, 2001; 
Wampler, 2000). Furthermore, while there may be many different motivations 
for initiating participatory budgeting-style processes, the Porto Alegrean 
example is consciously presented by its protagonists (and many scholars) as 
part of a radical and alternative tradition defending democracy against the 
hegemonic global forces explored in the previous two chapters (CIDADE, 2010; 
Goldfrank, 2006; Bruce, 2004; Pont, 2004; Baierle, 2003; Santos, 1998).  
This chapter will explore the development of PB in Porto Alegre and the 
underlying values which shaped it, relate this approach to the egalitarian 
democratic narrative, and ask what we in the UK can learn about the location of 
sovereignty and democratic engagement from the Porto Alegre experience.  
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 In the following chapter, I will look at the comparative literature which seeks to understand 
what factors account for the wide variations in outcomes across the many different processes 
called ‘participatory budgeting’. 
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PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING IN PORTO ALEGRE: AN OVERVIEW 
Porto Alegre (which translates as ‘joyful harbour’) is the state capital of Rio 
Grande do Sul, in the South of Brazil. It is a relatively wealthy city by Brazilian 
standards, but there is also great inequality. In 1988, the year Olívio Dutra was 
elected as the city’s first Partido dos Trabhaladores (the PT, the Workers’ Party) 
mayor, around a quarter of Porto Alegre’s approximately 1.3 million inhabitants 
lived in the ‘informal city’, with only limited access to basic services (Baiocchi, 
2005:6-7). The PT places inequality centre-stage, an ‘inversion of priorities’ for 
public spending being one of their two central concerns. The promotion of 
popular participation is the other. Launched in 1980, the PT has its roots in the 
Central Única dos Trabalhadores (a national Trade Union federation) and has 
always been closely allied with radical social movements. It represents a new 
autonomous Left which broke with the vanguardist ‘old Left’; accordingly, it is 
fundamentally participatory in its own organisational structure (Abers, 1996; 
Nylen, 2003:37-49). 
Dutra’s administration therefore came to power in Porto Alegre with an 
ideological commitment to the bottom-up democratic exercise of power, and to 
enacting fundamentally redistributive social policies. The first Porto Alegrean 
participatory budgeting experience took place the following year, in 1989. The 
vital role of the PT in establishing PB as a democratic process is explored in 
detail by some of PB’s earliest commentators (most notably Rebecca Abers, 
1996, 1998 & 2000). However, Sergio Baierle, widely recognised as one of 
Porto Alegre’s most insightful PB observers as well a deeply committed 
democratic activist whose NGO, CIDADE,4 has supported citizen access to the 
participatory budget since its inception, rejects the view sometimes expressed 
by state officials that ‘civil society was a desert by the end of the eighties … 
[from which] they have built an oasis of participation and investment in social 
needs’ (Baierle, 2002:1). This view is reinforced by scholars who have explored 
the role of civil society organisations in the development of PB (Avritzer, 2006; 
Baiocchi, 2005; Wampler & Avritzer, 2004), and there is increasingly a 
convergence around the idea that both high levels of political support and an 
active civil society (willing to cooperate but also prepared to contest the state 
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 Centro de Assessoria e Estudos Urbanos (Advisory and Urban Studies Centre); CIDADE itself 
translates as ‘city’. 
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where necessary) were central factors in creating the conditions for Porto 
Alegre’s successful PB system (Sintomer et al, 2008; Wampler, 2007; 
Goldfrank, 2007). Baierle (2002) articulates the role of popular education in the 
growth of politicised neighbourhood associations during the 70s and 80s (part of 
the movement against the dictatorship), which fostered an emergent culture of 
participation and open debate, as well as providing opportunities for learning 
community organising, empowered decision-making and how to exert pressure 
on government. This culture was already present to a significant degree in at 
least 5 of the 16 PB regions by 1989.5 
Both the PT and civil society organisations contributed specific design principles 
to the original PB structure. The umbrella organisation União das Associações 
de Moradores de Porto Alegre (UAMPA, the Union of Neighbourhood 
Associations of Porto Alegre) demanded the right to participate in deliberation 
on budget issues at the local level in 1986, and in 1989 negotiated with the PT 
that PB assemblies should be held at local rather than municipal level; for their 
part, the PT insisted on individual participation where UAMPA had envisaged 
participation via neighbourhood associations (Avritzer, 2006:625-6). 
The development of PB was facilitated by the 1988 Constitution’s position on 
the legitimate sovereignty of popular initiatives, and Porto Alegre stands out 
from the whole of the rest of Brazil in the degree to which it took advantage of 
this legal infrastructure (Avritzer, 2006:623). Fiscal and political decentralisation 
were also very important enabling factors, in particular the degree to which, 
under the Brazilian system, fiscal responsibility is concentrated in the hands of 
the mayor rather than the local legislature. Finally, the relative prosperity of 
Porto Alegre mattered; local resources existed which could be distributed via a 
participatory democratic process. 
Nonetheless, the early stages of the road to a successful PB system in Porto 
Alegre encompassed significant challenges. While the city was not itself poor by 
Brazilian standards, the PT in 1988 encountered both a bankrupt municipality 
and a disorganised bureaucracy (Wampler, 2000:3). Furthermore, clientelist 
practices, though challenged by empowered civil society organisations, defined 
the overall political context (Baiocchi et al, 2011:40-41). Abers outlines the 
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 There is considerable discussion within the literature about the impact of PB in less mobilised 
areas, which I will touch on briefly later in the chapter. 
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many immediate difficulties which the PT faced, including a lack of information, 
crises such as a bus company strike in response to the attempt to raise wages 
(i.e. a temporary withdrawal of service by contracted companies, not a strike by 
workers), opposition from the (non-PT) legislature, and accusations of ‘selling 
out’ as the mayor, who declared he could not solve the problems of capitalism, 
struggled to meet the expectations of the people (Abers, 2000:67-71). In this 
context, the first attempt at what would become known as participatory 
budgeting resulted in what many described as a colossal wish list; the 
administration’s subsequent inability to deliver on these demands led to a drop 
in participation the following year (op. cit.:71-75). 
The response to these crises was, however, informed by a genuine commitment 
to participatory democracy and to generating public outcomes which were 
transformational for the poor (a commitment both from within the state and 
empowered sections of civil society). In conjunction with deepening the 
participatory mechanisms of the budgeting cycle, and administrative 
restructuring to bring government closer to citizens, substantial tax reforms 
were undertaken in order to generate adequate state revenue. In order to do 
this, the PT (which did not have a majority in the legislature) relied on a major 
popular mobilisation to pressure legislators to approve the tax reform law 
(Santos, 1998:477).6 By way of these processes, PB emerged as part of a 
broader political movement to create meaningful and publicly agreed forms of 
democracy in accordance with popular social movement values.  
PB in Porto Alegre continued to evolve over the years, not least because 
citizens themselves had a central role in agreeing the rules of the process. In 
brief, the participatory budget deals with the investment budget, which is 10% of 
the city budget (though 100% of the overall budget is deemed to be involved, 
because this is subject to approval by the participatory budgeting council before 
it goes to the municipal council; Cabannes, 2004:34). PB in Porto Alegre 
involves a known annual cycle of public meetings and events; thus people 
understand when and how to participate, which amounts to a year-round 
mobilisation of budget participants. There are 16 regional and 5 thematic 
assemblies (transport; education, leisure and culture; health and social welfare; 
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 Santos (ibid.) notes in passing that the rightist and centrist legislators were quite surprised to 
find the people pressuring them to raise taxes!  
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economic development and taxation; and city organisation and development), 
which all meet twice each year. However, the budget cycle begins with 
preparatory meetings, organised by budget councillors, delegates and 
neighbourhood associations who mobilise citizens to attend the assemblies. In 
the first round of assembly meetings, the administration presents an account of 
the Investment Plan from the previous year for evaluation by communities, and 
outlines the arrangements for that year’s budget process. At this assembly, 
budget delegates are elected in proportion to attendance at the meeting (in 
other words, the larger the turnout from each neighbourhood, the more 
delegates it can elect).7 At intermediate meetings before the second round of 
state-run assemblies, each region agrees their broad priorities (ranking needs 
such as sewage, housing, street paving, education, social assistance, health, 
and transport). At these meetings, which are organised by civil society 
organisations (though with input from budget representatives and officials as 
needed), citizens also formulate and prioritise specific projects (referred to as 
demands). At the second round of assemblies, each region presents these 
priorities and demands, the administration gives an account of expenses and 
expected income, and budget councillors are elected (2 plus 2 substitutes per 
region). The thematic forums were introduced in 1993/94 to take account of city-
wide issues, and follow a similar process (including the election of citizen 
delegates and councillors). 
Delegates and councillors form regional budget forums, and the Conselho do 
Orçamento Participativo (the participatory budget council, known as the COP). 
The COP meets weekly, without remuneration or even travel expenses, to 
discuss resource allocation and prepare the Investment Plan, which allocates 
specific projects to the available funds. Funds are distributed according to a 
carefully worked out formula (itself agreed by the COP) balancing population 
and levels of deprivation. Priorities and specific projects are included in the 
Investment Plan according to the priorities agreed through the assemblies and 
taking technical criteria into account, a process which involves much negotiation 
and discussion. Council officers are present at COP meetings, and are able to 
contribute both suggestions and technical expertise. The COP also plays an 
essential role in agreeing the rules for the subsequent year’s budget cycle; PB 
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 From a ‘citizen-eye’ perspective, the participation of each individual matters. 
117 
 
in Porto Alegre is a participant-regulated process. Delegates meet on a monthly 
basis, and act as intermediaries between citizens and the COP. They 
additionally undertake ‘priority trips’ to all the projects in their own region, to 
collectively evaluate the social need of each project. 
The Investment Plan is finally presented to the legislature for approval, though 
the participatory nature of the process by which it has been developed makes 
this something of a formality (it is difficult for legislators to reject the people’s 
budget). Deliberation is an important dimension of the process, the primary 
deliberative forums being the regional assemblies, the COP and delegates’ 
meetings, and the process of agreeing the rules for PB. 
This overview briefly describes the main features of participatory budgeting in 
Porto Alegre between the years of 1989 and 2004.8 In that year, the PT lost the 
mayoral election to José Fogaça of the Partido Popular Socialista (the Socialist 
People’s Party, a party of the ‘old Left’ with a more limited and instrumental 
commitment to participatory democracy). Baiocchi & Ganuza have noted that ‘a 
politically conservative coalition maintained the surface features of Participatory 
Budgeting while returning the actual functioning of the administration to more 
traditional modes of favour-trading and the favouring of local elites’ (Baiocchi & 
Ganuza, 2014:34). Baierle describes PB after 2004 as a ‘parody’, citing a lack 
of transparency about rules and decisions, and describing how the link between 
participation and action has been weakened (if not broken), as neighbourhoods 
which didn’t prioritise certain themes receive more of those resources than 
those that did, and the administration cherry-picks initiatives for implementation 
(Baierle, 2008). The response of PB’s protagonists is encapsulated in a letter 
‘from Metropolitan Porto Alegre’ composed at a World Social Forum workshop 
convened by the NGO CIDADE, entitled ‘Participatory budgeting: popular power 
or participatory exclusion?’ The letter sets out the fundamental principles of PB, 
and argues that anything else cannot be called PB (CIDADE, 2010).  
Overall, the structures in place after 2004 are not considered ‘PB’ by its 
constituencies and supporters within Porto Alegre, and are not rooted in the 
same democratic understandings and values. Because the aim of this chapter is 
to explore the egalitarian-democratic narrative in practice, this chapter refers 
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 For more detail, see Marquetti et al, 2012:66-69; Wampler, 2000; or Santos, 1998:469-474. 
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predominantly to the practice and outcomes of PB in Porto Alegre between 
1989 and 2004 (in keeping with common practice in the literature). However, 
while the specific reasons for the PT’s defeat lie somewhat outside the scope of 
this work,9 it is important to note that the terrain of contesting and defending 
democracy remains very much alive in Porto Alegre. The fate of PB in Porto 
Alegre after 2004 is an enormously significant moment in terms of the power 
dynamics between this narrative and the possessive-individualist democratic 
tradition. The silence of the PB literature on this subject is remarkable,10 and 
arguably indicates a need to better understand not only the disparity in values 
between different democratic expressions, but the significance of the power 
struggle between them.  
SIGNIFICANT ACHIEVEMENTS (AND SOME LIMITATIONS) 
There is broad agreement that, between 1989 and 2004, PB in Porto Alegre 
generated an impressive range of positive outcomes, in terms of political 
participation, social justice and good governance. In the light of my primary 
focus on democratic engagement, I will turn to political participation first. 
Participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre has unquestionably generated a hugely 
significant increase in active citizen participation. The municipal administration 
recorded attendance of 979 in 1990, 3,694 in 1991, 10,735 in 1993, and 28,549 
in 1999 (Wampler & Avritzer, 2004:301-2), though it is possible that these 
figures could be multiplied several times if attendance at the intermediate 
meetings had also been counted (Santos, 1998:486). Attendance in the final 
2003/2004 budget cycle has been reported at around 50,000 participants 
(Wampler 2007:107). It is worth noting that the participation referred to is not 
trivial, either in time commitment or capacity, comprising as it does a spectrum 
of activity from neighbourhood mobilisation to (unpaid) weekly attendance at 
budget council meetings. 
There is widespread agreement that participatory budgeting led to an increase 
in the participation of women, ethnic minorities, and people with low incomes 
and/or low levels of education (Wampler, 2007:30-31; Baiocchi, 2005:14-15; 
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 Daniel Chavez (2006) highlights a campaign which played on the desire for change after 16 
years of continuous PT government, growing administrative problems and disenchantment with 
the national PT government. 
10
 Baierle stands out as a rare voice exploring the topic (see Baierle, 2003, 2008). 
119 
 
Baierle, 2002:7-8; Abers, 2000:121-132). In addition, each year saw a 
substantial number of ‘first timers’ without prior participation in civil society 
(Baiocchi, 2005:14). Although attention in the literature is commonly focused on 
the previously excluded, it is worth noting that middle-class participation also 
increased, because the administration was seen to be effective rather than 
corrupt, and because valued services such as public space and cultural 
activities were improved via PB (Santos, 1998:506). 
While the proportion of women and those with lower levels of education 
decreases amongst elected budget representatives, it is important to consider 
this against the pre-existing situation, rather than an as yet unrealised ideal. 
Thus, Baierle (2007:39-40) emphasises not just the discrete participation figures 
but the direction of travel compared to the previous arrangements. For example, 
the proportion of women in Porto Alegre’s city council had never been more 
than 10%, compared with 30% in COP (Baiocchi, 2001:64). Similarly, while 
participation remained highest in the areas with the strongest traditions of 
participation or community organisation (Avritzer, 2006:630), it increased most 
rapidly in areas with previously weak traditions of community organisation 
(Wampler & Avritzer, 2004:203; Abers, 2000:129-132; Baiocchi 2005:51-56). 
Related to the question of prior organisation, there is some discussion in the 
literature regarding the number of PB participants who are also members of civil 
society organisations, a much higher proportion than within the population as a 
whole (Wampler, 2007:76). However, the evidence suggests that people 
engage with such organisations (or create new ones where there is a lack) 
through the PB process itself (see Baiocchi, 2001 & 2005; Baierle, 2003:311). 
The concern that PB fails to reach beyond what we in the UK might call the 
‘usual suspects’ thus appears unfounded; rather the PB process makes a 
contribution to building civil society, particularly in areas with lower levels of 
prior organisation. Furthermore, following the analysis presented in the previous 
chapter, connecting citizens who are active elsewhere with formal political 
processes may itself be considered an outcome. 
In addition to the overall rise in participation, PB is widely understood to have 
generated an improvement in the quality of engagement, via the broad 
development of democratic skills. PB acts as a ‘school for citizenship’: the ability 
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of citizens to participate increases through the process itself (Pontual, 2014; 
Baierle, 2002; Wampler, 2000; Abers, 1998). This is an immensely significant 
outcome in terms of democratic engagement, which I will explore in more detail 
later in the chapter.  
These outcomes reflect gains in the field of political equality, but they are also 
linked to substantive equality. The motivation for this increased participation is 
understood to relate to resource distribution and the effectiveness of 
participation in PB decision-making in creating change for their communities; 
consequently it was not uncommon for regions to see a reduction in 
participation once their initial demands are met, only to come back when they 
realise that investment in their region declined accordingly (Santos, 1998:494). 
The issue of substantive equality brings us to the PT’s other primary aim, the 
‘inversion of priorities’ in favour of poorer citizens. Here, the evidence is equally 
conclusive; Porto Alegrean PB generated real changes in terms of the lived 
realities of the city’s poorer communities. In ten years, water supplies, sewage 
services, waste collection, public transport and primary level education reached 
almost 100% of the population, and there have been radical improvements in 
street paving and the provision of crèches and healthcare (Marquetti et al, 
2012:72-74; Baierle, 2002:4; Abers, 2000:109-110; Santos, 1998:485). Thus, 
Marquetti et al (2012:74-77), having undertaken a thorough review, conclude 
that PB between 1989 and 2004 had a clear redistributive effect toward the 
economically disadvantaged, noting also that the public works undertaken not 
only improved the quality of life for poorer citizens, but raised the value of their 
assets, which are even more unequally distributed than income. 
In addition, there is evidence of greater equality with regard to less tangible 
factors. I have already discussed political inclusion in relation to PB; there are 
also indications of improved social inclusion. Abers describes poorer regions 
gaining ‘the right to the city’ through PB. As these areas secured basic services 
that other districts took for granted, they became ‘part of the city’; citizens from 
other areas began for the first time to visit, either to use services or simply 
because the neighbourhoods became more easily accessible (Abers, 
2000:110). Similarly, the public discourse associated with PB is understood to 
have promoted a ‘trans-classist’ pride in the city (Santos, 1998:506). 
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The third and final broad area of outcomes associated with Porto Alegrean PB 
is the effect of increased transparency and accountability, which may be 
summed up as good governance.11 This includes a decrease in tax delinquency 
and a corresponding increase in tax revenue (Cabannes, 2004:36; Santos, 
1998:485), improved planning as a result of having to explain decisions in 
advance (Abers, 1996:46); a very significant reduction in clientelist practices 
(Avritzer, 2006:305; Abers, 1998, 2000), and a more general shift away from a 
confrontational political culture to one of constructive conflict and negotiation 
(Santos, 1998:482). 
While the literature is clear that Porto Alegre’s PB represents an immensely 
significant democratic advance with exceptionally positive effects, I will 
conclude this section with a brief review of its perceived limitations.12 Some are 
process-related, for example councillors frequently voiced a concern that 
discussions were rushed, and there is evidence that the executive was able to 
exert undue influence in the COP as a result of experience and technical 
expertise (Santos, 1998:473-4 & 498). Additionally, the amount of resources 
covered by PB is determined outside the participatory space (Marquetti et al, 
2012:78), in other words there is an issue of the scope of sovereignty. However, 
the issues of limited participation and citizen power predate PB: it is important to 
note that, as with the profile of participants, PB still represents an advance in 
these areas. Furthermore, there is evidence that participants respond to such 
limitations as they become aware of them, for example, changing the chairing 
arrangements in the COP in order to address power imbalances (Santos, 
1998:474), and mobilising to extend the sphere of decision-making under PB 
(op. cit.:1998:480-481).  
Other issues are more closely related to the nature of the process itself. For 
example, there are concerns that PB can focus attention on local rather than 
city-wide issues, and short-term rather than long-term planning (Marquetti et al, 
2012:79; Baierle, 2003). In these cases too, there have been attempts to 
address the issues through the (participant-regulated) PB system (albeit with 
                                                                
11
 Arguably, this is the root of the World Bank’s interest in the experience. See Shah, 2007; and 
Goldfrank, 2012, for further discussion. 
12
 In relation to the limitations of PB beyond Porto Alegre, there is considerable debate in the 
literature around what constitutes necessary conditions for successful PB. As this generally 
doesn’t involve a critique of the process in Porto Alegre itself, I am not addressing it here, but 
return to the issue in the following chapter. 
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varying degrees of success). These have included the introduction of thematic 
assemblies to address city-wide needs (Santos, 1998:479), and a Citizen’s 
Assembly to focus on longer term planning (Wampler, 2000:24).  
A more deep-rooted issue concerns the capacity of PB to address systemic 
problems (i.e. relating to capitalist economics). Marquetti et al (2012:79) note 
that PB is concerned only with the government budget in economies that are 
predominantly private, and Wampler (2007:65) articulates the ‘unintended 
consequence’ that activists are focused on the ‘local not global’. A more hard-
Left form of the argument suggests that PB helps elites cope with the “crisis of 
capitalism” by diverting popular movements into collaboration with the state, 
and away from direct action to transform it (Goldfrank, 2006:10). The issue here 
is that PB does not clearly provide participants with the opportunity to challenge 
the underlying reasons for their social and economic exclusion (these are held 
outside the democratic space by virtue of the capitalist separation of politics and 
economics, rather than through PB design). While this is a real concern for 
democrats, again PB is not worse than pre-existing systems in this sense. 
However, the crucial question, of how the undemocratic tendencies of 
capitalism can be effectively challenged, remains.  
A constructive engagement with the sentiments behind this critique is implied 
within the ‘Letter from Metropolitan Porto Alegre’ (defending the original 
conception of PB). The authors’ ask: 
‘How does one build the political will for such a project as radical as the 
socialization of the means of government decision-making, except by 
strengthening and democratizing the sources of popular power? These 
certainly cannot be found in state instruments, but in the construction of 
individual and collective subjects by ordinary women and men, of all 
ethnicities, colours and life conditions, within and outside local and global 
institutions, committed to reinvent not only political power but also 
society.’ (CIDADE, 2010) 
In the remainder of this chapter, I explore the potential that the experience of a 
more egalitarian form of democracy has for building a counter-narrative to the 
‘truths’ perpetuated by the possessive-individualist model of democracy 
associated with hegemonic capitalism, and for strengthening popular power. 
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A DEMOCRATIC LEARNING JOURNEY 
Faith in the public capacity for civic learning is a fundamental tenet of the 
egalitarian democratic narrative (as articulated most notably by Carol Pateman 
in her classic work Participation and Democratic Theory, 1970). Indeed, Fung & 
Wright (2003:28) note that the people affected by decisions have an incentive to 
learn to make good decisions ‘because they must live with the consequences of 
poor ones.’ In keeping with this, the Porto Alegrean approach to PB foregrounds 
the development of citizenship as an active, learned mode of being, which 
presents a clear contrast to the model of citizenship associated with the 
possessive-individualist narrative discussed in the previous chapter. It is 
significant that a prominent educational component was incorporated within the 
process design (Abers, 1996:43-44), specifically for this purpose. The evidence 
from Porto Alegre strongly demonstrates that such learning is possible, and 
allows us to explore in more detail precisely what it is that citizens learn through 
participatory democratic engagement.  
As I noted above, there is a broad consensus within the literature that PB does 
act as an effective ‘school for citizenship’. Through participation, citizens have 
developed skills including negotiation, prioritisation, cooperation, how to 
conduct (and participate in) a meeting so that all voices are heard, and 
mobilising resources for collective goals (Pontual, 2014:428; Abers, 1998:526-
529); Baiocchi, 2005:43). There have also been widespread gains in specific 
areas of knowledge, including knowledge of how the political system works 
(both legislative and administrative), public finance and budgeting, and technical 
information relating to public works (Pontual, 2014:428; Baiocchi, 2005:43; 
Wampler, 2000:16, 25 & 28). 
Importantly, there is also clear evidence that citizens increase their democratic 
understanding through participation, and that this translates into a developed 
practice of citizenship. Thus, participants use their improved understanding to 
defend or deepen the territory for exercising citizenship. In addition to the 
examples mentioned above (challenging the dominance of the COP by the 
executive and mobilising to extend the decisions subject to the participatory 
budget), participants held their representatives accountable, demanding 
‘retorno’ (the diffusion of information via reporting back) from councillors and 
delegates, as well as other institutions within the budgeting system (Santos, 
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1998:487-8), and increasingly used challenge and confrontation intelligently to 
return issues to the participatory arena. For example, when delegates disagreed 
with a decision to reject the demand for a streetlight (in an area with a high level 
of accidents involving children) on the technical grounds that there were 
sufficient lights nearby, they used direct action, stopping traffic to draw attention 
to the issue. While there was no immediate solution, discussion between 
delegates and the state resumed (Baiocchi, 2005:78-80). 
Similarly, as the post-2004 administration sought to decrease the importance of 
PB as an empowered decision-making arena, delegates used the skills, 
knowledge and language gained during sixteen years of PB to directly confront 
the government (Wampler, 2007:260). This is how Wampler describes the 
delegates whom he observed: 
‘They were no longer simply citizens trying to get the government to 
listen to them; they were rights-bearing members of the polity seeking to 
force the government to comply with their previous commitments and the 
institutionalised rule structures that governed the distribution of public 
works projects.’ (ibid.) 
In defending these rule structures, delegates are safeguarding not simply their 
access to resources but democratic norms, which they have learned to value 
and to fight for through the participatory experience itself.  
Increased understanding and experience has encouraged more collective civic 
behaviour. PB is a forum for prioritising competing demands, and therefore 
predominantly a vehicle for dialogue between citizens, rather than between 
citizens and the state. There is ample evidence to suggest that citizens will 
enter into long-term negotiations with their fellow citizens, often sacrificing short-
term gains for future gains (Wampler, 2007:277), and expanding their focus to a 
wider community or city-wide perspective (Baiocchi, 2005:56-59; Wampler, 
2000:16, Abers, 1998:527-528). This was observed to happen in a number of 
ways: through the deliberative process itself, as many demands must be 
postponed in order to attend to the most critical (Baierle, 2002:4, calls this a 
‘negotiated solidarity’, recognising that ‘this learning is not easy’); via the 
‘priority trip’ by delegates, which highlights the similarity of demands by different 
neighbourhoods (delegates have been known to change their position after 
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visiting a site where the social need appears greater; Wampler, 2000:26); and 
finally, because even ‘losing’ issues are publicly aired, the strength of concern is 
communicated to fellow citizens (Wampler, 2007:8-11). This can be considered 
a growth in solidarity, an important element in a relational model of citizenship. 
The experience of participatory democracy generated an increase in active 
citizenship outside the process itself, including (in addition to the mobilisation for 
tax reform already mentioned) the demand for land regularisation (after citizens 
learned how this issue prevented state provision of basic services in many 
cases; Baierle, 2003:312-313); budget councillors learning to follow wider 
debates in the legislature and mobilising fellow citizens to attend debates or 
organise rallies (Santos, 1998:473), and the development of PB fora as a 
broader civic public sphere (for example a mother using a PB meeting to 
organise a response to a school shooting) (Baiocchi, 2005:99). 
Arguably, this expansion represents an extension of ‘democratic appetite’, 
though I am not implying that the desire for change did not already exist, rather 
that the learned experience of participatory democracy encourages participants 
to take action. The huge increases in participation in the early years of PB is 
attributed to the fact that time spent doing PB demonstrably delivered public 
goods (Avritzer, 2006:629-630; Abers, 2003:205; Wampler, 2000:25).13 
While the literature tends to focus predominantly on participants, it is worth 
recording that PB proved a learning journey for those within government bodies 
as well. In this sense, PB is a democratic intervention which does not only 
improve access to the state, but improves the democratic qualities of the state 
(as befits a ‘supply-side’ response to the democratic deficit). To illustrate, state 
officials used to exercising power by virtue of their technical knowledge have 
been through a profound learning process concerning dialogue with lay citizens, 
finding ways to communicate technical issues simply, and persuade rather than 
impose (Santos, 1998:500). This has also been consciously supported through 
PB; in 1997 the mayor launched the ‘Program of Internalisation of the 
Participatory Budgeting’ aimed at state officials (ibid.). Like participants, 
government representatives learn listening, dialogue and respect for citizens 
                                                                
13
 This motivation is recognised by Fung & Wright in their ‘empowered participatory governance’ 
model. They argue that the opportunity to change outcomes via the exercise of observable 
power (with visible results) motivates participation (Fung & Wright, 2003:27). 
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through shared deliberative processes (Pontual, 2014:428). This is a two-way 
process – there is evidence of improved trust in public officials and government 
as a result of the closer proximity (Wampler, 2007; Baiocchi, 2005:45). 
By highlighting what can be learned through ‘doing democracy’, PB illustrates 
the kind of citizenship inherent in participatory democracy. The evidence from 
Porto Alegre builds a picture of an informed, value-driven, relational process, 
which is premised on the potential for cooperation and solidarity in the pursuit of 
collectively negotiated goals. This citizenship is not a right to be possessed, but 
an action which is brought into existence by virtue of being practiced. As Barber 
(1984:155) puts it: ‘at the moment when “masses” start deliberating, acting, 
sharing and contributing, they cease to be masses and become citizens’. By 
implication, and as the evidence above suggests, citizenship is a quality that 
each of us can develop through practice. This view of citizenship is intimately 
related to the egalitarian democratic view of human nature as not fixed but 
possessing the potential for mutuality and cooperation (and thus to a view of 
democracy as an inherently collective rather than aggregative process). 
Pateman (1970:29) explicitly links this potential for growth within the human 
character to the nature of political institutions, arguing that the basic assertion of 
participatory democratic theory concerns ‘the interrelationship and connection 
between individuals, their qualities and psychological characteristics, and types 
of institutions; [therefore] responsible social and political action depends largely 
on the sort of institutions within which the individual has, politically, to act’. 
Importantly, democratic practice in this view is iterative. As the Luddites found 
two hundred years ago, the development of democratic literacy is both radical 
and radicalising.  
THE ‘ORDER OF EQUALITY’ ENACTED? 
Thus far, I have focused on the practice and outcomes of PB, in order to 
understand what different outcomes may be possible in the context of a 
radically different manifestation of democracy. I have previously suggested that 
the democratic outcomes we can expect are intimately connected to the 
principles and values inherent in each particular model of democracy. With 
regard to Porto Alegrean PB, these principles and values are explicitly spelled 
out by most protagonists and scholars. CIDADE offers the following definition: 
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‘A bottom-up social contract, combines structure and process … based 
on direct participation and social justice standards, aiming at the drafting 
and co-management of the public budget.’ 14 
While this is a good starting point, the literature contains a wide variety of 
different lists of PB’s essential principles (democracy being the contested 
concept that it is). Drawing on key scholars as well as local actors such as Raul 
Pont, mayor of Porto Alegre from 1997 to 2000, Sergio Baierle, and the ‘Letter 
from Metropolitan Porto Alegre’ (which sought to defend the original conception 
of PB), the following list gives an overview of the most referenced principles 
(ordered by theme not importance): 
 The direct participation of individuals;15 
 A participant-regulated cycle of known events;16 
 The power to make real decisions (i.e. ‘binding’ not consultative);17 
 Combination of representative and participatory traditions;18 
 Significant opportunities for deliberation;19 
 Social justice intention.20 
Taken together, the first four principles emphasise the nature of the relationship 
between the citizen and the state, a relationship in which the citizen is 
empowered to be an active participant. Accordingly, the practices they generate 
are useful in exploring the nature of sovereignty integral to PB. Foregrounding 
deliberation reflects the understanding that democracy is a collective process. 
CIDADE’s definition is a useful additional reference, as it highlights how social 
justice and participation are given equal emphasis. In the following sections, I 
situate these principles with reference to the egalitarian narrative (reviewing 
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 See: http://www.ongcidade.org/site/php/op/opEN.php?acao=conceitos_op. Accessed 
24/08/2014. 
15
 Baiocchi et al, 2011:54; CIDADE, 2010; Sintomer et al, 2008:167; Baierle, 2007:81; Avritzer, 
2006:623; Goldfrank, 2006:4, Pont, 2004:117; de Souza, 2004; Santos, 1998:46; Abers, 
1996:37. 
16
 Wampler 2012; Baiocchi et al, 2011:54; CIDADE, 2010; Sintomer et al, 2008:167; Goldfrank, 
2006:4; Avritzer, 2006:624; Pont, 2004:117; de Souza, 2004; Santos, 1998:468; Abers, 
1996:37. 
17
 Wampler 2012; Baiocchi et al, 2011:54, Goldfrank, 2007:163; Baierle, 2007:81; de Souza, 
2004. 
18
 Baiocchi et al, 2011:159; CIDADE 2010; Avritzer, 2006:624; Goldfrank, 2006:4; Santos, 
1998:468. 
19
 Wampler 2012; Baiocchi et al, 2011:89; Sintomer et al, 2008:168; Baierle, 2007:81; 
Goldfrank, 2006:4; Pont, 2004:117; Wampler & Avritzer, 2004:300. 
20
 Wampler, 2012; Baierle, 2007:81; Sintomer et al, 2008:167; Goldfrank, 2006:4; Avritzer, 
2006:624; Abers, 2000:50. 
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what we learn from Porto Alegrean PB about conceptions of human nature, the 
state, equality and freedom), and explore the location of sovereignty which 
underpins the outcomes described above. 
PB AND THE PARTICIPATORY CITIZEN 
By insisting on the direct participation of individuals and giving citizens 
responsibility for regulating the democratic process, PB demonstrates a 
conception of human nature which contrasts with the individualistic and static 
liberal model associated with representative democracy. As the construction of 
PB as a ‘school for citizenship’ makes clear, people are understood to have the 
potential to be effective democratic agents. PB expects a great deal of citizens, 
expectations which, as the previous section demonstrates, have been fulfilled. 
Opportunities for learning were intentionally built into the process, in conscious 
rejection of the common policy-world objection to participatory democracy that 
poor communities don’t have the capacity to engage in decision-making 
(Baiocchi et al, 2011:157). These ‘opportunities’ can take the form of direct 
information-sharing, as mentioned earlier, or design features that consciously 
enable participants to develop skills, such as those articulated in Fung & 
Wright’s ‘empowered participatory governance’ model, which engages citizens 
deliberatively with specific, tangible problems, via devolved but supported 
decision-making units (Fung & Wright, 2003:15-16). 
In contrast to the rationale behind representative democracy, participatory 
democracy is designed to encourage not contain democratic expression. The 
underlying assumption is that citizens are the best source of expertise on the 
issues that affect them. Indeed, Baiocchi et al (ibid.) suggest that claims to the 
contrary are little more than polite ways of legitimising the transfer of decision-
making from citizens to elites. Thus, former Porto Alegrean mayor Raul Pont 
argues that ‘through opening up spaces for participatory democracy, and 
inviting the people themselves to take the lead … change can be achieved 
more quickly and more deeply’ (Pont, 2004:131).  
What shines through here is the political importance of ‘becoming’. Democracy 
is not an opinion poll, because people can change their ideas as they work, 
learn and debate together. This is a central theme in participatory political 
theory, in which democracy is understood as ‘a project concerned with the 
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political potentialities of ordinary citizens, that is, with their possibilities for 
becoming political beings through the self-discovery of common concerns and 
of models of action for realising them’ (Wolin, 1996:31). Thus, Benjamin Barber 
argues that: 
‘In a strong democratic community … the individual members are 
transformed, through their participation in common seeing and common 
work, into citizens. Citizens are autonomous persons whom participation 
endows with a capacity for common vision.’ (Barber, 1984:232) 
Foregrounding deliberation as a central element of PB accords with this positive 
view of human nature. Deliberative democratic theory places dialogue and 
political communication at the heart of democratic processes (see Dryzek, 2000 
& 1990; Bohman & Rehg, 1997; Habermas, 1984); democracy is understood to 
require ‘equal and effective opportunity to participate in processes of collective 
judgement’ (Warren, 2002:174; emphasis added). As such, it rests on a belief in 
citizen capacity to reflect, analyse, problem-solve and make decisions. It 
requires creativity: deliberation doesn’t involve prioritising a set menu of 
choices; it is a process which forges options (Fung & Wright, 2003:18). 
Therefore, deliberation postulates the ability to reflect on our own preferences, 
values and judgements through dialogue (Dryzek & Dunleavy, 2009:216), and 
to listen, feel and reflect as well as speak, think and act (Barber 1984:178). It is 
rooted in the belief that we are not creatures of fixed preferences but are 
communicative, social beings, whose ‘preferences’ are shaped by our 
engagement with others in collective encounters.  
A deliberative democratic system is therefore inherently collective, in contrast to 
aggregative systems which assume fixed preferences formed privately outside 
the realm of politics. In recent times, the collective nature of democracy has 
been powerfully articulated by Benjamin Barber, in Strong Democracy (1984) 
and associational democracy theorists (Cohen, 1996; Cohen & Rogers, 1995; 
Hirst, 1994). This view of democracy is explicitly supported through PB. While it 
insists on the importance of individual participation (thus maintaining the 
connection between individual involvement and outcomes), civil society 
organisations such as neighbourhood associations are understood to support 
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that engagement, as effective vehicles for collective action (see Baiocchi, 2005; 
Wampler & Avritzer, 2004).  
Reviewing the Porto Alegre experience, Avritzer concludes that deliberation is 
strongly linked to changed outcomes for the poor, and itself has a democratising 
effect on the political culture (Avritzer, 2006), the ‘negotiated solidarity’ referred 
to earlier. This is an important point. Just as possessive individualism can foster 
self-interest, so egalitarian democracy can foster solidarity. 
While I do not have space here to review the many debates in deliberative 
theory, it is worth noting that Porto Alegrean PB occupies a particular place on 
the theoretical deliberative democracy spectrum. Firstly, it demonstrably rejects 
the view that deliberation and broad participation are difficult to reconcile 
(Ganuza et al, 2014; see also Mutz, 2006). Thus, PB processes have 
emphasised open participation, in contrast to the model of deliberative forums 
based on random selection (most notably, Fishkin, 1995, see also Smith, 
2009).21  Wampler & Hartz-Karp (2012:2) note that deliberative practices 
associated with PB ‘fall short’ of the standards set out in the academic literature 
on deliberative democracy (see Melo & Baiocchi, 2006:589-591); however, they 
defend its relevance as a widespread form of actually existing deliberation, and 
because many PB advocates identify the crucial role of deliberation within PB in 
generating democratic outcomes. Arguably, for a participatory democrat, 
deliberation enhances the quality of decision-making; it does not generate a 
limit to participation. 
Secondly, the interpretation of democracy inherent within PB fits with a more 
agonistic approach to deliberative theory which regards conflict as inescapable, 
rather than more procedural models emphasising consensus (see Benhabib, 
1996; Cohen, 1997). In this view, difference requires more than simply 
mediating group interest, rather, democracy must recognise that there are no 
right answers and no final outcomes (Honig, 1996); disagreement is ‘a 
permanent condition of democratic politics’ (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996). For 
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 This is not to suggest that mechanisms based on random selection (which is equally rooted in 
the idea of a civically competent citizenry) could not be instituted as part of a wider egalitarian 
democratic project, if linked to broad citizen participation and binding decision-making 
mechanisms. However, my aim here is not to evaluate different democratic approaches per se, 
but to explore the underlying values and principles behind one actually existing example of 
‘egalitarian democracy’ and to understand how these connect to democratic appetite. 
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Mansbridge, embracing the presence of conflict goes hand-in-hand with 
recognising the role of self-interest as a realistic starting-point for engagement 
(traditionally frowned upon by more procedural models of deliberation) 
(Mansbridge, 2003:179-188; see also Mansbridge et al, 2010).22 For Barber 
(1984:158), the incontrovertible contestability of political ends means that the 
responsibility of the citizen ‘is not merely to choose but to judge’.  
The notion that politics is about real dilemmas which may not ultimately be 
agreed upon but which must be acted upon, has implications which are 
extremely pertinent to questions of political motivation and engagement. 
Arguably, it is a felt need for change and the lack of a ‘right’ answer which gives 
the impetus to act, and confers responsibility – we must fight for our conception 
of what is needed in our society. This view is central to participatory budgeting. 
As Baierle puts it, PB ‘attracts social conflicts and offers a political field of 
participation for processing it … then, the rules are important, so dissatisfied 
people can organise better for the next PB cycle’ (Baierle, 2002:4). 
Collective (participatory) politics therefore involve both solidarity and conflict, 
and are premised on both the capacity and desire of citizens for change. In 
foregrounding relationships and dialogue between citizens, PB fosters the 
development of a genuine political community. This theoretical notion has been 
captured effectively within Fung & Wright’s discussion of the characteristics of 
‘countervailing power’; they argue that the qualities of countervailing power 
needed in adversarial conditions are very different to those appropriate to 
collaborative conditions (Fung & Wright, 2003:266). Thus Wampler (2007:259) 
refers to conflict in PB as being ‘among friends’ not between political rivals, an 
impression which perhaps encapsulates the relationship between conflict and 
solidarity within a collective democratic process.  
PB AND THE PARTICIPATORY STATE 
Reimagining the relationship between citizens and the state is a central goal of 
PB (Baiocchi et al, 2011:43; Pont, 2004), and the idea of an active political 
community, what Wampler & Avritzer (2004) have called ‘participatory publics’, 
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 While I don’t have space to address this issue here, it is worth noting that Mansbridge’s 
treatment of self-interest is very much bound up with the pursuit of social justice and the reality 
of striving for the common good. It explicitly does not preclude empathy or the expression of 
solidarity. Thus it is a materially different conception of self-interest from the neoliberal model 
which allies self-interest with competition in its construction of human nature. 
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is fundamental to this. 23 Unlike the UK democratic structure, participatory 
budgeting (which has been from the start supported by both state and civil 
society) is intended to be enabling not power-hoarding. This coheres with 
participatory theories of the state. Liberal democracy aims to protect people 
from the state; participatory governance facilitates self-rule and emancipation 
(Bevir, 2010:126). Thus (as I explored in chapter 3), the possessive-individualist 
democratic narrative presents the state as ‘a necessary evil’ safeguarding 
liberty, property and trade, whereas within the egalitarian narrative the ideal 
state is a ‘collective achievement’ of the people, who are close enough to it to 
use it for public benefit. 
In this light, it is striking that the literature on PB overwhelmingly reflects the aim 
of increased proximity between citizens and the state. Thus, former mayor Raul 
Pont (2004:117) states that ‘because of its capacity to mobilise and enlighten, 
participatory democracy allows people to understand the state and begin to 
control it’. Baierle (2002:1) asks if it is possible for the state to act as a social 
movement (by which he means facilitating civic participation and aimed at social 
transformation), a form of words which reminds us that the PT, as a political 
party born of social movements, itself represents the goal of the state and the 
people in closer proximity. In practice, the physical decentralisation of the 
administration, via meetings held at neighbourhood level, provided citizens with 
unprecedented access to state officials (Wampler, 2000:2) and so to the 
authority and technical expertise that they represent. As we have seen, PB 
facilitated collaborative relationships between autonomous citizens and officials 
at the intersection of civil and political society (Wampler, 2007; Santos, 
1998:491), indicating a deliberate blurring of boundaries between the two.  
The goal of greater proximity between state and citizen is the context for a 
similarly reimagined model of representation under PB, one which strongly 
recalls the Anti-Federalist themes of accountability through substantive 
relationships and delegation (indeed, in Porto Alegrean PB, the term ‘delegate’ 
is used in preference to ‘representative’). Firstly, a great deal of attention is 
given to the mechanisms by which citizens ensure that their delegates adhere 
to the collective intentions of the people they represent; ‘autonomy’ on the part 
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 While the aims are clear, achieving genuinely transformed relationships is of course a 
process of negotiation and struggle. I will discuss this issue in more detail later in the chapter. 
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of representatives is regarded with suspicion as enabling clientelism (Santos, 
1998:488). Thus, PB councillors and delegates are subject to instant recall 
(Baiocchi, 2005:77), links are maintained with budget forums in order to 
facilitate ‘constant exchange’ between delegates and popular communities 
(Baierle, 2007:81), and ‘retorno’ is emphasised (as I have mentioned) to guard 
against the positions of delegates simply reflecting their own preferences (levels 
of consultation prior to decisions and feedback afterwards are monitored by 
CIDADE) (Santos, 1998:488). This relationship allows for a much more active 
role for non-elected citizens; representation appears as a partnership. Former 
mayor Olívio Dutra (2014:10) contrasts the widespread daily, conscious 
exercise of citizenship with representative democracy, in which the elected 
official simply replaces the voter. 
Secondly, avoiding the professionalisation of representation is regarded as 
crucial within PB (again echoing the Anti-Federalists). To this end, no delegate 
can serve more than two years in any position (Baiocchi, 2005:77), deliberately 
ensuring a rotation of delegates in order to limit the likelihood of ‘capture’ by the 
state (Wampler, 2007:77). The suggestion that PB councillors’ term be 
increased to two years (so that knowledge could be more effectively 
transmitted) was fiercely debated by the COP and ultimately voted down on the 
grounds of potential professionalisation (Santos, 1998:489). This underlines not 
only the citizen-based model of representation, but the fact that the parameters 
of what constitutes ‘good’ democracy remain in the hands of the people. 
Finally, the fact that delegates are elected in proportion to turnout at 
neighbourhood meetings further strengthens the link between delegates and 
citizens. In this sense, representation has to be earned, and mobilisation at 
neighbourhood meetings is accordingly high (Wampler, 2007:54). There is thus 
a direct link between increased mobilisation and outcomes, unlike 
representative democracy where, as I discussed in the previous chapter, each 
citizen’s individual participation makes very little difference to overall outcomes. 
This model of representation of course coexists with the more traditionally 
elected legislature. Indeed, this combination (of representative and participatory 
traditions) is deemed a key principle of PB, arguably because PB needs to be 
connected to the existing location of power if it is to be a meaningful decision-
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making space. Reviewing the experience in Porto Alegre, Baiocchi et al 
conclude that: 
‘In contrast to the assumption in much of the democracy literature (as 
well as neoliberal views of governance), that participation and 
representation do not sit well together, instituted participatory democracy 
can produce collaborative arrangements between officials and civil 
society actors that strengthen both governance and democracy.’ 
(Baiocchi et al, 2011:159). 
However, in considering the combination of representative and participatory 
processes a key principle, protagonists do not mean that there cannot be 
tension between them. As within collaborative decision-making, it is important 
that this is recognised and that PB provides a forum for constructive conflict and 
challenge. The combination of systems therefore implies something about the 
place of PB relative to the representative system – actors within that system 
must be obliged to engage with PB as a legitimate decision-making forum. 
While the evidence I have considered supports this view, it is important to note 
that ‘representative democracy’ is not a fixed variable when participatory 
processes are introduced. The values and narrative espoused by the 
representative actors matter. In the case of Porto Alegre, there were some 
representative actors (the mayor’s office and the PT) with a strong existing 
commitment to participatory democracy, and others in the legislature who 
became bound by participatory democracy (being constrained from voting 
against the people’s budget). Arguably, therefore, the strengthening occurs 
because the nature of representation is changed through the participatory 
process. A successful participatory initiative in this sense brings the local 
expressions of representative and participatory democracy closer together in 
terms of their underpinning narratives. 
THE CHARACTER OF EQUALITY (AND FREEDOM) IN PB 
Before considering the extent to which the values and principles I have 
discussed so far represent a significant shift in sovereignty, I want to briefly 
reflect on the two other notable features of democratic approach: equality and 
freedom. 
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An egalitarian approach to democracy unsurprisingly rests on a substantive 
view of equality, and this was indisputably a foundational aim of PB in Porto 
Alegre (Baierle, 2007:81; Wampler, 2000:18; Abers, 2000:50). For Baierle 
(2002:2), the ‘social justice criteria … implies the notion of social inequality as 
an unfair situation that must be [fought] as government’s number one priority’. 
This commitment to substantive equality is visible in the redistributive outcomes 
of the process. PB also addresses substantive political equality, rather than 
equality of opportunity, via attention to democratic education needs, as I have 
discussed. In Porto Alegre, citizens with low levels of information and expertise 
are making important public decisions (Wampler, 2000:16). 
Furthermore, the relationship between substantive and political equality has 
been carefully considered (recognising that substantive inequality inhibits 
political equality). Thus, for example, the poorest region of the city (Ilhas) 
carries the same decisional weight as the wealthiest region (the Centro), though 
that has more than fifty times the number of residents (Santos, 1998:484-485). 
Baiocchi (2001) considers the problem of substantive inequality and concludes 
that Porto Alegrean PB can lay claim to a sufficient level of political equality, as 
evidenced by both participation statistics and outcomes. PB is clearly not a 
magic bullet in regard to political equality (as with women, the very poor are not 
as well represented in the COP as at other levels of participation, for example); 
however, deliberation through PB does lead to investments that benefit poor 
areas (Avritzer, 2006:631).  
While conceptions of liberty within PB are not foregrounded in the way that 
equality is, it is clear that the implied understanding is a concern with human 
flourishing, as befits a focus on substantive rather than formal equality. Thus PB 
advocate Ubiratan de Souza describes how the control of public finances, ‘held 
together by a sense of solidarity … has given birth to an awareness amongst 
citizens of their own capacity for freedom … [the] result of ordinary citizens 
discovering the power of collective action’ (de Souza, 2004:61). This suggests a 
more widespread and tangible freedom than the abstract liberty of liberalism, in 
whose name governments protect the poor as well as the rich from state 
interference with their prospects. In contrast, the freedom of participatory 
democracy is rooted in the idea that by acting together we can change our 
context; the goal is to enlarge the scope of what is possible for everyone. 
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A SOVEREIGN PEOPLE? 
PB is evidently a ‘supply-side’ response to the problem of the democratic deficit, 
in that it fundamentally reformed how the state operates, not only the means by 
which people engage with existing decision-making mechanisms. It also 
consciously allows for and encourages learning amongst state officials as well 
as citizens, who in turn are viewed unmistakably as a source of solutions and 
knowledge rather than a problem to be addressed. On this point, Baierle is 
unequivocal. He says: 
‘There was a time when … the conclusion was that there was a deficit of 
people, not of power. In the last 20 years, the popular classes of this 
country broke through the seclusion wall that was separating them from 
an autonomous political participation.’ (Baierle, 2007:77) 
In articulating so vividly the people as political catalyst, he brings us to what I 
have suggested may be regarded as the central issue in assessing democratic 
deficits, the location of sovereignty. Here, the logic in Porto Alegre is 
correspondingly clear. PB is premised on the notion of popular sovereignty, and 
it has demonstrably shifted the location of sovereignty towards the people. 
With regards to intention, PB was built through social movements that fuelled 
the push for democracy, who demanded ‘the right to have (political) rights’, 
rather than favours in return for obedience (Baiocchi et al, 2011:42). In keeping 
with this commitment to empowering citizens as actors, the original PB 
administration made the intended location of sovereignty explicit by redesigning 
its administrative regions so that they matched patterns of mobilisation (Avritzer, 
2006:627). Thus, Baierle (2002:2) insists that PB is not about welfare but the 
principle of popular sovereignty.  
Importantly, sovereignty within Porto Alegrean PB was widely perceived as 
residing with the people; this is across all groups of actors, those elected as PB 
delegates, wider participants, and within the state itself. For example, delegates 
surveyed in 2003 reported a high level of belief in their authority to make 
decisions (Wampler, 2007:110-111), Baierle (2002:4) reports that ‘people in the 
PB forums feel like co-mayors sometimes’, and state officials articulate that their 
technical expertise serves the popular mandate, not the other way round 
(Ganuza & Baiocchi, 2012:5).  
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Furthermore, scholars have documented examples of activity which I would 
describe as the practice of sovereignty. Most notably, in budget meetings and 
forums, citizens spoke first and foremost to one another, to government officials 
only secondarily as needed (Wampler, 2007:278). Gianpaolo Baiocchi regards 
this as the creation, by the urban poor themselves, of a broader public sphere 
for civic discourse and deliberation (Baiocchi, 2003). With regard to state actors, 
the administration began to submit its own proposals to the budget process for 
approval, proposals which can be (and have been) rejected (Wampler, 
2007:128). The changed culture from protest and confrontation to mediated 
conflict and negotiation referred to earlier (and the model of citizenship inherent 
in PB) also illustrate the shift in sovereignty, as these both depict a people 
engaged in solving political problems, not asking the state to solve them.  
Finally, the orientation of representation and the proximity of the state and 
citizens reflect the notion of popular sovereignty. Baiocchi et al (2011) are 
interested in the ‘chain of sovereignty’, which they define as the means by 
which preferences transmit to the state and thus to outcomes, and which, as 
they document, is often broken. As we have seen, the models of state and 
representation within PB pay attention to maintaining this chain. I suggest this 
represents the attempt to shift sovereignty along the chain towards citizens (if 
the chain is ‘broken’ then sovereignty remains with the state). 
Nonetheless, while it does represent a significant example of popular 
sovereignty (not least because it is rare), it is important not to lose sight of the 
fact that PB in Porto Alegre, even prior to 2004, was an ongoing site of struggle 
for democratic meaning. I have already described the contested control of the 
agenda within the COP. As another example, in the thematic forums, delegates 
tended to negotiate with the state, rather than articulate demands independently 
(Abers, 2000:201), leading to a danger of rubber-stamping priorities if citizen 
knowledge was low (Wampler, 2007:61). Furthermore, the Pont administration’s 
decision (referred to earlier) to initiate a ‘Program of Internalisation of the 
Participatory Budgeting’ in 1997 evidently reflects the limits to state acceptance 
of popular sovereignty. 
Even within the stated logic of the structure itself, power is not given up by the 
state, but shared. The  legislature must approve the budget, though while it is 
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not impossible to refuse to do so, in practice it is a formality, as the cost of 
denying sewage or education to hundreds of people from poor neighbourhoods 
is high (Baierle, 2002:2; Abers, 2000:97; Santos, 1998:502). Therefore, while 
the location of sovereignty is not uncontested, PB emerges – in contrast to 
representative democracy which seeks to contain popular power – as a form of 
democracy that strongly and intelligently attempts to contain elite power.24  
Despite this, prior to the change in administration in 2004, Baierle predicted a 
‘Thermidorian phase’ in which the transformative process will be dramatically 
challenged, driven by the old impulse to put the popular classes ‘back in their 
place’ (Baierle, 2003), a prediction that appears to have been justified, as 
sovereignty was consciously resumed by the Fogaça administration (Baierle, 
2008). Likewise, Fung & Wright (2003:35) suggested that if deliberative 
apparatuses become sites of genuine challenge to the power and privileges of 
dominant classes and elites, they are likely to seek to dismantle them. 
Importantly, in seeking to strengthen PB against this threat, Baierle (2003:302) 
focused on the challenge of deepening participants’ understanding of the 
process as political, in a context in which ‘neoliberal forces are challenging for 
hegemony’. Thus, sovereignty appears as precariously balanced, dependent on 
two opposing forces of will.  
CONCLUSION 
Participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre (1989-2004) is an example of the 
egalitarian democratic tradition in action. It represents a substantial attempt at 
popular rather than state sovereignty, which rests on very different democratic 
values and principles to representative systems of government, and which is 
linked to outcomes in popular participation, social justice and good governance 
that are widely recognised as impressive. 
Thus, Porto Alegre not only suggests that democracy in the egalitarian tradition 
is a realistic proposition, but gives us an idea of what that might look like. The 
                                                                
24
 There is considerable discussion in the literature regarding power and deliberative 
mechanisms, which I do not have space to address here. See Cohen & Rogers, 2003, and 
Fung & Wright, 2003:259-289 for a discussion of power in relation to mechanisms they define 
as empowered participatory governance (EPG), including Porto Alegrean PB. In brief, Fung & 
Wright argue that successful EPG requires significant ‘countervailing power’, a notion which 
intuitively accords with the idea that participatory democracy attempts to contain elite power, as 
I have suggested. Ganuza & Francés (2012) discuss inequalities of deliberative participation 
with specific reference to PB processes. 
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democracy glimpsed in Porto Alegre is a public space in which state and people 
come together for the mediation of social conflicts and in which a serious, 
negotiated solidarity can be built. This is a form of democracy which, while it 
does not assume agreement or shared goals, recognises and places centre-
stage the human potential for cooperation and collective action, a potential 
which rests on the possibility of changed outcomes. Democracy is not an 
opinion poll, and citizens are not vessels containing fixed preferences. Rather, 
citizenship is learned through practice, and encompasses judgement, 
relationships and reciprocity. The state is not simply a structure, but a dynamic 
process, a collective attempt to create conditions for human flourishing (and 
thus for a meaningful liberty). Democracy in this view is active, a shared and 
ongoing journey. Equally, it appears as difficult, fragile, and requiring defending.  
Due to the intimate relationship between social and political equality, this view 
of democracy entails a commitment to social justice (substantive equality). 
Therefore, the practice of democracy is constructed to ‘make a difference’; 
people get involved in participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre because it 
changes things. This presents a strong contrast with the limited role available to 
the many UK citizens who are dissatisfied with government performance. In 
Porto Alegrean PB, the process is demanding, but participation works. The 
evidence suggests that this is a very empowering – and motivating – realisation. 
This analysis reflects a ‘citizen-eye view’ of democracy, not an ‘engineer’s-eye 
view’. By this I mean that it is an approach to democracy which pays attention to 
what it feels like to be a participant, rather than a preoccupation with pre-setting 
the destination (a fundamental issue that I will come back to in subsequent 
chapters). Thus, democracy is not so much a governance structure as a call to 
action, an invitation to join in the democratic conversation as a co-creator of the 
society we want to live in. 
The egalitarian strand of democratic thought can seem defeated in Western 
traditions of representative democracy, but this counter-narrative in democratic 
theory, which challenges the assumptions made in neoliberal theoretical 
accounts, was brought to life in Porto Alegre. Importantly, the agenda and 
values of the actors matter in shaping the democratic experience. Participatory 
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budgeting embodies this model of democracy because the PT and their civil 
society allies consciously articulated radical aims and fought to implement them.  
Tom Paine presented Athens as an inspiration for late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century citizens struggling to change their social reality, and this is 
one function of Porto Alegre for democrats today. This is not to imply that it is 
an ideal form of egalitarian democracy; rather it is in its actual and flawed 
existence that it provides the means to extend our democratic imaginations. 
Reinvigorating democracy requires more than a critique of the status quo, and 
Porto Alegre represents a different way of thinking which allows us to inhabit 
alternative ways of being political.  
This is the global symbolic importance of Porto Alegre's participatory budgeting. 
In the next chapters, I consider the journey that PB made in order to take root in 
the UK, introduce the values and motivations driving the main actors involved 
with the process here, and reflect on the idea illustrated by the Porto Alegrean 
experience after 2004 – PB as a site of (unequal) encounter between egalitarian 
and possessive-individualist democratic narratives. 
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CHAPTER 6 
JOURNEY OF AN IDEA: PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING TRAVELS TO THE UK  
One of the earliest participatory budgeting experiences in the UK took place in 
2004, in the northern city of Bradford. Over the course of two public assemblies, 
local citizens from 50 community organisations in some of the city’s most 
economically deprived wards decided how to spend £700,000 from the ‘Clean, 
Green, Safe Neighbourhoods Fund’ administered by Bradford Vision, the then 
Local Strategic Partnership (LSP).1 Between 2004 and 2008, there were 
approximately ten PB pilots in the UK. These were primarily led by local 
government, though many worked closely with the PB Unit, an NGO which 
advocated PB and offered support to interested institutions. 
In 2006, the New Labour national government took notice, creating a national 
reference group in partnership with the PB Unit. Hosted by the Department of 
Communities and Local Government, this was associated with PB making an 
appearance in both the 2006 Local Government White Paper Strong and 
Prosperous Communities (DCLG, 2006:28) and the 2008 White Paper 
Communities in Control: Real People, Real Power (DCLG, 2008a:67-69), and 
led to the publication of a Participatory Budgeting National Strategy in 2008: 
Giving more people a say in local spending (DCLG, 2008b). To date, a total of 
over 25 million pounds has been allocated using what is here referred to as PB 
(PB Network, 2014a; 2014b), across public policy arenas including community 
development, health, policing, highway maintenance and the environment.2  
However, a closer examination of UK PB practices immediately reveals a very 
different scenario to Porto Alegre. This expenditure has in general been through 
discrete initiatives across many different towns and cities, often small-scale in 
terms of resources, and it has frequently taken the form of participatory grant-
making, distributing public funds to voluntary and community sector bodies 
rather than involving citizens in allocating core state expenditure. On the other 
hand, PB is clearly distinguishable from more traditional engagement 
                                                                
1
 Local Strategic Partnerships were a New Labour initiative intended to bring together 
stakeholders such as public services and the Voluntary and Community Sector. 
2
 While ‘participatory budgeting’ in the UK does not refer to the same set of practices, values 
and goals discussed in relation to Porto Alegre, in this and subsequent chapters I will use the 
term to refer to practices that are given the name here.  
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mechanisms. In practice, it gives binding control over resources (citizen 
decisions within UK PB processes are honoured), it invites ideas as well as 
opinions (citizens are invited to propose projects, not to choose between 
existing options), and it is based on direct participation by citizens (present as 
individuals, not community representatives). In 2008, the PB Unit published a 
set of ‘values, principles and standards’, modelled on the tenets of Porto 
Alegrean PB (Waters & Jackson, 2008; see also, PB Unit, 2009), through which 
they aspired to ‘set minimum expectations for the way PB is implemented in the 
UK, and to help ensure integrity in PB projects’ (Waters & Jackson, 2008:5).3 
Nevertheless, most of the UK cases would not qualify as PB according to widely 
accepted definitions, being neither city-level, meaningfully deliberative or 
repeated annually (Sintomer et al, 2012:2-3). Accordingly, participatory 
budgeting in the UK has not up to now attracted tremendous interest within the 
international PB literature. However, where the UK does get a mention, it has 
been assessed relatively positively in terms of its orientation towards 
participatory democracy. Proposing a typology of European processes labelled 
as PB, which ranges at one end of the spectrum from ‘Porto Alegre adapted for 
Europe’ to ‘consultation on public finances’ at the other, Yves Sintomer et al 
(2008) locate the UK in their ‘community funds’ category. While they note the 
modest level of impact to date, they consider this, alongside ‘Porto Alegre 
adapted for Europe’, to have the greatest potential for increased social justice, 
as well as for realising empowered participatory governance. 
Updating the typology a few years later, they remain positive but are perhaps 
more cautionary, considering the UK to fall broadly under the category of 
‘community development’, and suggesting that while rooted in an empowerment 
agenda, such processes need to look beyond the micro-local to the 
transformation of institutional politics (Sintomer et al, 2012:25-27). This 
conclusion is echoed by both Baiocchi & Ganuza (2014:41) and Hall & Röcke, 
who, while they consider the diversity, number and scale of UK PB experiences 
positive, suggest that their transformative value is ‘questionable’ on the grounds 
of their small-scale nature, and the need for them to be embedded in broader 
political reforms. (Hall & Röcke, 2013:195-196). 
                                                                
3
 Since the demise of the PB Unit, the volunteer-run PB Network continues to share and 
promote these principles. 
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With the question of addressing democratic engagement in mind, I am, 
however, primarily concerned with what the UK can learn through PB, rather 
than vice versa. In the context of the UK democratic deficit, the arrival of 
participatory budgeting is of interest for at least four important reasons. Firstly, 
the original impetus to PB in the UK came directly from Porto Alegre, largely via 
an exchange involving community activists from Manchester and Porto Alegre 
under the auspices of an NGO, Church Action on Poverty (CAP). The normative 
social justice agenda that prompted the visits has been consistently maintained 
through advocacy for PB by the PB Unit (originally a CAP project, this ran from 
2000 to 2012) and now via its volunteer-run successor, the PB Network. As a 
result the scale of ambition for PB continues to reflect broader values which are 
very much in the egalitarian democratic tradition, and which go far beyond those 
reasonably implied by current practice. 4 This element of the UK experience is 
also considered by some to indicate greater potential for building an 
empowered partnership between the state and civil society than many other 
European cases (Allegretti & Herzberg, 2004:18-19). 
Secondly, PB in the UK is distinguished from many similar-scale participatory 
initiatives in that it was not led by national government, but began as a 
spreading local innovation, which only later attracted government support. This 
is significant because, in an environment characterised by a high degree of 
centralisation (Wilson & Game, 2006:157), it meant that PB was able to develop 
in less prescribed ways than nationally designed initiatives, and thus offered 
much greater scope for democratic learning through experience. This is also 
reflected in the variation between processes at local level. When, in July 2007, 
newly appointed Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government 
Hazel Blears stated her intention that every local authority would be using PB 
by 2012, alongside an ‘announcement’ of 10 pilots (Newcastle and Bradford 
amongst them) (Wintour, 2007), at least 5 of these ‘pilots’ were rather surprised, 
as they were already up and running on their own initiative. There have been 
later attempts to codify PB as a technique and manage its spread from above; 
as a result, the earlier processes are likely to be more interesting in this respect. 
Thirdly, as a decision-making process without encultured ‘baggage’, it offers the 
potential for a freer expression of ‘democratic values’. In keeping with the 
                                                                
4
 The nature of this support arguably explains the value-base identified by Sintomer et al (2008). 
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hegemonic success of the representative definition of democracy, many people 
have internalised ‘truths’ about democracy, which by and large reflect the elitist 
democratic narrative associated with representative democracy. We are, after 
all, a 'democracy' and therefore our system of representation, voting and elite 
decision-making is what 'democracy' is. Within PB processes, people are less 
constrained by what they are used to knowing about 'democracy', and 
accordingly freer to enact their own instinctive sense about the relationship 
between people and decisions, which as I will explore in the following chapters, 
may in practice be closer to the egalitarian tradition represented by PB. 
Finally, as an attempt to introduce a participatory process reflecting egalitarian 
democratic values within an established representative system, it embodies an 
encounter between these two narratives. As such, it offers the opportunity to 
consider potential for developing different expressions of democracy, and the 
likely reaction of the existing power system to ideas which could be said to pose 
a fundamental challenge to the location of power and sovereignty, and to our 
taken-for-granted ‘truths’ about democracy. 
Given the condition of British democracy indicated in chapter four, it is not 
difficult to understand why Porto Alegre has inspired activity in the hope of 
generating similar outcomes. This illustrates how the struggle between different 
democratic narratives is alive today in people’s experiences and aspirations. 
This chapter will reflect on the significance of PB in the UK as a point of 
encounter between the two narratives, through an exploration of the forces 
which have shaped it, including the hopes and intentions animating its 
development. I will also locate the UK experience in terms of the key PB 
principles outlined in the last chapter. It is not my aim to evaluate either the 
performance or prospects of UK participatory budgeting, but rather to explore 
what we can learn from this encounter about the current democratic deficit and 
therefore about the development of democratic energy and appetite. 
I will begin by considering the literature on the spread of PB from Brazil to 
Europe, and reflect on what this analysis contributes to a study of PB in the UK.   
PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
Following the first wave of literature on PB, which analysed the achievements of 
Porto Alegre and other noteworthy individual cases, a second, perhaps more 
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critical wave sought to understand why the spread of PB across Brazil and 
globally had generated very variable effects compared to Porto Alegre. While 
this endeavour immediately encounters problems of generalisability, as systems 
and contexts differ so enormously (Baiocchi et al, 2011:59-60; Cabannes, 
2004:35), there is a coherent thread providing evidence that less rigorous PB (in 
other words, less institutionalised, with fewer opportunities for deliberation, 
fewer resources and less binding mechanisms for decision-making) inevitably 
generates poorer outcomes, including less engagement and more limited 
participation (Sintomer et al, 2008; Wampler, 2007; Goldfrank, 2007; Avritzer, 
2006; Baiocchi, 2005; Wampler & Avritzer, 2004). 
While this in itself is fairly unsurprising, it is a starting point for attempts to 
understand the contexts in which effective system design is likely to occur. 
Suggested ‘indicators of success’ in this sense, include: 
 A mobilised citizenry capable of both cooperation and contestation;5 
 Political commitment;6 
 Fiscal decentralisation, and thus adequate discretionary finances 
available for the process;7 
 Operational autonomy, therefore political decentralisation, but (for 
example) mayoral fiscal control, to allow for delegation to citizens.8 
Taken together, these factors emphasise the availability of power which can be 
harnessed to the PB process, and the potential for a robust partnership 
between civil and political society. Goldfrank (2007:148) notes that this is 
enhanced by a weakly institutionalised political opposition, as that allows for 
more direct engagement between the mayor and citizens. This has been 
articulated as civil and political society ‘joining the same project’; thus, alongside 
their scope for action, the nature of political and civil society organisations as 
internally democratic and committed to promoting participation, is seen to be 
important (Wampler & Avritzer, 2004:38; see also, Abers 2000). 
                                                                
5
 Sintomer et al, 2012:20; Marquetti 2005:19; Wampler, 2007:38; Baiocchi, 2005; Cabannes, 
2004:40, Allegretti & Herzberg, 2004:17. 
6
 Sintomer et al, 2012:20; Marquetti 2005:19; Allegretti & Herzberg, 2004:17; Wampler, 
2000:23-4. 
7
 Goldfrank, 2007:147-148; Marquetti 2005:19; Allegretti & Herzberg, 2004:17; Wampler 
2000:28; Abers 2000:105. 
8
 Wampler, 2007:36; Goldfrank, 2007:147-148; Allegretti & Herzberg, 2004:17; Abers 2000:105.  
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Overall, there is a strong message from the literature that participatory 
budgeting is not a technical fix, and that its use does not guarantee outcomes. 
Rather, Baiocchi et al (20011:3) consider the willingness to experiment with a 
blueprint and transform it a hallmark of successful PB processes. This contrasts 
strongly with the approach of some technocrats, international agencies and 
NGOs who are understood to regard PB as a recipe for ‘implanting’ participation 
and transparency (Cabannes, 2004:40). 
A second, related aspect of the comparative literature (one which has received 
increasing attention in recent years), takes the problem of generalisability as a 
point of departure and asks what values and practices are actually travelling 
under the name of participatory budgeting. A number of commentators have 
proposed classification schemes, which include an explicit judgment on the 
extent to which processes can actually be considered ‘participatory budgeting’. 
In addition to Sintomer et al’s typology referred to earlier (2008, 2012, 2013a), 
Marquetti (2005) distinguishes low to high intensity PB (depending on the 
proportion of the budget involved) from communitarian PB (engagement via 
organisations rather than individuals) and public hearings (consultative 
approaches), Wampler (2007) classifies cases according to the relationship 
between levels of political will and civil society mobilisation, and Baiocchi et al 
(2011:79) take care to differentiate between full (binding) PB and consultation.  
In this vein, Baiocchi & Ganuza suggest four dimensions for judging PB 
experiments: the primacy of the participatory forums (whether they are the 
principal point of contact between government and citizen), the scope and 
importance of the issues covered by the budget, the degree of actual 
participatory power over the budget, and the degree to which participants are 
able to determine the rules of the budget (Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2014:39). These 
questions focus our attention on the significance of the PB process to wider 
decision-making structures, and so address the question of the relationship 
between the participatory and representative systems. 
Overall, therefore, an important distinction is made between PB as one 
component of a broader movement for renewal, based on interaction between 
the state and grassroots movements (as the previous chapter describes, this 
was undoubtedly the case in Porto Alegre), and PB as a technical device (see 
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Ganuza & Baiocchi, 2012; Sintomer et al, 2012).9 These two approaches to PB 
are clearly associated with different rationales for its use. Cabannes (2004:38) 
identifies three: to improve administrative efficiency, to generate social 
outcomes (for example, redistributive), and to ‘democratise democracy’. These 
are not mutually exclusive, but the two approaches appear to flow from different 
primary rationales, which in turn imply different democratic values.  
At the more radical end of the spectrum, PB retains the values explored in the 
previous chapter, and is associated with the same social justice discourse. 
Ganuza & Baiocchi (2012:1-3) consider this as most applicable to the ‘Brazilian 
phase’ of spread, in which PB ‘travels intact as a piece of political strategy’, 
based on the recognition that PB was successful because it was part of a whole 
administrative system. Importantly, this indicates a coherent set of values 
underpinning the democratic project in that locality. In Europe, similarly value-
driven experiences have occurred to an extent in Italy, and most notably in the 
Spanish cities of Seville and Cordoba, where the Izquierda Unida (United Left) 
played a major role (Sintomer et al, 2012:10; Talpin, 2007; Allegretti & 
Herzberg, 2004). Here, there was an emphasis on transparency, power-sharing, 
and redistribution, with an explicitly stated desire for cooperation between the 
state and citizens against private interests (Talpin, 2007:8-9). Of course, these 
values remain contested, as was amply demonstrated in Porto Alegre itself. 
Turning to the practice of PB as a technical device, its proliferation in this form 
is largely connected to the role of international organisations known for their 
neoliberal, pro-market agenda, in particular the World Bank, which has in recent 
years surpassed the PT as PB’s most influential exponent (Goldfrank, 2012). 
Abstracted from local democratic thinking and negotiation, PB becomes 
politically neutral, a ‘best practice’ device codified in training manuals and 
applied by expert knowledge. Here, there is a clear association with the 
measurement culture of New Public Management. Rather than the robust 
partnership of political and civil society described above, the local state is likely 
to be the lead player (though citizens are not absent, Sintomer et al, 2012:17).  
This approach coheres with an impetus based on good governance, associated 
with the marginalisation or exclusion of the other two major rationales, and 
                                                                
9
 I have explored this distinction with reference to the UK in an earlier paper (Blakey, 2008), in 
which I developed some of the ideas presented in later sections of this chapter. 
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arguably, with attempts to render PB into a form more acceptable to the 
possessive-individualist model of democracy. Consequently, Baiocchi & 
Ganuza conclude that the communicative dimensions of PB have travelled well, 
but the empowerment dimensions have not (Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2014). Social 
justice principles are squeezed out as PB is lauded for its value neutrality; plus 
there is a view within the World Bank that PB is only needed in the absence of 
‘democratic participation’ as it can be a costly ‘repetition’ of representative 
democracy (Ganuza & Baiocchi, 2012:8-9).  
This approach is prevalent in Europe, in particular France and Germany, where 
PB tends towards the consultative end of the spectrum, and lacks a real 
recognition of citizens as joint decision-makers (Sintomer et al, 2008; Allegretti 
& Herzberg, 2004). Thus PB in Europe tends to fit the ‘good governance’ model. 
The rationale of ‘democratising democracy’ is also commonly articulated, but 
within a context where the European political class tends towards seeing PB as 
a threat to the sovereignty of representative democracy (Allegretti & Herzberg, 
2004:17).  Finally, it is clear that in Europe there is, broadly speaking, no such 
‘inversion of priorities’ as seen in Brazil – either in intention or outcomes 
(Sintomer et al, 2012:8-11).10  
This sober analysis does not, however, imply a deterministic view of the 
prospects for democratic learning. Cabannes (2004:40) ascribes the importance 
of a mobilised citizenry to its ability to protect against the purely technical 
implementation of PB, and Baiocchi & Ganuza emphasise the importance of 
connections between PB campaigns and other movements for democratic 
control of the state (Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2014:44). Close analysis of decision-
making in European PB suggests that while local politicians retain high levels of 
influence in budget decisions, citizens are not naïve, and – aware of the risks of 
manipulation and co-option – set up strategies to counter this and maximise 
their influence (Talpin, 2007). Thus, the ‘competing logics of participation, 
representation and what counts as expert knowledge can come to clash within 
even the most well-organised PB process’ (Ganuza & Baiocchi, 2012:9) – well-
organised, of course, in this instance meaning ‘controlled’. Accordingly, PB is 
understood to act as a platform for learning, even in situations where the 
process is decoupled from broader reforms (Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2014:45). 
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 Arguably, elements of both approaches are present in the UK, as I will explore. 
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Neither is the dynamic as simple as ‘citizens versus the state’. While the 
question of whether citizens can use PB to mount a practical opposition to the 
state is considered key (Ganuza & Baiocchi, 2012:9-10), as the situation in the 
UK bears witness, officials (and potentially even elected representatives) may 
also use participatory processes in a way that seeks to subvert the over-riding 
logic of their context.11 Thus, Baiocchi et al (2011) explore the impact of PB, not 
by comparing ‘successful’ and ‘unsuccessful’ PB as has been the most common 
approach to date, but by pairing municipalities using PB with localities that 
display similar contextual features but which are not using PB. 
This is based on the explicit recognition that what might be seen as ‘failure’ 
compared to the outcomes witnessed in Porto Alegre, might still represent 
progress in a different political context (op. cit.:10). Their cases therefore do not 
fit the ‘ideal context’ outlined earlier, having, for example, a lack of organised 
civil society allies or limited fiscal resources, yet their findings offer grounds for 
cautious optimism. Overall, the political culture of ‘control’ cities continued as 
usual, while the cities using PB experienced a rupture with past practices. 
In keeping with the conception of democracy as attitude not structure, they do 
not reify the role of PB, recognising that, in one of their matched pairs, the 
extraordinarily active civil society of Diadema (the birthplace of the PT) fared 
better than its PB partner, and reflecting on other binding forms of participatory 
democracy such as decentralised planning in the Indian state of Kerala. 
Similarly, they document the choices of the impoverished Brazilian town of 
Camaragibe, which broke with PB ‘best practice’ in channelling participation 
away from direct investment towards managing externally funded services such 
as healthcare because the lack of state resources meant external funding was a 
more significant focus for democratic control. The resulting Participatory 
Administration was ‘not PB’ but was formal and binding and had positive 
outcomes (op. cit.:93-99). They conclude that the malleability of participation in 
pursuit of civil society inclusion is a key lesson – though Baiocchi (writing with 
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 Even in relation to the World Bank, Goldfrank (2012) argues that unintended consequences 
can result. While some within the Bank promote PB as part of a standard pro-market agenda, 
there are radical elements who share the original Porto Alegrean aims, and moreover, the Bank 
has little or no control over outcomes in the locality. As a result, he argues that the role of the 
World Bank in propagating PB should be encouraged. While this is a controversial and 
debatable position, it does draw attention to the fact that even situations which seem less than 
hopeful from an egalitarian democratic viewpoint can be sites of democratic struggle. 
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Ernesto Ganuza) later warns of the dangers of accepting artificial limits to 
participation even in ‘non-ideal’ circumstances (Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2014:44-
45). Similarly, I would suggest that conscious attention to furthering the 
enactment of sovereignty by citizens is a vital element in challenging such 
limits. What the literature tells us about PB is that it can, in certain 
circumstances (particularly regarding the intentions of key actors rather than 
specified political contexts) provide an effective way for this to be facilitated. 
In a similar vein, Nylen (2003:164-155) provides an overview of what North 
America can learn from participatory democratic experiments in Brazil, which to 
the extent that our context shares similarities, is pertinent to the development of 
participatory budgeting in the UK. Alongside empirically demonstrating an 
alternative, providing evidence that democracy is enhanced by introducing more 
non-elite activists into the increasingly elitist world of representative democracy, 
and demonstrating that participatory institutions act as ‘schools of democracy’, 
Nylen suggests that Brazil both allows proponents of participatory democracy to 
learn from strategy and design regarding ‘what works’, and alerts us to pitfalls of 
implementation. Finally, he argues that Brazil teaches the need for a value 
commitment to participatory democracy which is decidedly not politically neutral. 
Overall, this strand of analysis illustrates that democracy is a journey. What 
matters is that we find ways of moving in the direction we consciously choose to 
embrace, according to our values. I have suggested with reference to Porto 
Alegre that our ‘citizen-eye’ belief in our ability to make a difference through 
participation is vital to the question of democratic motivation. Arguably, a non-
determinist view of macro democratic outcomes itself supports work on political 
engagement (in other words, democratic activists need ideas which help us 
understand how we might move forwards within our existing contexts). This, I 
believe, is a crucial message for the UK, which does not fit the profile of an ideal 
context for PB according to the analysis reviewed earlier, as I describe below. 
THE UK POLITICAL CONTEXT: INHOSPITABLE TERRAIN FOR PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING? 
In this section, I consider the UK context in the light of the four ‘indicators of 
success’ suggested by the comparative PB literature: a mobilised citizenry, 
fiscal decentralisation, operational autonomy and political will. 
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The evidence reviewed in chapter 4 suggests a citizenry that is civically active 
and interested in making a difference. Furthermore, there is some evidence of 
the desire for greater direct democracy. The British Social Attitudes survey 
canvassed opinion on various democratic reforms, including electoral reform, an 
increase in elected positions, and more direct democracy; of these, the idea of 
an increase in more direct forms of democracy received the most favourable 
response by a considerable margin. In terms of the egalitarian-democratic 
approach more broadly, 88% of respondents believed that MPs who ‘break the 
rules’ should be subject to recall by voters, and 58% believed they should be 
subject to recall if citizens feel they are ‘not doing a very good job’ (Curtice & 
Seyd, 2012:55-56). These views were even more pronounced in respect of 
respondents with a low level of faith in the current system (op. cit.:56-57), 
supporting the idea that more participatory democracy is a fruitful avenue to 
explore in relation to the ‘democratic deficit’. 
While this presents a positive picture of receptiveness to participatory reforms, 
importantly, the disillusion with the state that it reflects is associated with a 
corresponding increase in disengagement from the formal democratic system 
(as I discussed in chapter 4). Thus, the specific contextual factor identified in 
the literature, mobilisation in terms of the ability to strategically engage the 
state, is at a historically low ebb. This assessment is powerfully expressed by 
an experienced Bradford community activist: 
“What distresses me about the current managerial structure and current 
voluntary-sector-as-business-culture atmosphere and the partnership 
mentality is the huge resources that go into it.  And I just weep when I 
think what those resources could have achieved twenty years ago if they 
were mobilised by people who had a more oppositional, and more 
radical, and more determined, and more focused, political strategy.”12 
This illustrates the message in the literature that access alone is insufficient, 
and even the desire for change may not be enough; what is needed is the 
capacity to engage strategically, to cooperate but also to contest if necessary.  
With reference to fiscal decentralisation and operational autonomy, the UK 
political structures are decidedly hierarchical in character. In chapter 4, I 
                                                                
12
 Interview 10, community activist, Bradford, 26/02/2007. 
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referred to the ongoing withdrawal of power from the local to the national state, 
including increasing levels of non-elected local governance in many fields, 
including health, development and education. This has the effect of reducing 
both the amount and scope of funds and decision-making power in the hands of 
the local elected state. Furthermore, the long history of governmental structures 
in this country has engendered a level of bureaucratisation unmatched in Latin 
America. While the strength of state institutions in the UK brings many benefits, 
including stability, it also brings a marked bias towards procedural complexity, 
and reduced scope for local political innovation (not least because senior 
officers possess a high degree of systemic authority, through opportunities to 
influence the thinking and choices of elected members as well as via delegated 
power; Wilson & Game, 2006:291). The situation is exacerbated by the 
Conservative-led budget cuts, which represent a projected overall reduction in 
local authority funding of almost one-third by the end of 2015, with a 
disproportionate effect on deprived areas, and, crucially, without a 
corresponding reduction in responsibilities (Hastings et al, 2013). 
However, there have been opportunities via ring-fenced budgets where 
sufficient operational autonomy has existed to permit the possibility of changed 
outcomes implied by participatory decision-making. As a result, many UK PB 
processes have been associated with time-limited funds, such as 
neighbourhood renewal programmes in economically deprived areas. While 
such funds present an opportunity for greater decision-making autonomy, they 
tend towards insulating PB from mainstream decision-making processes and 
funds (as is particularly illustrated by the Bradford case), and so may limit the 
impact of PB on existing systems. These dynamics complicate the more radical 
use of PB as one element within a broader movement for renewal. Furthermore, 
this level of dependence on non-core ‘initiative’ funds gave the processes (in 
England particularly) what one activist has described as ‘weak roots’, creating 
additional vulnerabilities when ‘the tap was turned off’.13  
Turning to political will, it is important to recognise that the situation here has 
different, perhaps competing, elements. Therefore, I will address New Labour’s 
political commitment to PB, as the national government under which PB in the 
UK first developed, and then situate this within the wider context of a 
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 UK PB activist, personal communication, 13/02/2015. 
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government-led growth in new participatory spaces more broadly, before briefly 
mentioning the current situation under the Conservative-led coalition. Local 
expressions of political will are also important, and are not entirely precluded by 
limitations at national level (I will consider this in relation to the case studies in 
Newcastle and Bradford in the following chapters). 
Between 2006 and 2010 there was high profile national support for PB from the 
New Labour administration, epitomised by the publication of the national 
strategy (DCLG, 2008b). In this strategy, Blears says that she believes 
democracy ‘should be a daily practice, enriched by every part of the community’ 
(op. cit.:7), and aims to ‘shift power into the hands of the local communities and 
generate a vibrant local democracy’ (op. cit.:11). In keeping with an egalitarian 
view of democracy, the strategy identifies the potential of PB in the area of 
citizenship learning (in particular regarding learning about the difficult trade-offs 
involved in political decisions) and outcomes (budgets becoming more focused 
on the ‘right’ priorities) and recognises the collective nature of democracy, 
valuing the fact that PB brings people together to talk about what they want (op. 
cit.:8). It rests on a positive view of human nature, the belief that people don’t 
just vote for their own interests (op. cit.:14) and that citizens know best what is 
needed in their area (op. cit.:26). 
However, it also reveals some of the conflicted attitudes to participatory 
democracy that PB analysts have observed in Europe. Its first sentence 
declares that ‘representative democracy is widely believed to be the fairest and 
most effective system of governance’ and defines participatory democracy as 
enhancing representative democracy by ensuring that representatives 
understand the changing priorities and views of the public (op. cit.:9). There is 
also a strong theme within the strategy around opportunities for people to ‘give 
back to’ or ‘take part in’ their neighbourhoods (op. cit.:7, 11, 13), emphasising 
community cohesion, rather than democratic, outcomes. Nowhere does the 
strategy explicitly recognise a problem to be solved with the state, therefore 
there is no conscious attention to enabling the resolution of potential conflicts or 
tension with existing state decision-making processes. 
As a result, the strategy does not foreground ‘changed outcomes’ as an impetus 
for PB (therefore, there is no mention of anything approaching social justice or 
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an ‘inversion of priorities’). Rather, the strategy is said to present PB as ‘a 
particularly effective activity which can achieve real engagement with local 
people’ (op. cit.:10). This undeniably complicates the extent to which it can be 
considered a ‘supply-side’ response to the democratic deficit. This is important, 
because as Porto Alegre demonstrated, and as I will explore in subsequent 
chapters with reference to the UK, the idea of changed outcomes is centrally 
linked to citizens’ motivation to participate.  
Ultimately, the strategy does not seek to shift the location of sovereignty. It 
encourages the dissemination of good practice via training courses, learning 
sets and tool-kits (op. cit.:9, 16-7, 26), but leaves PB at the discretion of public 
bodies. It emphasises how it can help public decision-makers ‘respond to the 
concerns of local people more effectively’ (op. cit.:16), rather than how citizens 
can exercise power directly (it is perhaps significant that the strategy refers to 
people and communities – never citizens).14 The proposed articulation between 
participatory and representative systems is therefore distinctly limited.15 
While the publication of a national PB strategy was consistent with a 
considerable increase in a wider range of innovative participatory mechanisms 
for engagement (Davidson & Elstub, 2014; Birch, 2002), the limits to its 
ambition (as described above) are equally in keeping with the view that these 
new participatory spaces emerged from an essentially government-led project 
to ‘mobilise citizen consent’ with respect to non-negotiable government policies 
(Davies, 2012), in a consciously de-politicised policy context (Burnham, 2001). 
Thus, Bernard Crick (2002:488) noted with concern that the New Labour 
leadership talked more often about ‘volunteering’ than ‘citizenship’. The 
exclusion of alternative policy goals explicitly minimises the scope for the 
expression of conflict, as is illustrated by the PB Strategy’s reticence regarding 
‘changed outcomes’. Research into Bradford’s more formal partnership 
structures for community participation reinforces this point: the new participatory 
space emerged as an increasingly depoliticised space, which ‘privatises’ overtly 
political voices (Blakey, 2010:188-189). Thus the overall context for such 
                                                                
14
 I choose to use the term ‘citizen’ in relation to UK PB processes, as I have done with 
reference to Porto Alegre. However, it is telling that this term is used less frequently here (in that 
respect the PB strategy is not alone), the much less political ‘resident’ or (marginally less 
apolitical) ‘community member’ being more common. 
15
 The Newcastle case in particular demonstrates how political support can combine with limited 
connections to the existing representative decision-making structures. 
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initiatives fits the ‘demand-side’ classification of the democratic deficit discussed 
in chapter 4, rather than a ‘supply-side’ approach which acknowledges a 
fundamental need for democratic improvement within the state itself. 
In addition, the top-down nature of the approach foregrounds state officials and 
the professionalised voluntary sector, whose ‘job’ it increasingly is to encourage 
participation. The UK national reference group on participatory budgeting (which 
ran from 2006 to 2010) demonstrates this, being predominantly made up of 
national and local civil servants and council officers, with no politicians and no 
community members. Tellingly, Chavez identifies similarities between the new 
localism promoted by New Labour in the UK and Porto Alegre’s post-2004 local 
solidarity governance, whose policy coordinator declared that ‘in this space 
there is no conflict, no elections, no delegates’ (Chavez, 2006). 
With the arrival of the Conservative-led coalition in 2010, PB was also briefly 
supported as a flagship project within David Cameron’s short-lived ‘Big Society’ 
discourse, which located the problem in a ‘broken’ society, and was moreover 
essentially anti-state in character (Bowers & Bunt, 2010; Kisby, 2010). PB did 
not, however, receive the same level of support from the Conservative-led 
government, and has faded from view in terms of national policy.  
At national level therefore, even at the moment of PB’s inception, there is only 
limited evidence of strong political will for PB as an egalitarian-democratic 
project. At local level of course, the potential exists for significant variation (as I 
will discuss with reference to the case studies). Clearly, this does not negate the 
importance of a public, national commitment to PB (especially where local 
political will is lacking). PB organisers in Bradford described how the local 
development of PB was rooted in local political learning and goals, but 
enthusiastically welcomed the subsequent national profile; in their view: ‘giving 
that permission in legislation is fantastic’.16 
While much of the literature appears to suggest that this overall context doesn’t 
bode well for democratic outcomes from PB, the work of Baiocchi et al (as I 
have said) directs our attention to how we can make a difference from this 
starting point. I believe that the relatively positive (if fleeting) references to the 
UK in the wider PB literature reflect the presence of egalitarian-democratic 
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 Interview 5, joint interview, senior management team, Bradford Vision, 13/01/2007. 
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values amongst a wider PB community, if not within the state itself. However, 
the literature also provides a warning that the transmission of values through 
institutional design and political practice really matters in terms of generating 
democratic outcomes (in other words, the importance of pushing for the 
implementation of key principles such as binding decisions, deliberation, self-
regulation, and a meaningful relationship between participatory and 
representative decision-making mechanisms). 
PB INNOVATION IN THE UK CONTEXT 
By the time of Hazel Blears’ announcement of 10 participatory budgeting pilots, 
at least 6 localities were already experimenting with PB (see Lavan, 2007 for a 
comprehensive overview).17 While Bradford and Newcastle proved to be the 
most influential of these, the variety across the six demonstrate the scope of 
early examples of PB in the UK for experiential learning and democratic 
innovation. In Bradford, there had been several pilots including a 
Neighbourhood Renewal funded town-wide process in Keighley, and a number 
of smaller neighbourhood or themed events. Newcastle began their PB journey 
with a two year pilot funded through Neighbourhood Renewal money. PB 
subsequently became a core part of the council’s engagement work, with 
dedicated support for an ongoing programme, known as U-Decide. Coedpoeth 
was a small-scale rural process, unusual in being VCS-led. In Salford, two 
neighbourhoods dispersed highways improvement money via PB. Though 
limited in scale, Salford was significant in using core funds rather than a 
supplementary funding pot. The Sunderland initiative involved the distribution of 
New Deal funds for community chest small grants via 5 PB events. Finally, in 
West Dunbartonshire, an event inspired by the Sunderland process was held to 
disburse money for community organisations.  
PB processes have proliferated since then, with upwards of 100 local authorities 
claiming to have undertaken some type of participatory budgeting process by 
2010 (Hall & Röcke, 2013:183). However, the early examples stand out as sites 
of local experimentation and negotiation; many (though by no means all) of the 
later processes following a more codified model, disseminated in part through 
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 In addition, Harrow held an event called Harrow Open Budget in 2005. This was a purely 
consultative, non-binding exercise, in which participants, who were paid a small fee to attend, 
prioritised pre-formed budget options (see Mahony, 2008:78-122). Accordingly, this was not 
considered ‘PB’ by many actors involved in advocating or supporting PB in the UK at the time. 
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national promotion of the PB Unit ‘tool-kit’ (Rossiter, 2008), which was itself 
heavily influenced by the early experiences, Bradford and Newcastle in 
particular. Later PB cases of particular interest include Manton, 
Nottinghamshire, where organisers express a cautious optimism about the 
impact of PB on voter turnout (Hall & Röcke, 2013:187); Scarborough, where 
community activists challenged council officers for a greater say in PB design 
and oversight, and Tower Hamlets, an unusually deliberative process in which 
the municipal council committed a percentage of central council funds to PB. To 
date, aspirations for more ‘mainstream’ PB have not materialised, and the 
scope of individual PB initiatives remains limited in both aims and longevity.18 
While this variety illustrates the nature of PB’s development in the UK, the early 
examples in particular represent locally worked out experiments with new 
democratic process. In each case, the local actors, values and goals are critical. 
In addition, the PB Unit, with its unequivocal commitment to social justice, 
played a vital role in sharing stories and learning, connecting experiences, and 
making the connection between PB and the radical values represented by its 
Latin American roots. This was a two-way relationship, with key actors migrating 
from innovative PB localities to the Unit (including organisers from Bradford and 
Newcastle). It is important that the PB Unit was not a state initiative, but one 
housed by an NGO concerned with eradicating poverty, locating its rationale 
firmly within the egalitarian democratic narrative. Furthermore, it is very clear 
that PB would not have achieved the national profile it did without the work of 
the Unit over many years.19  
In 2008, the PB Unit was named as the ‘key delivery partner’ in the national 
strategy, and became increasingly state-funded (DCLG, 2008b:9). Arguably, 
this had mixed implications for the Unit’s role as a catalyst for PB, increasing its 
capacity, reach and influence but potentially compromising its identity as a 
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 Participant observation record: National Meeting of the PB Network, Tamworth, 06/11/2014. It 
is, however, worth noting that a new wave of interesting discussions and experiments with 
participatory democracy (including PB) are emerging in Scotland in the wake of the 2014 
Independence Referendum, arguably as citizens come face-to-face with the limitations of what 
they have been used to understanding as ‘democracy’ (Oliver Escobar’s blog on Scottish 
participatory practice, for the Citizen Participation Network, provides a brief overview of current 
developments; see Escobar, 2015).  
19
 For example, when Hazel Blears came into post as Communities Minister in 2007, she drew 
on the work of the PB Unit and the national reference group set up in partnership between the 
Unit and DCLG to publicise PB as a distinctive policy associated with her ministry, in particular 
drawing on the Practitioner Evaluation undertaken by Kezia Lavan (2007) for the PB Unit and 
the International Centre for Participation Studies (Bradford University). 
158 
 
mobilised NGO which was capable of both cooperation and challenge. 
Furthermore, this coincided with an increased drive to frame civil society 
organisations as ‘choice’ not ‘voice’ – service delivery rather than campaigning 
organisations (see Blakey, 2010:197-199). This carries with it the logic of 
claiming professional territory and developing marketable services, a logic 
which the unmistakably value-driven PB Unit nevertheless operated within (and 
one which represented a ‘push’ towards operating as a PB delivery organisation 
rather than a campaigning network). 
In negotiating these tensions, the PB Unit sought to maintain independence, 
and a critical distance from party politics, identifying the politicisation of PB as 
New Labour policy as problematic (after the 2010 general election) because 
‘both the Conservatives and the Liberal Democratic Parties have policies of 
community engagement and empowerment within which PB could sit, but as it 
stands [i.e. overt association with the New Labour administration] there are 
political vulnerabilities with PB in the UK’ (Jackson, 2011:98). There is a tension 
here. On the one hand, this may indicate a positive recognition of the limits to 
the Labour agenda, as discussed above, and a tactical approach to creating 
space for local innovation. On the other, it may risk delinking participatory 
budgeting from the social justice principles which are essential to the outcomes 
observed in Porto Alegre.  
Church Action on Poverty’s ‘People’s Budget’ campaign (linked to the PB Unit) 
affords an illustration of this tension. The campaign provided a menu of ‘buttons 
to push’ with councillors of different political parties, aimed at communities 
demanding inclusion in the budget process.20 While this has been interpreted as 
the marginalisation of social justice principles (Ganuza & Baiocchi, 2012:8), I 
would argue that its aim was in fact to subvert mainstream policy commitments 
with a more radical agenda.21 In this vein, the PB Unit promoted the idea of 
varying ‘levels’ of PB (beginning with participatory grant-making) not through 
abandoning the more ambitious goal, but because it was felt to be more realistic 
than expecting a fully developed programme to emerge from generally cautious 
local authorities (Hall & Röcke, 2013:193). However, tactical or subversive aims 
may not be sufficient in themselves. A key question is the extent to which such 
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 See http://www.thepeoplesbudget.org.uk/makethecase (Accessed 25/09/14). 
21
 Participant observation record: conversations with the People’s Budget coordinator, 2011-
2012. 
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transformation is possible in practice, without explicitly and publicly embracing a 
commitment to social justice. This dynamic played out in two very different ways 
in my two case studies, as I explore in the following chapters. 
CONCLUSION 
The UK’s overarching model of democracy falls within the possessive-
individualist tradition: hierarchical, centralised, and designed to contain 
collective expressions of popular sovereignty. As a result, the ‘ideal conditions’ 
identified for transformative PB are not strongly present at national level. 
However, as the case studies of Newcastle and Bradford suggest, this does not 
mean it is impossible to creatively carve out local spaces for counter-cultural 
democratic experiences. Indeed, whether here or in Porto Alegre, it is the 
context of flawed democracy that sparks that endeavour. Therefore it is vital 
that we understand how such attempts work in a variety of contexts, and what 
they might be able to achieve. It follows, however, that our context cannot be 
ignored. It has particular consequences for any serious, sustained attempt to 
create a democratic experience framed by the egalitarian narrative, and these 
can only be addressed if we are aware of them. I will conclude this chapter by 
briefly outlining four such implications. In the following chapters, I will use the 
case studies of Newcastle and Bradford to explore these in more depth. 
Firstly, there are clear conceptual tensions with the existing representative 
culture. In chapter 8, I consider how different actors’ perceptions of democratic 
legitimacy are expressed through their behaviour in PB processes, and suggest 
that we are prey to ‘representative habits of mind’ as a direct consequence of 
the dominant democratic culture in the UK. Importantly, this compromises the 
role of the individual citizen in participatory spaces, there being an implicit 
understanding that legitimacy comes through representing others in your 
community, either through shared identity or membership of a community 
association. In the Newcastle case, this tendency shaped opportunities for 
wider engagement, and led to concerns around accountability, which in turn 
affected the enthusiasm of some within the state for participatory processes. 
The second context issue concerns the role of voluntary sector organisations in 
supporting or constraining a mobilised citizenry. At the 2010 UK National 
Participatory Budgeting Conference, Sergio Baierle raised the absence of 
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citizens as a concern, asking if in the UK the voluntary sector has ‘captured the 
social’.22 Arguably, we need a clearer recognition that this is not a separate 
issue to the retention of sovereignty by the state, but intimately connected. 
Controlling and prescribing the role of the voluntary sector assists the state in 
managing the exercise of sovereignty by the people. This is exemplified by the 
‘delivery choice’ government agenda (mentioned above), which is in direct 
tension with the idea of ‘voice’ as a primary identity for the voluntary sector.23 
On the one hand, there is evidently resistance to the imposed ‘choice’ identity 
(this was described by Kevin Curley, chief executive of the National Association 
for Voluntary and Community Action, as the central challenge facing the 
sector).24 As a Keighley voluntary sector manager from the health and social 
care sector (which is particularly targeted by this agenda) put it: 
‘We shouldn’t just be helping decide how to share the pie; we should be 
asking “why isn’t the pie bigger!?”’25 
On the other, the ideologically-driven economics of the national context often 
push individual organisations towards ‘choice’ to safeguard their existence (as 
witnessed, to an extent, in the story of the PB Unit itself).26  This tension has 
implications for the goal of building ‘a mobilised citizenry, capable of both 
cooperation and challenge’. With reference to PB processes, there is an 
acknowledged tension between individual citizen participation, and the 
imperative for associations to represent others (Ganuza et al, 2014). While the 
dynamics of the voluntary and community sector overall lie outside the scope of 
this thesis, I return to this issue briefly in chapter 9, as the role played by some 
local voluntary sector organisations in Bradford was instructive.  
Thirdly, as in the view of the PB Unit, there is a prevalent belief that this work 
needs to be ‘unpolitical’ because the overall environment is felt to be hostile to 
genuinely participatory democracy, an issue I will discuss in chapter 9 through 
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 Sergio Baierle, UK PB National Conference: Participatory Budgeting and the Big Society, 
London, 09/11/2010. 
23
 A clear expression of this agenda can be found in the green paper Modernising 
Commissioning: increasing the role of charities, social, enterprises, mutual and cooperatives in 
public service delivery (Cabinet Office, 2010). 
24
 Participant observation record: Building on Our Strengths, Voluntary and Community Sector 
annual conference, Bradford, 31/10/2006. 
25
 Interview 6, voluntary sector officer, Keighley, 16/01/2007. 
26
 I have discussed this subject in more depth elsewhere, with reference to nationally-
determined VCS engagement structures in Bradford (Blakey, 2010). 
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the lens of the Bradford PB process. Arguably, as I have said, this is a tactical 
means to create spaces which are subversive of the democratic culture. 
However, to retain the social justice principles inherent in a radical rather than 
technical implementation, the literature suggests this tactic must be consciously 
employed in conjunction with an explicitly political agenda (though not 
necessarily party political). Without this, the evidence indicates that 
transformative outcomes will be severely limited. 
Actually buying into, as opposed to tactically utilising, the idea that PB is 
apolitical (the seductive but simplistic idea that a technical device can generate 
transformative outcomes however and wherever it is applied) stands in stark 
contrast to the aim of Porto Alegre’s PB activists who made the following 
declaration: 
‘We seek to inaugurate a proactive agenda of social movements amid 
the rising banalisation of participatory processes by many governments 
which reduce them into a simple tool to distribute resources for social 
amelioration, without ties to a vision of development and without a 
perspective of effectively transforming the social realities in which 
ordinary citizens live.’ (CIDADE, 2010) 
It is not therefore surprising that, when visiting the UK, Baierle asked why 
activists were working with the Conservative-supported Big Society Network 
around their interest in PB, instead of building a social movement to fight the 
cuts.27  
Finally, variable levels of political will and a hostile democratic culture mean it is 
problematic to embed genuinely participatory democratic spaces over a longer 
time period, and so create adequate opportunities for ongoing learning. While 
this is most evident in the Bradford case, Newcastle illustrates how this dynamic 
can also be manifested through the difficulties of finding sufficient fiscal and 
operational freedom to create such experiences in the first place. 
While these contextual limitations do not prevent us starting from where we are 
and trying to improve the democratic environment, they do direct our attention 
                                                                
27
 Participant observation record: UK PB National Conference: Participatory Budgeting and the 
Big Society, London, 09/11/2010 (the conference took place in the first months of the 
Conservative-led coalition government). 
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to two important questions. Firstly, to what extent can individual citizens be 
empowered to negotiate a collective voice within any new structures, despite 
the individualising and disenfranchising tendencies of the representative 
political culture? Arenas which promise empowerment but ultimately do not 
enable it, risk further demobilising a distrustful citizenry. Secondly, to what 
extent is it necessary to maintain a political agenda despite the depoliticising 
logic of our context? In other words, is this a precondition for achieving different 
goals (such as the inversion of spending priorities witnessed in Porto Alegre)?  
If so (supposing that democratic motivation is related to ‘making a difference’), 
then the relationship between democratic appetite and a political agenda of this 
kind may be significant. This leads us to consider not only the level but the 
nature of political will (in other words, the reasons for supporting PB).  
Baiocchi et al (2011) offer a useful typology which illustrates this point (and the 
relationship between my two questions). They distinguish prostrate democracy 
(with limited will from the state and dependent civil society) from bifurcated 
democracy (limited will from the state but civil society capable of making 
autonomous demands), affirmative democracy (a willing state, and dependent 
civil society) and mobilised democracy (a willing state and autonomous civil 
society). While prostrate democracy can become affirmative or bifurcated, and 
bifurcated and affirmative can become mobilised, they articulate a danger that 
‘consultative’ PB can have the effect of actually demobilising an active civil 
society (giving the example of the Brazilian town of Mauá, op. cit.:130-141). 
This typology really brings alive the idea that democracy is a journey and not a 
structure. It helps us identify possibilities because movement is always possible, 
wherever you start from. While the situation even in different localities is of 
course both fluid and uneven, the analysis presented in chapter 4 suggests that 
the UK is closest to a prostrate democracy. Thus, both affirmative and 
bifurcated democracy are likely to represent a positive step forwards, though 
the danger exists for disempowering experiences to have a detrimental effect 
on civil society’s capacity to autonomously engage the state. 
The core question for my thesis relates to whether and how a mobilised 
citizenry capable of cooperation and challenge (in other words, citizens with an 
active democratic appetite) can be encouraged through experiences of direct 
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democracy in the UK’s less than ideal circumstances. Baiocchi et al’s typology 
indicates the importance of clarity – within each local scale process, not just on 
the part of national activists – on the ‘big picture’ political philosophy behind 
participatory budgeting, if PB in the UK is to deliver on some of its claimed 
radical potential.28 
I explore some of these conceptual issues in more depth in chapters 8 and 9, 
through the case studies of Newcastle and Bradford. However, it is important 
first to consider the potential of UK PB processes for generating democratic 
outcomes, given the less than ideal context described in this chapter. Therefore, 
in the next chapter I turn to Newcastle, which arguably represents the UK’s 
most embedded PB programme to date, and as such provides an in-depth 
opportunity for reflecting on outcomes. In chapter 8, I examine the underlying 
democratic narratives revealed in the Newcastle case, in order to understand 
the extent to which the U-Decide programme represented a genuine attempt to 
shift sovereignty, before considering the case of Bradford in chapter 9, where a 
short-lived PB experiment formed part of a more radical challenge to the 
existing system. 
 
                                                                
28
 It is significant that such clarity is much more likely to exist in locally negotiated processes 
than cases where an ‘off-the-peg’ technical procedure is implemented by ‘experts’.  
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CHAPTER 7 
DEMOCRACY IN PRACTICE: SHARING POWER IN NEWCASTLE 
As an attempt to introduce a new form of participatory decision-making into a 
deeply-embedded system of representative democracy, PB processes enable 
us to consider the democratic deficit in two ways. Firstly, they provide an 
opportunity for observing the extent to which a different democratic approach 
can impact on the quality and quantity of democratic engagement. Secondly, 
PB is a space in which people are able, through the tangible practice of 
democracy, to more freely express their conception of what it might look like. As 
the UK’s most extensive PB programme to date, Newcastle’s U-Decide 
programme (the local name for PB) generates insights in both these areas. 
In addition to its relative scale, U-Decide is interesting because, in contrast to 
many UK PB processes, councillors, council officers and citizens all played 
active roles. U-Decide formed a key part of the local Liberal Democrat 
administration’s strategic governance agenda, consequently the Social Policy 
Unit housed a small team of officers dedicated to developing PB in the city. In 
addition, citizens were involved in the planning for each individual PB process, 
via a system of working groups. Therefore it presents an ideal opportunity to 
explore the democratic values of, and interaction between, all three groups. 
In this chapter, I explore the main achievements and limitations of the 
Newcastle U-Decide programme, with a particular focus on citizen democratic 
learning outcomes; in this regard U-Decide offers strong evidence that the 
experience of a different form of democracy can generate democratic learning, 
despite a more hostile overall context. I conclude with some reflections on what 
the evidence suggests about the location of sovereignty within U-Decide. I will 
begin by introducing the programme as a whole, and the particular processes 
included in this case study. 
THE ‘U-DECIDE’ PROGRAMME 
Newcastle-upon-Tyne is a city of around 250,000 inhabitants in the North East 
of England. It has a strong industrial past, centred on ship-building and coal. It 
therefore has had to navigate the difficult process of de-industrialisation in 
recent decades. However, Newcastle remains the heart of its region, with a 
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flourishing city centre. This conceals inequality, with more deprived 
neighbourhoods the focus of recurrent regeneration schemes.  
The development of PB in Newcastle followed the election of a new 
administration, replacing what was generally seen as a moribund Labour 
administration, lending greater emphasis to the development of new thinking 
around decision-making. For the Liberal Democrats, U-Decide sat squarely 
within its overall neighbourhood management reforms, which they regarded as 
a fundamentally different approach to the recently departed administration.1 
Their particular interest in PB developed through council officers’ involvement in 
a European learning network around citizen participation.2 Inspired by hearing 
directly from Porto Alegrean PB activists, they visited Bradford to observe an 
event there, and launched a two-year pilot using Neighbourhood Renewal 
Funds. This utilised ring-fenced neighbourhood renewal money, therefore 
representing additional rather than core funding.  
Citizens who expressed interest in the working group for the first U-Decide 
process were introduced to the concept and practice of PB through a 
presentation by the UK PB Unit, who made a strong link between the work in 
Newcastle and the process in Porto Alegre. The lead officer at the Social Policy 
Unit was later invited to be a member of the National PB Reference Group; 
enabling shared learning between Newcastle and other areas (he subsequently 
joined the PB Unit and then Network). By 2008, the NRF pilot had come to an 
end. However, the Liberal Democrat administration established a permanent U-
Decide team within the council’s Social Policy Unit in order to continue the 
development of PB in Newcastle, bringing together both councillor and officer 
support. At the time of my research (2008-2009), this team had supported 14 
neighbourhood or themed PB processes.  
My research focused on two neighbourhoods, Denton and Newburn. During the 
year I followed their work, the U-Decide team facilitated two events in each of 
these areas. Denton had been part of the original NRF pilot, whereas Newburn 
was new to PB. While Denton is poorer than Newburn, both are neither 
                                                                
1
 Interview 22, Cllr John Shipley, Leader, Newcastle Council, 26/1/2009; interview 27, Cllr David 
Faulkner, Deputy Leader, Newcastle Council, 02/03/2009; interview 25, ward councillor, 
Denton, 28/01/2009. 
2
 Partecipando, a project of the URBACT European exchange and learning programme. See: 
http://www.mdrl.ro/urbactII/urbact/projects/partecipando/partecipando.html (Accessed 
27/12/2014). 
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Newcastle’s wealthiest areas, nor its most deprived. They are located close 
together towards the western edge of the city, and have strong local identities. 
Denton is a largely residential area without a central community hub of shops 
and services;3 Newburn ward lies to the west of Denton, and is more rural. It 
comprises five villages, of which four participated in the PB process. Throckley 
is the largest and Blucher is the smallest (Walbottle and Newburn village also 
took part). The fifth village, North Walbottle, is an estate both socially and 
geographically separate from the other four. Both wards share a perception that 
they are ‘forgotten areas’ of Newcastle, who struggle to gain access to 
resources spent on more socially troubled areas of the city.4 Within Newburn 
ward, there is additionally some friction between the villages, the perception in 
each being that ‘they never get anything in their little patch’;5 cohesion between 
the villages is considered an issue. Both wards have a good variety of active 
civil society organisations. However, there is a common perception amongst 
local activists that there has been a significant loss of community spirit. 
The processes I observed developed as follows: 
 In early 2008, the U-Decide team wrote to all ward committees in 
Newcastle, inviting them to run a PB process using ward funds (plus an 
additional £5,000 from the Social Policy budget). Councillors in 5 of the 
26 wards responded positively, including Newburn and Denton (a PB 
process with young people ran concurrently in Walkergate ward, while 
processes in two other areas were provisionally scheduled to run later).  
 
 The ward councillors in these areas worked with the U-Decide team to 
identify which of the three budgets available to them (ward, 
environmental and highways) they would use. In both Denton and 
Newburn, the councillors decided to use their ward budget underspend, 
and seek additional monies, for example from local businesses. In 
Newburn, with the Social Policy £5,000, this initially amounted to 
£16,000, and in Denton, £22,000. U-Decide processes typically 
                                                                
3
 This did exist in the past. As one Denton resident put it: ‘the way new West Denton is built, is 
not a community … it’s needing a heart’ (Interview 30, group interview, working group members, 
Denton, 26/3/2009). 
4
 Interviews 17, 26, 30, 33, working group members, Denton and Newburn wards, November 
2008 – April 2009. 
5
 Interview 14, ward councillor, Newburn, 17/11/2008. 
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supported activity and resources which would not be funded via 
mainstream Council budgets (but might traditionally be considered by the 
local ward committee grants scheme). 
 
 The U-Decide team hosted a community lunch in each ward, inviting 
local citizens via word of mouth and existing networks of community 
activists. The process was explained, and participants invited to join a 
working group.  Council officers from different departments made a ‘pitch’ 
for the theme of the budget. In Denton, participants selected culture; in 
Newburn, ‘cleaner, greener, safer’ was chosen.  
 
 The working groups met regularly, at least once a month, and comprised 
mainly experienced local activists (though the voting events attracted a 
wider range of citizens). Their remit was process planning, rather than 
decisions on how funds would be allocated. This included agreeing 
eligibility criteria for bids, inviting applications and planning the voting 
event. The working groups were supported by local councillors and the 
U-Decide team, who attended meetings, but described themselves as 
having a facilitating rather than decision-making role. 
 
 The process was publicised by written and verbal means, including 
‘roadshows’ from a council trailer, at times and places decided by 
working group members. Community organisations, service providers 
and individual citizens were invited to submit proposals.  
 
 The working groups held a ‘sifting day’ in each ward, with the mandate to 
judge which bids met the agreed criteria for inclusion. In Newburn, this 
was preceded by a meeting between the (citizen) chair of the working 
group and council officers to look at technical criteria. Sifting days were 
supported by officers and / or councillors, though in a non-decision-
making capacity. Members of the U-Decide team then either informed 
projects they could present at the Grand Voting Event, or gave advice on 
alternative sources of funding. 
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 Applicants were supported by council officers (members of the U-Decide 
team, ward coordinators and community development officers) to 
develop a 3-minute presentation of their idea. 
 
 Applicant groups were given a number of tickets for the Grand Voting 
Event (where space allowed, additional tickets were given to groups 
whose ideas had not progressed to the voting event, and occasionally to 
wider citizens). 
 
 In November 2008, both wards held a Grand Voting Event, at which 
funds were allocated by means of an electronic vote taken after each 
presentation (grading each project from 1-9). Between 80 and 90 people 
attended in each ward. At both, the U-Decide team made a surprise 
announcement on the day of an additional £5000 from their own budget 
for the ‘pot’, bringing the total available in Newburn to £21,000 and the 
total in Denton to £27,000. 
 
 In January 2009, the U-Decide team heard that they had been successful 
in securing funds to run two Community Safety processes, as part of a 
national pilot. The funding criteria meant the theme and timescales were 
fixed, with the events to be held by the end of March. Because of the 
short deadline, the U-Decide team sought agreement from councillors in 
Denton and Newburn to run the events there, due to their existing 
experience, and the fact that there were already working groups in place.  
 
 Both wards agreed, and ran processes following a similar format, with 
Grand Voting Events held in March. Between 60 and 70 people attended 
each event. The U-Decide team introduced a deliberative element to 
these events, comprising a 3 minute discussion in small groups following 
each presentation. These discussions were facilitated by officers and 
other practitioners (as opposed to citizens). Participants were able to ask 
questions of presenters during this period. Participants then voted twice 
on each project (scoring from 1 to 5), firstly on whether they believed the 
project would make a difference to community safety in the area, and 
secondly on whether they believed it represented value for money. 
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These events were reasonably typical of U-Decide processes, though the model 
did vary.6 However, while the processes in Denton and Newburn were almost 
identical in structure, there were clear differences between the experiences, 
largely as a result of tensions between some members of the working group in 
Denton, and local councillors and the U-Decide team. Where the Newburn 
group worked closely with officers and councillors, the Denton group was seen 
as adversarial and unaccountable. Both involved citizens active in local 
community organisations; however, in Denton, a high proportion of these were 
existing ‘community reps’ on many statutory partnerships and boards. 
Significantly, they were used to being treated (and acting) as representatives of 
the community (a constituent element of what I am calling ‘representative habits 
of mind’).7 In Denton, the tensions with the working group led to a reduction in 
councillor support for U-Decide in the ward, and the decision of the U-Decide 
team to work in other parts of the city in preference to Denton.  
Locating Newcastle in terms of the key principles outlined in chapter 5, all the 
actors involved understood U-Decide to be binding (citizens have the power to 
make real decisions). The working groups were a genuinely deliberative space, 
and there was a commitment to increasing deliberation at voting events. Each 
process was set up to be internally participant-regulated, though the city-wide 
programme was not. Although from the council’s perspective, U-Decide was an 
ongoing programme, there was not ‘a cycle of known events’ from a citizen-eye 
perspective; events occurred ad hoc in different neighbourhoods depending on 
the will of local councillors and the U-Decide team. In terms of the direct 
participation of individuals, citizens played a core role in the working group 
(though there was some confusion over whether the source of their legitimacy 
was as citizens or representatives), but participation at Grand Voting Events 
was generally by invite. However, there were lively debates about whether the 
voting events should be open to all, or to members of the applying community 
                                                                
6
 For example, in 2009, the U-Decide team facilitated a process in which citizens from 
Lemington ward were asked to choose between a number of proposals for environmental 
improvements, all of which would be carried out by the Council. This process was also of note 
because the voting occurred in multiple venues around the neighbourhood, over one weekend, 
thus attracting much wider participation. This illustrates the development of thinking about 
participation and decision-making within the programme. However, U-Decide in Newcastle is 
currently dormant, following a shift in political control from the Liberal Democrats to Labour in 
2011 (arguably associated with local reactions to the national Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
coalition rather than the local performance or approach of the local administration in Newcastle).  
7
 In the next chapter, I will explore the nature of accountability in relation to this dynamic, and its 
implications for sovereignty. 
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groups. With regard to social justice intention, this was framed as ‘improved 
services’ for all, rather than a more radical goal relating to inequality. Therefore, 
while the political commitment to improved participation was strong, it was not 
explicitly rooted in the recognition that the status quo is failing the poorest 
members of society. 
The final key principle is that PB should combine representative and 
participatory democratic traditions. While U-Decide did this in the sense that it 
was rooted within the representative democratic state, it existed as a discrete 
space, and as such did not necessarily offer a challenge to existing decision-
making mechanisms (as I noted in relation to Porto Alegre, the emphasis on a 
connection between representative and participatory processes does not imply 
a non-conflictual relationship, but rather an engaged relationship, whereby one 
system cannot realistically ignore the other).  
It is for this reason that Baiocchi & Ganuza (2014:39) direct our attention to the 
primacy of the forum, and the scope of the decisions involved. These 
components reveal the principal limitation of the U-Decide programme. Dealing 
primarily with ‘extras’ rather than core services, it was one of a menu of options 
for engaging with the council (other options included ward committee meetings, 
which consider and fund comparable projects to those submitted to U-Decide). 
U-Decide was therefore an entirely discrete space, rather than being structurally 
connected to wider decision-making processes. While new initiatives of this kind 
are almost inevitably small-scale, in the following chapter I consider the nature 
of this particular dynamic in terms of U-Decide’s potential for mounting a 
genuine challenge to the existing democratic narrative.  
Turning to the context factors identified as favourable in the international 
comparative PB literature, the central involvement of the Liberal Democrat 
administration indicates clear political will. However, fiscal and operational 
autonomy are not automatically available to the programme organisers, but 
dependent on the buy-in of individual ward councillors. Civil society is engaged, 
but at the level of individual processes rather than the overall programme. This 
set of context factors prompts the question of why, given the political will, 
greater fiscal and operational autonomy was not created, and thus focuses our 
attention on the nature of that will (in other words, on precisely what is being 
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supported by different actors). I will return to this issue in the next chapter. 
Importantly, despite the apparent contextual constraints, U-Decide offers 
convincing evidence that the experience of direct democracy does hold the 
potential to generate significant democratic outcomes. 
U-DECIDE: A DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE 
Evidence of democratic outcomes from the U-Decide programme fall under four 
broad headings: increased participation, greater proximity to the state, changed 
outcomes (i.e. evidence that democratic engagement was effective in 
generating decisions more closely aligned to citizen wishes) and democratic 
learning (on the part of citizens and also the state). These themes reflect values 
inherent in the egalitarian democratic tradition, including active democratic 
engagement, a closer relationship between the state and citizens, and a belief 
in the capacity of citizens to develop democratic and civic skills.  
INCREASED PARTICIPATION 
Citizen participation in U-Decide took two main forms: membership of the 
working group, and attendance at voting events. Turning first to the broader 
participation at voting events, in Newburn, 85 voting citizens were present at the 
November 2008 Grand Voting Event, and 68 at the March 2009 event; in 
Denton, 89 voting citizens were present at the first event, and 62 at the 
second.8 Lower participation at the March events was widely attributed to the 
much shorter timescale for organising the process.  
Participation at the voting events was restricted; invites were sent to each group 
or individual presenting projects (usually 4 or 6 per project) with additional 
tickets being allocated to groups or individuals who had suggested projects 
deemed ineligible at the sifting day. Working group members attended the event 
as voting participants; however, many also belonged to groups submitting bids. 
In the event of further space being available, wider citizens were invited on a 
fairly ad hoc basis, though none of the events were open invite. Participation in 
decision-making via the voting events represented an increase, relative to 
attendance at ward committee (where similar decisions about local funds were 
                                                                
8
 At the young people’s voting event in Walkergate held in November 2008, 53 voting young 
people attended. Of these, there was an even division between male and female participants; 
29 were under 12, and 24 between 12 and 19 years (participant observation record: Walkergate 
Grand Voting Event, 18/11/2008). 
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made). The number of citizens attending ward committee varied, but there was 
an accepted view that the meetings were not well attended,9 attracting an 
average of perhaps 6 people (these generally being already well-known to the 
councillors and local officers).10 As I will explore further in the following chapter, 
participants tended to express their motivation to attend in fundamentally 
democratic terms (the desire to participate in decision-making), indicating a 
clear link between this outcome and the democratic nature of the process. 
In terms of participant profile, citizens attending both November events were 
approximately 60% female and 40% male. In March, the proportion of female 
participants increased to around 70% in Newburn, and 75% in Denton. At all the 
events, ethnicity was predominantly White, as reflects the population of both 
areas. The picture with regards to age is a little more varied. In Newburn, 
approximately a third of participants at both events were 15 or under, reflecting 
the high levels of engagement with schools and youth groups. The 16-24 age 
group was poorly represented, with only 5-6% at each event. However, at the 
first event, there was an even split between the remaining three age groups (25-
49, 50-64, 65 and over). At the March event, there was a very slightly increased 
proportion of the 65 and over group, relative to the 25-49 and 50-64 groups. In 
Denton, approximately a quarter of all participants at both events were 15 or 
under. There was some variation across the 16 to 65 age groups across the two 
events, but at both, the 65 and over group was the largest group present by a 
substantial margin, with approximately 40% at the first (better attended) event, 
and over 55% at the later event. The strong attendance of older participants 
coheres with local (older) activist views that there has been a significant loss of 
community spirit amongst younger citizens (and may also partially explain the 
higher proportion of female participants); the relative success of Newburn in 
mobilising younger participants is therefore noteworthy. 
Importantly, the evidence suggests that U-Decide was successful in attracting 
participants who were not previously involved with the state. This was partly 
because, while participation at voting events was restricted by invite, the main 
route to a voting event invitation – submitting a funding idea – was open to all 
citizens. The process was advertised to existing groups, but it was also 
                                                                
9
 Interview 27, Cllr David Faulkner, Deputy Leader, Newcastle Council, 02/03/2009. 
10
 Interview 14, ward councillor, Newburn. 
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publicised across the ward, including fliers to every home and a week of 
roadshows in each area prior to an event, at which council officers and working 
group members spoke directly to members of the public (unsurprisingly, this 
was a more successful route to new involvement than fliers). Citizens were 
invited to submit ideas which could be fulfilled by the state (for example, 
requests for public seating and additional waste bins), as well as applying for 
funds for community groups. Area coordinators, ward councillors, community 
development workers, and the U-Decide team within the Social Policy Unit all 
reported success in reaching people ‘who have never had anything to do with 
the council before, or haven’t even been part of a formal group’.11 This was 
referenced particularly strongly in Newburn (where 127 proposals were 
submitted for the November event), as the area coordinator and a ward 
councillor reflected: 
‘There were lots of faces there that we don’t see at our ward meetings. 
There were groups there that don’t come to our ward meetings. There 
were normal residents who aren’t part of a group, who came up with 
ideas. And they were very diverse, the ideas.’12 
‘It must have shown us that there’s about another eight or nine groups 
that we were never aware of, that come out of the woodwork so to speak, 
and we now have them on our little map of what things happen, because 
we didn’t know about them.’13 
Similarly, local activists valued the participation of citizens who had not 
previously been involved in formal political activities, as a working group 
member describes: 
‘We know the people up there, but they’ve never really … come to any 
tenants and residents’ meetings or anything like that.’14 
In Denton, though less ideas had been generated (45 proposals were 
considered at the sifting day)15 the officer evaluation of the November process 
                                                                
11
 Participant observation record: informal interview, council officer, Social Policy Unit, 
16/10/2008. 
12
 Interview 13, ward councillor, Newburn, 17/11/2008. 
13
 Interview 18, joint interview, area coordinators, 28/11/2008. 
14
 Interview 17, working group member, Newburn ward, 28/11/2008. 
15
 Participant observation record: sifting day, Denton, 12/3/09. 
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noted that approximately half the people present were new to U-Decide, and 
‘organisations new to U-Decide are putting forward proposals too’.16 
The second main form of engagement with U-Decide was through membership 
of the working group. This of course involved a much smaller number of people, 
but required a deeper level of commitment. In Newburn, there were initially 13 
regular members of the working group (sadly, one died during the course of the 
planning process); in Denton, there were 11 regular members. In both groups, 
most members were women, and most were retired (there were 2 working age 
adults in each group). Given the word of mouth method of recruitment, it is not 
surprising that most were already known to local councillors and ward officers, 
as ‘active citizens’. A community development officer explained that ‘people are 
approached because we know that they are very active in the area and have a 
good local knowledge of the groups, and the infrastructure.’17 
As I have mentioned, the two working groups were quite different in character. 
In Newburn, the working group contained some well-known community activists. 
However, in the view of their local councillor, ‘they wouldn’t have been involved 
in the workings of the council per se, [they’re not the sort who] go to meetings in 
the city centre;’18 rather, they were active with community organisations and 
groups at local level. Furthermore, one key member of the working group, a 
former councillor herself, but very rooted in her community rather than party 
politics, consciously worked to widen participation in the working group: 
‘I tried to get people involved who were on the tip, on the verge of getting 
involved with the community, to sort of ease them in, and I knew this 
would be a good project, with a good end result, that would make them 
feel, “we’ve done something.”’19 
In contrast, many members of the Denton working group sat as citizen 
representatives on an impressive variety of committees and statutory forums. 
The following two interview extracts give a flavour of the Denton group: 
‘Do you really want to know what I’m on? [It’s] a list as long as your arm! 
I’m on the [local] Tenants and Residents Group; I’m Secretary of that 
                                                                
16
 Participant observation record: officer evaluation meeting, Denton, 03/12/2008. 
17
 Interview 32, community development worker, Newcastle Council, 27/03/2009. 
18
 Interview 13, ward councillor, Newburn, 17/11/2008. 
19
 Interview 17, working group member, Newburn ward, 28/11/2008. 
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group. From there, I got elected to go onto Newcastle Tenants 
Federation Executive Board. Well, it’s not Board; it’s just Committee. And 
I’m also, from our tenants’ group, I go onto the Denton Community 
Partnership, because we’re allowed 4 members from each group on the 
DCP. I’m on the DCP, and from there I’m also on the Outer West Area 
Forum, and the Safer Stronger Communities Funding Neighbourhood 
Element, that’s all through the DCP. But the Tenants’ Federation is from 
my own Tenants’ group, because I’m very involved with tenancy 
federation, housing and things like that. And the Tenants’ Federation also 
has about four other working groups, which I’m involved with as well.’20 
‘I’m on Your Homes Newcastle housing board, which is all the council 
houses across Newcastle, and particularly Denton. I’m on the Area-
based Grant group, which was Neighbourhood Renewal … I’m still, at 
the moment, on the Delivery Partnership of the Local Strategic 
Partnership but I think I’m coming off it. I’m also on the Denton over 60s, 
which is the pensioners’ group held in Denton. I’m on the Friends of the 
Matchbox, which is a local community centre. I’m on, err, trying to think! 
There are about 6 involved with Your Homes Newcastle from every 
different angle, I was on an Area Board, but we’re not going to have 
them, and that’s unofficial at the moment. I’m trying to think what I’m on. 
There are about 6 groups, for example the Finance, I’m on, and the 
Property Committee, I’m on. So there are a lot of subgroups from [Your 
Homes Newcastle]. I’m trying to think of the local ones… oh, the Mature 
Action Group, which is another older people’s group. The LEAF, which is 
the Environmental Forum group … I was on Newcastle Empowerment 
Network, but that came to an end … And I’m also on the Safe Newcastle 
reference group. Knew there was some more somewhere.’21 
As another member of the working group put it, ‘we're on all the committees, if 
we're not on 'em, they're not worth being on!’22 The extent to which working 
group members are already actively involved with the state evidently represents 
a limit to U-Decide’s potential for engaging new citizens in that role (and, 
arguably, for democratic learning by working group members). Moreover, it 
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 Interview 33, working group member, Denton ward, 02/04/2009. 
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creates a dynamic which affects engagement with the wider community, and 
between the working group and the state. Regarding engagement with the 
wider community, it is reasonable to believe that the more inclusive approach of 
Newburn was a factor in both the more representative age range of voting 
participants, and in the stronger evidence that Newburn ward was successful in 
reaching people new to civic engagement. It is important to note that the 
‘experienced reps’ were by no means the only voices on the Denton group; one 
younger member in particular stood out as working hard to involve others, and 
facilitate quieter members of the group being heard. My interviews with some 
members of the less vocal element on the Denton group were in fact notable for 
deeply reflective democratic thinking. However, perhaps unsurprisingly, those 
used to attending formal meetings were the more dominant voices at meetings.  
CITIZENS AND THE STATE 
The mixed experience in Denton notwithstanding, it is clear from this review of 
participation that the U-Decide programme did achieve significant success in 
building some closer relationships between citizens and the state. The Newburn 
ward councillors, who played an active (but not decision-making) role in the 
working group, described the value of the voting events in developing wider 
relationships, and improving citizen views of the council: 
‘I had a better surgery there than I do at my normal surgeries … it was 
interesting because I got to speak to people that I wouldn’t normally see, 
and people I hadn’t known before. So I went up and said hello, and 
introduced myself. And from that point of view it was good. And it’s 
strange, because I did nip out for 10 minutes because I should’ve had 2 
surgeries, and one we put a notice on saying it was cancelled, but I went 
to the [other] one, which was local, and there wasn’t a soul there, and yet 
I’ve got a list from [the voting event]. You know, if they see you, then they 
come up with things. Yes, there was people that I hadn’t met before, so 
from that point of view it was quite good, because you’re being seen by 
other people, you know, so when they see your surgery lists go round, 
they might think ‘oh, I saw her’ or ‘I saw him at that day, now I know I can 
put a face to them’ … It was a very, very positive event.’23 
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‘I think it’s shown people the council in a different light, after Saturday … 
you know, they were going out the door saying, “by, it’s been 
marvellous”, you know, and “we’d never have been able to do it without 
your help” … and I’m out there and I’m seeing people.’24 
This was echoed by a working group member in Denton, who runs a voluntary 
youth group. Speaking of the young people she worked with, she said:  
‘I think if nothing else, it’s broken down the walls. You know, it’s knocked 
the walls down. And made w’ councillors more approachable.’25 
There is also evidence of greater information-sharing between communities and 
services. For example, because the play and youth service learned more about 
community-led children’s activities through U-Decide, they now liaise with the 
Newburn summer camp project to ensure that their summer activities 
complement one another, rather than clashing.26 Similarly, proposals that 
weren’t eligible for U-Decide were passed on to the appropriate council service, 
and a council officer contacted each citizen to tell them where their ideas had 
been taken, or to offer a route forwards.27 
In this vein, people valued tendencies in the PB processes which suggested a 
different kind of relationship with the state. Partnership was a common theme: 
‘They are saying they can’t do nothing without our help.’28  
‘See the difference that we’ve made, as a community, as a ward, with our 
councillors on board, backing us. But, you know, it’s not just the 
councillors backing us; we’re backing the councillors.’29 
‘If I’ve gone to council meetings in my area, you sit and listen … but with 
these committee meetings, I’ve found when you’re all sitting round the 
table, they advise you on what’s happening, but they listen as well. So 
it’s a two-way thing, and I think that’s important.’30  
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 Interview 14, ward councillor, Newburn, 17/11/2008. 
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 Interview 28, working group member, Denton ward, 20/03/2009. 
26
 Interview 32, community development worker, Newcastle Council, 27/03/2009. 
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 Interview 26, group interview, working group members, Newburn ward, 16/02/2009; 
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29
 Interview 28, working group member, Denton ward, 20/03/2009. 
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Unsurprisingly, the most marked development of relationships occurred within 
the Newburn working group, where officers, councillors and citizens worked 
alongside one another. Working group members consistently praised both 
councillors and officers, seeing them ‘in a little bit different light … you see them 
wanting to do a little bit for the community.’31 In Denton, however, positive 
engagement between citizens and the state was more limited. While a 
particularly negative tone was set by just one citizen, the resulting atmosphere 
led to decreased engagement by councillors, and a working group culture that 
officers found very difficult.32 Furthermore, to the extent that the Denton working 
group members were already formally engaged with the state, the potential for 
achieving closer involvement was correspondingly limited. 
EFFECTIVE AND TRANSPARENT DECISION-MAKING 
While the impact of decisions made through U-Decide lies outside the scope of 
this study, it is worth noting that participants valued these outcomes highly. In 
the words of one working group member: ‘it’s all exciting; it’s brought a lot of 
happiness and joy to all the groups that put in for it.’33 All the working group 
members I spoke to described with enthusiasm the difference that particular 
projects would make, many focusing on the community-building aspects of both 
the process itself, and the projects funded. Denton’s intergenerational projects 
were much talked about, the youth group’s successful bid for a tea dance being 
reciprocated by an older people’s group, who secured funding to invite them to 
a ceilidh in return. As the volunteer youth worker describes: 
‘The feedback that we got from the older people was amazing, because 
they said they can now quite happily walk through a crowd of kids, 
because nine times out of ten, they recognise the kids, and the kids 
recognise them, so for us that was massive.’34 
At the Grand Voting Event, it was evident the young people were delighted that 
the older group had returned their invitation, and moreover, it was clear that the 
process itself gave impetus to the intergenerational work, as new relationships 
were built between groups that would not otherwise have become so familiar 
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 Interview 31, joint interview, working group members, Newburn ward, 26/03/2009. 
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 Participant observation record: officer evaluation meeting, Denton, 03/12/2008. 
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 Interview 17, working group member, Newburn ward, 28/11/2008. 
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 Interview 28, working group member, Denton ward, 20/03/2009. 
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with one another.35 While these activities may well have been funded by other 
routes, their success was enhanced by the community-based planning process.  
Stories such as this are important because, as Porto Alegre demonstrates, it is 
the prospect of changed outcomes that motivates people. Therefore 
participants’ belief that U-Decide leads to different outcomes is significant. The 
view expressed by this Denton working group member was common: 
‘I think it’s made a big difference. I mean there are some lovely projects 
that’s been done already.’36 
There was a clear perception that many or most of the projects would not have 
happened without U-Decide,37 that ‘there’s always something else that’s more 
important, whereas this is the people’s choice.’38 In addition, there was a shared 
understanding that the process encouraged people to develop ideas they would 
not have otherwise considered: 
‘I think we have more scope on the U-Decide … you know, you can 
come up with daft ideas, and some of them are daft and some of them 
are good, but you do have more play round with that, you know, and 
people’s suggestions.’39 
Similarly, U-Decide presented an opportunity for the state to think about ideas 
they would not otherwise have considered, as this councillor describes: 
‘The danger is trying to find out what the play service wants to provide, 
rather than finding out what people actually want. There are a lot of ideas 
we wouldn’t have thought of, certainly, which came through from the 
process.’40 
Furthermore, independent of the outcomes themselves, there is a democratic 
value to citizens knowing that what they want for their community has been 
funded, and that they had a role in making it happen. The difference between 
this and electing a representative to take good decisions for you is palpable: 
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‘Even if one group had been helped, that was an achievement, and it 
was wonderful. But because of all the people that got helped, god, I was 
flying. Really, I’ve never, ever had anything to do with anything like that, 
and it was brilliant. Really brilliant.’41 
‘This was my contribution to making a difference. I couldn’t have made a 
difference on my own … you can walk around, and you can see the 
things that have been put in place now, especially after, this is the 4th 
one coming up. You know, you can look around Denton and you can 
think, oh, that was because of us, and U-Decide.’42 
Arguably, this is the practice of citizenship, a key feature of shifting sovereignty, 
and a very strong indicator that democratic learning is taking place. 
A ‘SCHOOL FOR CITIZENSHIP’ 
As the views above suggest, there was evidence of clear democratic learning 
on the part of working group members. This came through the closer working 
relationship with officers and councillors, as a working group member new to 
civic involvement describes: 
‘There were different people there from different services nearly all the 
time. So it was something new you were picking up, all the way along.’43 
This learning could be about the limits of the existing system too. For example, 
one (less experienced) member of Denton working group was shocked to learn 
that the 3 councillors had previously made funding decisions by themselves: 
‘Just the 3 councillors? Never! I thought actually there was a committee 
of people.’44 
Discovering the realities of the existing system, and learning, via U-Decide, 
about what was possible instead, led some working group members to develop 
their own ideas about what ‘better democracy’ might look like: 
‘I just wondered if it wouldn’t be a better project, or a different project, to 
say, let’s tackle something big, instead of all these small ones?’45 
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‘How about, we’ve got the next Denton ward meeting, and we say, look 
here, we think we’re making such a good job of spending the money, we 
want to spend 25% of your budget. Wonder what they would say?’46 
‘Could we take it a step further? Could we – this is me going with me 
political hat on – could we do it with every lot of money that comes into 
the ward? Like [the] neighbourhood response manager’s money? 
Highways and byways, their pot of money? You know, there’s pots and 
pots of money. You know, the play and youth money.’47 
Crucially, it is apparent from these quotes that active learning is going on. The 
citizens quoted here are not endorsing a different vision of democracy; they are 
trying to create one. Thus, I heard numerous working group discussions about 
the nature of democracy. In this vein, some of the usually less vocal Denton 
working group members strongly challenged a councillor when he suggested 
that working group deliberation was the essence of U-Decide, and that the 
voting event was, under some circumstances, not necessary. As they told him: 
‘It's not U-Decide, if there is no voting … it's only us here today – the 
Grand Voting Event is people getting together, the community coming 
out.’48 
Citizens’ enlarged visions would often be explicitly or by implication deliberative. 
Thus, in Newburn ward, the following suggestion was made: 
‘Maybe in the future [we should] fund just one or two events, but make 
the communities work as a community, and see what they come up with? 
And if our community doesn’t work, they don’t go in it. It’s as simple as 
that. If they can’t come down here and hold a meeting and say well we 
would like this, well, then they’re not worth bothering with.’49 
In Denton, the working group discussed a similar idea:  
‘It’s to come up with a project idea for the whole of Denton. It’s no good 
looking out of the window and saying I would like that there, you’ve got to 
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 Interview 31, joint interview, working group members, Newburn ward, 26/03/2009. 
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look at the whole scope of Denton, and say “we as a whole would like in 
Denton…”’ 
‘We would be stronger as a community, because you would get more 
people involved, because they would be hands on making decisions 
about their money and their taxes.’50 
While these views were not expressed by every member of the group, it is 
significant that movement in citizen views went markedly in this direction, 
towards a more collective and deliberative democratic process. Arguably, this 
occurred as their experience enlarged their understanding of what was possible 
(previously constrained by what is publicly understood to ‘be’ democracy).  
Clearly, opportunities for the same depth of learning were not present for voting 
day participants. However, there is some evidence that even a limited taste of 
direct democracy can have an effect – as illustrated by these ‘before and after’ 
quotes from a Newburn citizen who volunteers with an after-school club: 
‘To me, they should ask them to maybe request what they think they 
might need, and then a group of the people who are offering the money 
up sit down and say yes, well, you can have that … but that should be 
people who are completely outside, I mean people who are not involved 
in any kind of group, and that way everybody gets something.’51 
At the end of the day, I again asked the same participant how she was feeling: 
‘Oh, I’m very, very happy actually. I’ve completely – I didn’t understand at 
the beginning, to be truthful. I was just sort of roped in, to make up the 
numbers, but having seen it, it was fantastic … you’re getting more 
voices, I think, really. Alright, you might get one person representing 
maybe a group of people going along [to a meeting], but at the end of the 
day, it comes across as that one person’s view, at any meeting, I think, 
whereas this way, you have everybody. You hear everybody’s view, or 
vote. You know, it’s a better opinion for the area; I think it’s very good. 
Because obviously, once people know about it, they’ll be more inclined to 
get involved, and I think just basically try and get more done for their 
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area, knowing that they can have an input. I mean, I work in a local 
playgroup, and to be honest, I didn’t even think about it, it was [my fellow 
volunteer] that got me involved. So, maybe the next time, my group might 
be putting in a bid for it. So, you learn. I’ve learnt something by coming. 
It’s very good. Yes, I’ve enjoyed it.’52 
Similarly, for some the experience of making decisions was powerful, with 
younger participants in particular commenting on both the difficulty of this, and 
the responsibility of making good decisions.53 In addition, councillors, officers 
and citizens all felt that the increased visibility of democracy supported wider 
democratic learning, for example the plaques that told citizens what was funded 
through U-Decide (‘if one person has asked me “what’s U-Decide”, a hundred 
have’).54 The public presence of officers and councillors at voting events was 
understood to play a similarly informative role (‘I think on the day, suddenly all 
those new people started to realise that what was available was coming from a 
process which they probably didn’t fully understand … they started to maybe 
understand that there is a local democracy scene).55 When asked if they would 
do it again, across the 4 events, 95% of participants said yes. 
The development of more collective civic behaviour is a related outcome. 
Examples included organisational support from the Denton Bowling Club for a 
youth group fighting to save their community centre56 and a new community 
group made up of citizens who had individually suggested environmental 
improvements to their village.57 There was also a hint of ‘negotiated solidarity’ 
as in Porto Alegre (what one U-Decide organiser called ‘empathising with each 
other’s cause’).58 Thus, the Newburn working group valued the quality of 
collaboration across all the villages in the ward, instead of ‘the north-south 
divide’ they had feared.59 Importantly, finite resources still had to be divided 
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between the villages, but the relationships and support generated (as well as 
the transparency of the process) transformed the experience. Similarly, the 
introduction of a limited deliberative element meant that some participants were 
able to move beyond an initial negative reaction to understanding and 
supporting a project (for example, after some discussion, an elderly man moved 
from disparaging a youth rap project to voting positively for it).60 
For a Newburn councillor, it mattered that people saw their project ‘supported 
by the community’: 
‘People are voting for each other. It’s the wider community listening to 
other people in the area, and saying we’ll support this. We’ll support it.’61 
Here, again, we can see the practice of citizenship (or, to put it another way, the 
exercise of sovereignty) as community groups face their fellow citizens rather 
than the state. Thus, the community development team observed that proposals 
tended to do better when presented by citizens rather than officers: ‘you know 
the community are really keen they should be up there, members of the 
community, asking for it.’62 Significantly, these outcomes are generated by 
collective decision-making, not simply social interaction. 
Finally, as in Porto Alegre, there is evidence that PB developed citizen skills 
and knowledge. This included knowledge of their communities (‘you find out a 
lot what’s going on, what you don’t know about; I go to a lot of meetings [but] 
everything’s bad information’),63 learning about budgeting (‘it makes you know 
how to spend your money, and how to spend it wisely’),64 and communication 
skills (‘community development outcomes, the confidence-building, the 
experience of fundraising, the experience of doing presentations, learning to put 
your point across … brilliant outcomes’).65 Citizens also learned more about the 
cost of services. For example, at the March Newburn event there was an 
audible reaction to hearing that a wheelie bin fire cost £2000. Interestingly, a 
little knowledge prompted more questions, for example, asking whether that 
included wages they were already paying, or if it was entirely additional money 
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(the implication being that more opportunities for deliberation could enhance 
learning further).66 Evidence of increased confidence to participate came across 
particularly strongly, as a member of the Newburn working group exemplifies: 
‘It’s a learning process for somebody like me … to hear everybody’s 
point of view, and give your point of view as well. So, as the weeks have 
gone by and the months have gone by, and just to hear people talk and 
discuss, it was a learning process … for the last month or two I’ve been 
really in, and been able to put things forwards as well.’67 
As this quote makes clear, the deliberative elements of the process actively 
supported civic learning. While this was most noticeable in the working group 
setting (which was undoubtedly where the most meaningful deliberative 
experiences occurred), the introduction of even a few minutes discussion at the 
March events was widely felt to support learning, and so improve decision-
making.68 Seemingly, the experience of a more egalitarian democratic process 
not only encourages democratic engagement, but resources it too.  
Democratic learning was not, of course, wholly confined to citizens. The Social 
Policy team described how the views of officers and councillors could change: 
‘there’s been a big increase in the numbers of people inclined to support PB 
[which] doesn’t come through evaluation, or through strong political edicts; the 
more powerful stuff is about storytelling, experiencing it.’69 Thus, one ‘resistant’ 
councillor moved from maintaining that she was an ‘observer’ to actively 
supporting citizen engagement.70 Similarly, a community development officer, 
who had always been positive about the community development outcomes, 
described the evolution of her views on U-Decide’s democratic potential: 
‘I couldn’t see how that process, which was about funny money being 
spent on community projects, could translate to mainstream funding, and 
it took me a long time to see how that might happen. But now I can.’71 
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There was also evidence of officers learning how to make the process more 
meaningfully democratic. This occurred particularly in response to problems, 
such as issues with accountability in Denton (as one council officer described: ‘I 
love the fact that we increase our learning all the time … things happen that 
aren’t easy, but then that makes us better, because we address that and we try 
and redesign the process’).72 Likewise, a Denton councillor realised that if 
citizens were being asked to make decisions, they needed better access to 
information, and asked the police to share the maps showing anti-social 
behaviour hotspots with citizens.73 Of course, the council could share this 
information at any time; what is significant is that sharing power prompts it to 
happen.  
However, for some Denton working group members who had heard directly 
about Porto Alegre, the experience was tempered with disappointment that 
there hadn’t been more learning opportunities: 
‘At the beginning, to be quite honest, I thought it was wonderful, because 
this is the way it was put over to us, that people would be learning to 
budget, would be interested in finance … but somehow or other, that part 
just hasn’t come.’74 
Evidently, revitalising the democratic experience is a journey, and 
improvements can be made as limitations are identified. This is illustrated by the 
addition of a deliberative element between the two rounds. However, in the 
context of a deeply entrenched elitist model of democracy, there are also, of 
course, ideological impediments to building a genuinely transformative 
democratic process. Understanding the underlying tensions between the two 
democratic narratives can help explain the ways in which limits to civic learning 
are all too easily designed in (and incidentally, how some of the state responses 
to problems are shaped by that tension). In the following chapter, I examine 
how these dynamics were manifested in the case of U-Decide, but first I will 
reflect on what the evidence reveals about the location of sovereignty within the 
programme. 
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WHO DECIDES IN U-DECIDE? 
The quality of democratic learning suggests that U-Decide offers citizens a 
meaningful experience of sovereignty. This was explicitly understood by 
councillors, the official holders of sovereignty within a representative system: 
‘As councillors, we felt that it was for the public, by the public … therefore 
we took a back seat. We agreed in principle to take a back seat.’75 
‘You can’t say to the community, we’re giving you a free rein, and then 
suddenly decide, no, on this occasion, we want to do this … I didn’t want 
to pay lip service to it. I wanted it to be a community-led project.’76 
Thus, for one Denton councillor, handing decision-making control to citizens 
meant respecting decisions made within the process. He outlined what 
happened when a community group contacted him after the November voting 
event to ask for additional money: 
‘A few days later I got a phone call – “We need £800 pound” … I said, 
“Oh, hold on, you’ve just got a thousand pound, from U-Decide”. “Well, 
that’s what we’re ringing up for. We want to know if you’ll give us £800, 
because we only bid a thousand pound, because we knew we wouldn’t 
get it if it was £1,800. I said, “No, sorry, that’s part of the whole…” If 
they’d come to the ward committee afterwards, if they didn’t take part in 
U-Decide, we’d have helped them the best we could, but they cannot go 
there and say a thousand pound, it’s going to cost a thousand pound to 
run this, when it’s actually going to cost £1,800.’77 
The working groups also felt citizen sovereignty was the heart of U-Decide: 
‘I mean if we involve councillors, it takes away the actual PB, the 
participatory budgeting, because we are participating in it, not the 
councillors. Not even [the officers] are. It’s left to the tenants and the 
community to participate in how the budget’s spent. We are the ones that 
make the decisions.’78 
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77
 Interview 24, ward councillor, Denton, 27/01/2009. 
78
 Interview 30, group interview, Denton working group members, 26/03/2009. 
188 
 
‘The community decided, not the officials, yes, the councillors had a vote 
on the day, the same as the U-Decide committee had, but they didn’t 
make the final decision.’79 
The felt reality of this is illustrated by the ‘practices of citizenship’ described 
above. A member of Newburn working group explained the experience of 
sovereignty in this way:  
‘I think it makes you a bit more responsible, it makes you stand up and 
take a bit more responsibility for your area. And sort of think, well, what 
can we be doing?’80 
There were some notable exceptions to this practice of citizenship, in the sense 
of assuming responsibility for and within the decision-making space. Tellingly, I 
only observed this in the case of the more experienced ‘community reps’ on the 
Denton working group. Typically, these working group members would combine 
forthright verbal insistence on citizen control of the process with a high degree 
of criticism towards the council if problems arose. 
The most dramatic instance of this occurred at a sifting day in Denton, when a 
working group vote went decisively against the most vocal member of the 
group. This member announced loudly to the councillor present that ‘this is on 
your head, Chair; if this is challenged, you personally are responsible,’ with the 
result that he immediately insisted the vote had been illegitimate, and over-rode 
the decision.81 This illustrates how the picture is a little more complicated than 
the state simply exercising sovereignty against the wishes of citizens. 
There was a strong response from other working group members and council 
officers, with ‘behind the scenes’ arguing over the authority for the final decision 
(‘there’s been hell on’, as one officer later put it).82 While some working group 
members were, as one described, ‘disgusted’ by what had happened,83 officers 
tended to presume that they were challenging a working group decision, rather 
than a councillor’s decision. As a result, officers’ efforts to reinstate what was in 
fact a majority citizen decision further worsened relationships between officers 
                                                                
79
 Interview 17, working group member, Newburn ward, 28/11/2008. 
80
 Interview 31, joint interview, working group members, Newburn ward, 26/03/2009. 
81
 Participant observation record: sifting day, Denton ward, 12/03/2009. 
82
 Participant observation record: 18/03/2009. 
83
 Interview 28, working group member, Denton ward, 20/03/2009. 
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and the working group, and perceptions around sovereignty and power. In other 
words, both officers and citizens believed they were witnessing members of the 
other group using power in an unaccountable and undemocratic manner.  
Compromises over sovereignty were also apparent in the felt need to financially 
support ‘disappointed’ applicants. In some cases, this meant simply allocating 
the remaining ward funds to those projects, as one area coordinator described: 
‘Fortunately, we had 3 failures, three unsuccessful [projects], and they 
came to ward committee, were funded from the ward committee, so 
everybody was a winner at the end of the day.’84 
Not only does this effectively remove space for genuine dilemmas over scarce 
resources, but it had an ongoing effect on the exercise of citizen sovereignty. 
Consequently, a Newburn councillor explained that the ward committee couldn’t 
commit to running a U-Decide process with ward funds the following year, 
because financing the unsuccessful projects had made an underspend unlikely 
(this was the source of the funds for the 2008 process).85 
This brings us to the limits of citizen sovereignty within the U-Decide 
programme, which is that while citizens are effectively sovereign within the 
process, they are not sovereign over it. A growing awareness of this clearly 
prompted some of the ‘democratic discussions’ I described above, as this 
working group member explains: 
‘The way we stand at the moment, under the present financial situation, 
[they] can pull the plug on us any time. They can say well, we’re having 
no more U-Decide now … it’s that simple. We’re asking for security.’86 
The location of sovereignty over the programme was clear. As relations 
deteriorated with some members of the working group in Denton, a decision 
was made (informally, and in agreement with local councillors, but unbeknownst 
to the working group) that U-Decide would not happen in Denton again, 
because the working group were seen as unwilling to develop the process.87 
                                                                
84
 Interview 18, joint interview, area coordinators, 28/11/2008. 
85
 Interview 14, ward councillor, Newburn, 17/11/2008. 
86
 Interview 30, group interview, Denton working group members, 26/03/2009. 
87
 Participant observation record: informal interview, Social Policy Unit, 02/03/2009. 
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This example illustrates the limits to sovereignty dramatically, through control of 
access to the decision-making space.88 However, the same sense of state 
ownership of the process appeared to affect sovereignty within the decision-
making space as well. For example, a working group member observed that: 
‘Once the voting day is finished, we don’t hear anything else. We never 
see the accounts. … I would like to see where all the money went and 
how much it cost. Real costings.’89 
Similarly, officers evidently felt able to make decisions about the nature of the 
process, as they worked to make it more meaningfully democratic for voting day 
participants. Thus, the deliberative element of the voting process came as a 
surprise to the working groups, who felt ‘it should have been discussed.’90 While 
citizen views were generally positive (after the event) about how it had worked, 
it was noticeable that the Social Policy team appeared to consult rather than 
engage in dialogue with working group members over it, ending a conversation 
about it with the statement that ‘this will be a new feature in the voting from now 
on.’91 Furthermore, two evaluations were held for each voting event, one with 
working group members, one for officers only. Significantly, a discussion as to 
whether membership of the working groups should be time-limited was held at 
the officer-only evaluation of the Denton process.92 
Finally, there is an issue about what citizens are sovereign over. As I have said, 
U-Decide in Newcastle operated as a discrete space, which was essentially 
disconnected from wider decision-making and core funds. Thus, while it was 
evident that many PB advocates in Newcastle did want this to be a stage on the 
journey towards more fundamental decisions, in practice the scope of decision-
making referred to, as one area coordinator put it, ‘luxury items in a hamper as 
opposed to necessities.’93 In the following chapter, I examine different actors’ 
views on what ‘mainstreaming’ PB might look like, and reflect on the underlying 
democratic values they reveal. 
                                                                
88
 This case also illustrates the central role the working group played in officers’ and councillors’ 
understanding of the process. Issues with the working group led to the suspension of U-Decide 
for all Denton citizens. I explore the roots of this significant dynamic in the following chapter. 
89
 Interview 30, group interview, Denton working group members, 26/03/2009. 
90
 Interview 30, group interview, Denton working group members, 26/03/2009. 
91
 Participant observation record: Newcastle Council U-Decide evaluation workshop, 
30/04/2009. 
92
 Participant observation record: officer evaluation meeting, Denton, 03/12/2008. 
93
 Interview 18, joint interview, area coordinators, 28/11/2008. 
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CONCLUSION 
Newcastle’s U-decide programme provides strong evidence that the experience 
of a more egalitarian democratic process can act as a ‘school for citizenship’, 
despite the constraints of the UK context. Importantly, this supports the 
heartening conclusion that, as Baiocchi et al (2011) have suggested, PB does 
offer the potential to improve the democratic experience in a wide variety of 
political contexts; ‘ideal’ preconditions for empowerment are not required.  
While it is clear that effecting a genuine shift in sovereignty is a demanding task 
in the UK context, even comparatively limited opportunities to practice a more 
sovereign form of citizenship can be transformative. This is centrally relevant to 
understanding the nature of the democratic deficit in the UK. Evidence from the 
U-Decide programme suggests that such experiences offer genuine 
opportunities for building a more ‘mobilised citizenry capable of both 
cooperation and challenge’. This indicates that there is a strong value to 
creating more egalitarian decision-making spaces where possible, however 
constrained.  
While such processes (and consequently their outcomes) are very small scale, 
what matters is that they suggest possibilities. ‘Demand-side’ theories of the 
democratic deficit imply that engagement of this nature is difficult to create. The 
evidence presented here suggests that, on the contrary, alternative experiences 
of democracy do possess the potential to generate alternative outcomes. 
Nonetheless, it is also evident from the U-Decide case that such spaces are 
subject to, shaped, and ultimately constrained by ideological tensions over the 
nature of democracy. Thus, reviewing democratic outcomes has raised 
questions of accountability, citizen rights to participation, sources of democratic 
legitimacy and the nature of political will. In the next chapter, I explore these 
questions, and examine the ways in which citizen experiences of U-Decide was 
influenced by the struggle between competing democratic narratives. 
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CHAPTER 8 
DEMOCRATIC ASSUMPTIONS AND VALUES IN NEWCASTLE 
The U-Decide programme in Newcastle was actively championed by citizens, 
councillors and public officers; this breadth of support facilitated the creation of 
a genuinely different decision-making space within the representative system. 
However, while PB allows alternative democratic values to be expressed, 
participants and organisers do not, of course, start with a blank sheet. 
Democratic innovations are a site of struggle not only because of the competing 
agendas of different actors, but also because there are tensions between our 
acquired understandings of democracy and counter-cultural democratic values. 
This raises the important question of precisely what it is that different actors aim 
to achieve when they support PB.1 
To illustrate, a 1989 Brazilian survey (in the very early years of the fledgling 
democracy) found that 42% of respondents said that democracy was always 
better, 40% said either that dictatorship was better or that it made no difference, 
but between 71% and 86%2 said that the country would be better ‘if the people 
had the power to decide’ (Abers, 2000:53). This illustrates the ubiquity of 
conflating democracy with a limited structure associated with professional 
politicians – and the limitations of reading a lack of interest in ‘democracy’ as a 
lack of interest in collectively exercising sovereignty. As a Scarborough PB 
supporter and community activist from put it: ‘oh, I’ve no time for democracy; I 
just want my community to have a say about the decisions that affect us.’3  
The purpose of this chapter is to consider how these underlying values enhance 
or limit the potential for the kind of democratic outcomes discussed in the 
previous chapter, and reflect on the implications this has for creating a more 
egalitarian decision-making experience in the UK context. I aim to identify the 
threads of our two competing narratives, and examine the struggles for 
democratic meaning which lie behind the development of the U-Decide 
programme. Accordingly, I explore different actors’ motivations for initiating, 
                                                                
1
 Likewise, in chapter 5, I noted that PB has attracted interest from a wide variety of individuals 
and organisations embodying a variety of political viewpoints, and hence an equally wide variety 
of aims. 
2
 The variation depended on the age of the respondent. 
3
 Participant observation record: informal interview, Scarborough, 17/06/2010. 
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supporting or participating in U-Decide, alongside associated conceptions of 
human nature, representation and the state (as revealed through practice).  
This enables me to address two key questions. Firstly, the analysis I have 
presented so far suggests that an important aspect of the deficit may lie in the 
discrepancy between the nature of what is on offer as democratic engagement, 
and the kind of democracy that could inspire wider engagement. Through a 
review of democratic values expressed by citizens engaged with U-Decide, I 
consider whether the egalitarian model of democracy represented by PB 
accords more closely with citizens’ democratic values. Secondly, I consider the 
extent to which advocates of PB within the representative state are in practice 
engaged in an attempt to subvert the dominant context towards a more 
egalitarian model (reflecting on what their assumptions and actions reveal about 
their understanding of sovereignty). In this respect, the evidence suggests that 
while PB advocates engage positively with egalitarian democratic values, they 
operate in a context characterised by what I call ‘representative habits of mind’. 
This matters because it can affect the extent to which democratic activists 
succeed in enacting a different vision of democracy.  
I will begin with an overview of citizen assumptions and democratic values, as 
expressed through their participation in U-Decide. 
CITIZEN-DEMOCRATS  
When asked why they attended the Grand Voting Events, or the reasons they 
thought U-Decide was a good idea, participating citizens typically responded in 
terms of basic democratic values, as the following quotes illustrate: 
 ‘I like this basic democracy thing … and I think this is brilliant.’4 
‘You know, it’s local democracy in action, really. It’s excellent.’5 
‘It’s better this way because everyone gets their own input and opinion 
on how they would like the money spent.’6 
At the November events, 96% of participants, when asked, agreed that this was 
a good way to spend public money.7 Importantly, this was frequently connected 
                                                                
4
 Interview 19vi, Grand Voting Event, Denton ward, 29/11/2008. 
5
 Interview 12vii, Grand Voting Event, Newburn ward, 15/11/2008. 
6
 Interview 19iii, Grand Voting Event, Denton ward, 29/11/2008 
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by participants to changed outcomes and improved facilities as a result of better 
democratic decision-making,8 as summed up by a Newburn youth group: 
‘It’s better doing it this way, cos then your public’s voting, what the public 
want and that. It makes everyone happy, instead of people moaning.’9 
Citizens were also centrally involved in process planning, via the working 
groups. Here, there was a much greater degree of time-commitment, and a 
correspondingly greater depth of reflection. However, the primary motivating 
factors remained changed outcomes for their neighbourhoods and communities, 
and direct, binding involvement in decision-making (control over resources). 
Working group members understood changed outcomes to result from two 
causes. Firstly, some working group members emphasised the additional funds 
that the process brought into the ward (an aspect given a high profile by 
Newburn councillors in particular). They expressed this in social justice terms, 
relating to their perception of their neighbourhoods’ historically unmet needs: 
‘We’ve always said we never get nowt. That’s the cry. We get nowt. We 
don’t come under the classification for deprivation, although we do have 
deprivation in the ward. We have high elderly people, we’ve got high 
sickness rates, all that. But no, we don’t fit into the deprivation lists.’10 
However, going beyond the added resources, the degree to which changed 
outcomes were linked to greater democratic control was striking. As the views 
described in the last chapter indicate, the over-riding message was that citizen 
engagement in decision-making is felt to be worthwhile because it leads to 
different (and, in their view, more socially just) outcomes. This was explicitly 
rooted in support for a shift of sovereignty; U-Decide was valued because it 
‘takes power away from the big people’.11  
                                                                                                                                                                                            
7
 Participant observation record: Grand Voting Event, Newburn ward, 15/11/08 & Grand Voting 
Event, Denton ward, 29/11/08. At the March events, participants were asked to indicate the 
degree to which they agreed, from 1-5, rather than answering yes or no. The range of 
responses weren’t made public, only the average score: 4.64 in Newburn, 4.42 in Denton. 
8
 This is echoed in Kezia Lavan’s assessment that the transformatory potential of UK PB 
processes may be their strongest appeal for participants (Lavan, 2007:34). 
9
 Interview 23, youth group, Newburn ward, 26/01/2009. 
10
 Interview 26, group interview, Newburn working group members, 16/02/2009. 
11
 Interview 26, group interview, Newburn working group members, 16/02/2009. 
195 
 
For some of the more community-oriented working group members in Denton, 
the description of decision-making in Porto Alegre (given by the PB Unit) had 
stayed with them as inspiration and reference point:  
‘I think the idea was, when I first heard about it in Brazil, and the way it 
was happening in Brazil, I thought it was fantastic. Because it works 
differently over there to what it does here. Because there the money … 
can go back to the roads and things like that. That’s where they started. 
And we were trying to get our heads round how it would go here.’12 
This chimes with the increased democratic appetite and desire for security that I 
discussed in the previous chapter: 
‘We don’t want to be begging for money for this … we want to be part of 
the ward committee, part of the system. Not a gift. We don’t need to go 
cap in hand. So, the ward has £36,000, we [would] have 25%, oh boy, 
we’ve got £9000, what are we going to do with it, what do the people in 
the Denton ward want done?’13 
Significantly, the only contradictory view was expressed by one of the 
‘experienced reps’ in Denton. This working group member, while very 
antagonistic towards the council and vocal about citizen capacity, did not want 
to see citizens engaged with ‘mainline stuff’.14 Arguably, this is a view that 
accords with the ‘cult of expertise’ inherent in the existing system, from 
someone who regarded themselves as very much part of that culture.15  
Citizen motivations in general therefore reflect an affinity with the idea of 
democracy as participatory and inclusive rather than elitist. This is reinforced by 
citizen views of their communities’ capacity to be involved in decision-making. 
Local knowledge was frequently referenced (alongside its lack within existing 
decision-making systems). There was also a strong sense of the innate capacity 
of people to make sensible and prudent decisions. PB was frequently described 
as an opportunity, not only to take part in decision-making, but to prove that the 
people are capable: 
                                                                
12
 Interview 30, group interview, Denton working group members, 26/03/2009. 
13
 Interview 30, group interview, Denton working group members, 26/03/2009. 
14
 Interview 33, working group member, Denton ward, 02/04/2009. 
15
 This echoes the conclusions of Ganuza et al (2014:2277), who have noted that PB can 
generate a conflict between the old and new protagonists because the former have to share 
political space.  
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‘That’s what we need … to prove that the people out here, who may be 
people on the dole, they may be only householders to the people in the 
Civic, but we’re just as intelligent and probably have done just as good a 
job in life as they do. And we needed to prove that.’16 
Looking back to the American revolutionary debates, this coheres much more 
with the Anti-Federalist view of the people than the Federalist perspective; 
citizen participation in decision-making should be facilitated, not contained. It is 
noteworthy that the idea of citizen capacity which emerged in talking to working 
group members was clearly about potential, not necessarily proficiency. There 
was a sense that people have not always had the opportunity to develop skills, 
and that this needs support. Both voting day participants and working group 
members referenced a desire to learn about local decision making, finances 
and spending wisely. Thus, there was a strong sense that we are capable of 
more than we realise (which was understood to contribute to others’ reluctance 
to get involved). For some, this was based on their own personal journeys: 
‘You tell them and you say, “well, why don’t you come?” “Oh, no, not for 
me.” But we never thought anything like that was for us, did we?’17 
Similarly, the belief that people possess collective potential was fundamental to 
citizens’ understanding of democratic process, and to the value they saw in PB. 
The majority of working group members and participants explicitly valued the 
role of the face-to-face voting events in bringing communities together. While it 
was clear that any shared community activity would have been welcome, both 
participants and working group members referred positively to the opportunity 
for communities to work together, rather than simply being together: 
‘If you want more working together, achievement and a better life for 
everyone, to actually find ways of doing that together, and you know this 
is one of those big, big opportunities, to actually come together and 
forget about all this crap, and you know, you come from here, you come 
from there, you know, you’re rich, you’re poor, you’re anything, but really 
work together.’18 
                                                                
16
 Interview 33, working group member, Denton ward, 02/04/2009. 
17
 Interview 26, group interview, Newburn working group members, 16/02/2009. 
18
 Interview 19vi, Grand Voting Event, Denton ward, 29/11/2008. 
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This was reflected in some working group members’ increasing desire for the 
process to take a collective rather than individual form, as their experience of 
participatory democracy grew (described in the last chapter), as well as in 
debates over practicalities. More people could attend (and vote) if the seating 
was laid out in rows, but working group members emphasised the importance of 
the table layout in allowing people to discuss the presentations, demonstrating a 
practical commitment to deliberation (as one Newburn citizen explained: ‘that’s 
what we want, the talking and discussion about it, make people think’).19 
Importantly, the commitment to collective process explicitly didn’t preclude 
conflict. Citizens referenced both the possibility of conflict, and its relevance to 
the need for collective and participatory decision-making: 
‘It’s the people that are deciding, the people in the area. They’re having a 
say. I mean, somebody over there might think that’s an awful idea, so 
they’ve got a say.’20 
Commitment to collective action coexisted with a strong thread across the 
working groups that both the opportunities and inclination for community activity 
appear to have reduced in recent years, and need support to be rebuilt. A great 
many working group members focused on the difficulties of involving new and 
particularly younger people in community action. Interestingly, descriptions of 
this situation echoed the ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ idea that I raised in chapter 4:  
‘We’re turning more like the Americans every day.’21 
‘There aren’t many communities left nowadays, I don’t think. I think a lot 
of the communities got broken down and I think they need to be, start to 
be building them back up again.’22 
‘[They’ll] give the money. But they’ll not give their time. Expect to be paid. 
It’s sad. But it’s the way the country’s going, isn’t it? Do nowt for nowt. 
And it worries me, cos when we all pop our clogs, god knows what’ll 
happen. We’ve got to try and encourage the youngsters.’23 
                                                                
19
 Interview 31, joint interview, working group members, Newburn ward, 26/03/2009. 
20
 Interview 19iv, Grand Voting Event, Denton ward, 29/11/2008. 
21
 Interview 26, group interview, Newburn working group members, 16/02/2009. 
22
 Interview 28, working group member, Denton ward, 20/03/2009. 
23
 Interview 17, working group member, Newburn ward, 28/11/2008. 
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As the quotes above illustrate, this was not seen as a fixed aspect of ‘human 
nature’. Indeed, for many, addressing this issue was a significant goal of PB. 
Working group members clearly understood their fellow citizens to be capable 
of being motivated, even if not currently motivated. Thus, the view of human 
nature implied by the egalitarian democratic narrative – civically capable and 
possessing the potential for cooperation and collectivity – chimes with the view 
expressed through engagement with PB processes. 
As we saw in chapter 3, this understanding of human nature gives rise to a view 
of the state in which citizens are able to contain the government’s tendency 
towards abuse of power, rather than the view associated with more elitist 
systems, which emphasises the state’s role in containing the excesses of the 
people. Accordingly, the egalitarian democratic state is built on close 
representative relationships, characterised by trust, two-way communication 
and responsiveness. The democratic values described above were not 
presented in a vacuum, but often with direct reference to the existing system:  
‘They talk, you listen, and that’s to me the end of it. But this thing has 
been different; it’s been different altogether.’24 
‘It’s about people taking control … taking ownership of where they live, 
and where they belong, and being able to make the decisions, because 
nobody in the past has ever asked me or any of the people on my estate, 
what they thought of where they lived.’25 
A picture emerges of the state as a distant entity, which does not welcome 
citizens in, listen or respond. These statements were typical: 
‘If the council is running it, people don’t want to know. They mistrust the 
councillors. People’s perceptions are, if it’s the council, it’s already 
settled.’26 
‘I sometimes doubt whether I have much say, but never mind … well, if 
they make decisions here, that’s a better idea than somebody sort of 
sitting in an office … I’m a sceptic, I’m afraid.’27 
                                                                
24
 Interview 12ix, working group member, Grand Voting Event, Newburn ward, 15/11/2008. 
25
 Interview 28, working group member, Denton ward, 20/03/2009. 
26
 Participant observation record: Newcastle Council U-Decide evaluation workshop, Denton 
ward, 30/04/2009. 
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Moreover, if you do want to engage despite the perception that you and your 
views aren’t welcome, state structures are not seen as either easy to 
understand or negotiate: 
‘[If it wasn’t U-Decide] it would go into the mysterious pot, where nobody 
knows where it goes.’28 
Ward committees were described as ‘officious’,29 ‘too official’30 and poorly 
attended; the ‘usual channels’ as ‘a bureaucratic set-up that has to be gone 
through … that seems to take forever.’31 This impression was reinforced by 
many negative descriptions of councillors, as ‘professional politicians’ who ‘don’t 
know what to say to you’,32 and who are generally absent unless it’s election 
time. Interestingly, length of service was consistently referred to as a negative 
(‘in so long that really they’d lost contact with the community’),33 an attitude 
which echoes both the Anti-Federalist and Porto Alegrean desire to restrict 
terms of office. Lastly, the idea I explored in chapter 4, that the UK system is 
inherently power-hoarding, would doubtless ring true: 
‘The top and bottom is, do you think they would be eager enough to let 
us have some of that pot?’ 
 ‘No, when it comes to power, no. You’d need to fight for every minute.’34 
Meaningfully engaging people in decision-making is therefore not only 
understood to be good democracy, but, crucially, better democracy. However, 
despite their critical analysis of the status quo, for most working group members 
this did not mean citizens replacing existing decision-makers; rather, it meant 
working together, bringing different and valuable sets of knowledge and 
experience.35 Thus, the idea of closer proximity between the state and citizens, 
integral to PB in Porto Alegre and the wider egalitarian democratic tradition, 
resonated strongly (as I described in the previous chapter). Accordingly, 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
27
 Interview 12viii, working group member, Grand Voting Event, Newburn ward, 15/11/2008. 
28
 Interview 30, group interview, Denton working group members, 26/03/2009. 
29
 Interview 12x, working group member, Grand Voting Event, Newburn ward, 15/11/2008. 
30
 Interview 17, working group member, Newburn ward, 28/11/2008. 
31
 Interview 12vii, working group member, Grand Voting Event, Newburn ward, 15/11/2008. 
32
 Interview 26, group interview, Newburn working group members, 16/02/2009. 
33
 Interview 30, group interview, Denton working group members, 26/03/2009. 
34
 Interview 30, group interview, Denton working group members, 26/03/2009. 
35
 As I have discussed, there were a very small number of experienced ‘community reps’ who 
were more antagonistic towards (and often unwilling to see any good in) the council. However, 
this was not a typical view. 
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aspirational views of the representative relationship emphasised councillors 
who made an effort to get to know people, and who listen: 
‘I think, personally, I’ve always said anything going on with the 
government, our local MPs should be coming out and saying well, what 
do you think of this, and going by what we say. Not just what he thinks. 
And I think the councillors should be doing that. But it doesn’t work that 
way when you’re a councillor [because] you’re in a political party.’36 
Overall, the values inherent in citizen views and actions (as expressed within 
U-Decide) accord most consistently with the egalitarian democratic narrative, 
while views on what they have learned as ‘democracy’ are more critical. The 
evidence presented here does not suggest a citizenry which is apathetic, but 
one whose disengagement is rooted in a recognisable critique of the existing 
system; a citizenry which is, in fact, deeply receptive to the prospect of better 
politics and better outcomes.37 
The last chapter assessed the extent of democratic possibilities offered by PB 
processes of the type witnessed in Newcastle. In the remainder of this chapter, I 
relate these opportunities and limits to underlying struggles for democratic 
meaning within the state itself, in order to ask more precisely what democratic 
values the citizen appetite for more egalitarian democracy meets within the 
parameters of a process such as U-Decide. 
U-DECIDE AS EGALITARIAN DEMOCRACY? 
While there were competing narratives at work in the implementation of 
U-Decide, the main drive for its core advocates (officers and councillors) was 
clearly in keeping with the egalitarian tradition. Arguably, this is what elicited the 
response described above. The Social Policy team characterised the three 
elements of their motivation for the work as follows: ‘democratic renewal, 
community outcomes, and delivery of the projects and ideas themselves … if 
                                                                
36
 Interview 17, working group member, Newburn ward, 28/11/2008. Interestingly, the tendency 
of the party system to inhibit the representative relationship (discussed in chapter 4) is explicitly 
referenced here. 
37
 While the evidence I have presented here relates to citizens who have responded to the 
opportunity for engagement through U-Decide, and therefore cannot be simplistically presumed 
to hold true for all citizens, it is clear that the egalitarian democratic values inherent in the 
programme elicited a response from a much greater number of citizens than the alternative 
opportunities for ‘active citizenship’ offered within the local representative system. Thus, 
U-Decide can be said to suggest a more fruitful coherence with citizen democratic values.  
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you can revitalise democracy then services will become better’.38 Their 
democratic motivation was expressed directly, and echoes citizen views: 
‘I think it’s the right thing to do. I don’t think you can leave big decisions 
up to a minority … decisions that affect communities, and have the 
greatest impact on communities, should be made by the community, 
rather than by somebody who might not have the knowledge that a 
community has.’39 
Many of the councillors who chose to run U-Decide processes in their ward 
expressed their motivations in equally clear-cut terms: 
‘I believe in community politics, all the way along. I don’t see myself as 
somebody that’s elected to the ward and then goes back to the ward and 
say, “well, times are hard, so we can give you this, we can give you that.” 
I believe that the voice should come from the outside, to the centre.’40 
‘People who are affected by decisions by other bodies should take those 
decisions, because it affects their quality of life, how they live their lives, 
their community – they have an absolute right as far as I’m concerned’.41 
Furthermore, the officers leading the programme felt the depth of political 
support for the programme at strategic level was genuine:  
‘You look at some local authorities … you’ve got to have PB done by 
2012 and we’ll tick that off – but it’s not their mission. I do think that 
Newcastle can give out more of a mission statement about empowering 
communities. We’re not relying on individuals to support our work.’42 
This is illustrated by the coherence between the democratic agenda of the 
council officers developing the programme and that of the executive. Cllr John 
Shipley, the Leader of Newcastle Council, listed three motivations which echo 
those of the Social Policy team: 
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‘One is to engage with residents directly … so that the councillors are not 
seen to be aloof and away, separate, but actually as part and parcel of 
their neighbourhoods and communities.  Secondly, it’s to get better 
decision-making as well … it is much better if you engage more people in 
making decisions about what are priorities.  The third reason is that it 
gives a focus for neighbourhoods themselves, for residents in those 
neighbourhoods to come together to meet each other and to discuss 
their priorities … a structure that enables the people to come together is 
also very helpful in the building of sustainability within neighbourhoods.’43 
These motivations are underpinned by an unmistakable belief in citizen capacity 
and collective potential. Core U-Decide advocates repeatedly spoke of their 
confidence in citizens’ decision-making skills (specifically the ability to budget, 
and to empathise with and consider the needs of others),44 and willingness to 
engage, provided they ‘know it will make a difference to their community’.45 
Similarly, as for citizens, the collective nature of the process was understood to 
be essential: ‘seeing people grow within these events, from being silent, to 
being “this is what I want for my community.”’46 Thinking collectively was 
understood to come through acting collectively: ‘a sense of collective endeavour 
– rather than that of an individual organisation … it breaks down the barriers.’47 
The faith in citizen capacity was underlined by an extensive commitment to 
supporting citizen learning, as summed up by a Denton councillor: 
‘My view is, if the people of Brazil, with all the difficulties they have in 
Brazil, can cope with this process, why on earth can’t the people of 
Newcastle cope with it? … The challenge for the city council and the 
councillors and the officers would be an increase in communication. 
People can only make sensible – well they can make decisions even if 
they don’t have the best information – but the challenge for the City 
Council would be to say, right, we’ve got to look at how we communicate 
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with residents, let them know what is happening, why it’s happening, how 
much it costs, where the money’s coming from, and what other options 
there are for the money. There is still a large perception among members 
of the public that the council can do whatever it likes, that the council is 
omnipotent, and that it has a bottomless pit of cash … My experience 
has been, once people understand the process, they’re much more 
realistic about what can be done and what can’t be done.’48 
Accordingly, opportunities for officers to share information about legal and 
financial parameters of decision-making were built into the process, for example 
ensuring that voting participants understood the source of the money and the 
reasons why particular suggestions weren’t eligible.49 Importantly, there was a 
widespread belief that increased skills and understanding would facilitate an 
increased will and ability to make bigger decisions: 
‘It spreads up, doesn’t it? if you’re making smaller decisions about 
smaller pots of money that are based in your experience of services and 
your environment, and then you scale that up to a commissioning model 
that’s maybe about more strategic decisions, but you can recognise a 
thread there between what you’ve been doing on your Saturday, at this 
big event, and voting, and then these bigger decisions.’50 
This illustrates the fact that U-Decide organisers embraced the egalitarian 
democratic goal of a closer relationship between citizens and the state. One 
council officer articulated this powerfully: 
‘Is this our core business? Hell, yes! … We should be about making 
great relationships with our community. It is core business. In the early 
days, that expression ‘value for money’ used to really piss me off. 
Because, if you weren’t doing this, what would you be doing?’51 
Thus, there was an egalitarian motivation across officers and councillors directly 
involved in supporting U-Decide, which was relatively coherent with the views 
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expressed by citizens. As I outlined above, for citizens this was closely 
connected to a critique of the outcomes of the existing system (as in Porto 
Alegre). However, for officers and councillors, attitudes to the status quo 
appeared to be a little more varied.  
For officers supporting PB as a core element of their role, the commitment to a 
different form of democracy was absolutely rooted in a critique of the status 
quo. However, importantly, this tended to be a critique of the existing 
democratic process, rather than its outcomes. Thus, officers described seeing 
councillors ‘take decisions without reference to wider needs, decisions that 
wouldn’t arise in an open public meeting and wouldn't get supported even if it 
came up.’52 There was a particular concern over the extent of power wielded by 
officers rather than councillors, which officers advocating PB saw as 
undemocratic (though they also recognised that this relative powerlessness 
could make councillors protective of what power they have left).53 These officers 
recognised the extent of citizen lack of faith in the council as both reasonable 
and democratically problematic, and aimed to address this practically: 
‘They were so impressed that they got a letter from us really quickly, and 
we said we were going to be somewhere and we were there. She was 
absolutely shocked, and I was like, well, there you go, it’s not difficult.’54 
However, the specific nature of this systemic critique has one very significant 
implication. As I have said, U-Decide existed as a discrete space which was not 
structurally connected to wider decision-making mechanisms. Arguably, the 
absence of an explicit outcomes-based critique (in other words, a weak social 
justice motivation) made it easier for state actors to maintain a (comfortable) 
focus on the new, improved (but separate) space as complementary to 
unchanged control over existing resources, instead of being clearly understood 
as modelling a proposed alternative. 
This appeared to facilitate an emphasis on community development through U-
Decide as an end in itself, rather than as a route to changed outcomes: 
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‘To me the spin-offs are almost more important than the motivation for 
doing it. And this thing about looking at ways to ensure that our 
communities are cohesive is much bigger to me, than what we do. It’s a 
process, which spends public money, but which brings communities 
together, and you know when you see those spin-offs … like people 
saying “I look around my community, and I voted for that, and I voted for 
that,” that’s massive, and when you get in a room together, and a group 
of scouts will go along and do something with a group of older people … 
properly bringing communities together so that they know one another, 
they empathise with each other’s cause – it binds communities.’55 
Similarly, beyond the discrete arena of PB, a weakened social justice motivation 
can act as an impetus towards ‘demand-side’ solutions to the democratic deficit 
(despite a ‘supply-side’ critique). Thus, without an explicit goal of changing the 
mainstream system itself, the hopes for broader political change can tend 
towards a focus on citizen engagement, rather than state behaviour: 
‘I think it’s about seeing the value of PB as both a community 
development tool and a way of really increasing the involvement of 
people in the democratic process.’56 
‘It’s giving people the power, seeing the buzz, the buzz of touching 
people that don’t normally engage with the council, and that’s what I love 
more than anything.’57 
‘I think we give people a set of skills, by taking part in it, and a little peek 
of what budgeting is about, and then if they wish, they can go on to 
bigger things, making bigger decisions, and quite often people who aren’t 
active in their communities, which is the lion’s share of people at the 
starting point, as a result of that, become active citizens, and then can 
take control of the bigger thing … we should be about empowering our 
residents to make sure that they can have a relationship with us.’58 
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While citizens valued democratic learning and community development 
outcomes too, this is a very different emphasis to a primary focus on changed 
outcomes (note the orientation of empowering residents to have a relationship 
with the council, rather than vice versa). 
As is evident from the views of citizens, this dynamic did not compromise the 
experience of U-Decide itself – as an extra-systemic empowering democratic 
experience. It is important to be clear. U-Decide unambiguously represents a 
distinctive and more egalitarian decision-making space, the inherent values of 
which evidently cohere strongly with citizen democratic values, and which in 
itself can offer valuable democratic learning outcomes, as the previous chapter 
described. Nonetheless, as a separate space to the existing system, it does not 
necessarily offer a challenge to existing decision-making mechanisms. I 
suggest that this has implications for the programme’s broader development, 
and therefore its potential impact on wider decision-making processes (and 
accordingly, on its utility as a response to the democratic deficit). 
This is not, however, to imply that the Social Policy team were lacking in 
broader democratic ambition. On the contrary, the views of organisers reflected 
the increased citizen appetite for democratic engagement: 
‘Small decisions will wear thin … people realise there are bigger 
decisions to make and they would like to get involved.’59 
For them, U-Decide ultimately had to be ‘about reshaping how existing budgets 
are delivered,’60 not least because ‘it isn't sustainable to go on spending money 
that doesn't exist in someone's budget’.61 
My point is rather that the discrete nature of the U-Decide programme, without a 
clearly articulated critique of the existing system as failing to deliver, arguably 
restricted its potential impact. While U-Decide organisers (and committed 
advocates amongst their wider colleagues) were very aware of sceptical 
attitudes towards the programme, tackling this was frequently approached 
through the desire to demonstrate citizen capacity (as here: ‘there’s still an 
element of people, a lot of people out there that think the council knows best; 
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we’re the experts … and they don’t see, you know, the quality of decision-
making here can be really, really good’),62 rather than through challenging the 
state’s assumptions (arguably, complacency) about the existing system. In 
other words, organisers recognised that U-Decide offered an intrinsic challenge 
to the professional identity of some officers,63 but they did not articulate it as an 
overt challenge to the democratic legitimacy of the system as a whole. 
This meant that it was possible for a wider circle of council officers in Newcastle 
to fully support U-Decide as a ‘demand-side’ solution to the democratic deficit, 
despite not sharing a fundamental, egalitarian critique of the existing system. 
This included officers whose engagement would be vital for the mainstream 
development of U-Decide, for example, area coordinators. Thus, active support 
could combine with an equally firm defence of representative democracy (which 
entailed clearly articulated limits to the development of the programme): 
‘We want people to be engaged, participate, be involved in decision-
making processes, the democratic process. It’s absolutely everything that 
our jobs are about, so absolutely we do.  It’s really good when you see 
people being, you know, from an idea, going all the way through the 
process, looking at the pot of money. Really, that’s what you want for the 
wider public, isn’t it? For everyone to have a good grasp on budgets, 
budget controls, priorities, for the city, and all the rest of it. It fits perfectly. 
I like it, it’s great … [but] then you go back to that old argument of the 
Council saying “well look, I was voted in, and my mandate is to do that,” 
and if that’s what we encourage, do we start encouraging a  disaffected 
local politician who’s spent time canvassing, and everything else, up to a 
proper, a fully democratic election, and then suddenly that power is taken 
away because we’re introducing a PB process, and then local people 
decide what their priorities are as opposed to… what PB can’t do; it 
cannot replace the decision-making or the support by a local politician.’64 
This dynamic was echoed, albeit in a somewhat different way, by the (elected) 
executive supporters of the programme. As I have said, their commitment to the 
programme was not in doubt. The Leader, Cllr Shipley, was unequivocal: ‘you 
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can’t do everything out of this Civic Centre; it’s not possible – you end up with 
poorer decisions.’65 U-Decide was intended to encourage a more inclusive 
political approach, with the explicit aim of addressing the democratic deficit, as 
the Cllr Shipley explains: 
‘The push has come from us but I think it just reflects a general 
awareness of all politicians that voting is going down in elections; 
younger people aren’t engaging in the same way. Maybe this concept of, 
you know, the ballot box and that’s your involvement, you go and vote 
and that’s it, that actually, you just have to have a whole set of other 
ways in which people personally can engage at an individual level, and I 
think that’s what one of the things U-Decide is about.’66 
However, the underlying systemic critique at strategic level was not a critique of 
representative democracy as such, but rather, of the extent to which the system 
operates as a technocracy rather than a democracy: 
‘Most of these decisions are actually being made by officers, anyway, so 
it doesn’t impact upon councillors – it’s one of the little understood facts 
of local government, some 97% of all decisions are being made by 
officers on delegated powers and much of  the U-Decide money that was 
being disbursed actually would never have got as far as a ward 
committee, it would have come through different bits of the council, so 
what U-Decide does is it takes funds of money, wraps them up from 
several directorates and produces a pot, and I find that very welcome as 
an approach.’67 
Thus, U-Decide is meant to foster a culture shift for officers as opposed to an 
overhaul of the system, as the administration’s first Leader describes: 
‘By and large, the City Council gets it right most of the time, first time, but 
at the periphery, where it matters most, in the communities, it tends to 
get it wrong every time, and doesn’t seem to learn, mainly because a lot 
of officers are not used to talking and dealing with the public. They don’t 
know how to do that, and they regard it as an ordeal to have to come to 
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ward committees and explain what’s happening in a particular process … 
a lot of officers working for the authority and for public bodies like the 
police, like all sorts of other bodies, are not used to coming and 
explaining; they’re used to making decisions.’68 
The implication here is that the system produces generally good decisions, but 
is markedly less good at communicating with citizens about them. Thus, the 
administration was distinctly less critical of elected members (Cllr Shipley was 
‘not sure that it will do anything much in terms of building stronger relationships 
with local councillors than already exists because they’re already quite strong 
now within wards’).69 Executive members were instead keen to articulate how 
U-Decide supports the position of ward councillors, and explicitly, how it 
supports representative democracy itself: 
‘There is a direct connection between the councillor elected through a 
ballot box and the residents who elected that councillor, so I see a 
contract, you see, between those – I think I have a contract with the 
electorate as a whole who elected me, not just the people who voted for 
me, because some didn’t, but there’s a contract – and one of the ways 
that you deliver that contract, is by having a local structure within your 
ward whereby people can continue to engage with you.’70 
In this view, participatory structures both support councillors in being better 
informed, and help citizens develop democratic skills (which councillors are 
understood to already have):  
‘Councillors are pretty good at [decision-making], actually, because they 
have a whole ward view, whereas you often find that people within a 
smaller area have only their smaller neighbourhood view – but then this 
all would enable more people to get together to understand.’71 
Representative democracy continues to be seen as the ideal form of democratic 
expression. An important goal for U-Decide was therefore to resource more 
traditional engagement:  
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‘How do you organise elections that are meaningful, when people don’t 
know each other well? Parish councils often have problems filling their 
total number; they often don’t have enough candidates to stand in an 
election. Well, the more you have structures like this, the more people 
get to know each other, and the more elections you have.’72 
This is not to suggest that the changes Newcastle Council aimed to make were 
minor. Their approach entailed a genuine challenge to both officers and 
councillors, as they recognised: 
‘They are used to a situation where the councillors decide, sitting with the 
officers, what gets done where, and this is a different approach … some 
councillors think, well, just a minute, first of all, we have to share 
influence with these unelected people on the LSP, and now you’re 
expecting us to share our influence locally, through participatory 
budgeting and so on. But actually the ones who’ve got any sense at all 
will see it as absolutely part and parcel of what they are supposed to do 
as local councillors, recognising local priorities, and bringing together the 
resources that are available and the council partners, agencies, to deliver 
them, and to maximise the opportunities for people to influence not just 
the priorities but how those priorities are met.’73  
Critically, the executive needed to convince councillors of the value of the 
approach, because (as the last chapter demonstrated) control remains in the 
hands of the councillors. PB is presented as a tool, ‘a very liberating tool, an 
empowering tool,’ which councillors are encouraged to use. To be clear, the 
executive were powerfully in favour of councillors using PB, out of a manifestly 
genuine commitment to more inclusive decision-making, but they stopped short 
of requiring councillors to use it. Cllr Faulkner, Deputy Leader and executive 
member overseeing the programme, explains: 
‘We’re trying to encourage reasonable flexibility. So you get your money 
… if you want to put the money to one side to spend a bigger amount 
next year, you can – you know, within reason. And if you want to spend 
the money, or a chunk of it, on PB initiatives, you can. If you want to 
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spend the money in the usual way, you can. But my guess is that PB will 
increasingly be used by wards to determine that expenditure.’74 
U-Decide was presented as part of a core localism agenda (the desire to 
increase control over resources at ward level). In this vein, it was envisaged as 
an important option on each ward’s menu of engagement choices (accordingly, 
‘it should be written into role descriptions for councillors to maximise 
opportunities for the community to be empowered, including, as an example, 
PB’),75 rather than a model for spending mainstream resources, as the Social 
Policy team envisaged. To the extent that the executive considered a more 
embedded transformation of decision-making, this was representative in form: 
‘The elephant in the room is, would we ever change the fact that the 
councillors make the decisions, and my answer is yes, my answer is that 
I could see in three to five years’ time a whole different pattern across the 
council. In my ward, where there are 5 neighbourhoods, I, if people 
wanted it, I could see some kind of neighbourhood council, or community 
council, with elected reps, in one or more parts of the ward if they wanted 
it. And I could see that some might be more up for it than others.’76 
The executive’s plans for the future of U-Decide, while reflecting a desire to 
embed PB, stopped short of a transfer of sovereignty. This illustrates how (and 
explains why) U-Decide failed to meaningfully combine representative and 
participatory democracy, despite a high level of political will – to put it in terms 
of the favourable context features identified in the comparative PB literature, 
how and why political will did not translate into fiscal and operational autonomy. 
In view of the executive’s fundamental commitment to representative 
democracy, this apparent contradiction makes sense, and provides a context for 
the limited transfer of sovereignty referred to in the previous chapter.  
Before considering how these views on sovereignty were enacted in practice, I 
will briefly contrast the executive’s position with the systemic critique expressed 
by some ward councillors. Interestingly, this emerged as much more forthright 
and comprehensive than that of either officer PB advocates, or their own 
political leadership. 
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My focus here is specifically on non-careerist local councillors, who are rooted 
in their communities and who came to formal politics through a personal history 
of activism (for example, struggles to improve their neighbourhoods, or trade 
unionism). Their stories suggest that they were frustrated with the outcomes 
that the system produced for their communities, and they wanted to make a 
difference (a social justice motivation, essentially). The public narrative of 
democracy suggests that power is held by politicians, and if the outcomes are 
wrong, then we must have elected the wrong politicians. As I discussed in 
chapter 4, this is the system’s ‘myth of accountability’ – if the politicians don’t 
deliver what the people want, then the people can elect new politicians who will 
deliver what they want. In community-based, non-careerist local politicians, 
therefore, we can see individuals who want to be that difference, as one spelled 
out explicitly: ‘I’m only in it because the system stinks; that’s all I’m in it for.’77 
There are, of course, a wide variety of motivations to stand for election; 
however, it is not surprising that there should be a higher incidence of what we 
might call activist-politicians amongst those actively supporting PB. 
Accordingly, the ward councillors most passionate about U-Decide tended to 
share a strong critique of the existing system. Here, a Denton councillor clearly 
espouses a non-elitist democratic approach: 
‘Some of the councillors, both sides, they’ll not know who their ward 
manager is. You know, they’ll not have a mobile contact for them. I’ve got 
them in here. Some of them don’t even know the neighbourhood 
response team, or the street cleaners’ names. Honest. Don’t know who 
the wardens are. Don’t know how to contact them or nothing. Cos they 
just run for – they like to be in the big Civic Centre, the big I-am, getting 
theirselves in the paper.’78 
The critique also incorporated the culture of expertise which restricted 
democratic control. A Newburn councillor, who bemoaned the ‘jargon, which 
sometimes we as councillors don’t understand,’ described a well-attended 
community meeting about the closure of a local school, in which he symbolically 
sat with his constituents, rather than on the panel: 
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‘We had councillors sitting at the bench, and I was sitting in the audience, 
and they said “Come and sit here.” And I said “No, I’m not here to sit and 
look upon people. I’m part of this community. This is the community I 
represent, all these people here.” I’m sitting with about two or three 
hundred people, in the middle of a hall … and [I said], “The officers sitting 
here tonight, you don’t know a thing about the area, you don’t know 
what’s happening, but you’re coming with your proposals, you’re pushing 
it forwards to councillors like us, to go ahead and rubber-stamp it.”’79 
Unsurprisingly, these councillors saw citizens’ lack of faith in the council as both 
understandable, and justified: 
‘You know, they’ll come to you with a complaint, and you’ll say, well, 
who’ve you reported that to – “I haven’t reported to naebody, I’m just 
reporting to you.” “So, you haven’t gone through the proper channels?” 
“Waste of bloody time.” That’s the first thing they say to me. It’s a waste 
of time. I know where they’re coming from; it’s the truth … I try to make 
things better.’80 
This view of the state was combined with a recurring sense of disappointment, 
that no matter how hard you work, or how much you want to make a difference, 
the system defeats you (as acknowledged by the former Leader of the Council: 
‘some of my colleagues are saying, if I’d realised it was going to be as 
frustrating as this, I would never have stood for election in the first place’).81 
This rang true in Newburn and Denton: 
‘It’s a big learning curve going in to be a councillor, a hell of a learning 
curve, cos I know when I went in, I thought, wa-hey! I’m ganna start, I’ll 
do this, and I’ll do that, and I’ll clear all that rubbish, and … everything we 
wanted as a community. “Sorry, councillor, you can’t do that.” “Sorry, 
councillor, you can’t do that.” “Ooh, sorry, councillor, you can’t do that.” 
Well, what’s the point of being a councillor? What can I do?’82 
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‘They hate councillors, a lot of them. They think we’re on about 35 grand 
a year, man, [that] we get everything for nothing. That’s the thing. I 
mean, the hours I put in. I did 13 hours yesterday; I’m out till half five 
tonight. It’s like that 5 days a week. You can’t blame them though. 
Honest, you can’t. I know what it’s like. I’ve had loads of people tell me 
you’re all the bloody same. I just laugh. Sometimes it eats into you, 
people feeling like that…’83 
What is significant is that for these councillors, as for the citizens referred to 
above, there is an apparent mismatch between what they value about 
democracy – including their own democratic participation – and what they know 
of the reality. To an extent, they remain trapped within the system. Arguably, a 
more explicit challenge to the status quo, in the form of a clearly articulated 
alternative democratic vision, might help resolve this discrepancy. 
With regard to U-Decide, it is not hard to see how a frustration with the limited 
difference they are able to make as ward councillors contributes to a sense that 
‘mainstreaming’ the programme would have to be about extra resources (a view 
reinforced by the fact that the pilots came with additional funding). Thus, the 
Newburn area coordinator reported that the ward committee were ‘making a 
commitment, but they need to know where the money is coming from’.84 
Importantly, there isn’t outright opposition from any of the actor-groups. On the 
contrary, there is widespread support. However, a close look at motivations and 
underlying assumptions has suggested a variety of attitudes to the goal of 
shifting sovereignty. In the remainder of the chapter, I look at how these views 
on sovereignty are manifested in practice, including evidence of what we might 
consider to be persistent ‘representative habits of mind’. 
RELOCATING SOVEREIGNTY?  
PB advocates are working to create an egalitarian decision-making space in a 
context marked by a strong representative bias. As I have discussed, this has 
implications for the broader development of the programme, in that it limits the 
extent to which some key actors are actually engaged in an attempt to shift 
sovereignty. This is illustrated by the ‘representative habits of mind’ observable 
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 Interview 24, ward councillor, Denton, 27/01/2009. 
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 Participant observation record: officer evaluation meeting, Newburn ward, 03/12/2008. 
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within the programme. By this, I mean evidence of learned assumptions which 
belong to a representative understanding of democracy, but which are applied 
uncritically within the participatory setting. What I intend to convey here is not 
criticism of attempts to address material problems within real processes (which, 
almost by definition, exist within an ideologically challenging democratic 
context). Rather, my aim is to explore the ways in which the development of the 
programme can be constrained by fixed assumptions about democracy. 
The most readily identifiable example of ‘representative habits of mind’ relates 
to what is understood to ‘count’ as democratic legitimacy. In contrast to Porto 
Alegre, where activists consider the direct participation of individuals a core 
principle, there was frequently a tacit assumption that participating citizens 
should represent ‘the community’. In other words, for some, there was an 
apparent struggle to know how to understand wider participation as a legitimate 
means of decision-making if it is not in some sense representative. 
With regard to citizen participation at voting events, this surfaced in debates 
over who should attend, and how they should make decisions. Should 
participation be managed, because those in the room are understood to be 
deciding on behalf of the whole ward, or should it be open access (as in Porto 
Alegre) with an associated visible link between mobilisation and outcomes? 
The latter perspective was dominant amongst PB organisers and citizens.85 A 
community development worker reported that the young people she worked 
with felt that ‘their voice was reduced’ by the decision to limit attendance and 
voting rights,86 while working group members wanted people to understand that 
‘it’s not just for groups; it’s for you – right across the estate.’87 The Social Policy 
team linked the case for wider participation to democratic motivation: 
‘I do think that is democracy, and people might say, well, they brought 20 
people, well, yeah, because 20 bothered to turn up on the day.’88 
                                                                
85
 A small minority of working group members disagreed, but this was restricted to the ‘Denton 
reps’ who tended towards the view that ‘a nice mix comes along now, from the various groups 
that’s in the ward’ (interview 29, working group member, Denton ward, 20/03/2008). Arguably, 
these citizens have equally well-developed ‘representative habits of mind’. 
86
 Participant observation record: community development worker, Grand Voting Event, 
Newburn ward, 15/11/2008. 
87
 Interview 30, group interview, Denton working group members, 26/03/2009. 
88
 Interview 16, joint interview, council officers, Social Policy Unit, Newcastle Council, 
27/11/2008. 
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Open attendance clearly places sovereignty with the people. Their participation 
matters; they can affect the outcome (therefore, this approach coheres with 
what I have called a ‘citizen-eye’ perspective, rather than an ‘engineer’s-eye 
view’). As one working group member put it: 
‘It’s no wonder that you’ve got the ones that are undesirables, cos 
nobody wants them invited – well, I do … cos if they can see the 
difference that we’re making, they may not be undesirable … you know, 
it’s about engaging the community – so let’s engage them!’89 
However, councillors used to operating at executive level tended to express the 
opposing view, arguing for controlled attendance:  
‘One way of trying to make sure that there were some independent 
voices there, would be to allow independent people, but then I guess you 
would have to say, well, how can you prove that these people are 
independent; how do you know that they’ve not been chosen by the 
people who are presenting and they’re all their supporters or whatever? It 
just gets far too complex.’90 
The implication here is that the only legitimate motivation is disinterested; there 
is a sense that participants are expected to take a ‘whole ward view’, as an 
elected representative might, rather than participate as themselves, with their 
own desires and allegiances. This quote illustrates the extent to which this is an 
‘engineer’s-eye view’, implying as it does the primacy of external grounds for 
judging decisions made through the process. Accordingly, participation needs to 
be controlled (by the state) in order to ensure a valid outcome.  
It is important to note that there was no real indication of ‘bad’ decision-making 
at voting events; therefore, interest in this issue did not arise in response to a 
tangible problem. On the contrary, the evidence suggests that participants 
attended to the presentations, took the responsibility of voting seriously, and, 
importantly, believed the process to be fair.91 Nevertheless, a concern with 
‘good’ decisions (and an accompanying preoccupation with assessing their 
quality or ‘fairness’) was a recurrent theme. For some, this was evidently a 
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 Interview 28, working group member, Denton ward, 20/03/2009. 
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 Interview 25, ward councillor (and former Leader of the Council), Denton, 28/01/2009. 
91
 Participant observation record: Grand Voting Events, Newburn ward, 15/11/2008 & 
21/03/2009, Denton ward, 29/11/2008 & 28/03/2009. 
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desire to ‘test’ the process (such as the officer who worked through each 
handset allocation, to see if people voted most for the area they lived in),92 while 
others aimed to prove the quality of decision-making in order to build support for 
the process.93 Interestingly, officers at times defined good decision-making as 
having the same outcomes as if they had made the decisions themselves; for 
example, commenting ‘how sensible the decisions are – the same decisions 
that officers would have made!’94  By contrast, as I have said, it was of primary 
importance for citizens that the outcomes were different; indeed, that was often 
their motivation for getting involved.  This (citizen-eye) perspective does not 
diminish the importance of outcomes, but it does require that they are 
determined within the process, not in advance. 
The issue in terms of sovereignty is that this is held by those who accord 
themselves the right to judge what constitutes a ‘good’ decision. If citizens are 
sovereign within the process, the decision they reach is valid (regardless of 
whether the state agrees with it or not). Conversely, if the state retains the right 
to validate decisions, it remains sovereign.  
‘Representative habits of mind’ were also strongly in evidence with regard to the 
working groups. On one hand, they were frequently treated – even described – 
as if they were representative of the community. Thus, the Deputy Leader 
referred to the working group as demonstrating legitimacy by virtue of being 
‘elected members of community groups,’95 though being an elected official of a 
community group was decidedly not a requirement for membership of the (self-
selected) working groups. Evidently, the elected member struggled to express a 
sense of democratic legitimacy not based in representation. The Denton 
working group were also asked directly, ‘as members of the working group, as 
community representatives, do you feel you have the skills to run with this, 
yourselves?’96 The extent of this extrapolation was illustrated by repeated 
occasions on which the term 'community' was used to refer to the working 
group.  For instance, one councillor described the operation of the working 
group as follows: 
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 Interview 18, joint interview, area coordinators, 28/11/2008. 
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 Participant observation record: Social Policy team meeting, 27/01/2009. 
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 Participant observation record: officer and working group evaluation lunch, 02/12/2008. 
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 Interview 27, Cllr David Faulkner, Deputy Leader, Newcastle Council, 02/03/2009. 
96
 Participant observation record: Newcastle Council U-Decide evaluation workshop, 
30/04/2009. 
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Councillor: there were tensions between the community’s views of what 
the process was, and … officers’ and councillors’ views of the process. 
Interviewer:  when you say the community’s views, do you mean, as 
expressed by the working group? 
Councillor:  yes, yeah. The working group very much took to heart a 
phrase which was that the process was community-led. They took that to 
mean community-dominated. Where the community took all the 
decisions and they were not particularly happy that officers and 
councillors were part of the process.   
Interestingly, the representational loop was closed when the same councillor 
concluded that therefore voting wasn’t a necessary part of U-Decide if working 
group deliberations proved conclusive (as I described in the last chapter, this 
was strenuously resisted by some members of the working group). 
It is not hard to see how this approach exacerbated the situation in Denton 
where some experienced community reps assumed their right to speak for ‘the 
community’. Over time, officers and councillors (and, it is important to add, 
some members of the group itself) became increasingly uncomfortable with the 
perceived lack of accountability of the Denton working group. This was most 
visible at sifting days, where proposals put forwards by a community association 
‘disliked’ by vocal members of the working group were consistently rejected. 
At the sifting day for the November event, though some members of the group 
spoke strongly for inclusion at the voting event on the grounds of the process 
criteria, the (close) overall vote went against two projects, while similar 
proposals from different organisations were approved.97 Members who voted 
against the projects were unwilling to discuss reasons for the decision. Officers 
were very unhappy both at being left to communicate the outcome to the 
proposing association, and the lack of an adequate justification.98  
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 It is worth noting that concerns about the organisation’s delivery capacity (for example) would 
not have been a valid reason for rejection at this stage, as the working group’s role was simply 
to determine if each project fitted the funding criteria; decisions on whether projects should be 
funded were to be made at the Voting Event. 
98
 Participant observation record: sifting day, Denton ward, 21/10/2008. Similar events occurred 
during the March process (participant observation record: sifting day, Denton ward, 
12/03/2009). 
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As a result of such incidents, there was a heightened awareness that the 
working group was not representative of the ward (again, this was a shared 
view held by officers, councillors – including those that regularly referred to the 
working group as ‘the community’ – and some members of the working group). 
For councillors who identified with the existing system, this was addressed 
directly in representative terms: 
‘You’ve got to realise, the working group are setting themselves up as an 
alternative decision-making body. Some time, someone will ask, “who do 
you represent?”’99 
Of course, this ‘setting-up’ was in fact a two-way dynamic – as is, by now, 
hopefully clear. Members of the Social Policy team and concerned working 
group members had a different response. They hoped to address the issue 
through broadening the group membership, expressed as a desire to make it 
more representative in terms of identity (generally by age or neighbourhood).100  
As with wider participation at voting days, the only dissident citizen voices were 
those of the Denton ‘experienced reps’,101 summed up in the following view: 
‘It’s got the right people on, a right good mix. I mean, there’s people that 
represent young people, there’s people that represent their tenants’ 
groups, there’s people that represent the umbrella group, DCP [Denton 
Community Partnership], there’s people that come on from the over 60’s, 
you know, things like that, other groups, and high rise flats, there’s 
people on from there. So, I think there is a good mix of people.’102 
The emphasis on speaking for the community is apparent. For example, where 
other working group members repeatedly returned to the question of how to 
encourage young people to join, here the representation of young people (in 
this case, by a volunteer youth group coordinator) was felt to be sufficient.103 
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 Interview 25, ward councillor (and former Leader of the Council), Denton, 28/01/2009. 
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 This was also discussed in Newburn, though this appeared to arise more out of a desire for 
inclusiveness, than in response to particular concerns (other than a wish to demonstrate that 
the process was fair to all the villages of the ward; interviews 26 & 31, working group members, 
Newburn ward, 16/02/2009 & 26/03/2009). 
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 The issue was discussed at evaluation meetings for both Newburn and Denton. While in 
Newburn there was a shared enthusiasm for the idea, in Denton, the response was more mixed 
(participant observation record: working group evaluation meetings, 02/12/2008). 
102
 Interview 29, working group member, Denton ward, 20/03/2008. 
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 Though not, it should be added, by the youth group coordinator herself. 
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Furthermore, in response to previous attempts to widen membership, the 
Denton group introduced rules about only joining within the first three meetings 
of each planning process.104 These attitudes are perhaps unsurprising, given 
the degree to which the system consistently reinforces the message that there 
is power in representing others. 
Other officer responses included looking for ways to discourage the working 
group using local knowledge, because this was being expressed in a 
problematic way (‘it’s almost like a jury thing, where you are supposed to have 
no knowledge of the case beforehand, and to be able to make those 
decisions’),105 and from one officer who was passionate about involving the 
wider community, the reluctant desire to bypass the working group altogether: 
‘There’s no accountability, and I think that was evident at the sifting day. I 
think even maybe officers should put things through to the Grand Voting 
Event … maybe less of a role for steering, maybe [the working group] will 
be part of the engagement. But I feel, as we’re going down the road of 
risk assessment, have they got insurance, safeguarding children, we 
need to be a bit more savvy about where’s this money going, not the 
“Oh, it’s Betty Sue’s idea, I’ll let that go through,” or even the councillors 
maybe, sift … and then they go to the public to vote on – or even the 
councillors maybe, sift, maybe the road safety ones go to another pot, 
and then they go to the public to vote on. So people aren’t getting that 
power crazy. Or it’s councillors and community members make that 
decision, but I think it needs to be more people round the table.’106 
This officer was unusual in being remarkably clear that the working group did 
not equate to the community, and, moreover, was concerned about ‘new people 
who are a wee bit shy, who have got a really good contribution to make, but 
can’t make it cos they’re getting railroaded out.’107 
The fundamental issue in this situation is that almost everyone involved 
assumed that accountability had to be held by the state, not the wider 
community (indicating the persistent location of sovereignty). Accordingly, the 
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 Interview 33, working group member, Denton ward, 02/04/2009. 
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 Interview 16, joint interview, council officers, Social Policy Unit, Newcastle Council, 
27/11/2008. 
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 Interview 21, council officer, Social Policy Unit, Newcastle Council, 03/12/2008. 
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 Interview 21, council officer, Social Policy Unit, Newcastle Council, 03/12/2008. 
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state took responsibility for the behaviour of the group (as one officer said, ‘it’s 
almost like, have we created a monster here?’)108 and tried to find a way to 
solve the problem. 
The assumed direction of accountability is illustrated by the sense of betrayal 
felt by deeply committed officers and councillors: 
‘I just felt like standing up and saying, look, we’ve trusted you, you know, 
do this properly. And basically, you’ve gone and been really, really 
snidey about it. It’s not what democracy’s about.’109 
It is important to be clear that this didn’t arise out of a lack of commitment to 
participatory democracy. This councillor (one of the ‘activist-politicians’ 
portrayed earlier) described the first Denton U-Decide as ‘the best day of my life 
as a councillor’ and firmly believed that ‘politicians do have too much say.’110 
This is not a simplistic issue; the existing system strongly underlines that 
understanding of accountability. Thus, one of the organisers reflected that ‘the 
audit trail always leads back to the city council.’111 However, the alternative 
possibility, of supporting the wider community to hold the working group 
accountable for decisions taken in their name (i.e. the name of the community), 
was only raised by citizens themselves, as the same councillor described:  
‘What I have noticed this time, is three people come up to me, who are 
part of the community, and I think they want to challenge for a seat, for 
the next part, because they were absolutely disgusted with the decisions 
of the working group.’112 
Unfortunately, this wasn’t a solution that the structure as it stood facilitated, and 
as a result, the U-Decide programme did not run again in Denton. 
CONCLUSION 
A close look at the assumptions and values animating the U-Decide programme 
suggests that citizens respond strongly to a more egalitarian model of 
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democracy. There is, therefore, a gulf between the democratic narrative 
enacted by citizens participating in U-Decide, and the narrative embodied by the 
UK democratic system. The evidence from Newcastle further suggests that, as 
far as its core advocates are concerned, PB in the UK does represent a genuine 
attempt to enable a decision-making experience more in accord with egalitarian 
democratic values. The connection between these facts and the positive 
increase in participation via U-Decide seems clear. This is evidently of material 
importance in considering appropriate responses to the UK democratic 
deficit.113 
However, it is also clear that the political will behind such initiatives can mask a 
spectrum of democratic goals. There is a complicated relationship between 
political support and the manifestation of an egalitarian democratic decision-
making space within a strongly representative system. In the case of U-Decide, 
a high degree of political will did not therefore translate into fiscal and 
operational autonomy, or into a critical engagement with the existing system.  
As I have suggested, this matters for two reasons. Firstly, this dynamic makes 
possible a focus on the egalitarian decision-making space as complementary to 
representative democracy, rather than as challenging its fundamentally elitist 
assumptions. In practice, this draws its sting as a ‘supply-side’ response to the 
democratic deficit. Secondly, the ideological tensions bleed into the alternative 
space itself, minimising the transfer of sovereignty, and ensuring that 
democratic control ultimately remains in the hands of the state. Despite its many 
highly positive outcomes, the U-Decide experience reinforces the impression 
that the location of sovereignty in the UK is subject to a high degree of inertia.  
While there are certainly no easy answers to these dilemmas, the evidence 
presented here suggests that attending to and making visible these underlying 
narratives would be a fruitful avenue, most particularly in foregrounding the 
relocation of sovereignty as a primary goal. For democratic activists, this can be 
as simple as asking questions, for example: whether and how an egalitarian 
decision-making process allows for changed outcomes (in other words, who is 
sovereign within the space?), whether citizens or the state hold accountability 
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 In this vein, Henrik Bang (2009) argues that Barack Obama’s ‘Yes, we can!’ campaign 
succeeded so notably precisely because it consciously invoked the idea of sovereign citizens 
creating change. 
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(and how), whether citizens are understood to represent themselves or 
expected to behave as if they represent others, and who decides when citizens 
can make decisions (who is sovereign over the space?).  
Asking these questions does not, of course, in any way reduce the challenge of 
power within the existing system (and the desire of the powerful to hold onto it). 
However, the analysis presented here suggests that such questions could at 
least illuminate opportunities and limits in the struggle to develop a genuinely 
alternative democratic narrative. 
In the following chapter, I explore a very different meeting of democratic 
narratives in Bradford, where PB supporters articulated a much more explicit 
challenge to the status quo – and consequently met with a more unequivocal 
response from the state. 
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CHAPTER 9 
DEMOCRACY IN PRACTICE: CHALLENGING THE STATUS QUO IN BRADFORD 
Bradford was home to some of the UK’s earliest participatory budgeting pilots, 
and while the initiative never became as embedded as Newcastle’s U-Decide 
programme, it is of particular interest because it developed as part of a wider 
neighbourhood governance programme with explicit social justice aims. Thus, 
PB in Bradford was associated with a genuine ideological challenge to the 
status quo. As I described in chapter 6, the programme was led by Bradford 
Vision, the then Local Strategic Partnership (LSP), who facilitated several 
discrete PB processes, of which the largest and most substantial occurred in 
the town of Keighley in 2006. While many LSPs were housed within local 
government, Bradford was unusual in that the LSP was a company limited by 
guarantee, and therefore semi-independent of the local state. This was 
significant because it supplied the operational autonomy required for a more 
radical perspective on participation. The then Conservative-led local 
administration was strongly opposed to such an approach; accordingly, 
Bradford provides a complementary case study to Newcastle, in that it involved 
a more direct confrontation between the two democratic narratives. 
In this chapter, I describe the Keighley PB process and outcomes, including 
increased participation and community-building (as well as some reflections on 
the role of the voluntary sector), before looking in a little more detail at the 
essentially egalitarian democratic narrative animating its development, and the 
response of the state, which was unambiguously rooted in the more elitist 
representative narrative typical of the UK system. I conclude with some 
reflections on how the dynamic created by this narrative encounter impacted on 
the democratic potential of Bradford’s PB process, drawing out some 
implications for approaches to the democratic deficit. 
KEIGHLEY DECISION DAY 1 
Keighley is a small northern town of just over 50,000 inhabitants, located within 
the District of Bradford but with a strong sense of its own identity. Bradford was 
historically a wealthy city, a major centre of the global textile industry. Today, 
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 Some elements of this section draw on previously published work (Blakey, 2008; 2010). 
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however, both Bradford and Keighley are de-industrialised and impoverished, 
with high levels of deprivation and unemployment, and below average levels of 
educational achievement and standards of living. Bradford District has a long 
history of immigration which fed the city’s industrial growth, and which is with us 
still in the present-day diversity of the District. Like the city of Bradford, Keighley 
is home to a variety of geographically distinct, internally cohesive communities 
which tend to be defined by their ethnicity (see Ouseley, 2001). 
The District’s history is also present in the vibrancy of its civil society. It was, in 
1893, the birthplace of the Independent Labour Party, and boasts a proud 
history of strikes and protest that shaped the labour movement in this country. 
However, in recent decades, the District has lost the heart of its organised 
labour force as a result of de-industrialisation, and seen the decline of trade 
union activity – a school for political activists which has not been replaced. The 
District has often been at the forefront of national policy initiatives, such as the 
Community Cohesion agenda (following the ‘Bradford riots’ of 2001) and the 
Neighbourhood Renewal agenda, the Labour government’s key policy initiative 
around poverty and community, also launched in 2001. 
In 2006, the Neighbourhood Renewal programme was one of Bradford Vision’s 
two key responsibilities, the other being the LSP function of facilitating strategic 
partnership work. While the partnership work sat squarely within the nationally-
led initiatives for participation and engagement referred to in chapter 6, its 
relationship to neighbourhood governance in Bradford was built primarily on the 
vision of two committed women. The Chief Executive of Bradford Vision and the 
Director of Neighbourhood Renewal had a history of working together in the 
District to support unheard voices, one inspired by her strongly held Christian 
faith, the other by her personal experiences of deprivation, homelessness and 
exclusion. They held a deep-seated belief that work on the ground to alleviate 
the effects of poverty and deprivation only ever patched over a fundamental 
power imbalance, which they wanted to address. Therefore, their commitment 
to increased participation was rooted in the belief that the system had failed, 
and that this was behind the failure of outcomes for the poorest citizens. 
Across the District as a whole, they facilitated an approach to neighbourhood 
renewal work centred on Neighbourhood Action Planning (NAP): the creation of 
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Neighbourhood Renewal funded plans based on locally determined priorities, 
supported by Bradford Vision staff (initially, 12 Neighbourhood Partnership 
Managers (NPMs) across the District). The community groups developing these 
plans were encouraged to work with local service providers, creating a NAP 
group structure intended to act as a ‘clearing house’ for local information 
between service providers and citizens. In the 2004-2006 round of 
Neighbourhood Renewal Funding (NRF), £25,000 was available to a community 
group in each eligible area, for formulating and implementing a local plan. 
The second round launched in 2006. While funds were again primarily allocated 
at local level by the NAP groups, in Keighley, the neighbourhood manager 
launched a PB process which, over the course of a year, allocated £130,000 of 
Neighbourhood Renewal money (public funds ring-fenced for development in 
the District’s most deprived communities). This built on the ‘Clean, Green’ pilot 
mentioned in chapter 6 but went beyond it, opening up the process to every 
affected citizen, instead of the community groups previously invited. The 
Keighley experience underlines the role of individuals as key catalysts in the 
development of UK PB processes. In addition to the role played by Bradford 
Vision’s leadership, the Keighley neighbourhood manager had, while working 
for a civil society organisation, heard Hilary Wainwright, author of Reclaim the 
State, a book about experiments in popular democracy (Wainwright, 2003), 
speak about participatory budgeting and was inspired. This prompted him to 
move to Bradford Vision, which was already experimenting with new forms of 
participation, and look for opportunities to bring PB to life in Bradford. 
The key individuals leading the Keighley process therefore had a consciously 
radical vision for PB, focused on its redistributive potential, and also its political 
potential in terms of overhauling how and by whom decisions are made. This 
included the sense that ‘grown-up conversations’2 can replace unrealistic 
demands – that this model can be liberating for service providers and the state 
as well as for people, through helping citizens understand the budgetary 
constraints on service providers, in addition to understanding their own needs.  
Within Keighley, seven neighbourhoods met the economic deprivation criteria 
for inclusion: Highfield, Eastwood, Braithwaite & Guardhouse, Stockbridge, 
                                                                
2
 Interview 11, joint interview, senior management team, Bradford Vision, 16/04/2007. 
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Brackenbank, Hainworth and Parkwood. While sharing economic similarities, 
they differ in other respects, most notably in terms of ethnicity. Eastwood and 
Highfield have a high Asian population while other areas are predominantly 
White (including Braithwaite & Guardhouse, an estate which at the time was 
being targeted by the British National Party).3 As this money was ‘extra’ funds 
provided by the national government to address specific issues, the PB process 
did not affect the core council budget. It was, however, linked squarely to the 
goal of addressing poverty and attendant issues, including health, education 
and employment inequalities (Social Exclusion Unit, 2001:8).4  
The process as it evolved in Keighley has been described as ‘participatory 
grant-making’ rather than budgeting, though the organisers did have aspirations 
to move beyond this. The process, in brief, developed as follows: 
 In March 2006, the Neighbourhood Partnership Manager for Keighley 
presented a proposal to Bradford Vision, to use PB for the 2006-2008 
round of NRF spending, which was accepted. Two spending rounds were 
planned, though this was later reduced to one, due to time constraints. 
 
 He brought together a reference group, comprising Bradford Vision staff, 
Keighley Voluntary Services (the main VCS umbrella and support 
organisation in Keighley), the Council’s area coordinator, and the UK PB 
Unit, who provided advice and support. From time to time other senior 
VCS officers and staff from the Bradford Vision themed partnerships 
attended these meetings. 
 
 Bradford Vision secured additional funding through three of the four 
blocks of the Local Area Agreement: Children and Young People, Safer 
and Stronger Communities and Environment. This, together with NRF 
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 The British National Party (BNP) attempted to make political capital out of headline news 
stories about Asian men grooming young White girls, with a town councillor, Angela Clarke, 
being elected on the estate in 2004 (Keighley has a devolved town council, as well as belonging 
to Bradford District council). Many local citizens reacted strongly to this, and Cllr Clarke was 
barred from both the estate’s community centres, on the grounds that the BNP contravened 
their equal rights policies. A local mother subsequently stood against the BNP, angry that the 
party was exploiting her family’s story, and was elected in 2006. As a town councillor, she was 
very active in supporting the PB process. 
4
 It is interesting to note in passing that UK government documents such as the Neighbourhood 
Renewal National Strategy do not, perhaps predictably, refer to poverty, but rather to 
‘disadvantage’, begging the question of how meaningfully the government can engage with the 
poor if it will not name their existence. 
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money for the area resulted in a pot of £130,000, to be spent only in 
areas identified as ‘deprived’ and therefore eligible for NRF funds. 
 
 During the summer of 2006 the reference group developed a ‘budgeting 
process’ which was implemented in the main by Bradford Vision and the 
Keighley Voluntary Services community development team. This was 
carried out at existing community events, and by going door-to-door in 
some of the areas. Citizens were individually asked to choose their top 
three priorities for their area from a list of nine, and given space to 
identify particular issues within those three categories, and suggest 
solutions. Approximately 400 citizens completed these forms. 
 
 This information was collated. The reference group decided that the 
money should be distributed according to area allocations based on head 
of population, as this was a non-negotiable rule of NRF funding, and 
because it was felt to be too complex to allocate according to the themed 
data as well as by area.  
 
 Local organisations were given information on the priorities generated 
(as a guide only), and invited to propose projects. This process was open 
to VCS groups, statutory organisations and private companies. 
 
 The bids were scrutinised by a panel made up of local councillors, 
members of the PB reference group, and local staff from statutory 
organisations. The group’s remit was to ascertain that the bids met the 
rules of the process and to offer advice on deliverability to the applicant 
groups. They did not have a remit to reject bids – decisions on which 
projects received funding were to be taken by citizens at a voting event 
(this stage of the process was comparable to the U-Decide sifting days). 
 
 Citizens resident in the areas involved were invited to a Decision Day 
held at the end of November (3 areas in the morning and 4 in the 
afternoon). A letter went out to all eligible households, posters and fliers 
were used, and the community development team spread the word (in 
practice, the most effective means of invitation). 
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 In total, approximately 300 citizens attended the Decision Day. Each 
project had three minutes to present their idea. Due to the number of 
projects, the schedule did not allow time for questions or discussion. 
When five projects had been presented, citizens were asked to give each 
a vote out of ten (using paper voting sheets). The next five projects were 
presented, and so on. The votes were collated, and results announced. 
There was a definite ‘buzz’ amongst organisations and citizens around 
the opportunity to be involved, and the additional benefits of the process, 
in particular networking across different areas of Keighley, and shared 
learning about different communities and organisations. 
As I have said, the attitude of the elected state in Bradford was decidedly 
hostile, reflecting a more elitist democratic narrative. This narrative quickly 
gained the upper hand in the struggle for democratic practice in Keighley. The 
open ideological tensions between the council and Bradford Vision led the 
council to institute a review of Vision’s LSP function which culminated in its 
demise (Bradford Vision as an organisation was structurally independent of the 
council, but its designation as the Local Strategic Partnership, and therefore its 
access to resources, was controlled by the council). The council took the LSP 
function back in-house, and the innovative work begun by Bradford Vision 
around neighbourhood action planning and participatory budgeting went into 
abeyance as a result. However, the story has some continuity; Keighley’s 
neighbourhood partnership manager became an associate of the PB Unit and 
now shares his learning through the volunteer-run PB Network. 
Referring back, then, to the core principles of PB as defined by key actors and 
analysts regarding Porto Alegre, we can see that the Keighley process involved 
the direct participation of individuals, the power to make real decisions (it was 
binding not consultative), and a commitment to social justice. It did not, 
however, involve a participant-regulated cycle of known events. Though the 
Neighbourhood Partnership Manager aimed to model a process which he 
hoped would catalyse an ongoing cycle of events, it was (and remained) a one-
off pilot. Moreover, it was not participant-regulated, there being no citizens on 
the reference group which oversaw the process design and development.5 
                                                                
5
 Citizens were later involved in the project monitoring stages of the process, with about 8-10 
attending local meetings in this capacity; spending plans were only to be altered with citizen 
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While efforts were made to involve elected councillors, the funds involved were 
not part of the core budget, and not directly overseen by the Council, therefore 
there cannot be said to have been a combination of representative and 
participatory traditions (like U-Decide, PB in Bradford operated as a discrete 
decision-making space). Finally, deliberation was essentially missing from the 
process. The consultative ‘budgeting’ or prioritisation process rested on an 
individualised selection from a list. It did not require participants to explain, 
defend or test their views with others. Similarly, the voting procedure did not 
allow for discussion or questions.6  
The Keighley neighbourhood manager identified the following factors as very 
important in creating space for this pilot to happen: the nature of Bradford Vision 
itself – large enough as a statutory organisation to put resources behind the 
idea, but small enough (hence free enough from institutional bureaucracy) to be 
creative and flexible, permission from senior managers to take risks, existing 
working relationships with other actors, specifically the voluntary sector in 
Keighley, and ownership by the VCS locally – not just by Bradford Vision. This 
last point was the result of conscious team working by the organisers. 
These factors echo the operational and fiscal autonomy, ‘political will’ in the 
sense of the responsible authority, and partnership with civil society. There is 
however a question over the extent to which the process engaged a mobilised 
citizenry, given the absence of individual citizens from the planning process, 
and also the discrete nature of the event, which meant there was little 
opportunity for the kind of developmental dialogue implied by ‘cooperation and 
contestation’. Furthermore, operational and fiscal autonomy existed by virtue of 
being insulated from the core budget, rather than through having control over it. 
Finally, the ‘political will’ came in the guise of a quasi-autonomous public body, 
explicitly not governed at operational level by the elected local state. While 
these conditions do present difficulties for implementing a radical process, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
endorsement (there was a hope that this would embed citizen involvement in later planning 
processes). However, due to the demise of Bradford Vision, these did not come to fruition. 
6
 It is important to note that the organisers would agree that the experience was neither perfect 
nor intended to be. They wanted it to be ‘good enough’ and consciously thought of it as a ‘first 
time’ – that what didn’t happen this time, could be built on and developed (in the words of the 
Keighley NPM, ‘it’s just about keeping working, to make the thing better’, Interview 2, 
19/12/2006). As with the Newcastle case study, the purpose of this reflection is not to criticise 
real processes (which are never ideal), but to learn more about where the radical potential lies, 
how it is being squeezed – and why. 
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as I will discuss, led to the presentation of PB as politically neutral, they may 
also illustrate the creative identification of opportunities on the part of value-
driven actors in a less than ideal situation.7   
PB OUTCOMES IN BRADFORD 
Before exploring the dynamics of the narratives embodied within the Keighley 
PB experience, I will briefly examine what was arguably the most significant 
(and impressive) achievement of the process, the attendance of around 300 
citizens at the voting day. This notwithstanding, because citizens were only 
involved at the decision-making stage, not during the planning process, the 
potential for wider democratic learning and altered relationships with the state 
(as observed in Newcastle) was severely restricted. However, Bradford affords 
some interesting insights regarding the potential for community-building and the 
role of the voluntary sector, which I also discuss below. 
Approximately 100 people were present for the morning session of the Decision 
Day, including presenters (many of whom, being local residents, were also 
eligible to vote). Unlike in Newcastle, participant profile figures were not 
recorded. However, most were White, with some Asian participants; there was a 
fairly even spread between men and women, and different age groups. Around 
200 people attended in the afternoon. Of these, over 90 came from one (largely 
Asian) area, Eastwood. Between 20 and 30 attended from each of two further 
areas (one predominantly White and one predominantly Asian), with just 4 from 
the final (largely White) area. There were a higher proportion of female 
participants in the afternoon than the morning, and a marked increase in 
working age adults.8 Bradford Vision strongly believed that the process reached 
many new people who had not been involved in local decision-making before; 9 
a view supported by my observations and short interviews at the voting event. 
For example, many of the Eastwood participants were mothers supporting their 
children’s school, who said they had never been to ‘anything like this’ before. 10  
                                                                
7
 This notwithstanding, Baiocchi & Ganuza comment that while the ‘expert’ presentation of PB 
as value-neutral might feel like a necessity in order to introduce it in certain contexts, this can 
limit the potential for opening up discussion of empowerment outcomes later (Baiocchi & 
Ganuza, 2014:44); I discuss this tension further later in the chapter. 
8
 Participant observation record: Keighley Decision Day, 25/11/2006. 
9
 Participant observation record: Decision Day Debrief Session, Bradford Vision, 05/12/2006. 
10
 Participant observation record and short interviews (1i-1xviii): Keighley Decision Day, 
25/11/2006. 
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In Keighley, unlike Newcastle, the PB process operated on the basis of open 
invitation, a ‘right to participate’. This meant that organisers had no way of 
knowing in advance how many participants to expect. In the event, attendance 
exceeded the expectations of everyone involved.11 Moreover, for the 
organisers, it was important to consider attendance against existing levels of 
participation; in the case of the NAPs this was no more than 5-6 people in each 
neighbourhood, and often fewer.12 
In keeping with the findings from Newcastle, the participants I interviewed 
expressed their motivation for attending principally in democratic terms, 
sometimes explicitly, sometimes in terms that revealed the value placed on 
participation for change: 
‘It’s been worth it. Being here, and thinking yes, I feel strongly about that, 
and I want to be part of the decision making process.’13 
‘[I came] to support our community, for the children; it’s something that’s 
needed.’14 
‘I think the community voting is very important, ’cause you can’t just have 
ten people from the community saying, right, this is the best thing to do. 
The community needs the choice to make, so that’s a very good step.’15 
Some participants expressed a strong sense of the importance of collective 
action for change: 
‘I’ve never been to anything like this before … I was hoping that it would 
make a difference. I know one on their own can’t do much, but if you get 
a few together you can sometimes move forwards.’16 
For some, a belief in collective action combined with the high turnout to form a 
virtuous circle, which supported their own commitment to being civically active: 
                                                                
11
 Participant observation record: Facilitator’s Briefing Session, Keighley Decision Day, 
25/11/2006. 
12
 Participant observation record: PB planning meeting, Keighley Voluntary Services, 
29/06/2006. 
13
 Interview 1xii, Keighley Decision Day, 25/11/2006. 
14
 Interview 1iv, Keighley Decision Day, 25/11/2006. 
15
 Interview 1xiii, Keighley Decision Day, 25/11/2006. 
16
 Interview 1v, Keighley Decision Day, 25/11/2006. 
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‘It’s not very easy, but something like this, where you actually see 
residents of your area here, who have similar concerns and are worried 
about issues that are affecting the area, you know, it gives you that bit of 
a boost. You feel you want to help, contribute [to] making a difference.’17 
The large turnout from Eastwood was understood by participants and 
organisers alike to have occurred because, ten days before the vote, the head 
teacher of a primary school putting in a bid held a parents’ evening, and 
explained that if people came to the event, they would make a difference to the 
school – in other words, that their participation would have results.18 This clearly 
illustrates the ‘citizen-eye’ perspective, which rests on a transparent 
understanding that your presence can make a difference. For the organisers, 
the turnout confirmed their hopes for the process: 
‘Once they understood that their presence in the room would make an 
actual difference on who got money in their neighbourhood, they came.’19 
Despite this, organisers feared that the imbalance in numbers would be 
perceived as unfair by participants from other neighbourhoods, and hastily 
proposed a cap on voting numbers from each area. However, participants from 
Eastwood strongly objected to being turned away after making the effort to 
attend, and in the event everyone was allowed to vote. Importantly, while some 
participants did voice concerns about fairness prior to the voting (understood by 
the organisers to relate to tensions between White and Asian communities),20 
the evaluation forms from the end of the day showed that the overwhelming 
majority of voters (and a clear though smaller majority of presenters)21 felt that 
the process had been fair and effective. This was expressed by two women who 
were disappointed in the attendance from their own neighbourhood, but who 
were nonetheless positive about the Eastwood turnout: 
Participant: Actually, for me, this is a great surprise, so many people are 
here. It’s more of a turnout than any other meeting I’ve been to before … 
                                                                
17
 Interview 1viii, Keighley Decision Day, 25/11/2006. 
18
 Participant observation record: Keighley Decision Day, 25/11/2006; informal interview, 
Bradford Vision, 30/11/2006. 
19
 Interview 2, Keighley NPM, Bradford, 19/12/2006. 
20
 Participant observation record: Facilitator’s Briefing Session, Keighley Decision Day, 
25/11/2006. 
21
 I discuss some of the reasons for presenters’ more mixed views, later in the chapter. 
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They’ve obviously had a big push at the Eastwood end to get loads of 
people here … I think that might be the result of maybe what’s gone on 
at the primary school, where the head teacher has said ‘come on, you’ve 
got to go to this, vote for us; it’s the only way we’re going to get the 
money, if you vote for it’. 
Interviewer: and, not coming from that area, how do you feel about that? 
Participant: that’s fine; I have no worries about that at all. If they can be 
involved, that’s all well and good. I think it’s great. Rather than being 
passive, they are showing that they want to be active.22 
The high participation in Bradford appears to be connected to motivations 
cohering with the egalitarian democratic narrative. These include a belief in 
citizen capacity to make decisions (both implicit in the value placed on citizen 
participation, and expressed as ‘local knowledge’)23 and the legitimacy and 
power of collective action. In addition, some initial scepticism prior to the event 
(for example, ‘it’s about time!’ and ‘as long as the people making the decisions 
listen to what the people are proposing and really think it through, and hopefully 
the decisions haven’t been made before today’)24 suggests a more critical view 
of the existing system, in keeping with the views expressed in Newcastle. 
While the pilot was too limited to produce definitive evidence, there were 
nevertheless some indications that (as in Newcastle) the increased participation 
was associated with an appetite for more engagement of this type. While there 
was more mixed feedback from community groups applying for money (some 
preferring a more traditional process),25 citizens tended to be enthusiastic about 
‘doing it again’, with around ten putting their names forwards to be involved in 
ongoing monitoring. Significantly, much of the criticism of the process focused 
on a desire for more direct democratic engagement, not less.26 Accordingly, on 
the voting day, participants voiced concerns about the lack of opportunity to ask 
                                                                
22
 Interview 1xii, Keighley Decision Day, 25/11/06. 
23
 Interview 1xvi, Keighley Decision Day, 25/11/06. 
24
 Participant observation record: budget consultation, Braithwaite & Guardhouse estate, 
07/07/2006; interview 1ii, Keighley Decision Day, 25/11/06. 
25
 A point I will return to shortly. 
26
 This was one of three main areas of criticism, alongside, as I have mentioned, community 
groups who preferred a more traditional funding process, and the response of the state. 
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questions of presenters.27 Those who were critical of the decision-making 
tended to suggest more deliberation, rather than less participation:  
‘I have some very important comments which I think are very important 
and if they’re not seen and that project gets it, those other things which 
could play a part in it, won’t be known … I think you need a bit more 
depth into what, so these comments are better than what they were 
saying. It was like an advertisement, where this is like the small print. 
The small print I feel wasn’t given out. It’s like a credit card, all flashy, but 
with the small print. That’s what I think was missing…’28 
‘This isn’t participation if there is no discussion – for me, that’s what 
participation is.’29 
This criticism was often phrased in terms of how to ‘do it better next time’.30 This 
indicates that these were not ideological objections; rather, they reflect a desire 
for more informed decision-making by citizens. 
In a similar vein, there is clear evidence that officers were learning about 
democratic process through the experience of PB. While the Keighley 
neighbourhood manager was consciously inspired by Porto Alegre, it was 
striking that others were visibly working things out as the process unfolded. 
Thus, a Neighbourhood Partnership team leader made the following suggestion: 
‘This might be a radical move, but what if you don’t have neighbourhood 
allocations, just one pot? … If you lose out, you mobilise… people would 
be pissed off, but they would get another chance.’31 
Likewise, more than one officer brought up the importance of informing people 
better, if they are making real decisions: 
‘I’m thinking off the top of my head here, maybe we should be thinking a 
lot more about supporting the process by providing opportunities for 
people to learn a little bit more about what the other alternatives are.  
                                                                
27
 Participant observation record: Keighley Decision Day, 25/11/2006. 
28
 Interview 1xiii, Keighley Decision Day, 25/11/06. 
29
 Participant observation record: conversation with council officer, Keighley Decision Day, 
25/11/2006. 
30
 Participant observation record: Keighley NAP meeting, 05/12/2006. 
31
 Participant observation record: PB Decision Day Debrief Session, Bradford Vision, 
05/12/2006. 
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Saying to people, you know, have you tried this, did you know this, did 
you know that?’32 
‘I think if you’re talking about using it to decide how public services 
should be delivered, then the residents that are [deciding] need to be 
informed appropriately. So what is the implication of voting for this, do 
you know what I mean, for saying we want this as opposed to that?’33 
As with similar learning observed in Newcastle, it is apparent that this kind of 
support for citizen education is a consequence of sharing some power; these 
officers did not see the same imperative for citizens to understand what they are 
voting for within the existing representative system. Arguably, because they 
were working in the context of a governance programme which was trying to 
change outcomes (rather than meet a target of increased participation), they 
had to think about what is needed to connect participation with outcomes, rather 
than simply what is needed to increase participation. 
The second strong theme from Bradford relates to cohesion. As I have 
described, community divisions in Keighley are understood to be a significant 
issue. While participants very much valued hearing about projects in their own 
areas, some describing how they had learned about facilities and activities they 
didn’t know existed,34 many also explicitly valued hearing about those in other 
communities.35 A distinctive feature of Bradford Vision’s previous PB processes 
had been the ‘give-back’ (after the results were announced, successful projects 
were invited to voluntarily reduce the amount they received, in order to fund 
more projects). 36 This visibly translated interest in other communities’ needs 
into actual support – arguably fitting the definition of ‘negotiated solidarity’ that 
was so important in Porto Alegre. Thus, someone from a small ‘neglected’ area 
on the edge of a larger community, whose local project was funded through the 
give-back, declared that ‘this event has restored my faith in human nature’.37 
                                                                
32
 Interview 4, Keighley area coordinator, 11/01/2007. 
33
 Interview 8, Neighbourhood Partnership Manager, Bradford Vision, 22/01/2007. 
34
 Interview 1xiv, Keighley Decision Day, 25/11/06. 
35
 Participant observation record: review of evaluation forms, PB Decision Day Debrief Session, 
Bradford Vision, 05/12/2006. 
36
 This was not included at the Keighley event due to time constraints associated with the 
increased scale of the process. 
37
 Participant observation record: informal interview, Bradford Vision, 30/11/2006. 
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While clearly small-scale, this example reinforces the suggestion from 
Newcastle that learning more collective civic behaviour may be possible in the 
UK context, as well as in more democratically hospitable environments. For 
Bradford Vision, this relates directly to the nature of engagement: 
‘Where people are taken seriously, where they are listened to, they 
become generous.’38 
Importantly, there is also an echo of the learning from Porto Alegre that 
solidarity of this kind is connected to decisions between competing needs. To 
give a negative example, a Keighley community activist who was deeply critical 
of the PB process, argued for individual events in each neighbourhood precisely 
to avoid that element of competing needs between neighbourhoods – because 
‘we don’t care about the rest of Keighley’.39 This relates back to the point I made 
in chapter 4, that democracy requires real dilemmas, a reality that was apparent 
in Keighley (and which evidently did foster democratic learning): 
‘I’ve never been to anything like this before. There’s so many people all 
needing funding. How do you choose them all? I find that difficult.’40 
‘It’s just hard to decide … there isn’t enough money to go round.’ 41 
If the state decides for citizens which neighbourhood gets what, the decision is 
not then about resources, but simply about implementation. In other words, to 
foster democratic behaviour, we need to be engaged in democratic decisions. 
Similarly, several voluntary sector workers at Keighley Decision Day 
appreciated the opportunity for greater connections between citizens and their 
work, as this charity worker articulated:  
‘I actually think it’s really good, because that’s the reality … it’s about the 
community, it’s about their needs, it’s not just about us saying this is 
about money and we want this money. It’s about what do people really 
need from us as a service.’42 
                                                                
38
 Interview 11, joint interview, senior management team, Bradford Vision, 16/04/2007. 
39
 Participant observation record: Keighley NAP meeting, 09/06/2006.  
40
 Interview 1v, Keighley Decision Day, 25/11/06. 
41
 Interview 1iv, Keighley Decision Day, 25/11/06. 
42
 Interview 1iii, Keighley Decision Day, 25/11/06. 
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However, a vocal minority of voluntary sector workers and community activists 
expressed a very different view. Thus, a well-known ‘community leader’ from 
one area of Keighley (which was well represented at the voting event) said: 
‘There is an issue of losing face with the community … I prefer the 
traditional way of allocating funds, so that Bradford Vision or a committee 
would select who to fund. [We] could either apply or give a presentation, 
directly to the committee, who would choose. The community would not 
be directly involved.’43 
Two activists from a different neighbourhood, who were (like the ‘experienced’ 
Denton reps) used to representing their community on a variety of boards and 
committees, also had reservations. They submitted a formal complaint to 
Bradford Vision because they felt PB took control away from their NAP group: 
‘There’s been no checks and balances; there has been no genuine input 
from the community into the process. The neighbourhood action planning 
group has been bypassed.’44 
While this might have plausibly reflected frustration that citizens weren’t 
involved in the planning, these activists were clear they had been against the 
process all along, rather than seeking to shape it.45 Furthermore, it is significant 
that they previously spoke against wider citizen involvement at a meeting of 
their NAP group, because they said they themselves brought ‘resident views’ 
from their community centre’s meetings and help desk.46 It is telling that the use 
of the term ‘community’ to refer to the NAP group here echoes the usage in 
Newcastle, illustrating the same conflation of a small number of ‘community 
leaders’ with the wider community as a whole. Between 20 and 30 people from 
these two activists’ neighbourhood were present at the voting event. 
All this suggests the ‘representative habits of mind’ discussed in the last 
chapter. For some, there appears to be more willingness to speak for the 
community (on whose behalf the funding is requested) than to speak with it. For 
organisers (and frequently for workers and activists too, as mentioned above), 
the fact that the process enhanced their engagement with the communities they 
                                                                
43
 Participant observation record: research visit to Keighley, 8th March 2007. 
44
 Interview 1xviii, Keighley Decision Day, 25/11/06.  
45
 Interview 1xvii, Keighley Decision Day, 25/11/06. 
46
 Participant observation record: Keighley NAP meeting, 09/06/2006. 
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serve was ‘a reality check for them – the residents are the people they are 
delivering services to; if they can present their work to them and convince 
them…’47 This is reminiscent of the ‘practice of citizenship’ that I referred to in 
Porto Alegre – activists facing their communities rather than the state.  
Arguably, to the extent that a democratic process can create both opportunity 
and appetite for decision-making within communities, as opposed to a 
supplicant relationship between communities and the state, the potential for a 
shift in sovereignty exists. 
PB AS A CHALLENGE TO THE SYSTEM 
One of the most striking things about Bradford’s PB advocates is their 
passion.48 This is not just a job; it is activism. The officers most centrally 
involved described their motivation thus: 
‘What I saw was not victims, but people – through not being heard – 
being kept in places of powerlessness. So I deeply believe that my voice 
as someone who’s been on that journey is absolutely crucial to finding a 
workable solution to poverty and disadvantage.’49 
‘This is the first time I’ve actually felt really fulfilled about what I am doing 
professionally.’50 
Indeed, the most senior organiser at Bradford Vision told me she realised she 
would resign over PB being blocked in Bradford, that it was ‘somehow symbolic’ 
of what she and Bradford Vision were trying to achieve. As she said: 
‘I’m not in this for a career, or advancement, but to do this thing … 
people say, “Who are you to do that?” Who am I not to? I am a citizen of 
Bradford.’51  
In Bradford, the PB process unequivocally stemmed from a deep-seated 
commitment to challenging poverty and injustice, which were seen as ingrained 
in the existing system. That system was understood to have failed in three 
                                                                
47
 Participant observation record: Keighley Voluntary Services, 05/12/2006. 
48
 A passion matched by the most ‘hands-on’ U-Decide officer, who was utterly dedicated to 
changing the experience of citizens in Newcastle, and told me “I love this job; it’s my life” 
(participant observation record: informal interview, Social Policy Unit, 21/10/2008). 
49
 Interview 5, joint interview, senior management team, Bradford Vision, 13/01/2007. 
50
 Interview 2, Keighley NPM, Bradford, 19/12/2006. 
51
 Participant observation record: informal interview, Bradford Vision, 08/01/2007. 
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interlinked ways: the inadequate outcomes it produced, the failure to recognise 
the capacity of citizens to make a difference, and the systemic gulf between 
decision-makers and citizens. I will briefly compare organisers’ views of the 
status quo with their aspirational visions in each of these areas. This 
comparison underlines the extent to which the work in Bradford represents a 
more visible struggle between democratic narratives – and the extent to which, 
for Bradford Vision, injustice requires a different kind of democracy.  
Firstly, there is an overriding sense that politics-as-usual has failed the poor, 
and, as the second quote makes clear, that in so doing, it has failed everybody: 
‘One of the things that very much drove me was the sense of absolute 
waste. You know, waste of people’s lives – in a very wealthy nation. You 
know, how people could be born and live such … desperate lives.’52 
‘Our work has been about that continued and deepening exclusion of 
some of our people, and we feel society cannot afford that’.53 
Moreover, ‘dissatisfaction drives’. 54 For Bradford Vision, recognising the need 
for change was a vital element in creating change. Thus, PB was explicitly 
about fundamental democratic change in the service of substantive equality. 
Secondly, the system was seen to downplay the capacity of citizens to 
contribute to decision-making, through a culture of blaming people for their own 
situation.55 Worse, it was seen to undermine it, by ‘setting up an expert culture 
around things, that don’t necessarily need to be expert … [the] mystification of 
common-sense knowledge’.56 In contrast, Bradford Vision’s approach was 
rooted in the belief that ‘we ain’t going anywhere without communities’.57 This 
included the view that people experiencing a situation possess knowledge, 
reflecting a central belief in their existing skills and abilities (‘this is something 
we said over and over again, all of the city is held up by people’s own actions, 
not by public services, you know, they only step in when something is 
                                                                
52
 Interview 5, joint interview, senior management team, Bradford Vision, 13/01/2007. 
53
 Interview 11, joint interview, senior management team, Bradford Vision, 16/04/2007. 
54
 Interview 5, joint interview, senior management team, Bradford Vision, 13/01/2007. 
55
 Interview 5, joint interview, senior management team, Bradford Vision, 13/01/2007. 
56
 Interview 11, joint interview, senior management team, Bradford Vision, 16/04/2007. See 
Illich, 1977, & Bevir, 2010, for two comprehensive discussions of the role of problematic role of 
‘expertise’ in democratic process. 
57
 Interview 11, joint interview, senior management team, Bradford Vision, 16/04/2007. 
 241 
 
stretched’).58 Citizens, therefore, are understood to bring something unique and 
important to the decision-making process, a view on their own circumstances 
which people might need support to express, but which should be included:  
‘That outsider’s point of view can give you, with some tools to help make 
some constructs around that, a view of things that’s slightly different to 
how other people see things.’59 
In this vein, PB was seen as a means of placing citizen knowledge centre-stage 
(this was linked to the binding nature of the process, as this quote illustrates): 
‘[It’s] a direct link between local people’s inputs and priorities and 
knowledge … and how that money gets spent, rather than just the very 
bland, broad brush consultation process which officers can choose to 
ignore if they want … because the money will be spent on the say-so of 
the citizen rather than on the say-so of a set of paid officers who are 
acting on behalf of the citizens, or elected representatives who are acting 
on behalf of the citizens.’60 
Furthermore, for Bradford Vision, citizen decisions didn’t need to be perfect – 
because they recognised that existing decisions weren’t either: 
Interviewee 1: ‘OK, people don’t always have all the information, and 
neither do you actually … you don’t have all the information either.’ 
Interviewee 2: ‘And you don’t always make good decisions.’ 
Interviewee 1: ‘So, let go and trust.’61 
A fundamental belief in citizen capacity is revealed by the depth of commitment 
to citizen learning shown in Bradford, through the phased development of the 
NAPs (for example, in the second round asking citizens to develop their plans 
with reference to local statistical information and floor targets),62 and through 
the attempt to run the Keighley PB pilot as a two-stage process. Though this 
didn’t come to fruition, the attempt was firmly rooted in the belief that citizens 
learn through participation, that witnessing the connection between participation 
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 Interview 5, joint interview, senior management team, Bradford Vision, 13/01/2007. 
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 Interview 5, joint interview, senior management team, Bradford Vision, 13/01/2007. 
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 Interview 2, Keighley NPM, Bradford, 19/12/2006. 
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 Interview 11, joint interview, senior management team, Bradford Vision, 16/04/2007. 
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 Participant observation record: informal interview, Bradford Vision, 08/01/2007. 
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and outcomes in the first round would increase ‘understanding, commitment 
and participation’.63 Thus, when VCS partners voiced their concern that a 
project might bring lots of people, the Keighley neighbourhood manager 
responded that ‘it’s a good thing … that’s the thinking behind it, it’s about 
mobilising people, and if people complain, they need to come next time!’64  
The third way in which Bradford Vision understood the existing system to be 
failing was the distance between the state and citizens, characterised by a 
relationship which was at best paternalistic65 and at worst dismissive (‘they 
couldn’t give a hoot about some of the poorest communities … cos they weren’t 
voting, or they couldn’t count on their votes’).66 Crucially, this was regarded as 
systemic rather than the fault of individuals, with adversarial party politics, the 
disempowerment of local politics by national government (with the result that 
they don’t ‘have their roots into the community’) and ‘mad management 
performance target ways of looking at the world’ all identified as contributing 
factors.67 For Bradford Vision, what these things had in common was the effect 
of entrenching distance between decision-makers and communities: 
‘The disconnection between what strategic decision-makers knew and 
were experiencing, what they were being told, to be fair, and what was 
the reality on the ground’.68  
For the two women leading Bradford Vision, state-citizen proximity was in some 
sense the whole point of the neighbourhood governance programme, a 
framework in which PB was intended to catalyse greater citizen engagement 
and mobilisation,69 in order to close the ‘gap in knowledge’ between the state 
and the citizens – and so enable change:  
‘You create a field where they can meet and hear, and that’s the 
revolution. That’s where the head then connects with the heart. And then, 
when they admit they don’t know, then you can build new relationships, 
and that was it, and then we had to think about that. And say, so how do 
                                                                
63
 Participant observation record: PB Planning Meeting, Bradford Vision, 09/05/06. 
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 Participant observation record: PB Planning Meeting, Keighley Voluntary Services, 
10/10/2006. 
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 Interview 2, Keighley NPM, Bradford, 19/12/2006. 
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 Interview 5, joint interview, senior management team, Bradford Vision, 13/01/2007. 
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 Interview 11, joint interview, senior management team, Bradford Vision, 16/04/2007. 
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 Interview 5, joint interview, senior management team, Bradford Vision, 13/01/2007. 
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 Interview 2, Keighley NPM, Bradford, 19/12/2006. 
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we take it forward. This is what you heard. Communities were saying we 
don’t want to be shaped top-down any more. The top lot saying no matter 
what we do, it’s not making any difference.’70 
State-citizen proximity in Bradford was about much more than knowing each 
other better; it was clearly about deliberative problem-solving, underlining a 
belief in the collective potential within human nature: 
‘The conversation, in order for it to be more productive, needs to become 
more grown up, you know, and people need to understand from both 
sides that these are difficult decisions that have to be made … I think in 
terms of redistribution perhaps it would be helpful to get everyone around 
the table and not just the poorer communities.’71 
It explicitly did not preclude conflict, as the senior management team discuss:  
‘Partnership is not cosy. Dear god … do you want to see the scars? It’s 
bruising, partnership work.’ 
‘I think that what often gets covered up is this notion of power … pseudo 
liberal thing, you know, that we’re all being very pally. And that has to be 
brought into the room.’72 
Nonetheless, through PB (and the framework for citizen participation in which it 
sat), Bradford Vision set out to convince the state that it had nothing to fear, that 
‘in letting go they get back’.73 Power is ‘not a finite something, but an infinite 
something – and you don’t break a bit off and give it to somebody else and 
therefore you’ve got less.’74 Thus, state learning was also considered essential: 
‘In all this you cannot talk about involving and empowering people if you 
don’t at the same time talk about involving and empowering workers, 
who work with them through the public services. It’s the same story ... 
and you do one and not the other at your peril.’75 
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 Interview 5, joint interview, senior management team, Bradford Vision, 13/01/2007. 
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 Interview 2, Keighley NPM, Bradford, 19/12/2006. 
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 Interview 5, joint interview, senior management team, Bradford Vision, 13/01/2007. 
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 Interview 11, joint interview, senior management team, Bradford Vision, 16/04/2007. 
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 Interview 5, joint interview, senior management team, Bradford Vision, 13/01/2007. 
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It is noteworthy that this suggests a belief in the importance of meaningfully 
combining participatory and representative structures, despite the necessarily 
discrete nature of the Keighley process. 
Attention to local scepticism meant that the idea of PB as ‘show and tell’ was a 
recurrent theme, the value of the ‘live performance’ in creating understanding. 
Bradford Vision’s leadership were aware that ‘politicians and chief executives 
are afraid that people will just bring wish lists,’ and wanted to demonstrate that 
these fears are groundless, that communities can be seen as partners, not 
problems.76 There was an underpinning sense that the state learns through 
proximity to citizens, and thus a commitment to enabling the state to hear 
citizen voices, ‘so that they could admit their own powerlessness in this, and 
admit that they didn’t know that this was still happening in their own district.’77 
For Bradford Vision, then, one outcome of PB was that ‘it very rapidly shows … 
public services the range of things that people think they can do for themselves, 
which is helpful in terms of then deciding how you use your own budgets’.78 
While the need for the state to learn from citizens underlines a broad coherence 
between Bradford Vision’s approach and the egalitarian democratic narrative, 
the last quote reveals something very interesting about sovereignty. The 
Neighbourhood Action Planning process in Bradford was essentially state-
oriented in aims (an important point which I will discuss more fully later in the 
chapter). What the PB pilot represented was a serious attempt, led by the 
Keighley neighbourhood manager, to embed those values in a process which 
genuinely shifted power – and therefore sovereignty – towards citizens: 
‘Who decides what [the money] is spent on? Is it target driven from 
Whitehall? Or is it people in their neighbourhoods saying we want it to be 
spent on this? And that’s the question, and that’s what this is really 
throwing up, you know. And I think it should be the residents. Full stop. 
One hundred percent. And, they might get it wrong, as it were, to start 
with, but that’s OK, because they can learn that. It’s like Gandhi said: ‘we 
have the right to govern ourselves badly’; it’s that idea.’79 
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 Interview 11, joint interview, senior management team, Bradford Vision, 16/04/2007. 
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 Interview 2, Keighley NPM, Bradford, 19/12/2006. 
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This clearly goes beyond a preoccupation with reassuring the state that citizens 
will make good decisions. Indeed, it was striking that, while critics of PB in 
Bradford referenced the decision-making quality, its core advocates (unlike their 
counterparts in Newcastle) did not. I will discuss the struggles for sovereignty 
embedded in Bradford Vision’s state-facing orientation later in the chapter, but 
first I will turn to the response of the state in Bradford, the ideological roots of 
the ‘local scepticism’ that Bradford Vision was so alive to. 
DEFENCE OF THE EXISTING SYSTEM 
I have made the case that PB in its Porto Alegrean form inspires because it is 
an actually existing example of the egalitarian democratic tradition. In 
Newcastle, I have suggested that while U-Decide’s underpinning values cohere 
strongly with the egalitarian tradition, the programme was not rooted in explicit 
acknowledgement of the failures of the existing representative system. As we 
have seen, this described a limit to the transfer of sovereignty facilitated through 
the process. It was also, as a result, rather less challenging to existing power-
holders, who could support the programme without fundamentally eroding the 
ideological basis for their own mandate. 
In Bradford, where the critique of the existing system was unambiguous, the 
local administration’s attitude to participatory democracy was equally definite. 
The views of Cllr Kris Hopkins, then Conservative Leader of the Council, are 
useful in illustrating how the individualistic narrative associated with 
representative democracy is present in the rejection of PB (and of the wider 
NAP programme). This was also reflected by Keighley’s area coordinator, the 
local government officer who was the main Council contact for the Keighley PB 
process. His is an interesting perspective, because he sees himself as 
encouraging community engagement (indeed the area coordination role is 
considered the first point of contact for ‘getting involved’ with the council), but is 
strongly antipathetic to the more egalitarian model represented by PB. While 
these two individuals obviously only represent themselves, their perspective 
serves to illustrate the tension between the two democratic narratives.  
It is worth noting at this point that the views quoted here don’t artificially portray 
one end of a spectrum; they are simply those of the council officer (and ward 
councillor) most closely involved in supporting the PB process in Keighley, 
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alongside the Leader of the Council. It is hard, given the strength of feeling 
expressed, to disagree with the perspective of Bradford Vision’s senior officers: 
‘It brings things to light; that’s really interesting, the way that PB actually 
brings it out, this thing of councillors should decide, it comes again at us, 
in a way that we haven’t seen, because there’s quite a lot of good will 
about working with the NAPs really, but with PB, oh, it pops up again.’80 
I would add, there may specifically be something about a PB process which is 
rooted in an explicit challenge to the status quo.81 
Unlike Bradford Vision, then, Cllr Hopkins strongly defended the current system: 
‘The cornerstone of our country, of our democracy, is that representation; 
is that individuals, or groups of individuals, who are placed in a position 
of power, on the basis of a manifesto, and given a clear direction of steer 
over of a period of time.  They are accountable through the democratic 
process, and there is also a need to actually sustain some degree of 
stability, I think, in the direction of travel.’82 
Keighley’s area coordinator put it still more bluntly: 
‘We have what I consider to be in this country, the best democratic 
process that you can get.  I don’t think you can circumnavigate it … that’s 
why we don’t have military juntas, that’s why we don’t have drug dealers 
running things – well, some parts of town they might do, but not that 
much – and that’s why we don’t have multinational companies telling us 
what to do, either, because you’ve got that election process … This 
natural assumption that, or conclusion that people jump to, that somehow 
local authorities aren’t doing well, that they don’t do a good job, is 
absolute poppycock … The question you’re asking is, is there a better 
democratic system than the one that we’ve got already? Is there one? Is 
there one that exists anywhere?  I don’t think there is. I think what we’ve 
got is the best that we can get at the moment.’83 
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 Interview 4, Keighley area coordinator, 11/01/2007. 
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Alongside the perceived stability that Cllr Hopkins valued in representative 
democracy, both saw it as generating more valid decisions than those made by 
citizens (as is also apparent from their views on citizen capacity): 
‘That’s why we have elected members, they know they are going to be 
accountable; they know they will be held to account if things don’t go 
right … There is no way the area committee will subscribe to [PB] as a 
process for deploying its own budgets, because, like me, they firmly 
believe in that democratic process, one vote, one person, you vote for 
the person to represent you because you think that they’re the people 
who can do their best … People ask their politicians to act on their 
behalf. They’re the people’s advocates.’84 
This passage is particularly noteworthy because it incorporates the ‘social 
contract’ as legitimation for representative democracy. Here, a refusal to allow 
citizens a direct voice in decision-making is made in the name of the people, 
who are said to ‘ask’ their politicians to act on their behalf. Thus, citizens have 
neither sovereignty, nor a choice over relinquishing that sovereignty. 
Interestingly, for Cllr Hopkins, a positive view of the system did not mean the 
absence of problems. Rather, he associated the problems with attempts to 
widen participation, rather than with the existing system: 
‘We have no shortage of partnership working in this district, we have a 
shortage of outcomes … Whereabouts are the arenas where the 
principal people with cheque books, with a clear mandate from 
organizations and institutions have a way to actually deliver?  Now I am 
not sure whereabouts individual communities, outside of the democratic 
elected place … are going to be facilitated in that process, because we 
have got lots of them [participating] now, and we haven’t delivered.’85 
Thus, he regarded broader forms of democratic participation as unnecessary, 
even as problematic. Cllr Hopkins saw ‘a potential conflict between the two 
different ways of governing … [leading] open to chaos’,86 and the area 
coordinator ‘worr[ied] about systems that are brought in that actually undermine 
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 Interview 9, Kris Hopkins, Leader, Bradford Council, 30/01/2007. 
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processes that have evolved over a period of time’.87 Although, he did think 
broader participation might be necessary in some circumstances: 
‘I mean, it might be the preferable thing to do in South America, but you 
know, Bradford ain’t South America – we ain’t corrupt!’88 
In other words, the outcomes validate the process; the process does not 
determine what counts as a legitimate outcome. Accordingly, as I mentioned 
earlier, critics of PB in Bradford focused on the quality of decisions as a source 
of legitimacy (or otherwise). From this ideological standpoint, there is no right to 
participation, and so decisions viewed as poor (by the state) do not generate 
more support for or closer engagement with citizen decision-making, but 
invalidate that participation. Thus, a Keighley councillor who was actively 
engaged with the PB pilot, and very supportive of its community development 
aims, had reservations about more strategic citizen participation: 
‘We thought it was nice; we thought it was good. We thought that the 
right people got the money for the things that they felt were important for 
their area. Whether, if you started to look at bigger, more core money 
from the council, I think then we might to start to be – we would have to 
be convinced, shall I put it like that.’89 
The area coordinator was still more explicit in identifying outcomes as the 
source of legitimacy (and, likewise, the role of ‘expertise’ in judging outcomes): 
‘I won’t know [if it was worth doing] until the – in terms of the quality of 
the projects that came forward, I wasn’t particularly impressed … as an 
ex-youth worker with 25 years’ experience of taming the most difficult 
estates in this area … I will be so interested to see the evaluation of 
these projects at the end of December or whenever they are finished. 
Cos that’ll be the proof of the pudding.  And they need to be 
independently audited.’90 
These views of participatory democratic process are evidently underpinned by 
much more limited faith in citizen capacity than that displayed by Bradford 
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Vision. Thus, Cllr Hopkins believed that a participatory process would 
unavoidably result in deferral to professionals: 
‘It comes down to how, effectively, do we spend the many millions that 
we’ve got, for achieving outcomes for those people? That comes down to 
trying to have trust of professionals to be able to deliver those services, 
after engagement, and an understanding of, you know, effective 
politicians, representatives on the ground who reflect need … What will 
happen is that individuals will come to the [participatory process], and 
say we need to get some advice on this, so they will go find some more 
professionals, and they'll go and employ those, and they'll bring them 
back to the room, and they will say ‘yes, this is’, for instance, ‘the degree 
of care we should be giving to this group of people, all those in favour’.  
And actually we have got lots of people doing that already.’ 
The area coordinator was again, perhaps characteristically, blunter: 
‘If you’re asking me, do I believe that people should be responsible for 
their own futures, and they should be directly involved in shaping their 
own futures, yes, of course I do.  I just don’t believe that they can do it!’91 
Thus, he described how he thought participatory decision-making is ‘fine in 
terms of, what shall we call it, the distribution of funny money, [but] if you try to 
apply the same process to nuts and bolts everyday services, you are gonna be 
in serious trouble.’ To illustrate, he described a camping trip he organised as a 
youth worker: 
‘We thought we would do a little bit of what we now call participatory 
budgeting. I had six quid per head to spend on those kids for that 
weekend for food. I said to the kids, what do you want to do?  Do you 
want me to buy the stuff, and I’ll get everything, and we’ll make sure 
you’ve got what you need, and we’ll run it over the weekend, or, would 
you like the six pounds each, you can go off and decide what you want to 
get. So, what do people say? The six pounds …  At the end of the day, 
almost every one of those kids, by the time it got to 9 o’clock on the 
Saturday evening, bearing in mind we’d set off on the Friday, were 
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screaming that they’ve got nothing to eat, they had run out of money, 
what were we gonna do. The fact remains, when you’re looking at things 
like highways, when you’re looking at things like street lighting, when 
you’re looking about the a whole complicated issues of things like 
cleansing services, social services, services to younger people, all that 
kind of stuff that’s going on – you can’t tell me that local people living on 
[an] estate are going to be able to make informed decisions on where 
they are going to spend limited budgets.  It ain’t gonna happen. They 
won’t be able to do it. Because if you have a fixed budget, and you say to 
people, they could spend all their money on speed-bumps. What 
happens when the streetlights start going out? What happens when the 
Police Community Support officer ain’t there?’92 
In this view, service provision is about expertise – ‘years and years of training’, 
and ‘you can’t train everybody up on a housing estate or in a neighbourhood’.93 
This does not, of course, imply that defenders of the representative system 
don’t believe citizens are capable of being trained. Clearly, officers and 
councillors are understood to be citizens who have acquired a level of expertise, 
which, alongside their representative democratic mandate, qualifies them to 
made decisions on public funds.94 However, what is noteworthy (and again a 
striking contrast with the Bradford Vision perspective) is the absence of any 
suggestion that citizens bring additional knowledge to the consideration of their 
own circumstances, over and above that which can be provided by experts. 
It follows that control of resources is safest left in the hands of the experts: 
‘We can allow people to experiment, because we can take it in the neck 
when things go wrong.  We can provide safety nets. I forgot to say, the 
burger story: there was actually two cardboard boxes full of salad, 
burgers, pork, all the, super economy gristle burgers, bait for the fishing 
tackle, and some fish fingers and all that. So we were a bit clever there, 
because I wouldn’t dream of allowing people to make those choices.  
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 In the case of councillors, the assumption of expertise is perhaps a little more complicated 
than in the case of officers, resting on the view that the people have chosen their 
representatives on the basis that they believe they are the best people to do the job. 
Furthermore, as Cllr Hopkins made clear, there is an expectation that elected representatives 
will be guided by experts.  
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You can do it with bits, yeah, maybe, but in terms of basic services that 
people need, you just can’t trust, you cannot trust ordinary Joe and 
Jenny Public to make the right decisions, and I know that sounds 
extremely negative but, they can’t afford to get it wrong! Can they?’95 
Unsurprisingly, the state critique of PB also revealed limited faith in the human 
potential for cooperation and collective decision-making. For Cllr Hopkins: 
‘Actually, the more people you put into the room, the more different views 
you are going to get … I think it will just be another mechanism in which 
representation comes out of it, a representative form of governance 
comes out of it, because you won’t actually get a common overall 
response from the other mechanism.’96 
Conflict was thus seen as problematic, in contrast to understanding it as a 
necessary condition for negotiated solidarity. It was, therefore, equally 
unsurprising that Cllr Hopkin’s view of appropriate citizen engagement was 
actually more about experts educating citizens, not in terms of democratic skills, 
but rather, education as engagement: 
‘How do you actually get the public to engage, when, I remember a while 
ago, white bread's bad for you, brown bread, potatoes, don’t drink coffee, 
do drink wine, there are all these different messages coming out for 
people, and it's on the ground that dialogue can go on, where you can 
unpick myths, and actually attempt to lay facts in front of individuals, 
where I think that's really important that we do engage. Now is that about 
participatory or is it about education?’ 97 
In this view, citizens are not partners, but vessels – or sources of problems to 
be solved. Thus, as the 2006-2008 NAP round through which Bradford Vision 
trialled PB came to an end, an officer from the area coordinator’s office 
suggested that ‘the NAP is not necessarily the right place for residents’, 
because they want somewhere to take their issues, they want them to be acted 
on, and ‘this is too slow paced for them’.98 In the run-up to the demise of 
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Bradford Vision, the ideas and values inherent in their approach, that citizens 
may need support to participate but have something valuable to bring to the 
decision-making table, were visibly being eroded.  
In keeping with the assumption that citizens want ‘somewhere to take their 
issues to be acted on’, rather than involvement in solving problems, there were 
clear doubts about democratic motivation, despite the levels of participation in 
Keighley. The goal of budget literacy was described as ‘fantastic idealism, 
because I don’t actually believe that people care that much about that … when 
you go to a restaurant, do you expect someone to hand you the wok?’99 
Interestingly, both the area coordinator and the ward councillor most involved 
with the PB process were suspicious of the Eastwood turnout, wondering if they 
were ‘pushed into it … and they didn’t really know what they were voting for 
until they got there.’100 Thus, for the area coordinator, mobilising ‘a hundred and 
odd people, you know, in order to sway the vote in the afternoon’ demonstrated 
that the process was ‘easy to rip off’.101 When I suggested that the people I 
spoke to did seem to know what they were there for, he asked: 
‘But is there not an issue there?  Is the issue about motivation; is it the 
issue?’102 
And, indeed, perhaps it is. In thinking about the democratic deficit, the Bradford 
case echoes the U-Decide debates over acceptable democratic motivation. As 
we have seen, within the egalitarian tradition the desire for change via 
mobilisation around your needs and your local cause are understood to be, not 
only acceptable, but arguably necessary for democratic motivation. If, within the 
tradition reflected by the UK’s existing system, these things are dismissed as 
inappropriate motivation, the question arises of what does count. 
Following the reasoning presented in the last chapter, the answer appears to be 
that only ‘representative’ democratic motivation is understood to be legitimate. If 
you enter the decision-making arena, then the implicit expectation within the 
prevailing tradition is that you will aim to make decisions on behalf of your 
community, rather than participating as an individual (significantly, in opposition 
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to a primary principle of PB in Porto Alegre). This logic generates the view that 
participation in real decisions is not in citizens’ best interests, because you are 
personally accountable, not just for your own view, but for the overall decisions, 
as expressed here: 
‘Well, let me tell you what happens. Ordinary Joe and Jenny Public, who 
are involved in the process, end up with their windows being poked 
through, and they end up with their children being beaten up on the 
street.  That’s what happens, because not 100% of people are willing to 
take on responsibility for that decision-making … Someone has to sit in a 
room with a committee and represent the local community.  When a 
councillor does it, they know what they’re letting themselves in for – 
they’re elected by due process … I think it’s very naïve for people to 
assume that you can actually motivate a whole community and people 
are gonna be happy with decisions being made for them by what’s 
essentially it’s their neighbours … All this “power to the people” stuff is 
fine, but with power comes responsibility, and are people prepared to be 
accountable to that extent?’103  
Participatory processes are therefore suspect because, in the words of the area 
coordinator: 
‘Even though it looks good with 500 people turning up, there is no 
guarantee that those people are either representative of their 
communities that they come from, or secondly, have the mandate to 
represent that local community … [and] somebody who’s self-referring, 
from an association, group or partnership, cannot detach themselves 
from their own self-interests.’104 
The critique of PB in Bradford clearly demonstrates, not only a rejection of the 
fundamental tenets of the egalitarian tradition (namely, citizen capacity for 
collective decision-making, and the right to participate as a sovereign 
individual), but a staunch faith in the current system as the best possible system 
(a system on which, of course, the positions of both elected representatives and 
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council officers depend).105 By implication, the only possible responses to the 
democratic deficit, within this framework, must therefore be ‘demand-side’. 
Accordingly, there was a degree of conscious possessiveness over sovereignty, 
which (understandably, given the centralisation of power in the UK system) is 
felt to be limited at local level. Thus, the drive for participation was described as 
‘quite honestly, a process that’s disempowering local authorities,’106 and 
unrealistic to boot: 
‘What flexibility have we actually got to actually spend, and drive through 
individual activities? … I am the Leader of the council, but 90 odd 
percent, probably, of the things I have to do are actually sent down by 
somebody else.  I just get to steer the boat across a few degrees.’107 
A MEETING OF DEMOCRATIC NARRATIVES? 
As I have discussed, a key feature of Bradford’s PB pilot (and the ideologically 
congruent neighbourhood programme within which it sat) was that it was state-
facing. In Newcastle, the state looked outwards to communities, and sought to 
bring them in. In Bradford, a quasi-autonomous public body looked to a 
sceptical state, and tried to convince them. Thus, the primary focus after the 
event was ‘making the case’ to budget holders.108 Given the gulf between the 
response of citizens and the response of the state, this was perhaps 
unsurprising, as the Keighley neighbourhood manager articulated: 
‘You know, the reason all the people from Eastwood came was the 
parents meeting at Eastwood School the week before. Once they 
understood that their presence in the room would make an actual 
difference on who got money in their neighbourhood they came. So that’s 
why the argument with the service providers and agencies is so 
important. You know, if we win that argument the residents’ bit, as long 
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it is important to recognise the power dynamics inherent in any meeting of the two narratives. 
106
 Interview 4, Keighley area coordinator, 11/01/2007. 
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 Interview 9, Kris Hopkins, Leader, Bradford Council, 30/01/2007. 
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 Participant observation record: informal interview, Bradford Vision, 24/10/2007. 
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as it’s done properly, and resourced properly and managed sensibly and 
all the rest of it, I think that will take care of itself. I really do.’109 
In the run-up to Bradford Vision’s demise, there was an evident urgency around 
embedding the organisation’s ‘political change’ legacy. However, beyond the 
practical exigencies facing particular actors in particular circumstances, I want 
to reflect on the how the realities of an encounter between two democratic 
narratives can impact on the potential for citizen democratic learning. 
In my view, the orientation towards the state in Bradford had two major practical 
implications. Firstly, no citizens were invited to be involved in the PB planning 
process, a dynamic which appeared to arise through an intense effort to engage 
the local voluntary sector and local state in Keighley, with the ambition of 
building local ownership and embedding PB beyond the remit (and potentially 
limited lifespan) of Bradford Vision. The ‘sifting day’ (called the scrutiny panel in 
Bradford) did not include citizens, but was made up of 2 local councillors, 4 
public sector officers from the area coordinator’s office, health, police and 
children’s services, and one voluntary sector worker. Arguably, the emphasis on 
persuading the state shaped the process design. Where Newcastle emphasised 
the role of the process in allowing citizens to develop these skills, in Bradford 
this was plainly balanced with a felt need to build support from unconvinced 
power-holders (for example, emphasising the need for strategic partnerships to 
be present, in terms of who needed to be convinced that it should happen 
again).110 In this vein, organisers expressed concerns about finding citizens for 
the scrutiny panel ‘who are at that stage’ of thinking critically about the process, 
and not just articulating demands.111 
It is important to note that organisers considered citizen involvement a primary 
goal, and identified their absence from earlier stages of the process as a 
weakness (in other words, citizens weren’t absent because of a lack of faith in 
their capacities for involvement), but considered the need to build political will 
and ownership to be a paramount goal. Thus, organisers reflected that: 
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 Interview 2, Keighley NPM, Bradford, 19/12/2006. 
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 Participant observation record: PB Planning Meeting, Keighley Voluntary Services, 
10/10/2006. 
111
 Participant observation record: informal interview, Bradford Vision, 17/07/2006. 
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‘If all those residents that were there last month all started jumping up 
and down at once and saying we demand this next year or else, that 
would probably be counterproductive at this stage you know, because it 
would be like, oh god, we’ve stirred up a real hornets’ nest here.’112 
While the views described above demonstrate that this fear was not unfounded, 
it is an unambiguous illustration of how the tension between the two democratic 
narratives serves to constrain opportunities for democratic learning by citizens. 
The neighbourhood programme was also ‘state-facing’ in its tendency to focus 
on conflict with the state, in particular between power-holders and communities. 
However, the aim was to overcome this, rather than facilitate communities 
‘contesting’ the state. Importantly, it also served to downplay conflict across or 
within communities, who were seen to ‘want the same things, better health, they 
want less cancer and heart disease and those sorts of things.’113 This contrasts 
revealingly with the ‘negotiated solidarity’ between communities in Porto Alegre, 
which I have called the ‘practice of citizenship’, and which reflects a genuine 
shift in sovereignty from the state to the people.  
Secondly, the focus on the state generated a felt imperative that the work could 
not be seen to be political. Thus, an early internal document which highlighted 
the redistributive aspects of PB was vetoed as ‘too political’, and great efforts 
were made to stress the connections to ideologies across the political spectrum: 
‘It comes from a left wing … radical socialist background, and good on 
them, I say, but that’s not useful if you’re going to be working with people 
who don’t have those opinions … If you want to mainstream something, 
you’ve got to be able to describe it in other ways.’114 
Importantly, this was not because organisers disagreed with the social justice 
potential, but, rather, reflects a pragmatic attempt to sidestep opposition. 
Tellingly, not only was the main organiser (who was inspired by Porto Alegre) 
doubtful as to ‘whether that circle can actually be squared’,115 but, as the views 
above suggest, it seems the powerful were not wholly convinced either. 
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The fate of Bradford Vision – despite this cautiousness – underlines the reality 
of the tension that Bradford’s participatory democracy advocates were trying to 
negotiate. Consequently, these observations are not intended to simplistically 
imply that a different approach would have more successfully embedded a 
democratic alternative. However, exploring the detail of how the two traditions 
interact within serious attempts to challenge the democratic status quo can help 
us understand the ways in which sovereignty shifts – and the ways in which 
those who hold power within the existing system can and do resist its capture. 
CONCLUSION 
PB in Bradford unequivocally belongs to the ‘supply-side’ family of approaches 
to the democratic deficit, and demonstrates a clear citizen response to a 
different form of politics. Following the analysis of the deficit which I presented 
in chapter 4, PB evidently holds the potential to connect a citizenry which is 
willing to be active (but unpersuaded by conventional politics as an effective 
means to do this) with the state. 
Nonetheless, Bradford also illustrates the difficulties inherent in – and, I would 
say, the central importance of – working to enact a concrete shift in sovereignty 
from the state to the people. Arguably, the tension in Bradford exists in the 
distinction between democratic activists within the state working to create space 
for citizens, and a genuine alliance with citizens who demand that space (as 
represented by PB in Porto Alegre). This returns us centrally to the question 
raised by Baiocchi et al, in their comparison of ‘non-ideal’ municipalities with 
and without PB (discussed in chapter 6), and the core question of my thesis: 
how can the appetite to demand egalitarian democratic process be built in 
systems which are fundamentally rooted in an elitist, possessive-individualist 
democratic narrative? 
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CHAPTER 10 
CONCLUSION 
In this study, I set out to explore the question of ‘democratic appetite’ in the UK, 
with the aim of understanding what might make more of us choose to be 
democratically active. The conceptual framework for my analysis is provided by 
a historical account of democratic meaning-making, which counterposes two 
traditions of thought and action, the elitist democratic narrative and the 
egalitarian democratic narrative. This framework offers a lens through which we 
can understand the normative practice of citizenship (and the performance of 
the state) in the UK. 
With this in mind, I examined the nature of what is known as the democratic 
deficit, in order to understand the context for UK citizens’ expression of 
democratic appetite. I took a close look at the underlying values and 
assumptions embedded in the structures and practices of the UK democratic 
system, alongside a review of the formal and informal civic behaviour of its 
citizens. I present a view which problematises the easy verdict of citizens as 
‘apathetic’, and identifies the UK system as deeply rooted in the elitist 
democratic narrative. This contrasts strongly with the example provided by 
Porto Alegrean PB, where an egalitarian model of democracy has generated a 
significant and inspiring response in terms of citizen engagement. 
I then followed this inspiration on its journey to the UK, in order to explore the 
potential for a similar response in our very different context. The two case 
studies considered here offer empirical evidence of the potential for increased 
democratic appetite, as a result of a more egalitarian democratic experience. 
Importantly, they also provide an opportunity to get under the skin of the values 
and assumptions animating the practice of citizenship, and the ways in which 
opportunities for engagement are shaped by different (elected and unelected) 
actors within the state. 
Thus, the experience of participatory budgeting offers a window on the 
manifestation of UK democratic thought and action. Though small in scale and 
limited by competing norms and practices, PB can be used to create an 
alternative (and, for many, unfamiliar) experience of direct citizen decision-
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making, rooted in egalitarian democratic values. Its underlying assumptions – 
that citizens are civically capable (and capable of learning), that democracy is 
fundamentally collective and that sovereignty should rest with the people not the 
state – strike a powerful chord with participating citizens. Such citizens 
commonly share a more critical view of the existing democratic system, which is 
often described as distant, unresponsive and bureaucratic. Crucially, increased 
citizen participation is connected to the desire for different outcomes.  
The evidence therefore suggests that an important aspect of the democratic 
deficit is to be found in the gulf between what attracts citizens to the idea of 
democracy and civic participation, and the reality they observe or encounter in 
the dominant representative system. This arises because the values 
underpinning the UK democratic system present a marked contrast to those 
embodied by PB. Our system is ideologically (not only pragmatically) 
representative in that it presumes the necessity and value of an expert political 
class, who, by virtue of their enhanced civic capacity, hold sovereignty in place 
of the people. In addition to the resultant mismatch between citizen democratic 
desires and democratic experiences, this creates a set of internalised ‘truths’, 
shared across the democratic terrain (i.e. by state actors and citizens), that 
politics is the job of politicians, the domain of experts, that politics is ultimately 
not our job as citizens (and moreover, that it is a job we may not necessarily be 
equipped to do).1 This illustrates the degree to which the democratic deficit is 
profoundly associated with the location of sovereignty. 
From this conceptual divide, we can infer two different perspectives or 
standpoints from which democracy – and the democratic deficit – is considered. 
I have referred to these as a ‘citizen-eye view’ and an ‘engineer’s-eye view’. 
These perspectives illustrate the presumed location of sovereignty. We look at 
democracy from the place where sovereignty is held – or (perhaps more 
accurately) from the place where we think it should be held. Therefore, if our 
aim is to shift sovereignty towards citizens, I suggest that we need to start by 
looking at the system from a ‘citizen-eye’ perspective. 
Taking this ‘citizen-eye’ view, the primary question is: what does it look like to 
participate in this system? The evidence from Newcastle and Bradford 
                                                                
1
 As I suggested in chapter 8, it is plausible that this perception is felt still more strongly by 
citizens who are less easily engaged with alternative democratic experiences such as PB.  
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corroborates that from Porto Alegre; in a democratic system, your participation 
has to matter. In other words, it needs to be clear – to you as a citizen – how 
your participation connects to outcomes. This, of course, does not mean that 
individual citizens would always be successful in achieving their aims, but it 
does mean that you must be able to see how and why decisions are reached in 
each process that you engage with, and to know that you have had adequate 
opportunity to express your views and participate in the decision-making 
process. It means that the process – if not always the outcome – must be 
changed by your engagement. It also implies a particular understanding of 
legitimate democratic motivation, that we participate to push for the changes we 
understand as necessary, whether that relates to our own unmet needs, or a 
personal conception of the society we want to live in.  
This brings us to another question evoked by taking a citizen-eye view: what 
does democracy feel like? The understanding of legitimate democratic 
motivation suggested above implies that it feels like an action. It is a mode of 
being: something we do, not something we have. And it is ongoing, a journey. 
As I argued in chapter 5, if each new citizen comes to a democratic process in 
order to act, to contribute to change, there cannot be a final conclusion or an 
endpoint. The potential for conflict is therefore an inescapable element of 
democracy (as is the need to provide the means for it to be mediated). This was 
recognised instinctively by many participants in the egalitarian democratic 
spaces I have presented here. The experience from Porto Alegre illustrates how 
a process of this type foregrounds social conflicts, but also offers the potential 
for building solidarity. Thus, it provides a platform for the difficult process of 
negotiating a collective voice. If we as citizens are reaching a decision together, 
rather than offering our individual voices to the state so that it can use the 
information we provide to make decisions on our behalf, then the ability to 
speak together, to deliberate, to listen and to judge, are placed centre-stage. 
Arguably, a citizen-eye view of democracy is necessarily collective. 
All this has one absolutely fundamental implication. If the participation and 
judgement of every participating citizen matters, then the democratic process 
must determine the outcomes reached. This is categorically not to suggest that 
participating citizens are indifferent to the quality of outcomes, but simply that 
outcomes need to be validated by democratic process (not used to validate it). 
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Thus, as I discussed in chapter 4, a framework which specifies acceptable 
values by which to judge democratic decisions (for example, the neoliberal 
emphasis on efficiency and economy) does not accord with a citizen-eye view 
of democracy. From a citizen’s perspective, while some might (and some might 
not!) want to pre-set the destination in keeping with our own view of the world, 
as participants looking up – not power-holders looking down – we are not the 
people who get to choose the values and outcomes by which the ‘powers that 
be’ all too often presume to validate the process. Therefore, if outcomes matter 
to us, they must be determined within the democratic process. This is where 
we, as citizens, can have the opportunity to change things – to be sovereign. 
Within the representative democratic tradition, assessments of democracy too 
often approximate an ‘engineer’s-eye view’ rather than a ‘citizen-eye view’ 
(which perhaps in part explains why this perspective so often fails to inspire 
those looking at democracy from a very different place). In the US constitutional 
debates, Hamilton, Madison and Jay approached the federal government as the 
stage they would occupy – and reached very different conclusions to the Anti-
Federalists, who regarded it as the bid of an elite to rule over them. In Porto 
Alegrean PB, the state was expected to honour the decisions reached through 
the participatory forum. In Newcastle and Bradford, the idea of the state-
approved quality of outcomes emerged as critical in debates over process. 
The idea of a ‘right answer’, a set of outcomes which can validate or invalidate a 
democratic system, suggests that democracy is worthwhile because it produces 
the best outcomes (though this always begs the question, in whose opinion). 
Alternatively, we might argue, a priori, that it is the best system, distinct from the 
outcomes it generates. This carries the inference (supported by a close look at 
citizen motivations in Newcastle and Bradford) that people place an explicit 
value on self-determination (arguably, this is felt particularly strongly in 
situations where there is an equivalent distrust of the agendas of the powerful). 
In this sense, egalitarian democracy highlights the appropriate role of the state 
as facilitating our collective freedom to choose. This illustrates how PB, by 
reimagining the relationship between citizens and the state, poses fundamental 
questions. To what extent can the state be a collective expression of our 
political will? Or, is democracy what politicians do, and can it therefore be 
separated from citizen participation on instrumental (outcome-based) grounds? 
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Is being a good democracy non-negotiable, or is it a value to be weighed 
against other ‘goods’? In other words, to what extent is democracy a means (to 
good governance) and to what extent an end (the right to self-determination)?  
Importantly, neither of the two arguments for democracy that I have presented 
diminishes the importance of outcomes. However, the logical extension of the 
first argument is that ‘bad’ outcomes (again, in whose opinion?) can be used to 
justify a reduction in democracy; therefore it risks strengthening authoritarian 
rather than democratic tendencies within a system.2 Conversely, the logical 
extension of the second argument is that disputed or controversial outcomes 
direct our attention to improving the quality of democratic opportunities. Thus, in 
chapter 5, I quoted democratic activist Sergio Baierle: ‘the rules are important, 
so dissatisfied people can organise better for the next PB cycle’ (Baierle, 
2002:4). 
For this reason, holding the definition of the ‘right answer’ outside the 
democratic process ultimately tends to make sense to existing power holders, in 
other words, the actors who perceive themselves as having the entitlement (and 
the opportunity) to define that ‘right answer’. In contrast, egalitarian democracy 
tends to make more sense to the ‘ruled’, to people who (under the existing 
arrangements, at least) are only ever likely to have someone else’s vision of the 
‘right answer’ imposed on them. This is reinforced by the evidence from 
Newcastle, and more particularly Bradford, that dissatisfaction with existing 
outcomes is a powerful motivating force towards alternative forms of democratic 
engagement (by extension, those that are better served by the outcomes that 
the existing system produces are less likely to feel the need for change). 
As I discussed in chapter 3 (with reference to the US constitutional debates), 
the two democratic traditions (and so the two associated ‘views’ I am presenting 
here) rest on opposing understandings of accountability. In the elitist tradition, 
the people are ultimately accountable to government, which is responsible for 
containing our excesses and ensuring our participation is constructive. In the 
egalitarian tradition, the people are responsible for containing the tendency of 
government to exercise power undemocratically. This reminds us that 
                                                                
2
 For example, the European Union sanctioned the installation of unelected ‘technocrats’ in both 
Greece and Italy in 2011, in response to ‘outcomes’ they considered undesirable. Similarly, 
Jessop (2014) reviews ongoing patterns of American and European ‘depoliticisation’ (the 
removal of key areas of decision-making from democratic control) in response to fiscal crisis. 
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government is not neutral, but made up of actors, with associated perspectives, 
agendas and goals, which – if outcomes are to be determined by democratic 
process – we can democratically choose to reject.  
However, as the distinction between the likely holders of these different views 
(regarding external validation for outcomes) makes clear, this is not merely a 
conceptual distinction. Rather, it is ultimately about who has power, and what 
the limits to that power are – not the extent to which all citizens share any 
particular (state-sanctioned) vision of the ‘right answer’. As illustrated in the US 
constitutional debates, in the fate of Porto Alegrean PB after 2004, and in the 
struggles for democratic meaning in Newcastle and Bradford, a genuine 
challenge to elite power is most often resisted by those who hold that power. 
Not every response to the democratic deficit rests on an underlying belief that 
more people should be involved in exercising power.  
In a sense, this is about recognising that the representative system is an 
arbitrary moment to ‘halt’ democracy. The arguments for representative 
democracy as opposed to dictatorship carry the same logical weight if applied to 
direct democracy as opposed to representative democracy (as I quoted US 
revolutionary Ebenezer Fox suggesting, in chapter 3). This issue was illustrated 
in both Newcastle and Bradford, with reference to the problematic role played 
by some ‘experienced reps’ (whose voices were already included in the system) 
and some voluntary associations (who have been strongly given to understand 
that there is power in representing others). Thus, a citizen-eye perspective 
implies attention to the inclusion of those voices which are not present. 
Porto Alegrean democratic activists have suggested that one response to anti-
democratic hegemonic thought is to encourage reflection on political aspects of 
decision-making processes, in order to deepen participants’ understanding of 
them as democratically radical (Baierle, 2003:302). In other words, promoting 
alternative decision-making spaces doesn’t defend public resources against 
elite power unless they are explicitly politicised (for activists in Porto Alegre, this 
means, among other things, foregrounding a social justice motivation).  
The evidence from Newcastle appears to support this line of thought. Delinking 
processes from explicit criticism of the existing system can facilitate non-
transformative support for discrete democratic experiments which do not 
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ultimately push for a shift in sovereignty within the wider system. However, the 
Bradford case illustrates the ‘naked’ response of the state to an unmistakable 
challenge. A direct challenge clearly compromises the ability of actors within the 
system to hold open spaces for even discrete democratic experiments (which, 
while they may not be transformational in a systemic sense, can still be a 
‘school for citizenship’, as I have shown).  
Taken together, therefore, the evidence from Newcastle and Bradford appears 
mixed, from the point of view of an egalitarian democratic activist considering 
effective responses to the democratic deficit. On the one hand, in both cases it 
is striking that even a limited experience of a different kind of democracy can 
generate meaningful civic learning and – importantly – an answering expression 
of democratic appetite from citizens. Accordingly, it seems clear that building 
and protecting opportunities for a more egalitarian democratic experience is an 
appropriate response to the democratic deficit. 
On the other hand, turning our attention to the ‘supply-side’ problem of the 
democratic deficit, in relation to Baierle’s plea for more discussion of the political 
elements of PB, the learning from Newcastle and Bradford appears to suggest 
that we are ‘damned if we do, damned if we don’t.’ While this might seem 
disheartening, it can also be read as no more than a realistic assessment of 
sovereignty in the UK system as deeply entrenched, and not readily 
relinquished by its current holders. What a clearly articulated understanding of 
this situation can offer democratic activists is a mental checklist when faced with 
a decision-making arena. Where is sovereignty held within this situation, and 
where is sovereignty held over it? What safeguards can we fight for to increase 
or protect citizen sovereignty? How can the articulation between the egalitarian 
space and the representative system be increased? Where are the arenas in 
which citizens can learn the practice of citizenship (for example, opportunities 
for the negotiation of a collective citizen voice, and citizen-facing problem-
solving decision-making)?  
I started this thesis with a reflection on the limits of (still valuable) democratic 
theory which offers motivated citizens conceptual tools for more meaningful 
engagement (or which articulate an idea of what a ‘better’ democracy might look 
like). A ‘checklist’ such as the one I have just outlined only moves beyond these 
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limits if it is categorically about creating spaces for ‘learning democracy’ and so 
supporting any or all citizens to participate, rather than how to have a 
democratic voice in pursuit of your goals.  
An associated response to the democratic deficit, therefore, alongside 
highlighting the value of egalitarian democratic decision-making experiences, is 
a call for democratic activists – not simply active democrats. It is clear from the 
many and ongoing struggles over democratic values and assumptions that 
egalitarian democracy is not a ‘thing’ that we as a society can put down and 
expect to go on existing. It is a mode of being that exists only when we practice 
it, and it is beset by powerful and hostile interests. It is, perhaps surprisingly, 
fragile. It therefore needs activists to protect, defend and reinvigorate it, to hold 
open spaces for more people to cultivate and express a democratic appetite, to 
learn citizenship.  
As I discussed in chapter 4, powerful interests with an ideological agenda 
around narrowing or impoverishing the democratic arena actively shape the 
public understanding of democracy. But democracy is not neutral, and it is not 
static. Addressing the democratic deficit requires an equal and opposite effort to 
create ideological spaces for the particular, egalitarian democratic values which, 
the evidence suggests, are likely to offer more meaningful potential for inspiring 
wider and greater democratic engagement. Therefore, I suggest that democratic 
activists need clarity on the goal of exposing the poverty of what is commonly 
meant by democracy, in order to help carve out space for other visions (and 
resist those visions being tamed). In other words, if the hegemonic view goes 
unchallenged, then the system goes unchanged – and the democratic deficit 
remains.  
My ‘checklist’ is emphatically not a democratic ‘how-to’ guide. A citizen-eye view 
doesn’t obviate the need to think about design, but much like the outcomes 
which must be determined within the democratic arena, it implies that we should 
ask where the opportunities exist for us all to be democratic ‘engineers’. Thus, 
in Porto Alegrean PB, citizens co-design the democratic system; if the rules 
weren’t working, then citizens could change the rules. This highlights that the 
emphasis Baierle places on political discussion with citizens is not out of place 
in the UK context. Although a hostile local environment might at times call for a 
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pragmatic stance in dialogue with the state, the analysis I have presented 
suggests that a more political engagement with citizens is important in 
broadening democratic ownership and ultimately sovereignty. This does not of 
course rule out identifying deliberately subversive actors within the state, with 
whom we can build alliances – and in so doing, inviting the shared expression 
of values which the dominant ideology tries to privatise. 
Accordingly, even as this underlines the inspiration available from actually 
existing egalitarian democratic processes such as Porto Alegrean PB, it 
reinforces the importance of not simply trying to replicate them. For example, if, 
as in Newcastle and Bradford, there is an identified need to rebuild community 
in order to support the collective character of democracy (arguably, the need to 
undo the individualising tendencies of capitalist, neoliberal hegemonic thought), 
then citizens in that context need to work on how best to address that problem. 
Moreover, the formal democratic process is just one arena for the expression of 
citizenship and counter-hegemonic democratic values. Indeed, in some 
circumstances, it may be that other (more adversarial) arenas offer more fruitful 
avenues in hostile democratic environments. For example, as I touched upon in 
chapter 3, one of the impetuses driving the organised labour movement was a 
response to anti-democratic ideological forces. The loss of that ‘school for 
citizenship’ is often noted or lamented by democratic commentators, though 
there is less apparent attention to how and where it could be replaced. In a 
similar vein, workplace democracy offers an arena for democratising decisions 
in relation to ‘private’ finance (notably explored by Carol Pateman, 1970). 
The reality of our context, and of the wider ideological forces acting on the 
manifestation of democratic opportunities, means that genuinely alternative 
democratic arenas may be closed down or co-opted. The evidence presented 
here suggests that the (collaborative and citizen-facing) effort to create and hold 
open such spaces, even if short-lived, is worthwhile. What cannot be closed 
down is the egalitarian democratic tradition, which has animated democratic 
struggles in many times and places, in the service of social justice. 
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APPENDIX 1: OVERVIEW OF INTERVIEW DATA 
BRADFORD 
Reference Date Interviewee/s 
1i-1xviii. 25/11/2006 18 short interviews, each with between 1 & 5 
participants, Keighley Decision Day. 
2.  19/12/2006 Keighley Neighbourhood Partnership Manager. 
3.  09/01/2007 Voluntary Sector Community Development Worker, 
Keighley. 
4.  11/01/2007 Local government officer, Keighley. 
5.  13/01/2007 Joint interview, senior management team, Bradford 
Vision. 
6.  16/01/2007 Voluntary Sector officer, Keighley. 
7.  16/01/2007 Ward councillor, Keighley. 
8.  22/01/2007 Neighbourhood Partnership Manager, Bradford 
Vision. 
9.  30/01/2007 Cllr Kris Hopkins, Leader, Bradford Council, 
Conservative. 
10.  26/02/2007 Community activist, Bradford. 
11.  16/04/2007 Joint interview, senior management team, Bradford 
Vision. 
 
NEWCASTLE 
Reference Date Interviewee/s 
12i-12xi. 15/11/2008 11 short interviews, each with between 1 & 8 
participants, Newburn Grand Voting Event. 
13.  17/11/2008 Ward councillor, Newburn. 
14.  17/11/2008 Ward councillor, Newburn. 
15i-15xiv. 18/11/2008 14 short interviews, each with between 1 & 6 young 
people (plus a total of 4 parents and 1 teacher), 
Walkergate Grand Voting Event. 
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16.  27/11/2008 Joint interview, council officers, Social Policy Unit, 
Newcastle Council. 
17.  28/11/2008 Working group member, Newburn ward. 
18.  28/11/2008 Joint interview, area coordinators, Newcastle 
Council. 
19i-19xi. 29/11/2008 11 short interviews, each with between 1 & 5 
participants, Denton Grand Voting Event. 
20.  29/11/2008 Ward councillor, Walkergate. 
21.  03/12/2008 Council officer, Social Policy Unit, Newcastle 
Council. 
22.  26/01/2009 Cllr John Shipley, Leader, Newcastle Council, 
Liberal Democrat. 
23.  26/01/2009 Group interview, 3 youth group members, Newburn 
ward. 
24.  27/01/2009 Ward councillor, Denton. 
25.  28/01/2009 Ward councillor, Denton. 
26.  16/02/2009 Group interview, 4 working group members, 
Newburn ward. 
27.  02/03/2009 Cllr David Faulkner, deputy Leader, Newcastle 
Council, Liberal Democrat. 
28.  20/03/2009 Working group member, Denton ward. 
29.  20/03/2009 Working group member, Denton ward. 
30.  26/03/2009 Group interview, 3 working group members, Denton 
ward. 
31.  26/03/2009 Joint interview, working group members, Newburn 
ward. 
32.  27/03/2009 Community development worker, Newcastle 
Council. 
33.  02/04/2009 Working group member, Denton ward. 
34.  15/07/2009 Group interview, 4 council officers, Social Policy 
Unit, Newcastle Council. 
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APPENDIX 2: PUBLICATIONS RELATED TO THIS STUDY 
Blakey, Heather (2008) ‘Radical innovation or technical fix? Participatory 
budgeting in the UK: how Latin American participatory traditions are 
reinterpreted in the British context’, Popular Sovereignty, 1(1) on-line journal 
published by CIDADE, Porto Alegre. Available at: 
http://www.ongcidade.org/site/php/Revista/revista.php. 
 
Blakey, Heather (2009) “People taking control”: U-Decide in Newcastle. 
Bradford: International Centre for Participation Studies, Department of Peace 
Studies, University of Bradford. 
 
Blakey, Heather (2010) ‘Bradford: professionalised participation in a Northern 
de-industrialised city’. In: Jenny Pearce (Ed.) Participation and democracy in the 
twenty-first century city. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.180-204. 
 
Blakey, Heather (2011) ‘Fairness in participatory decision-making: the 
relationship between participation and deliberation in UK participatory budgeting 
processes’, Irish Journal of Public Policy, 3(1).  
 
 
 270 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Abers, Rebecca N. (1996) ‘From ideas to practice: the Partido dos 
Trabalhadores and participatory governance in Brazil’, Latin American 
Perspectives, 23(4):35-53. 
Abers, Rebecca N. (1998) ‘From clientelism to cooperation: local government, 
participatory policy and civic organising in Porto Alegre’, Politics and 
Society, 26(4):511-537. 
Abers, Rebecca N. (2000) Inventing local democracy: grassroots politics in 
Brazil. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Abers, Rebecca N. (2003) ‘Reflections on what makes empowered participatory 
governance happen’. In: Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright (Eds.) Deepening 
democracy: institutional innovations in empowered participatory 
governance. London: Verso, pp.200-207. 
Adler, Patricia A. & Peter Adler (1998) ‘Observational techniques’. In: Norman 
K. Denzin & Yvonna S. Lincoln (Eds.) Collecting and interpreting 
qualitative materials. Thousand Oaks: Sage, pp.79-109. 
Allegretti, Giovanni & Carsten Herzberg (2004) Participatory budgets in Europe: 
between efficiency and growing local democracy. TNI briefing, no. 5. 
Amsterdam: Transnational Institute. 
Almond, Gabriel & Sidney Verba (1963) The civic culture. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Amery, Leopold S. (1948) Thoughts on the constitution. London: Oxford 
University Press. 
Arrow, Kenneth J. (1963) Social choice and individual values. New York: John 
Wiley & Sons (2nd edtn). 
Avritzer, Leonardo (2006) ‘New public spheres in Brazil: local democracy and 
deliberative politics’, International Journal of Urban and Regional 
Research, 30(3):623–637. 
Baierle, Sérgio (2002) Transformation and empowerment through the 
participatory budget. Paper presented at Logolink International Workshop 
on Participatory Planning Approaches for Local Governance, Bandung, 
Indonesia, January 20-27, 2002. 
Baierle, Sérgio (2003) ‘The Porto Alegre Thermidor? Brazil’s ‘participatory 
budget’ at the crossroads’, Socialist Register, (39)300-322. 
 271 
 
Baierle, Sérgio (2007) Urban struggles in Porto Alegre: between political 
revolution and transformism. Porto Alegre: CIDADE. 
Baierle, Sérgio (2008) ‘Whittling down the potential of participatory budgeting?’ 
The Governance Link (4), Action Aid. 
Baiocchi, Gianpaolo (2001) ‘Participation, activism and politics: the Porto Alegre 
experiment and deliberative democratic theory’, Politics and Society, 
29(1):43-72. 
Baiocchi, Gianpaolo (2003) ‘Emergent public spheres: talking politics in 
participatory governance’, American Sociological Review, 68(1):52-74. 
Baiocchi, Gianpaolo (2005) Militants and citizens: the politics of participatory 
democracy in Porto Alegre. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Baiocchi, Gianpaolo & Ernesto Ganuza (2014) ‘Participatory budgeting as if 
emancipation mattered’, Politics & Society, 42(1):29-50. 
Baiocchi, Gianpaolo, Patrick Heller & Marcelo K. Silva (2011) Bootstrapping 
democracy: transforming local governance and civil society in Brazil. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Bang, Henrik P. (2009) ‘‘Yes we can’: identity politics and 
project politics for a late-modern world’, Urban Research & Practice, 2(2):117-
137. 
Barber, Benjamin R. (1984) Strong democracy. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
Bartolini, Stefano & Peter Mair (2001) ‘Challenges to contemporary political 
parties’. In: Larry Diamond & Richard Gunther (Eds.) Political parties and 
democracy. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, pp.327-343. 
Bauman, Zygmunt (1990) Thinking sociologically. Blackwell: Oxford. 
Bauman, Zygmunt (1998) Globalisation: the human consequences. Cambridge: 
Polity Press. 
Beetham, David (1997) ‘Market economy and democratic polity’, 
Democratization, 4(1):76-93. 
Beetham, David, Iain Byrne, Pauline Ngan & Stuart Weir, (2003) ‘Democratic 
audit: towards a broader view of democratic achievement’, Parliamentary 
Affairs, 56:334-47. 
Benhabib, Seyla (Ed.) (1996) Democracy and difference; contesting the 
boundaries of the political. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 272 
 
Bennett, Natalie (2015) Rising support for the Green Party. Available at: 
http://www.greenparty.org.uk/ (Accessed 20/02/2015). 
Bevan, Aneurin (1952) In place of fear. Wakefield: MacGibbon & Kee Ltd (1990 
edtn). 
Bevir, Mark (2010) Democratic Governance. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
Birch, Demelza (2002) Public participation in local government: a survey of local 
authorities. Local and Regional Government Research Unit. London: 
ODPM. 
Blakey, Heather (2008) ‘Radical innovation or technical fix? Participatory 
budgeting in the UK: how Latin American participatory traditions are 
reinterpreted in the British context’, Popular Sovereignty, 1(1) on-line 
journal published by CIDADE, Porto Alegre. Available at: 
http://www.ongcidade.org/site/php/Revista/revista.php. 
Blakey, Heather (2009) “People taking control”: U-Decide in Newcastle. 
Bradford: International Centre for Participation Studies, Department of 
Peace Studies, University of Bradford. 
Blakey, Heather (2010) ‘Bradford: professionalised participation in a Northern 
de-industrialised city’. In: Jenny Pearce (Ed.) Participation and democracy 
in the twenty-first century city. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.180-
204. 
Blakey, Heather (2011) ‘Fairness in participatory decision-making: the 
relationship between participation and deliberation in UK participatory 
budgeting processes’, Irish Journal of Public Policy, 3(1).  
Blakey, Heather & Ruth Jackson (2009) Participatory budgeting: self-evaluation 
toolkit. Manchester: Church Action on Poverty. 
Blakey, Heather & Ruth Jackson (2010) Who decides it’s worth it? Evaluating 
participatory budgeting in the UK. Manchester: Church Action on Poverty.  
Blakey, Heather & Ruth Jackson (2011) Community wellbeing champions 
initiative: programme level evaluation report. Manchester: Church Action 
on Poverty.  
Bogdanor, Vernon (2004) ‘The constitution and the party system in the twentieth 
century’, Parliamentary Affairs, 57(4):717-733. 
Bohman, James & William Rehg (Eds.) (1997) Deliberative democracy: essays 
on reason and politics. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
 273 
 
Bookchin, Murray (1989) Remaking society. Black Rose Books: Montreal.  
Bowers, Anne P. & Laura Bunt (2010) Your local budget: unlocking the potential 
of participatory budgeting. London: NESTA. 
Brand, Russell (2013) ‘“We no longer have the luxury of tradition”’, New 
Statesman. Available at: 
http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2013/10/russell-brand-on-revolution 
(Accessed 12/06/14). 
Brazil Government (1988) The constitution of Brazil (English translation). 
Available at: http://www.v-brazil.com/government/laws/constitution.html 
(Accessed 23/08/2014). 
Brittan, Samuel (1975) ‘The economic contradictions of democracy’, British 
Journal of Political Science, 5(2), pp.129-159. 
Brittan, Samuel (1998) ‘Comment’. In: Arthur Seldon, The dilemma of 
democracy: the political economics of over-government. Hobart Paper 
136. London: Institute of Economic Affairs, pp.107-111.  
Bruce, Iain (Ed.) (2004) The Porto Alegre alternative: direct democracy in 
action. London: Pluto Press. 
‘Brutus’ (29th November 1787 & 10th April 1788) ‘Essays IV & XVI’. In: Ketcham, 
Ralph (Ed.) (2003) The anti-federalist papers and the constitutional 
convention debates: the clashes and the compromises that gave birth to 
our form of government. New York: Signet Classic, pp.324-335. 
Bryan, Samuel (1787) ‘Centinel, number 1’. In: Ketcham, Ralph (Ed.) (2003) 
The anti-federalist papers and the constitutional convention debates: the 
clashes and the compromises that gave birth to our form of government. 
New York: Signet Classic, pp.227-236. 
Buller, Jim & Matthew Flinders (2005) ‘The domestic origins of depoliticisation in 
the area of British economic policy’, British Journal of Politics and 
International Relations, 7(4):526-544. 
Buonarroti, Filippo (1828) Buonarroti’s history of Babeuf’s conspiracy for 
equality (translated by Bronterre, 1836, London: Hetherington). Available 
at: https://archive.org/details/BabeufsConspiracyForEquality_242 
(Accessed 10/07/2014). 
Burawoy, Michael (2009) ‘The public sociology wars’. In Vincent Jeffries (Ed.) 
Handbook of public sociology. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers: New York.  
 274 
 
Burke, Edmund (1770) Thoughts on the cause of the present discontents. 
Available at: 
http://www.econlib.org/library/LFBooks/Burke/brkSWv1c1a.html (Accessed 
12/01/14). 
Burke, Edmund (1774) Speech to the electors of Bristol, 3rd November 1774. 
Available at: http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch13s7.html (Accessed 
08/08/2013). 
Burnham, Peter (2001) ‘New Labour and the politics of depoliticisation’, British 
Journal of Politics and International Relations, 3(2):127-149. 
Burnham, Peter (2014) ‘Depoliticisation: economic crisis and political 
management’, Policy & Politics, 42(2):189-206. 
Butt, Sarah & Rory Fitzgerald (2014) ‘Democracy: critical consensus? Britain’s 
expectations and evaluations of democracy’. In: Alison Park, Caroline 
Bryson & John Curtice (Eds.) British social attitudes: the 31st report, 
London: NatCen Social Research, pp.1-24. 
Cabannes, Yves (2004) ‘Participatory budgeting: a significant contribution to 
participatory democracy’, Environment & Urbanization 16(1):27-46. 
Cabinet Office (2010) Modernising commissioning: increasing the role of 
charities, social, enterprises, mutual and cooperatives in public service 
delivery. London: Cabinet Office. 
Cameron, David (2009) ‘Speech to the Conservative Party conference’, The 
Guardian [online]. Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2009/oct/08/david-cameron-speech-
in-full (Accessed 05/12/2013). 
Carter, April & Geoffrey Stokes (Eds.) Democratic theory today: challenges for 
the twenty-first century. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Chavez, Daniel (2006) ‘Participation lite: the watering down of people power in 
Porto Alegre’, Red Pepper, May 2006. 
Chesters, Graeme (2009) ‘Social movements and regeneration: within, without, 
against?’ Local Government Studies, 35(3):371–384. 
Chomsky, Noam (1999) Profit over people: neoliberalism and global order. New 
York: Seven Stories Press. 
 275 
 
Christopherson, Jens A (1966) The meaning of “democracy” as used in 
European ideologies from the French to the Russian Revolution. Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget.  
CIDADE (2010) Letter from Metropolitan Porto Alegre. Composed by ‘the 
constituencies and supporters of participatory budgeting’ at a World Social 
Forum workshop entitled ‘Participatory Budgeting: popular power or 
participatory exclusion?’, convened by the Centro de Assessoria e 
Estudos Urbanos (CIDADE), 26 January, 2010.  
Citrin, Jack (1974) ‘Comment: the political relevance of trust in government’, 
The American Political Science Review, 68(3):973-988. 
Clarke, John, Janet E. Newman, Nick Smith, Elizabeth Vidler and Louise 
Westmarland (2007) Creating citizen–consumers: changing publics and 
changing public services. London: Sage. 
Clarke, Robin (2002) New democratic processes: better decisions, stronger 
democracy. London: IPPR. 
Clegg, Nick (2010) Hugo Young Lecture, delivered 23 November 2010. 
Available at: 
http://www.libdems.org.uk/news_detail.aspx?title=Nick_Clegg_delivers_th
e_Hugo_Young_lecture&pPK=a7f4b726-ebb3-4025-a339-7946b4d9a06a 
(Accessed 29/11/10). 
Coelho, Vera Schattan P. & Bettina von Lieres (Eds.) (2010) Mobilizing for 
democracy: citizen action and the politics of public participation. London: 
Zed Books. 
Cohen, Joshua (1996) ‘Procedure and substance in deliberative democracy’. In: 
Seyla Benhabib (Ed.) Democracy and difference; contesting the 
boundaries of the political. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp.95-
119. 
Cohen, Joshua (1997) ‘Deliberation and democratic legitimacy’. In: James 
Bohman & William Rehg (Eds.) Deliberative democracy: essays on reason 
and politics. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, pp.67-91. 
Cohen, Joshua & Joel Rogers (1995) Associations and democracy. New York: 
Verso. 
Cook, Robin (2005) ‘We can restore trust in democracy’, The Guardian [online] 
Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2005/jan/07/labour.uk 
(Accessed 05/12/2013). 
 276 
 
Cooke, William N. & Deborah S. Noble (1998) ‘Industrial relations systems and 
US foreign direct investment abroad’, British Journal of Industrial 
Relations, 36(4):581-609. 
Copus, Colin, Alistair Clark, Herwig Reynaert & Kristof Steyvers (2009) ‘Minor 
party and independent politics beyond the mainstream: fluctuating fortunes 
but a permanent presence’, Parliamentary Affairs, 62(1)4-18. 
Crick, Bernard (2002) ‘Education for citizenship: the citizenship order’, 
Parliamentary Affairs, 55:488-504. 
Crouch, Colin (2004) Post-democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Crozier, Michael J., Samuel P. Huntington & Joji Watanuki (1975) The crisis of 
democracy: report on the governability of democracies to the Trilateral 
Commission. New York: New York University Press. 
Curtice, John & Ben Seyd (2012) ‘Constitutional reform: a recipe for restoring 
faith in our democracy?’ In: Alison Park, Elizabeth Clery, John Curtice, 
Miranda Phillips & David Utting (Eds.) British social attitudes: the 29th 
report. London: NatCen Social Research, pp.45-63. 
Dalton, Russell J (1999) ‘Political support in advanced industrial democracies’. 
In: Pippa Norris (Ed.) Critical citizens: global support for democratic 
governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.57-77. 
Dalton, Russell J (2008) ‘Citizenship norms and the expansion of 
political participation’, Political Studies, 56(1):76–98. 
Davidson, Stewart & Stephen Elstub (2014) ‘Deliberative and participatory 
democracy in the UK’, British Journal of Politics and International 
Relations, 16(3): 367-385. 
Davies, Jonathan S. (2012) ‘Active citizenship: navigating the Conservative 
heartlands of the New Labour project’, Policy & Politics, 40(1):3-19. 
DCLG (2006) Strong and prosperous communities: the local government white 
paper (Cm 6939-1). London: The Stationary Office. 
DCLG (2008a) Communities in control: real people, real power (Cm 7427). 
London: The Stationary Office. 
DCLG (2008b) Giving more people a say in local spending: participatory 
budgeting, a national strategy. London: DCLG. 
DCLG (2011) Citizenship Survey: 2010-11, Cohesion Research Statistical 
Release 16. London: DCLG. 
 277 
 
De Souza, Ubiritan (2004) ‘Basic principles’. In: Iain Bruce (Ed.) The Porto 
Alegre alternative: direct democracy in action. London: Pluto Press, pp.57-
62. 
De Tocqueville, Alexis (1998 edition, first published 1835 and 1840) Democracy 
in America. Ware: Wordsworth Editions. 
Denzin, Norman K. & Yvonna S. Lincoln (Eds.) (1998a) Collecting and 
interpreting qualitative materials. Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
Denzin, Norman K. & Yvonna S. Lincoln (Eds.) (1998b) Strategies of qualitative 
inquiry. Sage: Thousand Oaks. 
Denzin, Norman K. & Yvonna S. Lincoln (Eds.) (2000) Handbook of qualitative 
research. Sage: Thousand Oaks 
Denzin, Norman K. & Yvonna S. Lincoln (Eds.) (2003a) Strategies of qualitative 
inquiry. Sage: Thousand Oaks (2nd edtn). 
Denzin, Norman K. & Yvonna S. Lincoln (Eds.) (2003b) The landscape of 
qualitative research: theories and issues. Sage: Thousand Oaks. 
‘DeWitt, John’ (27th October 1787) ‘Essays I & II’. In: Ketcham, Ralph (Ed.) 
(2003) The anti-federalist papers and the constitutional convention 
debates: the clashes and the compromises that gave birth to our form of 
government. New York: Signet Classic, pp.189-198. 
‘DeWitt, John’ (5th November 1787) Essay III. In: Ketcham, Ralph (Ed.) (2003) 
The anti-federalist papers and the constitutional convention debates: the 
clashes and the compromises that gave birth to our form of government. 
New York: Signet Classic, pp.311-316. 
Diamond, Larry & Richard Gunther (Eds.) (2001) Political parties and 
democracy. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press. 
Dias, Nelson (Ed.) (2014) Hope for democracy: 25 years of participatory 
budgeting worldwide. São Brás de Alportel: In Loco Association. E-book 
available at: 
https://democracyspotdotnet.files.wordpress.com/2014/06/op25anos-en-
20maio20141.pdf (Accessed 10/06/14). 
Dinwiddy, John (1979) ‘Luddism and politics in the Northern counties’, Social 
History, 4(1):33-63. 
Dryzek, John S. (1990) Discursive democracy: politics, policy and political 
science. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 278 
 
Dryzek, John S. (1996) Democracy in capitalist times: ideals, limits and 
struggles. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Dryzek, John S. (2000) Deliberative democracy and beyond: liberals, critics, 
contestations. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Dryzek, John S. & Patrick Dunleavy (2009) Theories of the democratic state. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan. 
Dunleavy, Patrick (1991) Democracy, bureaucracy and public choice: economic 
explanations in political science. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf. 
Dunn, John (2005) Setting the people free: the story of democracy. London: 
Atlantic Books. 
Dutra, Olívio de Oliveira (2014) ‘Preface’. In: Dias, Nelson (Ed.) Hope for 
democracy: 25 years of participatory budgeting worldwide. São Brás de 
Alportel: In Loco Association, pp.8-11. E-book available at: 
https://democracyspotdotnet.files.wordpress.com/2014/06/op25anos-en-
20maio20141.pdf (Accessed 10/06/14). 
Dyble, Colleen (Ed.) (2008) Taming Leviathan: waging the war of ideas around 
the world. London: Institute of Economic Affairs. 
Eliasoph, Nina (1998) Avoiding politics: how Americans produce apathy in 
everyday life. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Elster, Jon (1997) ‘The market and the forum: three varieties of political theory’. 
In: James Bohman & William Rehg (Eds.) Deliberative democracy: essays 
on reason and politics. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, pp.3-33. 
Emsley, Clive (1985) ‘Repression, 'Terror' and the rule of law in England during 
the decade of the French Revolution’, The English Historical Review, 
100(397):801-825. 
Engler, Allan (2010) Economic democracy: the working-class alternative to 
capitalism. Winnipeg: Fernwood Publishing. 
Escobar, Oliver (2015) Beyond cynicism and complacency – participatory 
budgeting in Scotland. Available at: 
https://oliversdialogue.wordpress.com/2015/01/19/beyond-cynicism-and-
complacency-participatory-budgeting-in-scotland/ (Accessed 19/02/2015). 
EZLN (2005) EZLN communique - 6th Declaration of the Selva Lacandona. 
Available at: http://www.anarkismo.net/newswire.php?story_id=805 
(Accessed 08/07/13). 
 279 
 
Fawcett, Paul & David Marsh (2014) ‘Depoliticisation, governance and political 
participation’, Policy & Politics, 42(2):171-188. 
‘Federal Farmer’ (1787-1788) ‘Letters from the Federal Farmer’. In: Ketcham, 
Ralph (Ed.) (2003) The anti-federalist papers and the constitutional 
convention debates: the clashes and the compromises that gave birth to 
our form of government. New York: Signet Classic, pp.256-268. 
Fishkin, James S. (1995) The voice of the people. Yale University Press: New 
Haven. 
Flinders, Matthew (2012) Defending politics: why democracy matters in the 
twenty-first century. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Flinders, Matthew & Alexandra Kelso (2011) ‘Mind the gap: political analysis, 
public expectations and the Parliamentary decline thesis’, British Journal 
of Politics and International Relations, 13(2):249-268. 
Flinders, Matthew & Matt Wood (2014) ‘Depoliticisation, governance and the 
state’, Policy & Politics, 42(2):135-149. 
Foster, Emma Ann, Peter Kerr & Christopher Byrne (2014) ‘Rolling back to roll 
forward: depoliticisation and the extension of government’, Policy & 
Politics, 42(2):225-241. 
Foster, John (1974) Class struggle and the industrial revolution: early industrial 
capitalism in three English towns. London: Methuen & Co Ltd. 
Fox, Ebenezer (1838) The adventures of Ebenezer Fox, in the revolutionary 
war. Available at: 
http://archive.org/stream/ebenezerfoxwar00efoxrich#page/n7/mode/2up 
(Accessed 13/09/13). 
Frankfort-Nachmias, Chava & David Nachmias (1992) Research methods in the 
social sciences. Arnold: London.  
Freedom House (1999) Democracy’s century: a survey of global political 
change in the twentieth century. Available at: http://www.social-sciences-
and-humanities.com/PDF/century_democracy.pdf (Accessed 10/05/2012).  
Freire, Paulo (1972) Pedagogy of the oppressed. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Fuchs, Dieter & Hans-Dieter Klingemann (1995) ‘Citizens and the state: a 
changing relationship?’ In: Hans-Dieter Klingemann & Dieter Fuchs (Eds.) 
Citizens and the state. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.1-23. 
Fukuyama, Francis (1989) ‘The end of history?’ The National Interest, Summer 
1989, pp.3-18. 
 280 
 
Fukuyama, Francis (1992) The end of history and the last man. London: 
Penguin. 
Fung, Archon & Erik Olin Wright (Eds.) (2003) Deepening democracy: 
institutional innovations in empowered participatory governance. London: 
Verso. 
Gamble, Andrew (1999) ‘State, economy and society’. In: Ian Holliday, Andrew 
Gamble & Geraint Parry (Eds.) Fundamentals in British politics. 
Basingstoke: MacMillan, pp21-44. 
Ganuza, Ernesto & Gianpaolo Baiocchi (2012) ‘The power of ambiguity: how 
participatory budgeting travels the globe’, Journal of Public Deliberation 
[online], 8(2). Available at: 
http://www.publicdeliberation.net/jpd/vol8/iss2/art8/ (Accessed 
25/08/2014). 
Ganuza, Ernesto & Francisco Francés (2012) ‘The deliberative turn in 
participation: the problem of inclusion and deliberative opportunities in 
participatory budgeting’, European Political Science Review 4(2):283-302. 
Ganuza, Ernesto, Héloïse Nez & Ernesto Morales (2014) ‘The struggle for a 
voice: tensions between associations and citizens in participatory 
budgeting’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 
38(6):2274-2291. 
George, Susan (1997) ‘How to win the war of ideas: lessons from the 
Gramscian Right’, Dissent, Summer 1997 pp.47-53. 
Gillham, Bill (2008) Observation techniques: structured to unstructured. London: 
Continuum International. 
Goldfrank, Benjamin (2006) Lessons from the Latin American experience in 
participatory budgeting. Paper presented at the Latin American Studies 
Association meeting, San Juan, Puerto Rico, March 2006. 
Goldfrank, Benjamin (2007) ‘The politics of deepening local democracy: 
decentralisation, party institutionalization, and participation’, Comparative 
Politics, 39(2):147-168. 
Goldfrank, Benjamin (2012) ‘The World Bank and the globalisation of 
participatory budgeting’, Journal of Public Deliberation [online], 8(2). 
Available at: http://www.publicdeliberation.net/jpd/vol8/iss2/art7/ 
(Accessed 25/08/2014). 
 281 
 
Gould, Bryan (2010) ‘Markets in a democracy’, Political Studies Review, 8(1), 
pp.55-66. 
Graham, Andrew (Ed.) (2011) Innovations in public expenditure management: 
country cases from the Commonwealth. London: Commonwealth 
Secretariat. 
Gray, John (1998) False dawn; the delusions of global capitalism. London: 
Granta. 
Greenwood, Davydd J. & Morten Levin (1998) Introduction to action research: 
social research for social change. Sage: London. 
Greer, Donald (1966) The incidence of the Terror during the French Revolution: 
a statistical interpretation. Gloucester: Peter Smith (copyright, 1935, 
Harvard University Press). 
Gutmann, Amy & Dennis Thompson (1996) Democracy and disagreement. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: the Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press. 
Habermas, Jürgen (1984) The theory of communicative action: volume 1 (trans. 
Thomas McCarthy). Boston: Beacon Press. 
Hall, Jeremy & Anja Röcke (2013) ‘Participatory budgeting in Great Britain: 
between a neoliberal agenda and community empowerment’. In: Yves 
Sintomer, Rudolf Traub-Merz & Junhua Zhang (Eds.) Participatory 
budgeting in Asia and Europe: key challenges of participation. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.182-197. 
Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison & John Jay (2008 edition, Ed. Lawrence 
Goldman; first published 1787-1788) The Federalist papers. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  
Hammersley, Martyn (2000) Taking sides in social research: essays on 
partisanship and bias. Routledge: London. 
Hampson, Norman (1983a) The French Revolution and democracy. Reading: 
University of Reading. 
Hampson, Norman (1983b) Will and circumstance: Montesquieu, Rousseau and 
the French Revolution. London: Duckworth. 
Haraway, Donna (1988) ‘The science question in feminism and the privilege of 
partial perspective’, Feminist Studies, 14( 3):575-599. 
Haraway, Donna (1991) Simians, cyborgs and women: the reinvention of 
nature. Free Association Books: London. 
 282 
 
Hardman, John (1999) The French Revolution Sourcebook. London: Arnold. 
Hastings, Annette, Nick Bailey, Kirsten Besemer, Glen Bramley, Maria Gannon 
& David Watkins (2013) Coping with the cuts? Local government and 
poorer communities. JRF Programme Paper (Austerity). York: Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation. 
Hay, Colin (2007) Why we hate politics. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Hay, Colin (Ed.) (2010) New directions in political science: responding to the 
challenges of an interdependent world. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan. 
Hay, Colin (2014) ‘Depoliticisation as process, governance as practice: what did 
the ‘first wave’ get wrong and do we need a ‘second wave’ to put it right?’ 
Policy & Politics, 42(2):293-311. 
Henn, Matt, Mark Weinstein & Sarah Forrest (2005) ‘Uninterested youth? 
Young people's attitudes towards party politics in Britain’, Political Studies, 
53(3):556-578. 
Herman, Edward S. & Noam Chomsky (1994) Manufacturing consent. London: 
Vintage. 
Heron, John (1981) ‘Philosophical basis for a new paradigm’. In Peter Reason & 
John Rowan (Eds.) Human inquiry: a sourcebook of new paradigm 
research. John Wiley & Sons: Chichester.  
Heron, John (1988) ‘Validity in co-operative inquiry’. In Peter Reason (Ed.) 
Human inquiry in action: developments in new paradigm research. Sage: 
London, pp.40-59. 
Heron, John (1996) Co-operative inquiry. Sage: London. 
Heron, John & Peter Reason (2008) ‘Extending epistemology within a co-
operative inquiry’. In Peter Reason & Hilary Bradbury (Eds.) The Sage 
handbook of action research. Sage: London, 2nd edtn, pp.366-380. 
Hetland, Gabriel & Abigail N. Martin (2012) ‘A new way to occupy city hall: 
participatory budgeting’, The Nation. Available at: 
http://www.thenation.com/article/166842/new-way-occupy-city-hall-
participatory-budgeting# (Accessed: 11/07/14). 
Hirst, Paul (1994) Associational democracy: new forms of economic and social 
governance. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
 
 283 
 
HMG (2001) The House of Lords: completing the reform, Government White 
Paper presented to Parliament 7 November 2001. Available at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.dca.gov.uk/constitut
ion/holref/holreform.htm#part6 (Accessed 11/01/14). 
Hobsbawm, Eric (1962) The age of capital, 1848-1875. London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson. 
Hobsbawm, Eric (1975) The age of revolution, 1789-1848. London: Weidenfeld 
& Nicolson. 
Holliday, Ian, Andrew Gamble & Geraint Parry (Eds.) (1999) Fundamentals in 
British politics. Basingstoke: MacMillan. 
Honig, Bonnie (1996) ‘Difference, dilemmas, and the politics of home’. In: In: 
Seyla Benhabib (Ed.) Democracy and difference; contesting the 
boundaries of the political. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp.257-
277. 
Huntington, Samuel P. (1975) ‘The democratic distemper’, Public Interest (41), 
pp.9-38. 
Hutton, Will (2015) ‘The Greens, chaotic as they are, give a lesson to the main 
parties’, The Guardian [online] Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/feb/01/green-party-
chaotic-but-have-lesson-for-main-parties (Accessed 20/02/2015). 
Illich, Ivan (1977) ‘Disabling Professions’. In: Ivan Illich, Irving Kenneth Zola, 
John McKnight, Jonathan Caplan & Harley Shaiken, Disabling 
Professions. London: Marion Boyars, pp.11-39. 
Illich, Ivan, Irving Kenneth Zola, John McKnight, Jonathan Caplan & Harley 
Shaiken (1977) Disabling Professions. London: Marion Boyars. 
Inglehart, Ronald (1999) ‘Postmodernisation erodes respect for authority, but 
increases support for democracy’. In: Pippa Norris (Ed.) Critical citizens: 
global support for democratic governance. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, pp.236-256. 
Ipsos MORI (2013) Trust in professions. Summary available at: 
http://www.ipsos-
mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/poll.aspx?oItemId=15&vie
w=wide (Accessed 04/01/14). 
 
 284 
 
Jackson, Ruth (2011) ‘Participatory budgeting in the United Kingdom’. In: 
Andrew Graham (Ed.) Innovations in public expenditure management: 
country cases from the Commonwealth. London: Commonwealth 
Secretariat, pp.95-107. 
Jeffries, Vincent (Ed.) (2009) Handbook of public sociology. Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers: New York.  
Jenkins, Simon (2007) Thatcher & sons: a revolution in three acts. London: 
Penguin. 
Jessop, Bob (2014) ‘Repoliticising depoliticisation: theoretical preliminaries on 
some responses to the American fiscal and Eurozone debt crises’, Policy 
& Politics, 42(2):207-223. 
John, Peter, Edward Fieldhouse & Hanhua Liu (2011) ‘How civic is the civic 
culture? Explaining community participation using the 2005 English 
citizenship survey’, Political Studies, 59(2):230-252. 
Katz, Richard S. & Peter Mair (1995) ‘Changing models of party organization 
and party democracy: the emergence of the cartel party’, Party Politics, 
1:5-28. 
Kavanagh, D (1987) Thatcherism and British politics: the end of consensus? 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Ketcham, Ralph (Ed.) (2003) The anti-federalist papers and the constitutional 
convention debates: the clashes and the compromises that gave birth to 
our form of government. New York: Signet Classic. 
Kisby, Ben (2010) ‘The big society: power to the people?’, The Political 
Quarterly, 81(4):484-491. 
Klingemann, Hans-Dieter (1999) ‘Mapping political support in the 90s: a global 
analysis’. In: Pippa Norris (Ed.) Critical citizens: global support for 
democratic governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.31-56. 
Klingemann, Hans-Dieter & Dieter Fuchs (Eds.) (1995) Citizens and the state. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Laski, Harold J. (1951) Reflections on the constitution. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press. 
Lavan, Kezia (2007) Participatory budgeting in the UK: an evaluation from a 
practitioner perspective. Manchester: Church Action on Poverty. 
 285 
 
Lavie-Ajayi, Maya (2007) Is it a sex thing? Using co-operative inquiry to support 
sexual health: a YWCA report of action research by young women. Report 
published by the YWCA. 
Law, John (2004) After method: mess in social science research. Routledge: 
London. 
Lee, Lucy & Penny Young (2013) ‘A disengaged Britain? Political interest and 
participation over 30 years’. In: Alison Park, Caroline Bryson, Elizabeth 
Clery, John Curtice and Miranda Phillips (Eds.) British social attitudes: the 
30th report. London: NatCen Social Research, pp.62-86. 
Leys, Colin (2001) Market-driven politics: neoliberal democracy and the public 
interest. London: Verso. 
Lijphart, Arend (1999) Patterns of democracy: government forms and 
performance in thirty-six countries. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Lincoln, Yvonna S. & Denzin, Norman K. (2000) ‘The seventh moment: out of 
the past’. In Norman K. Denzin & Yvonna S. Lincoln (Eds.) Handbook of 
qualitative research. Sage: Thousand Oaks, pp.1047-1065. 
Lindblom, Charles E. (1977) Politics and markets: the world’s political-economic 
systems. Basic Books. 
Lipset, Seymour (1959) ‘Some social requisites of democracy: economic 
development and political legitimacy’, American Political Science 
Association, 53(1):69-105. 
Lowndes, Vivien (2002) ‘Between rhetoric and reality: does the 2001 white 
paper reverse the centralising trend in Britain?’, Local Government 
Studies, 28(3):135-147. 
Lundy, Patricia & Mark McGovern (2006) 'The ethics of silence: action research, 
community 'truth-telling' and post-conflict transition in the North of Ireland', 
Action research; 4:49-64. 
Mahony, Nick (2008) Spectacular political experiments: the constitution, 
mediation and performance of large-scale public participation exercises. 
PhD thesis, Open University. 
Mansbridge, Jane (2003) ‘Practice-thought-practice’. In: Archon Fung & Erik 
Olin Wright (Eds.) Deepening democracy: institutional innovations in 
empowered participatory governance. London: Verso, pp.175-199. 
 
 286 
 
Mansbridge, Jane, with James Bohman, Simone Chambers, David Estlund, 
Andreas Føllesdal, Archon Fung, Cristina Lafont, Bernard Manin & José 
Luis Martí (2010) ‘The place of self-interest and the role of power in 
deliberative democracy’, The Journal of Political Philosophy, 18(1):64-100. 
Marquetti, Adalmir (2005) Participatory budgeting experiences in Brazil: a 
classification proposal. Unpublished paper. 
Marquetti, Adalmir, Carlos E. Schonerwald da Silva & Al Campbell (2012) 
‘Participatory economic democracy in action: participatory budgeting in 
Porto Alegre, 1989-2004’, Review of Radical Political Economics, 
44(1):62-81. 
Marsh, David, Paul ‘t Hart & Karen Tindall (2010) ‘Celebrity politics: the politics 
of the late modernity?’, Political Studies Review, 8(3):322-340. 
Mason, Paul (2008) Live working or die fighting. London: Vintage. 
Masters, Roger D. (1989) The nature of politics. New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 
Mayo, K., Tsey, K., McCalman, J., Whiteside, M., Fagan, R. & Baird, L. (2009) 
‘The research dance: university and community research collaborations at 
Yarrabah, North Queensland, Australia’, Health and Social Care in the 
Community, 17(2):133-140. 
McCalman, Iain (1987) ‘Ultra-radicalism and convivial debating-clubs in London, 
1795-1838’, The English Historical Review, 102(403):309-333. 
McGuiness, Feargal (2012) Membership of UK political parties, House of 
Commons Library, available at: 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/research/briefing-
papers/SN05125/membership-of-uk-political-parties (Accessed 02/01/14). 
McMurtry, John (2002) Value wars: the global market versus the life economy. 
London: Pluto Press. 
McNiff, Jean with Jack Whitehead (2002) Action research: principles and 
practice. Routledge Falmer: Oxford. 
Mee, Charles L. (1987) The genius of the people. New York: Harper & Row. 
Meiksins Wood, Ellen (1995) Democracy against capitalism: renewing historical 
materialism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Melo, Marcus Andre & Gianpaolo Baiocchi (2006) ‘Deliberative democracy and 
local governance: towards a new agenda’, International Journal of Urban 
and Regional Research, 30(3):587–600. 
 287 
 
Miliband, Ralph (1969) The state in capitalist society. London: Quartet Books. 
Miller, Arthur H. (1974a) ‘Political issues and trust in government: 1964-1970’, 
The American Political Science Review, 68(3):951-972. 
Miller, Arthur H. (1974b) ‘Rejoinder to “Comment” by Jack Citrin: political 
discontent or ritualism?’, The American Political Science Review, 
68(3):989-1001. 
Miller, Arthur & Ola Listhaug (1999) ‘Political performance and institutional 
trust’. In: Pippa Norris (Ed.) Critical citizens: global support for democratic 
governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.204-216. 
Milne, E-J., Cherita Payne, Heather Blakey & Louise Kilburn (2008) Who 
Knows? Reflections of a community research team in Bradford and 
Keighley, UK. Paper presented at the Congress of Qualitative Inquiry, 
Urbana Champaign, USA, 17 May 2008. 
Mitchell, William C. (1988) Government as it is: the impact of public choice 
economics on the judgement of collective decision-making by government 
and on the teaching of political science. Hobart Paper 109. London: 
Institute of Economic Affairs. 
Moloney, Kevin (2001) ‘The rise and fall of spin: changes of fashion in the 
presentation of UK politics’, Journal of Public Affairs, 1(2):124-135. 
Morris, Gouverneur (1774) Letter from Gouverneur Morris to John Penn, 20 
May 1774, American Archives, 4th ser., 1:342-43. Available at: 
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch15s8.html 
(Accessed 10/08/2013). 
Mosley, Layna (2005) ‘Globalisation and the state: still room to move?’ New 
Political Economy, 10(3):355-362. 
Mueller, Dennis C. (1989) Public choice. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Mueller, John (1992) ‘Democracy and Ralph's pretty good grocery: elections, 
equality, and the minimal human being’, American Journal of Political 
Science, 36(4):983-1003. 
Murphy, Richard (2011) The courageous state: rethinking economics, society 
and the role of government. London: Searching Finance. 
Mutz, Diana C. (2006) Hearing the other side: deliberative versus participatory 
democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 288 
 
Nelson, Craig (2006) Thomas Paine: enlightenment, revolution and the birth of 
modern nations. London: Penguin. 
Newton, Kenneth (1999) ‘Social and political trust in established democracies’. 
In: Pippa Norris (Ed.) Critical citizens: global support for democratic 
governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.169-187. 
Newton, Kenneth & Pippa Norris (2000) ‘Confidence in public institutions: faith, 
culture or performance?’ In: Susan J. Pharr & Robert D. Putnam (Eds.) 
Disaffected democracies: what’s troubling the trilateral countries? 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp.52-73. 
Norris, Pippa (Ed.) (1999) Critical citizens: global support for democratic 
governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Norris, Pippa (2011) Democratic deficit: critical citizens revisited. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Nylen, William R. (2003) Participatory democracy versus elitist democracy: 
lessons from Brazil. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. 
Orrell, David (2010) Economyths: ten ways that economics gets it wrong. 
London: Icon Books. 
O’Toole, Therese, David Marsh and Su Jones (2003) ‘Political literacy cuts both 
ways: the politics of non-participation among young people’, Political 
Quarterly, 74(3):349-360. 
Ouseley, Herman (2001) Community pride not prejudice. Bradford: Bradford 
Council. 
Paine, Thomas (1776) Common sense. In: Mark Philp (Ed.) Thomas Paine: 
rights of man, common sense and other political writings. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp.1-60. 
Paine, Thomas (1792a) Rights of man. In: Mark Philp (Ed.) Thomas Paine: 
rights of man, common sense and other political writings. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp.83-198 
Paine, Thomas (1792b) Letter addressed to the addressers. In: Mark Philp (Ed.) 
Thomas Paine: rights of man, common sense and other political writings. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.333-384 
Paine, Thomas (1797) Agrarian justice. In: Mark Philp (Ed.) Thomas Paine: 
rights of man, common sense and other political writings. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp.409-433. 
 289 
 
Park, Alison, Elizabeth Clery, John Curtice, Miranda Phillips & David Utting 
(Eds.) (2012) British social attitudes: the 29th report. London: NatCen 
Social Research. 
Park, Alison, Caroline Bryson, Elizabeth Clery, John Curtice & Miranda Phillips 
(Eds.) (2013) British social attitudes: the 30th report. London: NatCen 
Social Research. 
Park, Alison, Caroline Bryson & John Curtice (Eds.) (2014) British social 
attitudes: the 31st report, London: NatCen Social Research. 
Parry, Geraint, George Moyser & Neil Day (1992) Political participation and 
democracy in Britain. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Pateman, Carole (1970) Participation and democratic theory. London: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Pateman, Carole (2012) ‘Participatory democracy revisited’, Perspectives on 
Politics, 10(1):7-19. 
Pattie, Charles, Patrick Seyd & Paul Whiteley (2004) Citizenship in Britain: 
values, participation and democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Pawson, Ray (2006) Evidence-based policy: a realist perspective. Sage: 
London. 
PB Network (2014a) Policy brief: citizen-led commissioning. Available at: 
http://pbnetwork.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Policy-briefs-from-
the-PB-Network.-The-budget-matrix-low-res.pdf (Accessed 04/09/14). 
PB Network (2014b) Policy brief: democratising policing in the UK. Available at: 
http://pbnetwork.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Policy-briefs-from-
the-PB-Network.-Democratising-Policing-low-res.pdf (Accessed 04/09/14). 
PB Unit (2009) Unpacking the values, principles and standards. Manchester: 
Church Action on Poverty. 
Pearce, Jenny (Ed.) 2010) Participation and democracy in the twenty-first 
century city. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Pearce, Jenny, Davina Miller, Lucy Brill, Heather Blakey, Sergio Baierle, 
Margarita Lopez Maya & Omar Uran (2008) ‘Here, the people decide’? 
New forms of participation in the city. Bradford: International Centre for 
Participation Studies Research Briefing, Department of Peace Studies, 
University of Bradford. 
 290 
 
Pearce, Jenny & E.J. Milne (2010) Participation and community on Bradford’s 
traditionally white estates: a community research project. York: Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation. 
Pharr, Susan J. & Robert D. Putnam (2000) (Eds.) Disaffected democracies: 
what’s troubling the trilateral countries? Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
Philp, Mark (Ed.) (1995) Rights of man, common sense and other political 
writings. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Pinkney, Robert (2005) The frontiers of democracy: challenges in the West, the 
East and the Third World. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing. 
Pollitt, Christopher (1990) Managerialism and the public services: the Anglo-
American experience. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Pont, Raul (2004) ‘Participatory democracy and local power: the experience of 
Porto Alegre’ and ‘Theses on local government and the struggle for 
socialism’. In: Bruce, Iain (Ed.) The Porto Alegre alternative: direct 
democracy in action. London: Pluto Press, pp.111-126. 
Pontual, Pedro (2014) ‘Building a democratic pedagogy: participatory budgeting 
as a “school of citizenship”’. In: Dias, Nelson (Ed.) Hope for democracy: 25 
years of participatory budgeting worldwide. São Brás de Alportel: In Loco 
Association, pp.427-429. E-book available at: 
https://democracyspotdotnet.files.wordpress.com/2014/06/op25anos-en-
20maio20141.pdf (Accessed 10/06/14). 
Power Inquiry (2006) Power to the people: the report of Power, an independent 
inquiry into Britain’s democracy. York: York Publishing. 
Putnam, Robert D. (2000) Bowling alone: the collapse and revival of American 
community. New York: Simon & Schuster. 
Ramsay, Adam (2015) ‘Green membership overtakes Lib Dems and UKIP; 
here's 13 reasons why’, Open Democracy. Available at: 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/adam-ramsay/green-
membership-overtakes-lib-dems-and-ukip-here%27s-13-reasons-why 
(Accessed 20/02/2015). 
Raphael, Ray (2001) The American Revolution: a people’s history. London: 
Profile Books. 
RCUK (2014) Pathways to impact. Available at: 
http://www.rcuk.ac.uk/ke/impacts/ (Accessed 15/03/2015). 
 291 
 
Reason, Peter (Ed.) (1988) Human inquiry in action: developments in new 
paradigm research. Sage: London. 
Reason, Peter (Ed.) (1994) Participation in human inquiry. Sage: London. 
Reason, Peter (1998) ‘Three approaches to participative inquiry’. In Norman K. 
Denzin & Yvonna S. Lincoln (Eds.) Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry. Sage: 
Thousand Oaks; pp.261-291. 
Reason, Peter & Hilary Bradbury (Eds.) (2008) The Sage handbook of action 
research. Sage: London, 2nd edtn. 
Reason, Peter & John Rowan (1981) Human inquiry: a sourcebook book of new 
paradigm research. John Wiley & Sons: Chichester. 
Reed, Jan (2007) Appreciative inquiry: research for change. London: Sage. 
Reid, Robert (1986) Land of lost content: the Luddite revolt 1812. London: 
Penguin. 
Ristock, Janice Lynn & Joan Pennell (1996) Community research as 
empowerment: feminist links and postmodern interruptions. Oxford 
University Press: Toronto. 
Rorty, Richard (1996) ‘Idealizations, foundations, and social practices’. In: Seyla 
Benhabib (Ed.) Democracy and difference; contesting the boundaries of 
the political. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp.333-335. 
Rossiter, Jenny (2008) Participatory budgeting in the UK: tool kit. Manchester: 
Church Action on Poverty. 
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1762) The social contract, or principles of political 
right. London: Wordsworth (1998 edition). 
Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, Evelyne Huber Stephens & John D. Stephens (1992) 
Capitalist development and democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Santos, Boaventura de Sousa (1998) ‘Participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre: 
toward a redistributive democracy’, Politics and Society, 26(4):461-510. 
Saward, Michael (2003) Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Scammell, Margaret (1999) ‘Political marketing: lessons for political science’, 
Political Studies, 47(4):718-739. 
Scammell, Margaret (2007) ‘Political brands and consumer citizens: the 
rebranding of Tony Blair’, Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, 611(1):176-192. 
Schlesinger, Arthur (1997) ‘Has democracy a future?’ Foreign Affairs, 76(5):2-
12. 
 292 
 
Schrader McMillan, Anita (2007) 'Learning at the edges: participatory action 
research and child maltreatment in post-war Guatemala', Bulletin of Latin 
American Research, 26(4):516-532. 
Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1943) Capitalism, socialism and democracy. Abingdon: 
Routledge (reprinted 1994). 
Seldon, Arthur (1998) The dilemma of democracy: the political economics of 
over-government. Hobart Paper 136. London: Institute of Economic 
Affairs. 
Self, Peter (1993) Government by the market: the politics of public choice. 
Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Shah, Anwar (Ed.) (2007) Participatory budgeting. Washington: World Bank. 
Shutt, Harry (1998) The trouble with capitalism: an enquiry into the causes of 
global economic failure. London: Zed Books. 
Singer, Peter (2002) One world: the ethics of globalisation. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
Sintomer, Yves, Carsten Herzberg & Anja Röcke (2008) ‘Participatory 
budgeting in Europe: potentials and challenges’, International Journal of 
Urban and Regional Research, 32(1):164–178. 
Sintomer, Yves, Carsten Herzberg, Anja Röcke & Giovanni Allegretti (2012) 
‘Transnational models of citizen participation: the case of participatory 
budgeting’, Journal of Public Deliberation [online], 8(2). Available at: 
http://www.publicdeliberation.net/jpd/vol8/iss2/art9/ (Accessed 
25/08/2014). 
Sintomer, Yves, Carsten Herzberg & Giovanni Allegretti (2013a) Participatory 
Budgeting Worldwide – updated version. Bonn: Global Civic Engagement. 
Sintomer, Yves, Rudolf Traub-Merz & Junhua Zhang (Eds.) (2013b) 
Participatory budgeting in Asia and Europe: key challenges of 
participation. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Smith, Adam (1759) The theory of moral sentiments. London: Oxford University 
Press (reprinted 1976, Eds. D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie). 
Smith, Adam (1776) The wealth of nations. London: Penguin (Penguin Classics 
edtn, reprinted 1986, Ed. Andrew Skinner). 
 
 
 293 
 
Smith, Melancton (1788, June 20-27), Speeches. In Ketcham, Ralph (Ed.) 
(2003) The anti-federalist papers and the constitutional convention 
debates: the clashes and the compromises that gave birth to our form of 
government. New York: Signet Classic, pp.336-356. 
Smith, Graham (2009) Democratic innovations: designing institutions for citizen 
participation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Social Exclusion Unit (2001) A new commitment to neighbourhood renewal: 
national strategy action plan. London: Cabinet Office. 
Soros, George (2008) ‘The Crisis and what to do about it’, Real-world 
Economics Review, 48:312-318. Available at: 
http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue48/Soros48.pdf (Accessed 
24/01/14). 
Stake, Robert E. (2003) ‘Case studies’. In: Norman K. Denzin & Yvonna S. 
Lincoln (Eds.) Strategies of qualitative inquiry. Sage: Thousand Oaks (2nd 
edtn), pp.134-164. 
Stevens, Daniel & Jeffrey A. Karp (2012) ‘Leadership traits and media influence 
in Britain’, Political Studies, 60(4):787-808. 
Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2002) Globalisation and its discontents. London: Penguin. 
Stoker, Gerry (2006) Why politics matters: making democracy work. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Stoker, Gerry (2010) ‘The rise of political disenchantment’. In: Colin Hay (Ed.) 
New directions in political science: responding to the challenges of an 
interdependent world. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, pp.44-63. 
Streeck, Wolfgang (2012) ‘Citizens as consumers: considerations on the new 
politics of consumption’, New Left Review, 73:27-47. 
Talpin, Julien (2007) Who governs in participatory democracy institutions? A 
comparative study of the decision-making processes in three European 
cases of participatory budgeting’. Paper presented at the CINEFOGO 
conference ‘Citizen Participation in Decision-Making, University of West 
England, 14-15 February 2007. 
Thale, Mary (1989) ‘London debating societies in the 1790s’, The Historical 
Journal, 32(1):57-86. 
Thatcher, Margaret (1988) House of Commons speech: Revolutions of 1688-89 
(Tercentenary), July 7th 1988. Available at: 
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/107286 (Accessed 12/07/13). 
 294 
 
Thompson, E.P. (1963) The making of the English working class. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin (1980 edition). 
Thompson, Gavin (2010) ‘Keeping things in proportion: how can voting systems 
be fairer?’, Significance, 7(3):128-132. 
Thompson, Helen (2010) ‘The character of the state’. In: Colin Hay (Ed.) New 
directions in political science: responding to the challenges of an 
interdependent world. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, pp.130-147. 
Wainwright, Hilary (2003) Reclaim the state: experiments in popular democracy. 
London: Verso. 
Wampler, Brian (2000) A guide to participatory budgeting. Available at 
http://www.internationalbudget.org/resources/library/GPB.pdf (Accessed 
13/03/07). 
Wampler, Brian (2007) Participatory budgeting in Brazil: contestation, 
cooperation and accountability. University Park: Pennsylvania State 
University Press. 
Wampler, Brian (2012) ‘Participatory budgeting: core principles and key 
impacts’, Journal of Public Deliberation [online], 8(2). Available at: 
http://www.publicdeliberation.net/jpd/vol8/iss2/art12 (Accessed: 
25/08/2014). 
Wampler, Brian & Leonardo Avritzer (2004) ‘Participatory publics: civil society 
and new institutions in democratic Brazil’, Comparative Politics, 36(3):291-
312. 
Wampler, Brian & Janette Hartz-Karp (2012) ‘Participatory budgeting: diffusion 
and outcomes across the world’, Journal of Public Deliberation [online], 
8(2). Available at: http://www.publicdeliberation.net/jpd/vol8/iss2/art13/ 
(Accessed 25/08/2014). 
Warren, Mark (2002) ‘Deliberative democracy’. In: April Carter & Geoffrey 
Stokes (Eds.) Democratic theory today: challenges for the twenty-first 
century. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp.173-202. 
Waters, Mark & Jackson, Ruth (2008) Participatory budgeting: values, principles 
and standards. Manchester, Church Action on Poverty. 
Williams, Raymond (1963) Culture and society 1780-1950. Harmondsworth: 
Penguin. 
Wilson, David & Chris Game (2006) Local government in the United Kingdom 
(4th edition). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 295 
 
Wintour, Patrick (2007) ‘Voters to get direct say on local spending’, The 
Guardian [online] Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2007/jul/05/constitution.localgovernme
nt (Accessed 05/07/2007). 
Wolin, Sheldon S. (1996) ‘Fugitive Democracy’. In: Benhabib, Seyla (Ed.) 
Democracy and difference; contesting the boundaries of the political. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp.31-45. 
Wood, Matthew (2015) ‘Politicisation, depoliticisation and anti-politics: towards a 
multilevel research agenda’, Political Studies Review [online] doi: 
10.1111/1478-9302.12074. 
World Social Forum (2002) World Social Forum Charter of Principles. Available 
at: 
http://www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/main.php?id_menu=4&cd_language
=2 (Accessed 23/08/2014). 
Wright, Tony (2003) British politics: a very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Zinn, Howard (1996) A people’s history of the United States: from 1492 to the 
present. Harlow: Longman (2nd edtn). 
 
